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20 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crundwell v. Beckergreen2 sentences2015ON PATTERN JURY CHARGES, STATE BAR OF TEX., TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES—MALPRACTICE, PREMISES & PRODUCTS PJC 51.15, cmt. (1997) (“If the physician has obtained the patient’s signature on a consent form ... containing the risks enumerated on list A, the only means by which the patient may recover for failure to obtain informed consent is to prove the invalidity of the form and that the risks had not otherwise been disclosed to him.”); see also Crundwell v. Becker, 981 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (holding that the trial court’s directed verdict on an informed cons 2015ON PATTERN JURY CHARGES, STATE BAR OF TEX., TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES—MALPRACTICE, PREMISES & PRODUCTS PJC 51.15, cmt. (1997) (“If the physician has obtained the patient’s signature on a consent form ... containing the risks enumerated on list A, the only means by which the patient may recover for failure to obtain informed consent is to prove the invalidity of the form and that the risks had not otherwise been disclosed to him.”); see also Crundwell v. Becker, 981 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (holding that the trial court’s directed verdict on an informed cons | 3 | 3 |
Binur v. Jacobogreen2 sentences2008Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d 646, 655 (Tex. 2004). “[I]f a physician recommends an unnecessary surgery, there may be liability for negligence in making an erroneous diagnosis or prognosis, but there can be no claim for lack of informed consent.” Id. 2008Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d 646, 655 (Tex. 2004). “[I]f a physician recommends an unnecessary surgery, there may be liability for negligence in making an erroneous diagnosis or prognosis, but there can be no claim for lack of informed consent.” Id. | 3 | 3 |
Johnson v. Whitehurstgreen2 sentences2008See Theroux v. Vick, 163 S.W.3d 111, 114 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied) (patient’s claims that doctor misrepresented his prior experience and training and misrepresented or failed to disclose the risks of need for more invasive surgery are based on “whether [the doctor] adequately disclosed the risks of the surgical procedure to her”); Baribeau v. Gustafson, 107 S.W.3d 52, 62 (Tex.App.San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (“Bari-beau’s fraudulent misrepresentation about the extent of the procedure he intended to perform essentially prevented [Gustafson] from making an informed choice about 2008See Theroux v. Vick, 163 S.W.3d 111, 114 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied) (patient’s claims that doctor misrepresented his prior experience and training and misrepresented or failed to disclose the risks of need for more invasive surgery are based on “whether [the doctor] adequately disclosed the risks of the surgical procedure to her”); Baribeau v. Gustafson, 107 S.W.3d 52, 62 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (“Baribeau’s fraudulent misrepresentation about the extent of the procedure he intended to perform essentially prevented [Gustafson] from making an informed choice abou | 2 | 2 |
Marks-Brown v. Rogggreen2 sentences2008See Theroux v. Vick, 163 S.W.3d 111, 114 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied) (patient’s claims that doctor misrepresented his prior experience and training and misrepresented or failed to disclose the risks of need for more invasive surgery are based on “whether [the doctor] adequately disclosed the risks of the surgical procedure to her”); Baribeau v. Gustafson, 107 S.W.3d 52, 62 (Tex.App.San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (“Bari-beau’s fraudulent misrepresentation about the extent of the procedure he intended to perform essentially prevented [Gustafson] from making an informed choice about 2008See Theroux v. Vick, 163 S.W.3d 111, 114 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied) (patient’s claims that doctor misrepresented his prior experience and training and misrepresented or failed to disclose the risks of need for more invasive surgery are based on “whether [the doctor] adequately disclosed the risks of the surgical procedure to her”); Baribeau v. Gustafson, 107 S.W.3d 52, 62 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (“Baribeau’s fraudulent misrepresentation about the extent of the procedure he intended to perform essentially prevented [Gustafson] from making an informed choice abou | 2 | 2 |
Baribeau v. Gustafsongreen2 sentences2008See Theroux v. Vick, 163 S.W.3d 111, 114 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied) (patient’s claims that doctor misrepresented his prior experience and training and misrepresented or failed to disclose the risks of need for more invasive surgery are based on “whether [the doctor] adequately disclosed the risks of the surgical procedure to her”); Baribeau v. Gustafson, 107 S.W.3d 52, 62 (Tex.App.San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (“Bari-beau’s fraudulent misrepresentation about the extent of the procedure he intended to perform essentially prevented [Gustafson] from making an informed choice about 2008See Theroux v. Vick, 163 S.W.3d 111, 114 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied) (patient’s claims that doctor misrepresented his prior experience and training and misrepresented or failed to disclose the risks of need for more invasive surgery are based on “whether [the doctor] adequately disclosed the risks of the surgical procedure to her”); Baribeau v. Gustafson, 107 S.W.3d 52, 62 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (“Baribeau’s fraudulent misrepresentation about the extent of the procedure he intended to perform essentially prevented [Gustafson] from making an informed choice abou | 2 | 2 |
Theroux v. Vickgreen2 sentences2008See Theroux v. Vick, 163 S.W.3d 111, 114 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. denied) (patient’s claims that doctor misrepresented his prior experience and training and misrepresented or failed to disclose the risks of need for more invasive surgery are based on “whether [the doctor] adequately disclosed the risks of the surgical procedure to her”); Baribeau v. Gustafson, 107 S.W.3d 52, 62 (Tex.App.San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (“Bari-beau’s fraudulent misrepresentation about the extent of the procedure he intended to perform essentially prevented [Gustafson] from making an informed choice about 2008See Theroux v. Vick, 163 S.W.3d 111, 114 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied) (patient’s claims that doctor misrepresented his prior experience and training and misrepresented or failed to disclose the risks of need for more invasive surgery are based on “whether [the doctor] adequately disclosed the risks of the surgical procedure to her”); Baribeau v. Gustafson, 107 S.W.3d 52, 62 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (“Baribeau’s fraudulent misrepresentation about the extent of the procedure he intended to perform essentially prevented [Gustafson] from making an informed choice abou | 2 | 2 |
Roark v. Allengreen2 sentences2015The jury also found that Dr. Allen's failure was the proximate cause of injury to the infant Roark. -2- Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804 (Tex., 1982) Dr. Allen first argues that Special Issue No. 8 is an improper application of the doctrine of informed consent. 1982Dr. McMillin’s liability was also predicated upon the jury’s findings that he failed to explain to appellee the operative procedure or those risks, complications, dangers, or hazards of the Devine patch graft urethro-plasty which would have been explained by a reasonable medical practitioner of the same school and community, and situated under the same or similar circumstances; and that had he done so appellee would not have permitted the operation. 1 This is known as the doctrine of informed consent. *841 Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Tex.1982). | 1 | 2 |
Power v. Kelleygreen1 sentence2024See Power, 70 S.W.3d at 143 (“Because Earl’s claims are for negligence based on the performance of unnecessary surgeries, Earl is not required to meet the causation requirements for an informed consent claim.”). | 1 | 1 |
Schaub v. Sanchezgreen1 sentence2018See Schaub, 229 S.W.3d at 323 . | 1 | 1 |
Wlosinski v. Cohngreen2 sentences2015Indeed, the court cautioned that making evi- dence related to the physician's personal experience relevant whenever a particular patient requests such information is "highly problematic" and "divorced from the fundamental prin- ciple of the informed consent doctrine that information is material to the procedure at hand, Page 8 279 Conn. 682 , *; 905 A.2d 15 , **; 2006 Conn. LEXIS 312 , *** and therefore must be divulged in order to obtain the patient's informed consent, if a rea- sonable person would wish to know it." Id., 136 ; see also Wlosinski v. Cohn, 269 Mich. App. 303, 308 , 713 N.W.2d 2015Indeed, the court cautioned that making evi- dence related to the physician's personal experience relevant whenever a particular patient requests such information is "highly problematic" and "divorced from the fundamental prin- ciple of the informed consent doctrine that information is material to the procedure at hand, Page 8 279 Conn. 682 , *; 905 A.2d 15 , **; 2006 Conn. LEXIS 312 , *** and therefore must be divulged in order to obtain the patient's informed consent, if a rea- sonable person would wish to know it." Id., 136 ; see also Wlosinski v. Cohn, 269 Mich. App. 303, 308 , 713 N.W.2d | 1 | 1 |
Vaughan v. Nielsongreen1 sentence2015See Vaughan v. Nielson, 274 S.W.3d 732, 734-41 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.). | 1 | 1 |
Duttry v. Pattersongreen2 sentences2015Id. at 1258. 2015Id. at 1259. | 1 | 1 |
Whiteside v. Luksongreen2 sentences2015Indeed, the court cautioned that making evi- dence related to the physician's personal experience relevant whenever a particular patient requests such information is "highly problematic" and "divorced from the fundamental prin- ciple of the informed consent doctrine that information is material to the procedure at hand, Page 8 279 Conn. 682 , *; 905 A.2d 15 , **; 2006 Conn. LEXIS 312 , *** and therefore must be divulged in order to obtain the patient's informed consent, if a rea- sonable person would wish to know it." Id., 136 ; see also Wlosinski v. Cohn, 269 Mich. App. 303, 308 , 713 N.W.2d 2015As one court explained in rejecting an informed consent claim based on a surgeon's failure to disclose his inexperience with the proposed procedure: "In theory, the physician's own health, financial situation, even medical school grades, could be considered material facts a patient would want to consider in consenting to treatment by that physician." See Whiteside v. Lukson, 89 Wn. | 1 | 1 |
Jerry W. Canterbury v. William Thornton Spence and the Washington Hospital Center, a Body Corporategreen2 sentences2015Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 172-73 ; Platta, 68 Wis. 2d at 60 ; see also Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788 . 2015Finally, the Canterbury court's decision--which, as the Martin court underscored last term, provides the basis for Wisconsin's doctrine of informed consent, Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 173 --states explicitly that under the doctrine of informed consent, "there is no bright line separating the significant from the insignificant." Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788 . | 1 | 1 |
Howard v. University of Medicine & Dentistrygreen2 sentences2015See Page 14 172 N.J. 537 , *; 800 A.2d 73 , **; 2002 N.J. 2015See Page 14 172 N.J. 537 , *; 800 A.2d 73 , **; 2002 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Felton v. Lovettgreen1 sentence2014See Barclay, 704 S.W.2d at 9-10 (explaining that claimant “must introduce evidence to show the risk is inherent to the medical procedure undertaken” to support an informed-consent claim); see also Felton, 388 S.W.3d at 663 (“Whether [a health care provider] was negligent in his treatment . . . is a distinct legal question from whether [he] was negligent in failing to disclose the risks of treatment . . . .”). 11 who “diagnosed a left lingual nerve injury with profound numbness in the left tongue extending to the midline.” In short, Bates’s amended report unambiguously explained the basis of hi | 1 | 1 |
| Barclay v. Campbellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rubalcaba v. Kaestnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mills v. Pategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Janie Sanchez and Kenneth Adams, Spouse v. Lowry Schaub, M.D., and Kevin Crawford, M.D.green | 1 | 1 |
| McMillin v. L.D.L.R.green | 1 | 1 |
| McKinley v. Striplinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Perkins v. Crittendengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schloendorff v. Society of the New York Hospitalred | 1 | 1 |
| Mrs. Clara H. Hall v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Scott v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mayor v. Dowsettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hall v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Greene v. Thiet
green
2 sentences2008For an informed consent claim, the defendant has the burden to negate one or more of the elements of the plaintiffs claim, which are “(1) a duty of the physician to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a failure to conform to the required standard; (3) resulting injury; and (4) a causal connection between the [physician’s] conduct and the injury.” Greene, 846 S.W.2d at 29 . 2008For an informed consent claim, the defendant has the burden to negate one or more of the elements of the plaintiff’s claim, which are “(1) a duty of the physician to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a failure to conform to the required standard; (3) resulting injury; and (4) a causal connection between the [physician’s] conduct and the injury.” Greene, 846 S.W.2d at 29 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Baylor College of Medicine v. Pokluda
green
1 sentence2018Thus, we need not address Dr. Arani’s remaining arguments, which are premised on an application of the informed-consent standard.8 See id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Quinones v. Pin Ex Rel. Pin
green
1 sentence2018Quinones, 298 S.W.3d at 814 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lambert v. Stovell
green
2 sentences2015"Traditionally, a physician's duty to disclose information was measured by a 'professional' standard [***15] which was set by the medical profession in terms of customary medical practice in the community. . . . [However, in] Logan v. Green- wich Hospital Assn., supra, [191 Conn.] 292-93, we adopted a 'lay' standard and stated that under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician is obligated 'to provide the patient with that information which a reasonable patient would have found material for making a decision whether to embark upon a contemplated course of therapy.'" (Citation [*692] omit 2015"Traditionally, a physician's duty to disclose information was measured by a 'professional' standard [***15] which was set by the medical profession in terms of customary medical practice in the community. . . . [However, in] Logan v. Green- wich Hospital Assn., supra, [191 Conn.] 292-93, we adopted a 'lay' standard and stated that under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician is obligated 'to provide the patient with that information which a reasonable patient would have found material for making a decision whether to embark upon a contemplated course of therapy.'" (Citation [*692] omit | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Martin Ex Rel. Scoptur v. Richards
green
2 sentences2015The 21 Martin court, explicitly recognizing that the statutory doctrine of informed consent in Wis- consin is "based upon the standard expounded in Canterbury," Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 173 , explained that a patient cannot make an informed decision to consent to the suggested treatment "unless the physician discloses what is material to the patient's decision, i.e., all of the viable alternatives and risks of the treatment proposed." Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 174 . 21 For a discussion of informed consent from the legal and medical perspectives, see also Paul S. Applebaum, Charles W. 2015The 21 Martin court, explicitly recognizing that the statutory doctrine of informed consent in Wis- consin is "based upon the standard expounded in Canterbury," Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 173 , explained that a patient cannot make an informed decision to consent to the suggested treatment "unless the physician discloses what is material to the patient's decision, i.e., all of the viable alternatives and risks of the treatment proposed." Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 174 . 21 For a discussion of informed consent from the legal and medical perspectives, see also Paul S. Applebaum, Charles W. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Willis v. Bender
green
2 sentences2015Page 7 596 F.3d 1244 , *; 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4531 , ** Therefore, it held an informed consent claim based on a physician lying to a patient in re- sponse to direct questions is only actionable where the information allegedly misrepresented would otherwise fall under the scope of required disclosure, i.e., the specific risks associated with a medical treatment or procedure. 2015Page 7 596 F.3d 1244 , *; 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4531 , ** Therefore, it held an informed consent claim based on a physician lying to a patient in re- sponse to direct questions is only actionable where the information allegedly misrepresented would otherwise fall under the scope of required disclosure, i.e., the specific risks associated with a medical treatment or procedure. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Trogun v. Fruchtman
green
1 sentence2015The court further developed the doctrine of informed consent in Trogun v. [**501] Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 596 , 207 N.W.2d 297 (1972), stating for the first time that a plain- tiff-patient could bring [***16] an informed consent action based on negligence rather than as an intentional tort. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
DeGennaro v. Tandon
green
2 sentences2015We agree that these cases are distinguishable from the present case. [***21] The present case is also distinguishable from the Appellate Court's decision in DeGennaro v. Tandon, 89 Conn. App. 183 , 873 A.2d 191 (2005). 2015We agree that these cases are distinguishable from the present case. [***21] The present case is also distinguishable from the Appellate Court's decision in DeGennaro v. Tandon, 89 Conn. App. 183 , 873 A.2d 191 (2005). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Platta v. Flatley
neutral
1 sentence2015Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 172-73 ; Platta, 68 Wis. 2d at 60 ; see also Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 788 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Duffy v. Flagg
green
2 sentences2015Thank you, Your Honor." Accordingly, the issue properly was preserved for appeal. [***7] The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had granted the defendants' motion in limine to preclude evidence regarding Flagg's prior experience with vaginal birth after cesarean sec- tion, which the plaintiff claimed was relevant to informed consent. [**18] The Appellate 6 Page 4 279 Conn. 682 , *; 905 A.2d 15 , **; 2006 Conn. LEXIS 312 , *** Court reversed the judgment of the trial court with regard to the informed consent c 2015Thank you, Your Honor." Accordingly, the issue properly was preserved for appeal. [***7] The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, claiming that the trial court improperly had granted the defendants' motion in limine to preclude evidence regarding Flagg's prior experience with vaginal birth after cesarean sec- tion, which the plaintiff claimed was relevant to informed consent. [**18] The Appellate 6 Page 4 279 Conn. 682 , *; 905 A.2d 15 , **; 2006 Conn. LEXIS 312 , *** Court reversed the judgment of the trial court with regard to the informed consent c | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Johnson Ex Rel. Adler v. Kokemoor
green
2 sentences2015"There can be no dispute," the [*641] Martin court declared, "that the 30 language in Scaria . . . requires that a physician disclose information necessary for a rea- sonable person to make an intelligent decision." Id. 30 Ruling before the publication of Martin on the admissibility of evidence pertaining to the defendant's experience, the circuit court made a similar point: I've also looked at the informed consent instruction, 1023.2, and it says that the doctor or physician is under a duty to make such disclosures that Page 15 199 Wis. 2d 615 , *; 545 N.W.2d 495 , **; 1996 Wisc. 2015"There can be no dispute," the [*641] Martin court declared, "that the 30 language in Scaria . . . requires that a physician disclose information necessary for a rea- sonable person to make an intelligent decision." Id. 30 Ruling before the publication of Martin on the admissibility of evidence pertaining to the defendant's experience, the circuit court made a similar point: I've also looked at the informed consent instruction, 1023.2, and it says that the doctor or physician is under a duty to make such disclosures that Page 15 199 Wis. 2d 615 , *; 545 N.W.2d 495 , **; 1996 Wisc. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Roybal v. Bell
green
1 sentence2015In Wyoming, with respect to the proximate cause element, the plaintiff must offer "proof that proper disclosure would have resulted in a decision against the proposed [*1261] treatment or procedure." [**45] 11 Roybal, 778 P.2d at 112 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital
green
2 sentences2015"The informed consent doctrine derives from the principle that [e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital, 278 Conn. 163, 180 , 896 A.2d 777 (2006). 2015"The informed consent doctrine derives from the principle that [e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sherwood v. Danbury Hospital, 278 Conn. 163, 180 , 896 A.2d 777 (2006). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Torres v. Carrese
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 273-77 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Sullivan v. Bickel & Brewer green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Rea v. Gaulke green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.