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9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1988–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crain v. Allisongreen2 sentences2026Cir. 1972) (explaining that the foundation for an informed consent claim is the understanding that “it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie”); see also Crain, 443 A.2d at 562 (agreeing with the “decision and . . . rationale” of Canterbury). 14 We have alternately framed this test as requiring proof that (1) “there was an undisclosed risk that was material,” (2) “the risk materialized, injuring [the] plaintiff,” and (3) “[the] plaintiff would not have consented to the procedure if she had been informed of 1997Thus, he argues, expert testimony was not necessary to establish breach because “if the jurors were to determine that Dr. Ammerman had ‘overstated the risk in his conversation with Mr. Cleary,’ then in light of the expert testimony presented at trial, they would have been able to determine whether that overstatement was a deviation from the standard of care.” He further maintains that, under the informed consent doctrine, expert testimony is not required to establish a breach of the standard of care because the issue is “whether a reasonable person in what the physician knows or should know to | 4 | 4 |
Schloendorff v. Society of the New York Hospitalred2 sentences1990See Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 561-562 (D.C.1982); Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 263 , 271, 464 F.2d 772, 780 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 , 93 S.Ct. 560 , 34 L.Ed.2d 518 (1972); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 127 , 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). 1990See Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 561-562 (D.C.1982); Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 263 , 271, 464 F.2d 772, 780 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 , 93 S.Ct. 560 , 34 L.Ed.2d 518 (1972); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 127 , 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). | 2 | 2 |
Miller-McGee v. Washington Hospital Centergreen1 sentence2026Cir. 1972) (explaining that the foundation for an informed consent claim is the understanding that “it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie”); see also Crain, 443 A.2d at 562 (agreeing with the “decision and . . . rationale” of Canterbury). 14 We have alternately framed this test as requiring proof that (1) “there was an undisclosed risk that was material,” (2) “the risk materialized, injuring [the] plaintiff,” and (3) “[the] plaintiff would not have consented to the procedure if she had been informed of | 1 | 1 |
Reed v. Campagnologreen1 sentence2026App. 636 , 665 (2024) (recognizing that the informed consent doctrine applies “only in the context of some treatment proposed by the health care provider” (emphasis in original) (quoting Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 241 (1993))). | 1 | 1 |
Wagner v. Georgetown University Medical Centergreen2 sentences2015However, an amendment that changes the legal theory may relate back if “the factual situation upon which the action depends remains the same and has been brought to the defendant’s attention by the original pleading.” Wagner, supra, 768 A.2d at 556 (emphasis added) (citing 6A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1497 (2d ed.1990)). 12 In Wagner, this court held that an informed consent claim in an amended complaint related back to the original complaint’s allegations of negligence in the performance of surgery, even though the “amendment change[d] the legal theory on wh 2015However, an amendment that changes the legal theory may relate back if “the factual situation upon which the action depends remains the same and has been brought to the defendant’s attention by the original pleading.” Wagner, supra, 768 A.2d at 556 (emphasis added) (citing 6A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1497 (2d ed.1990)). 12 In Wagner, this court held that an informed consent claim in an amended complaint related back to the original complaint’s allegations of negligence in the performance of surgery, even though the “amendment change[d] the legal theory on wh | 1 | 1 |
Wilkinson v. Veseygreen2 sentences2001For these reasons, we do not think it fatal to relation back that, as Dr. Kobrine and Georgetown argue, “informed consent claims concern a duty of the physician ‘which is completely separate and distinct from his responsibility to skillfully diagnose and treat the patient’s ills.’ ” Cleary v. Group Health Ass’n, 691 A.2d 148, 155 (D.C.1997) (quoting Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606 , 295 A.2d 676, 685 (1972)). 15 Nor can Dr. Kobrine and Georgetown legitimately claim surprise because the informed consent claim focuses on events occurring prior to rather than during the surgery itself. 2001For these reasons, we do not think it fatal to relation back that, as Dr. Kobrine and Georgetown argue, “informed consent claims concern a duty of the physician ‘which is completely separate and distinct from his responsibility to skillfully diagnose and treat the patient’s ills.’ ” Cleary v. Group Health Ass’n, 691 A.2d 148, 155 (D.C.1997) (quoting Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606 , 295 A.2d 676, 685 (1972)). 15 Nor can Dr. Kobrine and Georgetown legitimately claim surprise because the informed consent claim focuses on events occurring prior to rather than during the surgery itself. | 1 | 1 |
Keenan v. Yale New Haven Hospitalgreen2 sentences2001Accord, Bigay v. Garvey, 575 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Minn.1998); Keenan v. Yale New Haven Hospital, 167 Conn. 284 , 355 A.2d 253, 254 (1974). 10 In contrast, the court in Neeriemer v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 13 Ariz.App. 460 , 477 P.2d 746 (1970), held that an informed consent claim would relate back under the Arizona counterpart of Rule 15(c)(2) to a claim of negligence in the performance of surgery. 2001Accord, Bigay v. Garvey, 575 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Minn.1998); Keenan v. Yale New Haven Hospital, 167 Conn. 284 , 355 A.2d 253, 254 (1974). 10 In contrast, the court in Neeriemer v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 13 Ariz.App. 460 , 477 P.2d 746 (1970), held that an informed consent claim would relate back under the Arizona counterpart of Rule 15(c)(2) to a claim of negligence in the performance of surgery. | 1 | 1 |
Bigay v. Garveygreen1 sentence2001Accord, Bigay v. Garvey, 575 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Minn.1998); Keenan v. Yale New Haven Hospital, 167 Conn. 284 , 355 A.2d 253, 254 (1974). 10 In contrast, the court in Neeriemer v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 13 Ariz.App. 460 , 477 P.2d 746 (1970), held that an informed consent claim would relate back under the Arizona counterpart of Rule 15(c)(2) to a claim of negligence in the performance of surgery. | 1 | 1 |
Cleary v. Group Health Associationgreen1 sentence2001For these reasons, we do not think it fatal to relation back that, as Dr. Kobrine and Georgetown argue, “informed consent claims concern a duty of the physician ‘which is completely separate and distinct from his responsibility to skillfully diagnose and treat the patient’s ills.’ ” Cleary v. Group Health Ass’n, 691 A.2d 148, 155 (D.C.1997) (quoting Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606 , 295 A.2d 676, 685 (1972)). 15 Nor can Dr. Kobrine and Georgetown legitimately claim surprise because the informed consent claim focuses on events occurring prior to rather than during the surgery itself. | 1 | 1 |
Bardoff v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2001See Bardoff v. United States, 628 A.2d 86 , 90 n. 8 (D.C.1993) (questions raised but not argued in briefing are treated as abandoned) (citing Cratty v. United States, 82 U.S.App. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Boydgreen1 sentence1988See id. at 748 n. 8. 3 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jerry W. Canterbury v. William Thornton Spence and the Washington Hospital Center, a Body Corporate
green
2 sentences1990See Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 561-562 (D.C.1982); Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 263 , 271, 464 F.2d 772, 780 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 , 93 S.Ct. 560 , 34 L.Ed.2d 518 (1972); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 127 , 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). 1990To protect the right of every person to bodily integrity, courts uniformly hold that a surgeon who performs an operation without the patient’s consent may be guilty of a battery, Canterbury v. Spence, supra, 150 U.S.App.D.C. at 274 , 464 F.2d at 783 , or that if the surgeon obtains an insufficiently informed consent, he or she may be liable for negligence. | 2 | 1990–1990 |
In re Engler
green
2 sentences1990See Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 561-562 (D.C.1982); Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 263 , 271, 464 F.2d 772, 780 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 , 93 S.Ct. 560 , 34 L.Ed.2d 518 (1972); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 127 , 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). 1990See Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 561-562 (D.C.1982); Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 263 , 271, 464 F.2d 772, 780 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 , 93 S.Ct. 560 , 34 L.Ed.2d 518 (1972); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 127 , 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). | 2 | 1990–1990 |
Spence v. Canterbury
green
2 sentences1990See Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 561-562 (D.C.1982); Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 263 , 271, 464 F.2d 772, 780 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 , 93 S.Ct. 560 , 34 L.Ed.2d 518 (1972); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 127 , 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). 1990See Crain v. Allison, 443 A.2d 558, 561-562 (D.C.1982); Canterbury v. Spence, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 263 , 271, 464 F.2d 772, 780 , cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 , 93 S.Ct. 560 , 34 L.Ed.2d 518 (1972); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 127 , 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). | 2 | 1990–1990 |
In Re AC
green
1 sentence2007Thus, we escape a variant of the weighty issue that we faced in In re A.C.: the question of "who should decide how [a] child should be delivered." In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 , 1245 n. 9 (D.C. 1990) (en banc). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Strother v. District of Columbia
green
1 sentence2001This court has said that because Rule 15(c) is " 'an adoption without modification of the corresponding federal rule,' ” it is to be " 'given the same meaning.’ " Arrington v. District of Columbia, 673 A.2d 674 , 680 n. 6 (D.C.1996) (quoting Strother v. District of Columbia, 372 A.2d 1291 , 1297 n. 15 (D.C.1977)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Neeriemer v. Superior Court of Maricopa County
green
2 sentences2001Accord, Bigay v. Garvey, 575 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Minn.1998); Keenan v. Yale New Haven Hospital, 167 Conn. 284 , 355 A.2d 253, 254 (1974). 10 In contrast, the court in Neeriemer v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 13 Ariz.App. 460 , 477 P.2d 746 (1970), held that an informed consent claim would relate back under the Arizona counterpart of Rule 15(c)(2) to a claim of negligence in the performance of surgery. 2001Accord, Bigay v. Garvey, 575 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Minn.1998); Keenan v. Yale New Haven Hospital, 167 Conn. 284 , 355 A.2d 253, 254 (1974). 10 In contrast, the court in Neeriemer v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 13 Ariz.App. 460 , 477 P.2d 746 (1970), held that an informed consent claim would relate back under the Arizona counterpart of Rule 15(c)(2) to a claim of negligence in the performance of surgery. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Arrington v. District of Columbia
green
1 sentence2001This court has said that because Rule 15(c) is " 'an adoption without modification of the corresponding federal rule,' ” it is to be " 'given the same meaning.’ " Arrington v. District of Columbia, 673 A.2d 674 , 680 n. 6 (D.C.1996) (quoting Strother v. District of Columbia, 372 A.2d 1291 , 1297 n. 15 (D.C.1977)). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Williams v. Baker
green
2 sentences1991Thus, the same lack of a physical injury that rules out application of the informed consent doctrine also precluded Mrs. Jones from recovering under traditional tort principles for appellees’ negligence in failing to ascertain whether she was pregnant before subjecting her to the x-ray and surgical procedures. 7 In Williams, supra, this court held that a plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress, even without an accompanying physical injury, “if the plaintiff was in the zone of physical danger and was caused by defendant’s negligence to fear for his or her ow 1991Thus, the same lack of a physical injury that rules out application of the informed consent doctrine also precluded Mrs. Jones from recovering under traditional tort principles for appellees’ negligence in failing to ascertain whether she was pregnant before subjecting her to the x-ray and surgical procedures. 7 In Williams, supra, this court held that a plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of serious emotional distress, even without an accompanying physical injury, “if the plaintiff was in the zone of physical danger and was caused by defendant’s negligence to fear for his or her ow | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.