15 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Culbertson v. Mernitzgreen2 sentences2019“The evidence of an expert witness is to be received by the Court or jury trying the cause under the same rules and in the same manner that evidence of other witnesses is received and must be weighed by the trier of facts, the same as other evidence is weighed; the trier of facts is not bound by an expert’s opinion.” Ferdinand Furniture Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 399 N.E.2d 799, 807 (Ind. Ct. App 1980). [24] This Court recently held: Twenty-five years ago, our supreme court decided Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. 1992). 2019For this proposition, the court cited a part of the Culbertson opinion that was discussing cases from other jurisdictions that had adopted the view that “a jury is in the best position to determine whether the physician gave the patient the information needed by the patient to weigh the alternatives and make the ultimate decision of whether to proceed with the proposed treatment.” Culbertson, 602 N.E.2d at 100 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 505 , 502 P.2d 1 (1972)). | 2 | 6 |
Matter of Lawrancegreen2 sentences2019The lengthy dissent began by citing a decision by that court in the previous year in Matter of Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ind. 1991). 2017The majority did not explicitly adopt a set of elements needed to prove an informed consent claim/ The lengthy dissent began by citing a decision by that court in the previous year in Matter of Lawrance, 579 N.E.2d 32, 39 (Ind. 1991). | 2 | 2 |
Ferdinand Furn. Co., Inc. v. Andersongreen1 sentence2019“The evidence of an expert witness is to be received by the Court or jury trying the cause under the same rules and in the same manner that evidence of other witnesses is received and must be weighed by the trier of facts, the same as other evidence is weighed; the trier of facts is not bound by an expert’s opinion.” Ferdinand Furniture Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 399 N.E.2d 799, 807 (Ind. Ct. App 1980). [24] This Court recently held: Twenty-five years ago, our supreme court decided Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. 1992). | 1 | 1 |
City of Alexandria v. Allengreen1 sentence2019The Indiana Trial Lawyers Association filed an amicus brief and argues that requiring expert testimony to show that a reasonable Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-2486 | October 10, 2019 Page 17 of 27 person, if properly informed, would have rejected the proposed treatment runs afoul of public policy, is counter to the “most important and central goal of the informed consent doctrine[,] protect[ing] a patient’s personal autmonomy,” and “is essentially to say that people can control their bodies only to the extent that they are reasonable in the estimate of physicians.” Amicus Brief | 1 | 1 |
Spar v. Chagreen1 sentence2018See Spar v. Cha , 907 N.E.2d 974 , 979-80 (Ind. 2009) (a successful informed consent claim requires proof of nondisclosure of required information, actual damage resulting from the risks of which the patient was not informed, that the patient would have rejected the medical treatment had he known the risk, and that reasonable persons if properly informed would have rejected the proposed treatment); see also Miller v. State , 716 N.E.2d 367 , 370 (Ind. 1999) (holding that to preserve an error in a ruling on a motion in limine for appellate review, a party must do more than challenge the ruling | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See Spar v. Cha , 907 N.E.2d 974 , 979-80 (Ind. 2009) (a successful informed consent claim requires proof of nondisclosure of required information, actual damage resulting from the risks of which the patient was not informed, that the patient would have rejected the medical treatment had he known the risk, and that reasonable persons if properly informed would have rejected the proposed treatment); see also Miller v. State , 716 N.E.2d 367 , 370 (Ind. 1999) (holding that to preserve an error in a ruling on a motion in limine for appellate review, a party must do more than challenge the ruling | 1 | 1 |
Hamilton v. Ashtongreen1 sentence2015Hamilton v. Ashton, 846 N.E.2d 309, 317 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), clarified on reh’g, 850 N.E.2d 466 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Bunch v. Tiwarigreen1 sentence2014Bunch v. Tiwari, 711 N.E.2d 844, 850 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Oelling v. Raogreen1 sentence1999Oelling v. Rao, 593 N.E.2d 189, 190 (Ind.1992). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Weinberg v. Bess
green
2 sentences2019In Weinberg v. Bess, 717 N.E.2d 584 , 588 n.5 (Ind. 1999), the court stated, “Under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician must disclose the facts and risks of a treatment which a reasonably prudent physician would be expected to disclose under like circumstances, and which a reasonable person would want to know.” (Emphasis added). 2017In Weinberg v. Bess, 717 N.E.2d 584 , 588 n.5 (Ind. 1999), the court stated, “Under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician must disclose the facts and risks of a treatment which a reasonably prudent physician would be expected to disclose under like circumstances, and which a reasonable person would want to know.” (Emphasis added). | 4 | 2004–2019 |
Cobbs v. Grant
green
2 sentences2019For this proposition, the court cited a part of the Culbertson opinion that was discussing cases from other jurisdictions that had adopted the view that “a jury is in the best position to determine whether the physician gave the patient the information needed by the patient to weigh the alternatives and make the ultimate decision of whether to proceed with the proposed treatment.” Culbertson, 602 N.E.2d at 100 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 505 , 502 P.2d 1 (1972)). 2019For this proposition, the court cited a part of the Culbertson opinion that was discussing cases from other jurisdictions that had adopted the view that “a jury is in the best position to determine whether the physician gave the patient the information needed by the patient to weigh the alternatives and make the ultimate decision of whether to proceed with the proposed treatment.” Culbertson, 602 N.E.2d at 100 (citing Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 505 , 502 P.2d 1 (1972)). | 2 | 2017–2019 |
Ellis v. Smith
green
2 sentences1999Id. (citing Ellis v. Smith, 528 N.E.2d 826 (Ind.Ct.App.1988)). 1991Ellis v. Smith (1988), Ind.App., 528 N.E.2d 826 . | 2 | 1991–1999 |
Magazine v. Shull
green
1 sentence2019The Indiana Trial Lawyers Association filed an amicus brief and argues that requiring expert testimony to show that a reasonable Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CT-2486 | October 10, 2019 Page 17 of 27 person, if properly informed, would have rejected the proposed treatment runs afoul of public policy, is counter to the “most important and central goal of the informed consent doctrine[,] protect[ing] a patient’s personal autmonomy,” and “is essentially to say that people can control their bodies only to the extent that they are reasonable in the estimate of physicians.” Amicus Brief | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Hamilton v. Ashton
green
1 sentence2015Hamilton v. Ashton, 846 N.E.2d 309, 317 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), clarified on reh’g, 850 N.E.2d 466 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Revord Ex Rel. Revord v. Russell
green
1 sentence1999Id. (citing Ellis v. Smith, 528 N.E.2d 826 (Ind.Ct.App.1988)). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Culbertson v. Mernitz
green
1 sentence1993Culbertson v. Mernitz (1992), Ind.App., 591 N.E.2d 1040, 1042-1043 .” McGee v. Bonaventura (filed October 22, 1992), Ind. App. No. 56A05-9205-CV-151, at p. 7, 602 N.E.2d 1083 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Searcy v. Manganhas
green
2 sentences1992This view was continued in Searcy v. Manganhas (1981), Ind.App., 415 N.E.2d 142 . 1992This view was continued in Searcy v. Manganhas (1981), Ind. App., 415 N.E.2d 142 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Joy v. Chau
green
2 sentences1992Joy v. Chau (1978), 177 Ind.App. 29 , 377 N.E.2d 670 . 1992Joy v. Chau (1978), 177 Ind.App. 29 , 377 N.E.2d 670 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Johnson v. Padilla
green
1 sentence1991The trial court found authority for its order in Johnson v. Padilla (1982), Ind. App., 433 N.E.2d 393 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) v. United States of America, United Scottish Insurance Company v. United States
green
2 sentences1986In a different context, involving a criminal pre-trial detainee, but appropriate to the circumstances of a patient who has not been declared incompetent, the court in Bee v. Greaves (1984) 10th Cir., 744 F.2d 1387, 1392 , cert. denied 469 U.S. 1214 , 105 S.Ct. 1187 , 84 L.Ed.2d 334 (1985), observed: "The principle which supports the doctrine of informed consent is that only the patient has the right to weigh the risks attending the particular treatment and decide for himself what course of action is best suited for him. 'The very foundation of the doctrine of [informed consent] is every man's 1986In a different context, involving a criminal pre-trial detainee, but appropriate to the circumstances of a patient who has not been declared incompetent, the court in Bee v. Greaves (1984) 10th Cir., 744 F.2d 1387 , 1392, cert. denied 469 U.S. 1214 , 105 S.Ct. 1187 , 84 L.Ed.2d 334 (1985), observed: "The principle which supports the doctrine of informed consent is that only the patient has the right to weigh the risks attending the particular treatment and decide for himself what course of action is best suited for him. `The very foundation of the doctrine of [informed consent] is every man's | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Greaves v. Bee
green
2 sentences1986In a different context, involving a criminal pre-trial detainee, but appropriate to the circumstances of a patient who has not been declared incompetent, the court in Bee v. Greaves (1984) 10th Cir., 744 F.2d 1387, 1392 , cert. denied 469 U.S. 1214 , 105 S.Ct. 1187 , 84 L.Ed.2d 334 (1985), observed: "The principle which supports the doctrine of informed consent is that only the patient has the right to weigh the risks attending the particular treatment and decide for himself what course of action is best suited for him. 'The very foundation of the doctrine of [informed consent] is every man's 1986In a different context, involving a criminal pre-trial detainee, but appropriate to the circumstances of a patient who has not been declared incompetent, the court in Bee v. Greaves (1984) 10th Cir., 744 F.2d 1387 , 1392, cert. denied 469 U.S. 1214 , 105 S.Ct. 1187 , 84 L.Ed.2d 334 (1985), observed: "The principle which supports the doctrine of informed consent is that only the patient has the right to weigh the risks attending the particular treatment and decide for himself what course of action is best suited for him. `The very foundation of the doctrine of [informed consent] is every man's | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Eschweiler v. United States
green
2 sentences1986In a different context, involving a criminal pre-trial detainee, but appropriate to the circumstances of a patient who has not been declared incompetent, the court in Bee v. Greaves (1984) 10th Cir., 744 F.2d 1387, 1392 , cert. denied 469 U.S. 1214 , 105 S.Ct. 1187 , 84 L.Ed.2d 334 (1985), observed: "The principle which supports the doctrine of informed consent is that only the patient has the right to weigh the risks attending the particular treatment and decide for himself what course of action is best suited for him. 'The very foundation of the doctrine of [informed consent] is every man's 1986In a different context, involving a criminal pre-trial detainee, but appropriate to the circumstances of a patient who has not been declared incompetent, the court in Bee v. Greaves (1984) 10th Cir., 744 F.2d 1387 , 1392, cert. denied 469 U.S. 1214 , 105 S.Ct. 1187 , 84 L.Ed.2d 334 (1985), observed: "The principle which supports the doctrine of informed consent is that only the patient has the right to weigh the risks attending the particular treatment and decide for himself what course of action is best suited for him. `The very foundation of the doctrine of [informed consent] is every man's | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Nichols v. United States
green
2 sentences1986In a different context, involving a criminal pre-trial detainee, but appropriate to the circumstances of a patient who has not been declared incompetent, the court in Bee v. Greaves (1984) 10th Cir., 744 F.2d 1387, 1392 , cert. denied 469 U.S. 1214 , 105 S.Ct. 1187 , 84 L.Ed.2d 334 (1985), observed: "The principle which supports the doctrine of informed consent is that only the patient has the right to weigh the risks attending the particular treatment and decide for himself what course of action is best suited for him. 'The very foundation of the doctrine of [informed consent] is every man's 1986In a different context, involving a criminal pre-trial detainee, but appropriate to the circumstances of a patient who has not been declared incompetent, the court in Bee v. Greaves (1984) 10th Cir., 744 F.2d 1387 , 1392, cert. denied 469 U.S. 1214 , 105 S.Ct. 1187 , 84 L.Ed.2d 334 (1985), observed: "The principle which supports the doctrine of informed consent is that only the patient has the right to weigh the risks attending the particular treatment and decide for himself what course of action is best suited for him. `The very foundation of the doctrine of [informed consent] is every man's | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Medina
green
2 sentences1986Individual freedom here is guaranteed only if people are given the right to make choices which would generally be regarded as foolish.'" In People v. Medina (1985) Colo., 705 P.2d 961 , the en bane Colorado Supreme Court made no distinction between competent and incompetent mental patients but clearly and unmistakeably set forth a strong statement in protection of the rights of the mentally ill. 1986Individual freedom here is guaranteed only if people are given the right to make choices which would generally be regarded as foolish.'" In People v. Medina (1985) Colo., 705 P.2d 961 , the en banc Colorado Supreme Court made no distinction between competent and incompetent mental patients but clearly and unmistakeably set forth a strong statement in protection of the rights *226 of the mentally ill. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.