informed consent claim in Iowa

2026The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the informed-consent claim after concluding that physicians under Iowa law do not “have a duty to disclose physician-specific characteristics or experience in obtaining informed consent.” Id. at 531 .

2021We do not, however, rely on that error as a separate ground for reversal because of our conclusion that no expert testimony was required to establish the standard of care for the informed-consent claim. 34 making a reasonable effort—not on whether the patient actually grasps the information. “[O]ne of the difficulties with analysis in terms of ‘informed consent’ is its tendency to imply that what is decisive is the degree of the patient’s comprehension.” Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 n.15; see also Andersen, 913 N.W.2d at 546 (citing Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790 , and referring to it as the “land

2021We do not, however, rely on that error as a separate ground for reversal because of our conclusion that no expert testimony was required to establish the standard of care for the informed-consent claim. 34 making a reasonable effort—not on whether the patient actually grasps the information. “[O]ne of the difficulties with analysis in terms of ‘informed consent’ is its tendency to imply that what is decisive is the degree of the patient’s comprehension.” Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 n.15; see also Andersen, 913 N.W.2d at 546 (citing Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790 , and referring to it as the “land

2021We do not, however, rely on that error as a separate ground for reversal because of our conclusion that no expert testimony was required to establish the standard of care for the informed-consent claim. 34 making a reasonable effort—not on whether the patient actually grasps the information. “[O]ne of the difficulties with analysis in terms of ‘informed consent’ is its tendency to imply that what is decisive is the degree of the patient’s comprehension.” Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 780 n.15; see also Andersen, 913 N.W.2d at 546 (citing Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790 , and referring to it as the “land

2026Ctr., 491 N.W.2d 161, 166 (Iowa 1992) (requiring expert testimony to establish materiality of risk of cystostomy during reverse intestinal bypass surgery); Cox v. Jones, 470 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Iowa 1991) (requiring expert 10 testimony to establish materiality of risk of retinal detachment during cataract surgery); Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 360 (“Further, the patient ordinarily will be required to present expert testimony relating to the nature of the risk and the likelihood of its occurrence, in order for the jury to determine, from the standpoint of the reasonable patient, whether the risk is in fa

2018See, e.g. , Doe , 476 N.W.2d at 31 (requiring disclosure of reasonably available alternative methods of treatment even though the patient rule as expressed in Pauscher and Cowman did not explicitly require such a disclosure); Pauscher , 408 N.W.2d at 362 & n.2 (noting there is no bright-line determining when the probability of a risk is too remote to be material).

2026Ctr., 491 N.W.2d 161, 166 (Iowa 1992) (requiring expert testimony to establish materiality of risk of cystostomy during reverse intestinal bypass surgery); Cox v. Jones, 470 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Iowa 1991) (requiring expert 10 testimony to establish materiality of risk of retinal detachment during cataract surgery); Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 360 (“Further, the patient ordinarily will be required to present expert testimony relating to the nature of the risk and the likelihood of its occurrence, in order for the jury to determine, from the standpoint of the reasonable patient, whether the risk is in fa

2026Ctr., 491 N.W.2d 161, 166 (Iowa 1992) (requiring expert testimony to establish materiality of risk of cystostomy during reverse intestinal bypass surgery); Cox v. Jones, 470 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Iowa 1991) (requiring expert 10 testimony to establish materiality of risk of retinal detachment during cataract surgery); Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 360 (“Further, the patient ordinarily will be required to present expert testimony relating to the nature of the risk and the likelihood of its occurrence, in order for the jury to determine, from the standpoint of the reasonable patient, whether the risk is in fa

2026Ctr., 491 N.W.2d 161, 166 (Iowa 1992) (requiring expert testimony to establish materiality of risk of cystostomy during reverse intestinal bypass surgery); Cox v. Jones, 470 N.W.2d 23, 26 (Iowa 1991) (requiring expert 10 testimony to establish materiality of risk of retinal detachment during cataract surgery); Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 360 (“Further, the patient ordinarily will be required to present expert testimony relating to the nature of the risk and the likelihood of its occurrence, in order for the jury to determine, from the standpoint of the reasonable patient, whether the risk is in fa

2018If the physician obtains a patient’s consent but has breached this duty to inform, ‘the patient has a cause of action sounding in negligence for failure to inform the patient of his options, regardless of due care exercised at treatment, assuming there is injury.’ ” (Emphasis added.) (Citation omitted.) (quoting Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557 (Okla. 1979))); Gouse v. Cassel, 615 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. 1992); Backlund v. Univ. of Wash., 975 P.2d 950 , 954–55 (Wash. 1999) (en banc). 31 Even those jurisdictions that explicitly reject an informed-consent claim based on failure to disclose experi

2018If the physician obtains a patient’s consent but has breached this duty to inform, ‘the patient has a cause of action sounding in negligence for failure to inform the patient of his options, regardless of due care exercised at treatment, assuming there is injury.’ ” (Emphasis added.) (Citation omitted.) (quoting Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557 (Okla. 1979))); Gouse v. Cassel, 615 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. 1992); Backlund v. Univ. of Wash., 975 P.2d 950 , 954–55 (Wash. 1999) (en banc). 31 Even those jurisdictions that explicitly reject an informed-consent claim based on failure to disclose experi

2018See, e.g. , Duffy v. Flagg , 279 Conn. 682 , 905 A.2d 15 , 20-21 (2006) (rejecting argument that a physician's prior experience with vaginal birth after cesarean section was relevant to an informed-consent claim because the only required disclosures are the nature of the procedure, its risks and anticipated benefits, and alternatives to the procedure); Ditto v. McCurdy , 947 P.2d 952 , 958 (Haw. 1997) ("declin[ing] to hold that a physician has a duty to affirmatively disclose his or her qualifications or the lack thereof to a patient" and noting that "this is a matter best left to the legislat

2018See, e.g. , Duffy v. Flagg , 279 Conn. 682 , 905 A.2d 15 , 20-21 (2006) (rejecting argument that a physician's prior experience with vaginal birth after cesarean section was relevant to an informed-consent claim because the only required disclosures are the nature of the procedure, its risks and anticipated benefits, and alternatives to the procedure); Ditto v. McCurdy , 947 P.2d 952 , 958 (Haw. 1997) ("declin[ing] to hold that a physician has a duty to affirmatively disclose his or her qualifications or the lack thereof to a patient" and noting that "this is a matter best left to the legislat

2018But in Housel v. James, the Washington Court of Appeals implicitly limited the effect of its holding in Whiteside when it refused to “categorically hold[ ] that a physician’s inexperience is never material to an informed consent claim.” 172 P.3d 712, 716 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).

2018But in Housel v. James , the Washington Court of Appeals implicitly limited the effect of its holding in Whiteside when it refused to "categorically hold[ ] that a physician's inexperience is never material to an informed consent claim." 141 Wash.App. 748 , 172 P.3d 712 , 716 (2007).

2018See, e.g., Doe, 476 N.W.2d at 31 (requiring disclosure of reasonably available alternative methods of treatment even though the patient rule as expressed in Pauscher and Cowman did not explicitly require such a disclosure); 24 Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 362 & n.2 (noting there is no bright-line determining when the probability of a risk is too remote to be material).

2018See, e.g. , Doe , 476 N.W.2d at 31 (requiring disclosure of reasonably available alternative methods of treatment even though the patient rule as expressed in Pauscher and Cowman did not explicitly require such a disclosure); Pauscher , 408 N.W.2d at 362 & n.2 (noting there is no bright-line determining when the probability of a risk is too remote to be material).

2018See, e.g. , Duffy v. Flagg , 279 Conn. 682 , 905 A.2d 15 , 20-21 (2006) (rejecting argument that a physician's prior experience with vaginal birth after cesarean section was relevant to an informed-consent claim because the only required disclosures are the nature of the procedure, its risks and anticipated benefits, and alternatives to the procedure); Ditto v. McCurdy , 947 P.2d 952 , 958 (Haw. 1997) ("declin[ing] to hold that a physician has a duty to affirmatively disclose his or her qualifications or the lack thereof to a patient" and noting that "this is a matter best left to the legislat

2018See, e.g. , Duffy v. Flagg , 279 Conn. 682 , 905 A.2d 15 , 20-21 (2006) (rejecting argument that a physician's prior experience with vaginal birth after cesarean section was relevant to an informed-consent claim because the only required disclosures are the nature of the procedure, its risks and anticipated benefits, and alternatives to the procedure); Ditto v. McCurdy , 947 P.2d 952 , 958 (Haw. 1997) ("declin[ing] to hold that a physician has a duty to affirmatively disclose his or her qualifications or the lack thereof to a patient" and noting that "this is a matter best left to the legislat

2018See Duffy v. Flagg ( Duffy II ), 279 Conn. 682 , 905 A.2d 15 , 20-21 (2006) (holding physician's experience with the procedure was not relevant to informed consent because that information did not relate to one of Connecticut's four disclosure factors and noting the doctrine of informed consent under Connecticut law is limited); Duttry v. Patterson , 565 Pa. 130 , 771 A.2d 1255 , 1258-59 (2001) (holding evidence of physician's qualifications and experience is not relevant to an informed-consent claim because, under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine of informed consent is limited and only five typ

2018See Duffy v. Flagg ( Duffy II ), 279 Conn. 682 , 905 A.2d 15 , 20-21 (2006) (holding physician's experience with the procedure was not relevant to informed consent because that information did not relate to one of Connecticut's four disclosure factors and noting the doctrine of informed consent under Connecticut law is limited); Duttry v. Patterson , 565 Pa. 130 , 771 A.2d 1255 , 1258-59 (2001) (holding evidence of physician's qualifications and experience is not relevant to an informed-consent claim because, under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine of informed consent is limited and only five typ

2018See Duffy v. Flagg ( Duffy II ), 279 Conn. 682 , 905 A.2d 15 , 20-21 (2006) (holding physician's experience with the procedure was not relevant to informed consent because that information did not relate to one of Connecticut's four disclosure factors and noting the doctrine of informed consent under Connecticut law is limited); Duttry v. Patterson , 565 Pa. 130 , 771 A.2d 1255 , 1258-59 (2001) (holding evidence of physician's qualifications and experience is not relevant to an informed-consent claim because, under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine of informed consent is limited and only five typ

2018See Duffy v. Flagg ( Duffy II ), 279 Conn. 682 , 905 A.2d 15 , 20-21 (2006) (holding physician's experience with the procedure was not relevant to informed consent because that information did not relate to one of Connecticut's four disclosure factors and noting the doctrine of informed consent under Connecticut law is limited); Duttry v. Patterson , 565 Pa. 130 , 771 A.2d 1255 , 1258-59 (2001) (holding evidence of physician's qualifications and experience is not relevant to an informed-consent claim because, under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine of informed consent is limited and only five typ

2018See, e.g. , Duffy v. Flagg , 279 Conn. 682 , 905 A.2d 15 , 20-21 (2006) (rejecting argument that a physician's prior experience with vaginal birth after cesarean section was relevant to an informed-consent claim because the only required disclosures are the nature of the procedure, its risks and anticipated benefits, and alternatives to the procedure); Ditto v. McCurdy , 947 P.2d 952 , 958 (Haw. 1997) ("declin[ing] to hold that a physician has a duty to affirmatively disclose his or her qualifications or the lack thereof to a patient" and noting that "this is a matter best left to the legislat

2018See, e.g. , Duffy v. Flagg , 279 Conn. 682 , 905 A.2d 15 , 20-21 (2006) (rejecting argument that a physician's prior experience with vaginal birth after cesarean section was relevant to an informed-consent claim because the only required disclosures are the nature of the procedure, its risks and anticipated benefits, and alternatives to the procedure); Ditto v. McCurdy , 947 P.2d 952 , 958 (Haw. 1997) ("declin[ing] to hold that a physician has a duty to affirmatively disclose his or her qualifications or the lack thereof to a patient" and noting that "this is a matter best left to the legislat

2018See, e.g., Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 499 (Ariz. 1978) (in banc) (noting the wrong in an informed- consent claim is not the operation itself but rather the failure to disclose, and requiring the unrevealed risk to materialize and cause harm); Howard, 800 A.2d at 79–80 (noting the informed-consent damages analysis involves comparison of the condition the patient would have been in if the patient had been informed and not consented to the risk with the condition the patient is in as a result of the risk’s occurrence, but also noting the patient does not have to prove the physician negligent

2018See, e.g., Lee v. State, 906 N.W.2d 186 , 194 (Iowa 2018) (“A court abuses its discretion when the grounds or reasons for the court’s decision are ‘clearly untenable’ or when the court has exercised its discretion to an extent that is ‘clearly unreasonable.’ ” “A ground or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous application of the law.” (Emphasis added.) (quoting Equity Control Assocs., Ltd. v. Root, 638 N.W.2d 664, 674 (Iowa 2001))).

2018See, e.g. , Lee v. State , 906 N.W.2d 186 , 194 (Iowa 2018) ("A court abuses its discretion when the grounds or reasons for the court's decision are 'clearly untenable' or when the court has exercised its discretion to an extent that is 'clearly unreasonable.' " "A ground or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous application of the law ." (Emphasis added.) (quoting Equity Control Assocs., Ltd. v. Root , 638 N.W.2d 664 , 674 (Iowa 2001) )).

2018See Duffy v. Flagg ( Duffy II ), 279 Conn. 682 , 905 A.2d 15 , 20-21 (2006) (holding physician's experience with the procedure was not relevant to informed consent because that information did not relate to one of Connecticut's four disclosure factors and noting the doctrine of informed consent under Connecticut law is limited); Duttry v. Patterson , 565 Pa. 130 , 771 A.2d 1255 , 1258-59 (2001) (holding evidence of physician's qualifications and experience is not relevant to an informed-consent claim because, under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine of informed consent is limited and only five typ

2018See Duffy v. Flagg ( Duffy II ), 279 Conn. 682 , 905 A.2d 15 , 20-21 (2006) (holding physician's experience with the procedure was not relevant to informed consent because that information did not relate to one of Connecticut's four disclosure factors and noting the doctrine of informed consent under Connecticut law is limited); Duttry v. Patterson , 565 Pa. 130 , 771 A.2d 1255 , 1258-59 (2001) (holding evidence of physician's qualifications and experience is not relevant to an informed-consent claim because, under Pennsylvania law, the doctrine of informed consent is limited and only five typ

2018See, e.g., Duffy I, 869 A.2d at 1277 (“[W]e note that the viability of an informed consent claim does not depend on proof of malpractice relating to a particular medical procedure.

2018See, e.g. , Duffy I , 869 A.2d at 1277 ("[W]e note that the viability of an informed consent claim does not depend on proof of malpractice relating to a particular medical procedure.

2018See, e.g., Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 499 (Ariz. 1978) (in banc) (noting the wrong in an informed- consent claim is not the operation itself but rather the failure to disclose, and requiring the unrevealed risk to materialize and cause harm); Howard, 800 A.2d at 79–80 (noting the informed-consent damages analysis involves comparison of the condition the patient would have been in if the patient had been informed and not consented to the risk with the condition the patient is in as a result of the risk’s occurrence, but also noting the patient does not have to prove the physician negligent

2018E.g. , Duffy v. Flagg ( Duffy I ), 88 Conn.App. 484 , 869 A.2d 1270 , 1277 (2005), rev'd on other grounds , Duffy II , 905 A.2d at 18 ; Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J. , 172 N.J. 537 , 800 A.2d 73 , 79 (2002) ("The damages analysis in an informed consent case involves a comparison between the condition a plaintiff would have been in had he or she been properly informed and not consented to the risk, with the plaintiff's impaired condition as a result of the risk's occurrence.

2018See id.

2018In Parris, while discussing the injury element of an informed- consent claim, the Oklahoma Supreme Court acknowledged “the occurrence of an undisclosed risk is important to the determination of injury and absent such occurrence, a physician’s failure to reveal the risk is possibly not actionable.” 277 P.3d at 1263 (emphasis added).

2018In Parris , while discussing the injury element of an informed-consent claim, the Oklahoma Supreme Court acknowledged "the occurrence of an undisclosed risk is important to the determination of injury and absent such occurrence, a physician's failure to reveal the risk is possibly not actionable." 277 P.3d at 1263 (emphasis added).

2017See Overturff v. 21 Raddatz Funeral Servs., Inc., 757 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Iowa 2008) (“Because the existence of a duty under a given set of facts is a question of law for the court, it is properly resolvable by summary judgment.”).