informed consent doctrine in New Jersey

1994In Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 460-461 , 457 A. 2d 431 (1983), the Court set forth the following in discussing the doctrine of informed consent: Under the doctrine, the patient who consents to an operation is given the opportunity to show that the surgeon withheld information concerning "the inherent and potential hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to that treatment, if any, and the results likely if the patient remains untreated." Canterbury v. Spence, supra, 464 F. 2d at 787-88.

1994In Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 460-461 , 457 A. 2d 431 (1983), the Court set forth the following in discussing the doctrine of informed consent: Under the doctrine, the patient who consents to an operation is given the opportunity to show that the surgeon withheld information concerning "the inherent and potential hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to that treatment, if any, and the results likely if the patient remains untreated." Canterbury v. Spence, supra, 464 F. 2d at 787-88.

2015In an informed-consent analysis, the dominant issue is “whether the physician adequately presents the material facts so that the patient can make an informed decision.” Matthies, supra, 160 N.J. at 36 , 733 A.2d 456 .

2015In an informed-consent analysis, the dominant issue is “whether the physician adequately presents the material facts so that the patient can make an informed decision.” Matthies, supra, 160 N.J. at 36 , 733 A.2d 456 .

2015The factors contributing significance to the dangerousness of a medical 25 technique are, of course, the incidence of injury and the degree of harm threatened.” [Id. at 213 (alteration in original) (quoting Canterbury, supra, 464 F.2d at 787-88 ).] In Matthies, supra, the Court emphasized that a physician is required to explain the risks associated with all medically reasonable alternatives, including invasive and noninvasive treatments. 160 N.J. at 34 .

2015The factors contributing significance to the dangerousness of a medical 25 technique are, of course, the incidence of injury and the degree of harm threatened.” [Id. at 213 (alteration in original) (quoting Canterbury, supra, 464 F.2d at 787-88 ).] In Matthies, supra, the Court emphasized that a physician is required to explain the risks associated with all medically reasonable alternatives, including invasive and noninvasive treatments. 160 N.J. at 34 .

2015Finally, plaintiffs maintain that Howard v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, 172 N.J. 537 , 800 A.2d 73 (2002), suggests that an informed consent claim against Dr. Kaul should be permitted.

2015Finally, plaintiffs maintain that Howard v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey, 172 N.J. 537 , 800 A.2d 73 (2002), suggests that an informed consent claim against Dr. Kaul should be permitted.

1987Self-determination in its purest form thus includes elements of knowledge and volition. 4 This understanding of individual self-determination is illustrated by the companion case of Farrell, supra. The assurances and safeguards used to protect and effectuate a competent patient’s self-determination primarily through informed consent are not available when the patient whose treatment decision is at question is no longer competent.

1987Closely allied to this concept is the doctrine of informed consent, which "was developed to protect the right to self-determination in matters of medical treatment." Matter of Farrell, supra, 108 N.J. at 347.

2019Pa. 1974) (rejecting an informed consent claim on behalf of dozens of patients who underwent surgery with a non-FDA approved ligament because "[a] determination of informed consent in each case depends on a separate inquiry into the facts surrounding each operation and an application of the facts to the governing legal principles"); Harrigan, 63 F.R.D. at 405-07 (holding questions relating to veterans' informed consent for urinary tract surgery performed at a Veteran's Administration hospital had to be determined on the basis of the facts relevant to each individual case and rejecting informed

2007Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir.2006), vacated for rehearing en banc as stated in, 213 Fed.Appx. 508 (8th Cir.2007).

2002See also Bethea, supra, 546 S.E.2d at 544 (recognizing that fraudulent misrepresentation of facts material to consent may support claim based on lack of informed consent); Paulos, supra, 597 N.W.2d at 320 (suggesting misrepresentation by doctor that he was board certified in plastic surgery may present issue of informed consent).

2002See also Bethea, supra, 546 S.E.2d at 544 (recognizing that fraudulent misrepresentation of facts material to consent may support claim based on lack of informed consent); Paulos, supra, 597 N.W.2d at 320 (suggesting misrepresentation by doctor that he was board certified in plastic surgery may present issue of informed consent).

2002See also Bethea, supra, 546 S.E.2d at 544 (recognizing that fraudulent misrepresentation of facts material to consent may support claim based on lack of informed consent); Paulos, supra, 597 N.W.2d at 320 (suggesting misrepresentation by doctor that he was board certified in plastic surgery may present issue of informed consent).

1999See Tajchman v. Giller, 938 S.W. 2d 95, 100 (Tex.App.1996) (because the "disclosure requirement" is limited to the "consequences of a proposed medical procedure, exclusive of the means by which that procedure is performed," the doctrine of informed consent "requires that only inherent risks that result from the medical procedures performed—and not defects or steps in the procedure itself—must be disclosed"); Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash.App. 230 , 523 P. 2d 211, 219 (1974) ("A doctor need not disclose a risk of the improper performance of an appropriate procedure.").

1999See Tajchman v. Giller, 938 S.W. 2d 95, 100 (Tex.App.1996) (because the "disclosure requirement" is limited to the "consequences of a proposed medical procedure, exclusive of the means by which that procedure is performed," the doctrine of informed consent "requires that only inherent risks that result from the medical procedures performed—and not defects or steps in the procedure itself—must be disclosed"); Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash.App. 230 , 523 P. 2d 211, 219 (1974) ("A doctor need not disclose a risk of the improper performance of an appropriate procedure.").

1999See Tajchman v. Giller, 938 S.W. 2d 95, 100 (Tex.App.1996) (because the "disclosure requirement" is limited to the "consequences of a proposed medical procedure, exclusive of the means by which that procedure is performed," the doctrine of informed consent "requires that only inherent risks that result from the medical procedures performed—and not defects or steps in the procedure itself—must be disclosed"); Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash.App. 230 , 523 P. 2d 211, 219 (1974) ("A doctor need not disclose a risk of the improper performance of an appropriate procedure.").

1999See Tajchman v. Giller, 938 S.W. 2d 95, 100 (Tex.App.1996) (because the "disclosure requirement" is limited to the "consequences of a proposed medical procedure, exclusive of the means by which that procedure is performed," the doctrine of informed consent "requires that only inherent risks that result from the medical procedures performed—and not defects or steps in the procedure itself—must be disclosed"); Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash.App. 230 , 523 P. 2d 211, 219 (1974) ("A doctor need not disclose a risk of the improper performance of an appropriate procedure.").

1999By the same token, because the informed consent doctrine is "concerned with instances of performance of treatments recognized to have inherent and probable substantial risks associated with them," a physician does not have a duty to disclose the "risks of the improper performance of an appropriate procedure" or the "dangers in the procedure if not done properly." Mallett v. Pirkey, 171 Colo. 271 , 466 P. 2d 466, 470-71 (1970).

1999By the same token, because the informed consent doctrine is "concerned with instances of performance of treatments recognized to have inherent and probable substantial risks associated with them," a physician does not have a duty to disclose the "risks of the improper performance of an appropriate procedure" or the "dangers in the procedure if not done properly." Mallett v. Pirkey, 171 Colo. 271 , 466 P. 2d 466, 470-71 (1970).

1999In Mull v. Emory University, Inc., 114 Ga.App. 63 , 150 S.E. 2d 276 (1966), a hospital-employed laboratory technician performed an "improper injection" of Bromsulphalein, "a dye ... usually and customarily injected into a patient's bloodstream through a vein" as part of a "diagnostic test known as a `BSP' test." Id. at 279, 282, 292.

1999In Mull v. Emory University, Inc., 114 Ga.App. 63 , 150 S.E. 2d 276 (1966), a hospital-employed laboratory technician performed an "improper injection" of Bromsulphalein, "a dye ... usually and customarily injected into a patient's bloodstream through a vein" as part of a "diagnostic test known as a `BSP' test." Id. at 279, 282, 292.

1998Observing that “[w]ith differing opinions among experts,” the court “would not normally interfere with a jury’s choice of the appropriate standard of care,” Judge Wecker added that in this ease the court would depart from this rule because “defendant’s experts offered a value judgment, not a medical judgment, by testifying that a patient has no need to know that he has a terminal condition.” 301 N.J.Super, at 349, 693 A.2d 1287 .