informed consent doctrine in California

2024(See id. at p. 245 [casual connection between physician’s failure to obtain informed consent and injury arises “if it is established that had revelation been made consent to treatment would not have been given”].) If Somatics were correct that the physician’s prescribing decision is all that matters, and the patient’s own decision as to whether to undergo the treatment after having learned of the risks is irrelevant, then there would be no need for the informed consent rule.

2021(Cobbs, at pp. 240-241; Arato v. Avedon (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172, 1183 (Arato).) In imposing this duty, the doctrine of informed consent “injects into the established framework of negligence a concern with patient choice that would otherwise be absent.” (Townsend v. Turk (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 278, 284 .) To comply with the duty to obtain a patient’s informed consent, a physician must “disclose to the patient all material information—that is, ‘information which the physician knows or should know would be regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the patient’s position when deciding to acce

2021(Cobbs, at pp. 240-241; Arato v. Avedon (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172, 1183 (Arato).) In imposing this duty, the doctrine of informed consent “injects into the established framework of negligence a concern with patient choice that would otherwise be absent.” (Townsend v. Turk (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 278, 284 .) To comply with the duty to obtain a patient’s informed consent, a physician must “disclose to the patient all material information—that is, ‘information which the physician knows or should know would be regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the patient’s position when deciding to acce

2021(Cobbs, at pp. 240-241; Arato v. Avedon (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172, 1183 (Arato).) In imposing this duty, the doctrine of informed consent “injects into the established framework of negligence a concern with patient choice that would otherwise be absent.” (Townsend v. Turk (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 278, 284 .) To comply with the duty to obtain a patient’s informed consent, a physician must “disclose to the patient all material information—that is, ‘information which the physician knows or should know would be regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the patient’s position when deciding to acce

2001(Id., at p. 244; see also Arato v. Avedon [(1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172, 1190 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 , 858 P.2d 598 ]].) In addition to these ‘minimal’ disclosures, the physician must also reveal to the patient ‘such additional information as a skilled practitioner of good standing would provide under similar circumstances.’ (Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 244-245, and quoted in Arato v. Avedon, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1190 .)” (Spann v. Irwin Memorial Blood Centers (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 644, 656 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ], fns. omitted.) “With respect to . . . alternative treatments, under the doct

2001(Id., at p. 244; see also Arato v. Avedon [(1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172, 1190 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 , 858 P.2d 598 ]].) In addition to these ‘minimal’ disclosures, the physician must also reveal to the patient ‘such additional information as a skilled practitioner of good standing would provide under similar circumstances.’ (Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 244-245, and quoted in Arato v. Avedon, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1190 .)” (Spann v. Irwin Memorial Blood Centers (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 644, 656 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ], fns. omitted.) “With respect to . . . alternative treatments, under the doct

2023Rule 3.7 and the Factors Affecting Disqualification Rule 3.7 provides, “A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness unless: [¶] (1) the lawyer’s testimony relates to an uncontested issue or matter; [¶] (2) the lawyer’s testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or [¶] (3) the lawyer has obtained informed written consent from the client.” (Fn. omitted.) Comment 3 to Rule 3.7, citing Lyle v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 470 , clarifies that the informed-consent exception is not absolute: “Notwithsta

2022Decades before the adoption of Rule 3.7, our Supreme Court commented, in dicta, that in adopting the informed-consent exception in 1979, “the State Bar ha[d] concluded that a fully informed client’s right to chosen counsel outweighs potential conflict or threat to trial integrity posed by counsel’s appearance as witness.” (Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606, 619, fn. 9 (Maxwell), italics omitted, disapproved on another ground by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390 .) More recently, but still before the adoption of Rule 3.7, a federal district court concluded that informed writte

2001(Id., at p. 244; see also Arato v. Avedon [(1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172, 1190 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 , 858 P.2d 598 ]].) In addition to these ‘minimal’ disclosures, the physician must also reveal to the patient ‘such additional information as a skilled practitioner of good standing would provide under similar circumstances.’ (Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 244-245, and quoted in Arato v. Avedon, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1190 .)” (Spann v. Irwin Memorial Blood Centers (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 644, 656 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ], fns. omitted.) “With respect to . . . alternative treatments, under the doct

2001(Id., at p. 244; see also Arato v. Avedon [(1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172, 1190 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 , 858 P.2d 598 ]].) In addition to these ‘minimal’ disclosures, the physician must also reveal to the patient ‘such additional information as a skilled practitioner of good standing would provide under similar circumstances.’ (Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 244-245, and quoted in Arato v. Avedon, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1190 .)” (Spann v. Irwin Memorial Blood Centers (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 644, 656 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 360 ], fns. omitted.) “With respect to . . . alternative treatments, under the doct

2003(Thor v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 725, 735 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 357 , 855 P.2d 375 ].) In the medical context, the law has developed the doctrine of informed consent, which requires a patient’s consent be an informed consent to be effective and imposes a duty on the physician to provide material information about any proposed treatment, such as risks and alternative procedures.

2003(Thor v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 725, 735 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 357 , 855 P.2d 375 ].) In the medical context, the law has developed the doctrine of informed consent, which requires a patient’s consent be an informed consent to be effective and imposes a duty on the physician to provide material information about any proposed treatment, such as risks and alternative procedures.

2026Conduct, 4 rule 3.7(a), fn. omitted.) As Comment 3 to Rule 3.7 notes, the informed- consent exception is not absolute: “Notwithstanding a client’s informed written consent, courts retain discretion to take action, up to and including disqualification of a lawyer who seeks to both testify and serve as an advocate, to protect the trier of fact from being misled or the opposing party from being prejudiced.” (Geringer v. Blue Rider Finance (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 813 , 821-822 (Geringer).) But the “court’s discretion to disqualify a likely advocate-witness notwithstanding client consent—the exceptio

2023Rule 3.7 and the Factors Affecting Disqualification Rule 3.7 provides, “A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness unless: [¶] (1) the lawyer’s testimony relates to an uncontested issue or matter; [¶] (2) the lawyer’s testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or [¶] (3) the lawyer has obtained informed written consent from the client.” (Fn. omitted.) Comment 3 to Rule 3.7, citing Lyle v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 470 , clarifies that the informed-consent exception is not absolute: “Notwithsta

2023Rule 3.7 and the Factors Affecting Disqualification Rule 3.7 provides, “A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness unless: [¶] (1) the lawyer’s testimony relates to an uncontested issue or matter; [¶] (2) the lawyer’s testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or [¶] (3) the lawyer has obtained informed written consent from the client.” (Fn. omitted.) Comment 3 to Rule 3.7, citing Lyle v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 470 , clarifies that the informed-consent exception is not absolute: “Notwithsta

2022Decades before the adoption of Rule 3.7, our Supreme Court commented, in dicta, that in adopting the informed-consent exception in 1979, “the State Bar ha[d] concluded that a fully informed client’s right to chosen counsel outweighs potential conflict or threat to trial integrity posed by counsel’s appearance as witness.” (Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606, 619, fn. 9 (Maxwell), italics omitted, disapproved on another ground by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390 .) More recently, but still before the adoption of Rule 3.7, a federal district court concluded that informed writte

2021(Cobbs, at pp. 243, 245; Spann v. Irwin Memorial Blood Centers (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 644, 656 (Spann) [disclosure turns on what is “material to the patient’s decision, regardless of the custom in the profession”].) When a physician recommends one or more courses of treatment, the information that is “material” (and, hence, that must be disclosed in order to obtain the patient’s informed consent) falls into two categories—namely, (1) “minimal” disclosures that are always material, and (2) “additional” 14 disclosures that might be material if “skilled practitioner[s] of good standing” would “pro

2021(Cobbs, at pp. 240-241; Arato v. Avedon (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172, 1183 (Arato).) In imposing this duty, the doctrine of informed consent “injects into the established framework of negligence a concern with patient choice that would otherwise be absent.” (Townsend v. Turk (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 278, 284 .) To comply with the duty to obtain a patient’s informed consent, a physician must “disclose to the patient all material information—that is, ‘information which the physician knows or should know would be regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the patient’s position when deciding to acce

2023Rule 3.7 and the Factors Affecting Disqualification Rule 3.7 provides, “A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness unless: [¶] (1) the lawyer’s testimony relates to an uncontested issue or matter; [¶] (2) the lawyer’s testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or [¶] (3) the lawyer has obtained informed written consent from the client.” (Fn. omitted.) Comment 3 to Rule 3.7, citing Lyle v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 470 , clarifies that the informed-consent exception is not absolute: “Notwithsta

2023Rule 3.7 and the Factors Affecting Disqualification Rule 3.7 provides, “A lawyer shall not act as an advocate in a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness unless: [¶] (1) the lawyer’s testimony relates to an uncontested issue or matter; [¶] (2) the lawyer’s testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or [¶] (3) the lawyer has obtained informed written consent from the client.” (Fn. omitted.) Comment 3 to Rule 3.7, citing Lyle v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 470 , clarifies that the informed-consent exception is not absolute: “Notwithsta

2022(See Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205-1213 [affirming order disqualifying attorney from representing his son in dispute over custody of his grandson, without discussing whether son had provided informed written consent, in reliance on “[a] plethora of family entanglements, potential misuse of confidential information, a conflict posed by the near-certain prospect that counsel will have to testify, and the preservation of the integrity of the judicial system”]; People v. Donaldson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 916, 929-932 [reversing criminal judgment, where defense counsel was ine

2022(See Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205-1213 [affirming order disqualifying attorney from representing his son in dispute over custody of his grandson, without discussing whether son had provided informed written consent, in reliance on “[a] plethora of family entanglements, potential misuse of confidential information, a conflict posed by the near-certain prospect that counsel will have to testify, and the preservation of the integrity of the judicial system”]; People v. Donaldson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 916, 929-932 [reversing criminal judgment, where defense counsel was ine

2021(Noe v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 316, 335 [stating that, in reviewing summary adjudication orders, Court of Appeal ordinarily does not consider arguments not raised below].) Accordingly, without suggesting that defendants’ argument has merit, we decline to consider it. 22 As noted in footnote 7, ante, the record does not contain the proposed modified jury instructions that the trial court refused. 31 to permit her to bring her negligent misrepresentation claim to trial, by making clear that she was “unable to present her claim to the jury through the informed consent instruction.”

2021(Cobbs, at pp. 243, 245; Spann v. Irwin Memorial Blood Centers (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 644, 656 (Spann) [disclosure turns on what is “material to the patient’s decision, regardless of the custom in the profession”].) When a physician recommends one or more courses of treatment, the information that is “material” (and, hence, that must be disclosed in order to obtain the patient’s informed consent) falls into two categories—namely, (1) “minimal” disclosures that are always material, and (2) “additional” 14 disclosures that might be material if “skilled practitioner[s] of good standing” would “pro

2013(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [appellate briefs must be supported by record citations]; In re Daniel M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 708 [where party “develops no [coherent] argument” and cites no supporting authority, issue may be treated as waived]; Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115 [court may treat point as waived if no citation provided on it].) These arguments include Shade’s contentions that his constitutional rights were violated, that he is the victim of an intentional tort, that Freedhand breached the doctrine of informed consent, that Freedhan

2013(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [appellate briefs must be supported by record citations]; In re Daniel M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 708 [where party “develops no [coherent] argument” and cites no supporting authority, issue may be treated as waived]; Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115 [court may treat point as waived if no citation provided on it].) These arguments include Shade’s contentions that his constitutional rights were violated, that he is the victim of an intentional tort, that Freedhand breached the doctrine of informed consent, that Freedhan

2005(Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 571 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 , 888 P.2d 1268 ]; Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ].) The doctrine of informed consent was explained as follows in Arato v. Avedon (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172, 1182-1183 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 , 858 P.2d 598 ] (Arato): “The fount of the doctrine of informed consent in California is our decision of some 20 years ago in Cobbs v. Grant [(1972)] 8 Cal.3d 229 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 505 , 502 P.2d 1 ] [(Cobbs)], an opinion by a unanimous court that built on several out-of-state

2005(Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 571 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 , 888 P.2d 1268 ]; Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ].) The doctrine of informed consent was explained as follows in Arato v. Avedon (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172, 1182-1183 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 , 858 P.2d 598 ] (Arato): “The fount of the doctrine of informed consent in California is our decision of some 20 years ago in Cobbs v. Grant [(1972)] 8 Cal.3d 229 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 505 , 502 P.2d 1 ] [(Cobbs)], an opinion by a unanimous court that built on several out-of-state

2005(Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 571 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 , 888 P.2d 1268 ]; Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ].) The doctrine of informed consent was explained as follows in Arato v. Avedon (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172, 1182-1183 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 , 858 P.2d 598 ] (Arato): “The fount of the doctrine of informed consent in California is our decision of some 20 years ago in Cobbs v. Grant [(1972)] 8 Cal.3d 229 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 505 , 502 P.2d 1 ] [(Cobbs)], an opinion by a unanimous court that built on several out-of-state

2005(Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 571 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 , 888 P.2d 1268 ]; Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co. (1935) 3 Cal.2d 427, 429 [ 45 P.2d 183 ].) The doctrine of informed consent was explained as follows in Arato v. Avedon (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1172, 1182-1183 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 131 , 858 P.2d 598 ] (Arato): “The fount of the doctrine of informed consent in California is our decision of some 20 years ago in Cobbs v. Grant [(1972)] 8 Cal.3d 229 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 505 , 502 P.2d 1 ] [(Cobbs)], an opinion by a unanimous court that built on several out-of-state

2004In Traxler v. Varady (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1321, 1326 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 297 ], the plaintiff suffered a hemorrhage two weeks postpartum.

2004In Traxler v. Varady (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1321, 1326 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.2d 297 ], the plaintiff suffered a hemorrhage two weeks postpartum.

2003(See Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239-243 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 505 , 502 P.2d 1 ]; Berkey v. Anderson (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 790, 803 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 67 ].) Under the informed consent doctrine, “ ‘ “the patient must have the capacity to reason and make judgments, the decision must be made voluntarily and without coercion, and the patient must have a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment alternatives or nontreatment, along with a full understanding of the nature of the disease and the prognosis.” ’ ” (Thor, at p. 735.) In Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pages

2003(See Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 239-243 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 505 , 502 P.2d 1 ]; Berkey v. Anderson (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 790, 803 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 67 ].) Under the informed consent doctrine, “ ‘ “the patient must have the capacity to reason and make judgments, the decision must be made voluntarily and without coercion, and the patient must have a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment alternatives or nontreatment, along with a full understanding of the nature of the disease and the prognosis.” ’ ” (Thor, at p. 735.) In Cobbs v. Grant, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pages