informed consent doctrine in Kansas

2020App. 2d at 763 (quoting Funke v. Feldman, 212 Kan. 524, 532 , 512 P.2d 539 (1973) [quoting Tatro v. Lueken, 212 Kan. 606 , Syl. ¶ 3, 512 P.2d 529 (1973)]).

2008The duty to disclose information under the informed consent doctrine “ Is limited to those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances.’ ” Funke, 212 Kan. at 532 (quoting Tatro, 212 Kan. 606 , Syl. ¶ 3); see also Natanson I, 186 Kan. at 407 (a physician violates his or her duty to a patient and subjects himself or herself to liability if tire physician withholds any facts which are reasonably necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment).

2020App. 2d at 763 (quoting Funke v. Feldman, 212 Kan. 524, 532 , 512 P.2d 539 (1973) [quoting Tatro v. Lueken, 212 Kan. 606 , Syl. ¶ 3, 512 P.2d 529 (1973)]).

2008The duty to disclose information under the informed consent doctrine “ Is limited to those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances.’ ” Funke, 212 Kan. at 532 (quoting Tatro, 212 Kan. 606 , Syl. ¶ 3); see also Natanson I, 186 Kan. at 407 (a physician violates his or her duty to a patient and subjects himself or herself to liability if tire physician withholds any facts which are reasonably necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment).

2020Rather, the court expressly recognized that in order to prevail on an informed consent claim "'there must be medical causation [from the procedure], that is, a causal connection between the undisclosed risk [of the procedure performed] and the injury ultimately sustained.'" Howard, 172 N.J. at 549 (quoting Canesi v. Wilson, 158 N.J. 490, 505 , 730 A.2d 805 [1999]).

2020Rather, the court expressly recognized that in order to prevail on an informed consent claim "'there must be medical causation [from the procedure], that is, a causal connection between the undisclosed risk [of the procedure performed] and the injury ultimately sustained.'" Howard, 172 N.J. at 549 (quoting Canesi v. Wilson, 158 N.J. 490, 505 , 730 A.2d 805 [1999]).

2020Rather, the court expressly recognized that in order to prevail on an informed consent claim "'there must be medical causation [from the procedure], that is, a causal connection between the undisclosed risk [of the procedure performed] and the injury ultimately sustained.'" Howard, 172 N.J. at 549 (quoting Canesi v. Wilson, 158 N.J. 490, 505 , 730 A.2d 805 [1999]).

2020Rojas v. Barker, 40 Kan.

2009Dr. Klaumann further maintains that under Douglas v. Lombardino, 236 Kan. 471, 479-81 , 693 P.2d 1138 (1985), the jury could not have been reasonably misled by the giving of both the general and the specialist duty of care instructions because the evidence was undisputed that Dr. Klaumann was a specialist.

2009Dr. Klaumann further maintains that under Douglas v. Lombardino, 236 Kan. 471, 479-81 , 693 P.2d 1138 (1985), the jury could not have been reasonably misled by the giving of both the general and the specialist duty of care instructions because the evidence was undisputed that Dr. Klaumann was a specialist.

2009"A party is at fault when he or she is negligent and that negligence caused or contributed to the event which brought about the injury or damages for which claim is made." The Notes on Use for PIK Civ. 4th 123.14 state that this instruction "covers the duty of a physician, dentist, anesthesiologist or other specialist to disclose fully those facts necessary for the patient to make an informed consent to a proposed course of treatment." Although the Comments to PIK Civ. 4th 123.14 state that the instruction is based on the informed consent doctrine as established in Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan.

2009"A party is at fault when he or she is negligent and that negligence caused or contributed to the event which brought about the injury or damages for which claim is made." The Notes on Use for PIK Civ. 4th 123.14 state that this instruction "covers the duty of a physician, dentist, anesthesiologist or other specialist to disclose fully those facts necessary for the patient to make an informed consent to a proposed course of treatment." Although the Comments to PIK Civ. 4th 123.14 state that the instruction is based on the informed consent doctrine as established in Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan.

2009It has been frequently held that "where instructions are inconsistent and contradictory, involving a material point in the case, their submission to the jury is prejudicial, for the reason that it is impossible to know what effect they may have had on the verdict. [Citations omitted.]" Atkins v. Clein, 3 Wash.2d 168, 171 , 100 P.2d 1 (1940).

2009It has been frequently held that "where instructions are inconsistent and contradictory, involving a material point in the case, their submission to the jury is prejudicial, for the reason that it is impossible to know what effect they may have had on the verdict. [Citations omitted.]" Atkins v. Clein, 3 Wash.2d 168, 171 , 100 P.2d 1 (1940).

1996Later cases have further clarified the doctrine of informed consent In Yeates v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 333 , 393 P.2d 982 (1964), the Supreme Court ruled that a physician has no duly to inform a patient of “infinitesimal, imaginative, or speculative” risks.

1996Later cases have further clarified the doctrine of informed consent In Yeates v. Harms, 193 Kan. 320, 333 , 393 P.2d 982 (1964), the Supreme Court ruled that a physician has no duly to inform a patient of “infinitesimal, imaginative, or speculative” risks.

1973The other is to recognize that each patient presents a separate problem, that the patient’s mental and emotional condition is important and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent. . . .” (p.578.) This court commented further on the doctrine of informed consent in Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6 , 379 P. 2d 292 .

1973The other is to recognize that each patient presents a separate problem, that the patient’s mental and emotional condition is important and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent. . . .” (p.578.) This court commented further on the doctrine of informed consent in Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6 , 379 P. 2d 292 .