informed consent doctrine in South Carolina

2023The court expressed concern that expanding the doctrine of informed consent as requested in the instant case would "open[] a never-ending Pandora's box." Thus, the court found Dr. Davidson had no duty to disclose his alcohol use disorder. 8 7 Hook v. Rothstein, 281 S.C. 541, 547 , 316 S.E.2d 690 , 694–95 (Ct. App. 1984) ("Under the doctrine of informed consent, . . . a physician who performs a diagnostic, therapeutic, or surgical procedure has a duty to disclose to a patient of sound mind, in the absence of an emergency that warrants immediate medical treatment . . . (3) the material risks inv

2023The court expressed concern that expanding the doctrine of informed consent as requested in the instant case would "open[] a never-ending Pandora's box." Thus, the court found Dr. Davidson had no duty to disclose his alcohol use disorder. 8 7 Hook v. Rothstein, 281 S.C. 541, 547 , 316 S.E.2d 690 , 694–95 (Ct. App. 1984) ("Under the doctrine of informed consent, . . . a physician who performs a diagnostic, therapeutic, or surgical procedure has a duty to disclose to a patient of sound mind, in the absence of an emergency that warrants immediate medical treatment . . . (3) the material risks inv

2023See Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255 , 1258–59 (Pa. 2001) (noting the informed consent doctrine required a physician impart information "relative only to the surgery itself" including "the nature of the operation to be performed, the seriousness of it, the organs of the body involved, the disease or incapacity sought to be cured, and the possible results").

2023We find the issue was preserved. herself whether or not to submit to the particular procedure." Hook, 281 S.C. at 557– 58, 316 S.E.2d at 695 ; see also Harvey v. Strickland, 350 S.C. 303, 310 , 566 S.E.2d 529, 533 (2022) ("The right to control the integrity of one's own body spawned the doctrine of informed consent.").

2023We find the issue was preserved. herself whether or not to submit to the particular procedure." Hook, 281 S.C. at 557– 58, 316 S.E.2d at 695 ; see also Harvey v. Strickland, 350 S.C. 303, 310 , 566 S.E.2d 529, 533 (2022) ("The right to control the integrity of one's own body spawned the doctrine of informed consent.").

2010See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (C.A.D.C.1972) (stating the objective test requires the fact-finder to interpret the plaintiffs testimony through the filter of reasonableness in determining the proximate cause issue); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1132 (Me.1980) (agreeing with trial court’s instruction to the jury to employ the objective standard in considering proximate cause); Sard, 379 A.2d at 1026 (stating the plaintiffs testimony is relevant although not determinative and alluding to no expert testimony regarding causation). *469 Assuming expert testimony was not requir

2010Hook, 281 S.C. at 565 , 316 S.E.2d at 705 (quoting Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432 , 379 A.2d 1014, 1025 (1977)).

2010See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (C.A.D.C.1972) (stating the objective test requires the fact-finder to interpret the plaintiffs testimony through the filter of reasonableness in determining the proximate cause issue); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1132 (Me.1980) (agreeing with trial court’s instruction to the jury to employ the objective standard in considering proximate cause); Sard, 379 A.2d at 1026 (stating the plaintiffs testimony is relevant although not determinative and alluding to no expert testimony regarding causation). *469 Assuming expert testimony was not requir

2010See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (C.A.D.C.1972) (stating the objective test requires the fact-finder to interpret the plaintiffs testimony through the filter of reasonableness in determining the proximate cause issue); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1132 (Me.1980) (agreeing with trial court’s instruction to the jury to employ the objective standard in considering proximate cause); Sard, 379 A.2d at 1026 (stating the plaintiffs testimony is relevant although not determinative and alluding to no expert testimony regarding causation). *469 Assuming expert testimony was not requir

1984Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo. App. 357 , 492 P. (2d) 862, 865 (1971); Starnes v. Taylor, 158 S. E. (2d) at 344 . “[T]he doctrine of informed consent does not require the physician to risk frightening the patient away from treatment which sound medical judgment indicates is neces-sary____” 61 Am.

1984Stauffer v. Karabin, 30 Colo. App. 357 , 492 P. (2d) 862, 865 (1971); Starnes v. Taylor, 158 S. E. (2d) at 344 . “[T]he doctrine of informed consent does not require the physician to risk frightening the patient away from treatment which sound medical judgment indicates is neces-sary____” 61 Am.

1984Thus, proof of causation under a subjective [test] would ultimately turn on the credibility of the hindsight of a person seeking recovery after he had experienced a most undesirable result. [Citation omitted.] Such a test puts the physician in “jeopardy of the patient’s hindsight and bitterness.” [Citation omitted.] Furthermore, in cases where the plaintiff dies as a result of an unforewarned collateral consequence, the subjective [test] would bar recovery on an informed consent claim altogether. [Citation omitted.] 379 A. (2d) at 1025; see also Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P. (2d) at 11-12 .