informed consent doctrine in Georgia

2014See RNW Family Partnership, Ltd., supra. However, the trial court correctly concluded that the testimony of plaintiff’s expert pulmonolgist, Dr. Hyers, did impermissibly reference the doctrine of informed consent.

2014See RNW Family Partnership, Ltd., supra. However, the trial court correctly concluded that the testimony of plaintiff’s expert pulmonologist, Dr. Hyers, did impermissibly reference the doctrine of informed consent.

2009As explained in Division 1 of the majority opinion, this Court stated in Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland, 272 Ga. 296, 298-299 (1), 528 S.E.2d 777 (2000), that Georgia does not recognize the common law doctrine of informed consent, and that the "Georgia informed consent statute does not impose a general requirement of disclosure upon physicians; rather, it requires physicians to disclose only those factors listed in OCGA § 31-9-6.1(a). [Cits.]" I dissented in Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland , because I believed that the "appeal [was] controlled by the principle that consent which is obta

2009As explained in Division 1 of the majority opinion, this Court stated in Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland, 272 Ga. 296, 298-299 (1), 528 S.E.2d 777 (2000), that Georgia does not recognize the common law doctrine of informed consent, and that the "Georgia informed consent statute does not impose a general requirement of disclosure upon physicians; rather, it requires physicians to disclose only those factors listed in OCGA § 31-9-6.1(a). [Cits.]" I dissented in Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland , because I believed that the "appeal [was] controlled by the principle that consent which is obta

2023As an initial matter, as pointed out by the defendants in seeking dismissal of the Threadgills’ renewal action, our Supreme Court has held that “Georgia does not recognize a common law doctrine of informed consent”; that “the doctrine of informed consent for health procedures and treatment is defined in Georgia exclusively by statutes and regulations”; and that “[t]here is no question that chiropractic treatments are not among the procedures designated in [Georgia’s informed consent statute,] OCGA § 31-9-6.1[,] for which informed consent is required.” Blotner v. Doreika, 285 Ga. 481, 484-485 (

2023As an initial matter, as pointed out by the defendants in seeking dismissal of the Threadgills’ renewal action, our Supreme Court has held that “Georgia does not recognize a common law doctrine of informed consent”; that “the doctrine of informed consent for health procedures and treatment is defined in Georgia exclusively by statutes and regulations”; and that “[t]here is no question that chiropractic treatments are not among the procedures designated in [Georgia’s informed consent statute,] OCGA § 31-9-6.1[,] for which informed consent is required.” Blotner v. Doreika, 285 Ga. 481, 484-485 (

2009However, based on the doctrines of stare decisis and separation of powers, I am compelled to join the majority opinion in overruling Ketchup v. Howard, 247 Ga.App. 54 , 543 S.E.2d 371 (2000), and in reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals in the instant case, which erroneously relied upon Ketchup v. Howard .

2008In Ketchup , this Court held that Georgia "will recognize the common law doctrine of informed consent" and that "a medical professional in Georgia ... must inform a patient of the material risks of a proposed treatment or procedure which are or should be known, and they must inform a patient of available alternatives to the proposed procedure or treatment." Id. at 54, 59 , 543 S.E.2d 371 .

2008Ketchup overruled Young v. Yarn, 136 Ga. App. 737 ( 222 SE2d 113 ) (1975), which interpreted part of the Georgia Medical Consent Law in such a way that it implicitly rejected the common law doctrine of informed consent.

2008Ketchup overruled Young v. Yarn, 136 Ga. App. 737 ( 222 SE2d 113 ) (1975), which interpreted part of the Georgia Medical Consent Law in such a way that it implicitly rejected the common law doctrine of informed consent.

1986Hence, we decline appellant’s invitation to overrule our line of cases such as Hyles, supra, and Simpson v. Dickson, 167 Ga. App. 344 (2) ( 306 SE2d 404 ) (1983), which hold that the informed consent doctrine is not a viable principle of law in this state. 2.

1986Hence, we decline appellant’s invitation to overrule our line of cases such as Hyles, supra, and Simpson v. Dickson, 167 Ga. App. 344 (2) ( 306 SE2d 404 ) (1983), which hold that the informed consent doctrine is not a viable principle of law in this state. 2.

2015System, 330 Ga. App. 469, 474 (1) (b) ( 765 SE2d 525 ) (2014); Renz v. Northside Hosp., 285 Ga. App. 882, 884 (1) ( 648 SE2d 186 ) (2007). 6 Alicea has not filed a cross-appeal challenging the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendants on the informed consent claim pertaining to the March 7 intubation. 7 It is undisputed that asa licensed hospital established under the laws of Georgia, Doctors Hospital satisfied the statutory definition of a “health care facility” under the Advance Directive Act.

2015System, 330 Ga. App. 469, 474 (1) (b) ( 765 SE2d 525 ) (2014); Renz v. Northside Hosp., 285 Ga. App. 882, 884 (1) ( 648 SE2d 186 ) (2007). 6 Alicea has not filed a cross-appeal challenging the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendants on the informed consent claim pertaining to the March 7 intubation. 7 It is undisputed that asa licensed hospital established under the laws of Georgia, Doctors Hospital satisfied the statutory definition of a “health care facility” under the Advance Directive Act.

2015System, 330 Ga. App. 469, 474 (1) (b) ( 765 SE2d 525 ) (2014); Renz v. Northside Hosp., 285 Ga. App. 882, 884 (1) ( 648 SE2d 186 ) (2007). 6 Alicea has not filed a cross-appeal challenging the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendants on the informed consent claim pertaining to the March 7 intubation. 7 It is undisputed that asa licensed hospital established under the laws of Georgia, Doctors Hospital satisfied the statutory definition of a “health care facility” under the Advance Directive Act.

2009Contrary to the Court of Appeals' statement that OCGA § 31-9-6.1 "has no effect on the recognition of the common law doctrine of informed consent," Doreika v. Blotner, supra, 292 Ga.App. at 853 (1), 666 S.E.2d 21 , the doctrine of informed consent for health procedures and treatment is defined in Georgia exclusively by statutes and regulations.

2009Contrary to the Court of Appeals' statement that OCGA § 31-9-6.1 "has no effect on the recognition of the common law doctrine of informed consent," Doreika v. Blotner, supra, 292 Ga.App. at 853 (1), 666 S.E.2d 21 , the doctrine of informed consent for health procedures and treatment is defined in Georgia exclusively by statutes and regulations.

2009Nathans, supra, 282 Ga. at 805, n. 2 , 654 S.E.2d 121 . [2] We recognize that the Legislature revisited OCGA § 31-9-6.1 without taking any measures to limit the application of Ketchup v. Howard, supra, 247 Ga.App. 54 , 543 S.E.2d 371 , and that, under cases such as Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 281 Ga. 137 (1), 637 S.E.2d 14 (2006), that inaction might be construed as indicating the legislature's agreement with the holding in Ketchup .

2009Nathans, supra, 282 Ga. at 805, n. 2 , 654 S.E.2d 121 . [2] We recognize that the Legislature revisited OCGA § 31-9-6.1 without taking any measures to limit the application of Ketchup v. Howard, supra, 247 Ga.App. 54 , 543 S.E.2d 371 , and that, under cases such as Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 281 Ga. 137 (1), 637 S.E.2d 14 (2006), that inaction might be construed as indicating the legislature's agreement with the holding in Ketchup .

1992(Holbrook v. Schatten, 165 Ga. App. 217, 218 ( 299 SE2d 128 ) (1983); Young v. Yarn, supra at 738).

1992(Holbrook v. Schatten, 165 Ga. App. 217, 218 ( 299 SE2d 128 ) (1983); Young v. Yarn, supra at 738).

1985Compare Leagan v. Levine, supra. Appellant attempts to characterize the cause of action which he seeks to assert as being strictly based in fraud as opposed to traditional medical negligence or any notion of the informed consent doctrine, which has judicially been declared to be nonexistent in Georgia.

1983See Butler v. Brown, 162 Ga. App. 376 ( 290 SE2d 293 ) (1982); Parr v. Palmyra Park Hospital, 139 Ga. App. 457 ( 228 SE2d 596 ) (1976).

1983See Butler v. Brown, 162 Ga. App. 376 ( 290 SE2d 293 ) (1982); Parr v. Palmyra Park Hospital, 139 Ga. App. 457 ( 228 SE2d 596 ) (1976).

1983See 61 AmJur2d, Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers, § 187; see also 70 CJS, Physicians and Surgeons, § 48(g).“Briefly stated,this rule is that a consent to a treatment or diagnostic test obtained without disclosure of the hazards or dangers involved, is no consent.” Mull v. Emory University, 114 Ga. App. 63, 65-6 ( 150 SE2d 276 ) (1966).

1983See 61 AmJur2d, Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers, § 187; see also 70 CJS, Physicians and Surgeons, § 48(g).“Briefly stated,this rule is that a consent to a treatment or diagnostic test obtained without disclosure of the hazards or dangers involved, is no consent.” Mull v. Emory University, 114 Ga. App. 63, 65-6 ( 150 SE2d 276 ) (1966).