informed consent doctrine in Mississippi

2016Mississippi also recognizes an informed-consent analysis based around a theory of medical negligence, which is analyzed under the critical question of “whether or not a reasonably prudent patient, fully advised of the material known risks, would have consented to the suggested treatment.” Jamison v. Kilgore, 903 So. 2d 45, 48-49 (¶10) (Miss. 2005) (quoting Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385, 392 (Miss. 1985)). “[W]here a plaintiff charges that a doctor performed a procedure without first obtaining informed consent, the plaintiff’s first task is to establish what are known risks of the procedure.

2016Second, even if the physician obtains the patient’s consent in fact, the physician may still be liable if that consent was not “informed.” Jamison v. Kilgore, 903 16 See Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385, 392-93 (Miss. 1985) (holding that, in a medical-malpractice action based on the doctrine of informed consent, an objective standard applies, and the question is whether a reasonably prudent patient, fully advised of material known risks, would have consented to the suggested treatment).

2017The informed consent rule has been referred to as the “bedrock of this state’s respect for the individual’s right to be free from unwanted bodily intrusions no matter how well intentioned.” In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1040 (Miss. 1985).

2017The obvious corollary is that, absent special 'circumstances, a competent individual has a right to refuse to authorize a procedure, whether the refusal is grounded on doubt that the contemplated procedure will be successful, concern about probable risks or consequences, lack of = confidence in the physician recommending the procedure, religious belief, or mere whim. . - [[Image here]] The informed consent rule has been referred to as the “bedrock of this state’s respect for the individual’s right to be free from unwanted bodily intrusions no matter how well intentioned.” In re Brown, 478 So.2

2016Mississippi also recognizes an informed-consent analysis based around a theory of medical negligence, which is analyzed under the critical question of “whether or not a reasonably prudent patient, fully advised of the material known risks, would have consented to the suggested treatment.” Jamison v. Kilgore, 903 So. 2d 45, 48-49 (¶10) (Miss. 2005) (quoting Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385, 392 (Miss. 1985)). “[W]here a plaintiff charges that a doctor performed a procedure without first obtaining informed consent, the plaintiff’s first task is to establish what are known risks of the procedure.

2016Mississippi also recognizes an informed-consent analysis based around a theory of medical negligence, which is analyzed under the critical question of “whether or not a reasonably prudent patient, fully advised of the material known risks, would have consented to .the suggested treatment.” Jamison v. Kilgore, 903 So.2d 45, 48-49 (¶ 10) (Miss.2005) (quoting Reikes v. Martin, 471 So.2d 385, 392 (Miss.1985)). “[W]hére a plaintiff charges that a doctor performed a procedure without first obtaining informed consent, the plaintiffs first task is to establish what are known risks of the procedure.

1986This Court stated in Reikes v. Martin, 471 So.2d 385, 392 (Miss. 1985), that, "To recover under the doctrine of informed consent, as in all negligence cases, there must be a causal connection between the breach of duty by the defendant and the injuries suffered by the plaintiff." Under the doctrine set forth in Ross v. Hodges, supra , the plaintiff bears the burden of proof to show the professional standard of care, and this was not done in this case.

1986The point of having an informed consent rule in the first place is to insure that "the patient will be in a position to make an intelligent decision as to whether he will submit to such treatment or surgery." Ross v. Hodges, 234 So.2d 905, 908 (Miss. 1970).

2017The 13 Court explained “Mississippi follows the fundamental notion that the patient is master of his/her own body.” Fox v. Smith, 594 So. 2d 596, 604 (Miss. 1992).

2017After explaining the origin of the informed consent rule, the Fox Court stated the general rule: “Concisely stated in one sentence, no physician may perform any procedure on a patient no'matter how slight or well intentioned without that patient’s informed consent, and violation of this rule constitutes a battery[.]” Id. , ¶29.

2016See also Latham v. Hayes, 495 So. 2d 453, 458 (Miss. 1986) (applying the objective standard from Reikes to informed consent and acknowledging that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof to establish the professional standards of the medical profession for informed consent to the particular risk). 17 So. 2d 45 , 49-50 (¶15) (Miss. 2005).

2016See also Latham v. Hayes, 495 So.2d 453, 458 (Miss.1986) (applying the objective standard from Reikes to informed consent and acknowledging that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof to establish the professional standards of the medical profession for informed consent to the particular risk).

1987See Cole v. Wiggins, 487 So.2d 203, 205 (Miss. 1986); See also Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 872 (Miss. 1985) (rejection of subjective professional standard; physician's duty "must be objectively determined.") The causation issue has also been discussed in Reikes where the Court held: To recover under the doctrine of informed consent, as in all negligence cases, there must be a causal connection between the breach of duty by the defendant and the injuries suffered by the plaintiff.

1987See Cole v. Wiggins, 487 So.2d 203, 205 (Miss. 1986); See also Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 872 (Miss. 1985) (rejection of subjective professional standard; physician's duty "must be objectively determined.") The causation issue has also been discussed in Reikes where the Court held: To recover under the doctrine of informed consent, as in all negligence cases, there must be a causal connection between the breach of duty by the defendant and the injuries suffered by the plaintiff.