Prevention of unequal privileges or duties.

- What this paragraph seeks to do is to prevent the creation of special laws giving any one community any more rights or privileges than another, or putting any more duties on one community than any other similarly situated. DeJarnette v. Hospital Auth., 195 Ga. 189, 23 S.E.2d 716 (1942) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV).

Immunity of water authority.

- The immunity provision of the charter of the Macon Water Authority Act that exempted the Authority from vicarious liability was not preempted by O.C.G.A. § 51-2-2, and did not offend Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV(a). Matthews v. Macon Water Auth., 273 Ga. 436, 542 S.E.2d 106 (2001).

General and special laws mutually exclusive.

- A law territorially general, and a subsequent law territorially special, for the same order of cases, are mutually exclusive of each other. The legislature may have either, but, in the nature of things, cannot have both. City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 19 S.E.2d 508 (1942).

State statutes preempted city's ordinance.

- Conviction and fine against a convenience store operator for violating a city ordinance that prohibited certain retailers of packaged alcoholic beverages from allowing coin operated amusement machines (COAMs) on the same premises was reversed because the state's COAM Laws, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-12-35 and50-27-70 to50-27-104, preempted the city's ordinance at least insofar as the ordinance applied to COAMs as defined by the state statutes. Gebrekidan v. City of Clarkston, 298 Ga. 651, 784 S.E.2d 373 (2016).

Statute providing for recovery of costs for converting from oil-burning to coal-burning facility.

- O.C.G.A. § 46-2-26.3, relating to recovery of costs of conversion from oil-burning to coal-burning generating facility, is not unconstitutional as a special law for which provision has been made by general law, because O.C.G.A. § 46-2-23 does not divest the General Assembly of its power to regulate public utilities. Lasseter v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 253 Ga. 227, 319 S.E.2d 824 (1984).

The County Building Authority Act was not a special law or population bill and was not unconstitutional under either the 1976 or the 1983 Constitutions. Therefore, the Fulton County Building Authority was authorized to issue bonds to finance the acquisition and construction of mental retardation training centers and to finance studies, services, and reports incidental to preparing plans for a county office building, because such projects were within the scope of the Act, which was a "general law," as referred to in Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. VI, Para. I. Building Auth. v. State, 253 Ga. 242, 321 S.E.2d 97 (1984).

Supreme Court's approval of a local court rule providing that civil actions seeking primarily money damages up to $25,000 or in an unspecified amount would be referred to compulsory but nonbinding arbitration did not abridge the rights of any litigants or conflict with any federal or state constitutional provision or Georgia statute. Davis v. Gaona, 260 Ga. 450, 396 S.E.2d 218 (1990).

Condemning property for utility company.

- Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 46-3-201(b)(9), the electric corporation, which had to condemn property in order to effectuate its project, did not have to demonstrate to the county the necessity or the appropriateness of its proposed project; thus, the county ordinance prohibiting the electric lines for three years was unconstitutional. Rabun County v. Ga. Transmission Corp., 276 Ga. 81, 575 S.E.2d 474 (2003).

Amendment changing retroactive effect of prior amendment.

- An amendment which changed the retroactive effect of an earlier amendment to O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1, the implied consent warning law, so that it applied only to stops made after the effective date of the earlier amendment, rather than to cases pending on such date, did not violate the uniformity or special laws provisions of the state constitution. State v. Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 466 S.E.2d 216 (1996).

County ordinance was proper use of police power.

- Since the stated purpose of Gwinnett County, Ga., Ord. No. 82-11 was to impede the sale of stolen property, and its requirements were designed to achieve that end, it was a proper use of the county's police power; further, by expressly preserving local laws in O.C.G.A. § 44-12-135, which included county ordinances, the legislature had in effect "authorized" them, and so Gwinnett County, Ga., Ord. No. 82-11 did not conflict with O.C.G.A. § 44-12-138. Pawnmart, Inc. v. Gwinnett County, 279 Ga. 19, 608 S.E.2d 639 (2005).

Statutory interpretation of salary statute as to cost-of-living adjustments.

- According to the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 15-6-88, the 2007 Local Act does not establish $56,000 as the salary for the clerk. It simply states that the clerk's salary may not be less than $56,000; consequently, it is not inconsistent on its face with the terms of the general statute requiring a clerk to be paid no less than the amount set by the county population schedule set forth in the statute, and is not unconstitutional. Chatham County v. Massey, 299 Ga. 595, 791 S.E.2d 85 (2016).

Cited in County of Dougherty v. Boyt, 71 Ga. 484 (1883); Houston County v. Killen, 76 Ga. 826 (1886); Maxwell v. Tumlin, 79 Ga. 570, 4 S.E. 858 (1887); Adair v. Ellis, 83 Ga. 464, 10 S.E. 117 (1889); Mathis v. Jones, 84 Ga. 804, 11 S.E. 1018 (1890); Weed v. Mayor of Savannah, 87 Ga. 513, 13 S.E. 522 (1891); Union Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606, 34 S.E. 217 (1899); Williams v. Fears, 110 Ga. 584, 35 S.E. 699, 50 L.R.A. 685 (1900); Sayer v. Brown, 119 Ga. 539, 46 S.E. 649 (1904); Barber v. Alexander, 120 Ga. 30, 47 S.E. 580 (1904); Neal v. McWhorter, 122 Ga. 431, 50 S.E. 381 (1905); Sellers v. Cox, 127 Ga. 246, 56 S.E. 284 (1906); Binns v. Ficklen, 130 Ga. 377, 60 S.E. 1051 (1908); Clark v. Reynolds, 136 Ga. 817, 72 S.E. 254 (1911); Hammond v. State, 10 Ga. App. 143, 72 S.E. 937 (1911); Clark v. Clark, 137 Ga. 185, 73 S.E. 16 (1911); Macon, D. & S.R.R. v. Calhoun, 138 Ga. 165, 74 S.E. 1030 (1912); Williams v. State, 138 Ga. 168, 74 S.E. 1083 (1912); Greer v. Turner County, 138 Ga. 558, 75 S.E. 578 (1912); Stewart v. Anderson, 140 Ga. 31, 78 S.E. 457 (1913); Board of Comm'rs v. Mayor of Americus, 141 Ga. 542, 81 S.E. 435 (1914); McWilliams v. Smith, 142 Ga. 209, 82 S.E. 569 (1914); Sampson v. Harris, 147 Ga. 426, 94 S.E. 558 (1917); Wright v. Hardwick, 152 Ga. 302, 109 S.E. 903 (1921); Cooper v. Rollins, 152 Ga. 588, 110 S.E. 726 (1922); Wilkins v. Mayor of Savannah, 152 Ga. 638, 111 S.E. 42 (1922); Walthour v. City of Atlanta, 157 Ga. 24, 120 S.E. 613 (1923); Downs v. State, 158 Ga. 669, 124 S.E. 166 (1924); Spielberger v. Hall & Co., 159 Ga. 511, 126 S.E. 391 (1925); Abbott v. Commissioners of Fulton County, 160 Ga. 657, 129 S.E. 38 (1925); Baugh v. City of LaGrange, 161 Ga. 80, 130 S.E. 69 (1925); Shore v. Banks County, 162 Ga. 185, 132 S.E. 753 (1926); Mayor of Danville v. Wilkinson County, 166 Ga. 460, 143 S.E. 769 (1928); Harris County v. Williams, 167 Ga. 45, 144 S.E. 756 (1928); Cochran v. City of Thomasville, 167 Ga. 579, 146 S.E. 462 (1928); Greer v. State, 169 Ga. 552, 150 S.E. 839 (1929); Avery v. Bower, 170 Ga. 202, 152 S.E. 239 (1930); Wilson v. Harris, 170 Ga. 800, 154 S.E. 388 (1930); Taliaferro County v. Edwards, 171 Ga. 289, 155 S.E. 180 (1930); Curtis v. Town of Helen, 171 Ga. 256, 155 S.E. 202 (1930); Murray v. City of Waycross, 171 Ga. 484, 156 S.E. 38 (1930); Meyers v. Whittle, 171 Ga. 509, 156 S.E. 120 (1930); Bower v. Avery, 172 Ga. 272, 158 S.E. 10 (1931); York v. State, 172 Ga. 483, 158 S.E. 53 (1931); Medders v. Stewart, 172 Ga. 507, 158 S.E. 56 (1931); Jordan v. State, 172 Ga. 857, 159 S.E. 235 (1931); Felton v. McArthur, 173 Ga. 465, 160 S.E. 419 (1931); Strickland v. Houston, 173 Ga. 615, 161 S.E. 262 (1931); Hopkins v. Chatham Phoenix Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 174 Ga. 136, 162 S.E. 521 (1932); Family Fin. Co. v. Allman, 174 Ga. 467, 163 S.E. 143 (1932); Slater v. Davis, 174 Ga. 633, 163 S.E. 704 (1932); State Bd. of Barber Exmrs. v. Blocker, 176 Ga. 125, 167 S.E. 298 (1932); Von Schmidt v. Noland Co., 176 Ga. 784, 169 S.E. 11 (1933); Moseley v. State, 176 Ga. 889, 169 S.E. 97 (1933); Green v. Harper, 177 Ga. 680, 170 S.E. 872 (1933); Felton v. Huiet, 178 Ga. 311, 173 S.E. 660 (1933); Newport v. Longino, 178 Ga. 797, 174 S.E. 537 (1934); Simmons v. Newton, 178 Ga. 806, 174 S.E. 703 (1934); Dillon v. Continental Trust Co., 179 Ga. 198, 175 S.E. 652 (1934); Gormley v. Searcy, 179 Ga. 389, 175 S.E. 913 (1934); Williams v. McIntosh County, 179 Ga. 735, 177 S.E. 248 (1934); Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. City of Albany, 180 Ga. 355, 179 S.E. 369 (1935); Georgia Power Co. v. City of Decatur, 181 Ga. 187, 182 S.E. 32 (1935); Harbin v. Holcomb, 181 Ga. 800, 184 S.E. 603 (1936); Board of Educ. v. Board of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 182 Ga. 326, 185 S.E. 331 (1936); Wright v. Richmond County Dep't of Health, 182 Ga. 651, 186 S.E. 815 (1936); Gormley v. Hart, 54 Ga. App. 373, 188 S.E. 66 (1936); Russell v. Burroughs, 183 Ga. 361, 188 S.E. 451 (1936); McKown v. City of Atlanta, 184 Ga. 221, 190 S.E. 571 (1937); National Fin. Co. v. Citizens Loan & Sav. Co., 184 Ga. 619, 192 S.E. 717 (1937); Freeney v. Pape, 185 Ga. 1, 194 S.E. 515 (1937); Sharpe v. City of Waycross, 185 Ga. 208, 194 S.E. 522 (1937); Gibson v. Hood, 185 Ga. 426, 195 S.E. 444 (1938); Webb v. City of Atlanta, 186 Ga. 430, 198 S.E. 50 (1938); Hoover v. Brown, 186 Ga. 519, 198 S.E. 231 (1938); Head v. Wilkinson, 186 Ga. 739, 198 S.E. 782 (1938); Williamson v. Housing Auth., 186 Ga. 673, 199 S.E. 43 (1938); State Hwy. Dep't v. H.G. Hastings Co., 187 Ga. 204, 199 S.E. 793 (1938); Lloyds Am. v. Brown, 187 Ga. 240, 200 S.E. 292 (1938); Steele v. City of Waycross, 187 Ga. 382, 200 S.E. 704 (1938); Rourke v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 187 Ga. 636, 1 S.E.2d 728 (1939); County Bd. of Educ. v. Young, 187 Ga. 644, 1 S.E.2d 739 (1939); Garner v. Wood, 188 Ga. 463, 4 S.E.2d 137 (1939); Barber v. Housing Auth., 189 Ga. 155, 5 S.E.2d 425 (1939); Kelisen v. Savannah Theatres Co., 61 Ga. App. 100, 5 S.E.2d 712 (1939); Upson v. Almand, 190 Ga. 376, 9 S.E.2d 662 (1940); Board of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage v. State Bd. of Educ., 190 Ga. 581, 10 S.E.2d 365 (1940); Town of McIntyre v. Scott, 191 Ga. 473, 12 S.E.2d 883 (1940); Feagin v. Freeney, 192 Ga. 868, 17 S.E.2d 61 (1941); Jones v. Methvin, 193 Ga. 17, 17 S.E.2d 172 (1941); Sumter County v. Allen, 193 Ga. 171, 17 S.E.2d 567 (1941); McCook v. Long, 193 Ga. 299, 18 S.E.2d 488 (1942); Brock v. Chappell, 196 Ga. 567, 27 S.E.2d 38 (1943); Chappell v. Kilgore, 196 Ga. 591, 27 S.E.2d 89 (1943); Derrick v. City Council, 138 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1943); Nichols v. Hampton, 198 Ga. 327, 31 S.E.2d 659 (1944); Sneed v. State, 72 Ga. App. 102, 33 S.E.2d 29 (1945); Morgan v. Mertins, 198 Ga. 800, 33 S.E.2d 156 (1945); Owens v. Rutherford, 200 Ga. 143, 36 S.E.2d 309 (1945); Bowen v. Lewis, 201 Ga. 487, 40 S.E.2d 80 (1946); Nichols v. Pirkle, 202 Ga. 372, 43 S.E.2d 306 (1947); Mayor of Savannah v. Savannah Distrib. Co., 202 Ga. 559, 43 S.E.2d 704 (1947); Lashley v. McDowell, 75 Ga. App. 695, 44 S.E.2d 487 (1947); Christian v. Moreland, 203 Ga. 20, 45 S.E.2d 201 (1947); Brunswick Peninsular Corp. v. Daugharty, 203 Ga. 454, 47 S.E.2d 275 (1948); Irwin v. Torbert, 204 Ga. 111, 49 S.E.2d 70 (1948); City of Griffin v. Southeastern Textile Co., 204 Ga. 579, 50 S.E.2d 322 (1948); Hasty v. Hamrick, 205 Ga. 84, 52 S.E.2d 470 (1949); Calhoun County v. Early County, 205 Ga. 169, 52 S.E.2d 854 (1949); Houlihan v. Saussy, 206 Ga. 1, 55 S.E.2d 557 (1949); Norris v. McDaniel, 207 Ga. 232, 60 S.E.2d 329 (1950); Richards v. Richards, 85 Ga. App. 605, 69 S.E.2d 911 (1952); City of Atlanta v. Anglin, 209 Ga. 170, 71 S.E.2d 419 (1952); Mayor of Savannah v. Harvey, 87 Ga. App. 122, 73 S.E.2d 260 (1952); City of Atlanta v. Wilson, 209 Ga. 527, 74 S.E.2d 455 (1953); Phillips v. City of Atlanta, 210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E.2d 723 (1953); Herrod v. O'Beirne, 210 Ga. 476, 80 S.E.2d 684 (1954); City of Atlanta v. Sims, 210 Ga. 605, 82 S.E.2d 130 (1954); Richmond Concrete Prods. Co. v. Ward, 212 Ga. 773, 95 S.E.2d 677 (1956); Hansell v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 213 Ga. 205, 98 S.E.2d 622 (1957); Hannah v. State, 97 Ga. App. 188, 102 S.E.2d 624 (1958); Laurens County v. Keen, 214 Ga. 32, 102 S.E.2d 697 (1958); Sigman v. Brunswick Port Auth., 214 Ga. 332, 104 S.E.2d 467 (1958); Smith v. City of Albany, 97 Ga. App. 731, 104 S.E.2d 488 (1958); Barnett v. Boling, 214 Ga. 401, 105 S.E.2d 312 (1958); Hix v. Ramey, 214 Ga. 464, 105 S.E.2d 452 (1958); City of Macon v. Harrison, 98 Ga. App. 769, 106 S.E.2d 833 (1958); Lewis v. City Council, 215 Ga. 427, 110 S.E.2d 665 (1959); Smith v. Branch, 215 Ga. 744, 113 S.E.2d 445 (1960); Kennison v. Lee, 217 Ga. 155, 121 S.E.2d 821 (1961); Williams v. State, 217 Ga. 312, 122 S.E.2d 229 (1961); Cox v. DeJarnette, 104 Ga. App. 664, 123 S.E.2d 16 (1961); Willingham v. State, 104 Ga. App. 863, 123 S.E.2d 199 (1961); Vandiver v. Williams, 218 Ga. 60, 126 S.E.2d 210 (1962); Meeks v. Lunsford, 106 Ga. App. 154, 126 S.E.2d 531 (1962); Vandiver v. Williams, 106 Ga. App. 435, 127 S.E.2d 168 (1962)

Harper Motor Lines v. Roling, 218 Ga. 812, 130 S.E.2d 817 (1963); Stewart v. Davidson, 218 Ga. 760, 130 S.E.2d 822 (1963); Clark v. Kaylor, 219 Ga. 256, 132 S.E.2d 778 (1963); Stephenson v. State, 219 Ga. 652, 135 S.E.2d 380 (1964); Howard v. Housing Auth., 220 Ga. 640, 140 S.E.2d 880 (1965); Ralston Purina Co. v. Acrey, 220 Ga. 788, 142 S.E.2d 66 (1965); Henson v. Georgia Indus. Realty Co., 220 Ga. 857, 142 S.E.2d 219 (1965); Fleming v. Daniell, 221 Ga. 43, 142 S.E.2d 804 (1965); Stephens v. Moran, 221 Ga. 4, 142 S.E.2d 845 (1965); City of Columbus v. Atlanta Cigar Co., 111 Ga. App. 774, 143 S.E.2d 416 (1965); DuBose v. City of Lumpkin, 113 Ga. App. 297, 147 S.E.2d 837 (1966); Billingslea v. Flynt, 222 Ga. 444, 150 S.E.2d 678 (1966); Ingram v. Payton, 222 Ga. 503, 150 S.E.2d 825 (1966); Lee v. City of Jesup, 222 Ga. 530, 150 S.E.2d 836 (1966); Talley v. Sun Fin. Co., 223 Ga. 419, 156 S.E.2d 55 (1967); Cambron v. Cogburn, 118 Ga. App. 454, 164 S.E.2d 350 (1968); Dobson v. Brown, 225 Ga. 73, 166 S.E.2d 22 (1969); Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790 (1969); Local 574, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Floyd, 225 Ga. 625, 170 S.E.2d 394 (1969); Gainer v. Ellis, 226 Ga. 79, 172 S.E.2d 608 (1970); Flanigen v. Preferred Dev. Corp., 226 Ga. 267, 174 S.E.2d 425 (1970); Pye v. State Hwy. Dep't, 226 Ga. 389, 175 S.E.2d 510 (1970); Electro-Kinetics Corp. v. Wilson, 122 Ga. App. 171, 176 S.E.2d 604 (1970); Gresham v. Symmers, 227 Ga. 616, 182 S.E.2d 764 (1971); Laidler v. Smith, 227 Ga. 759, 182 S.E.2d 891 (1971); Forbes v. Lovett, 227 Ga. 772, 183 S.E.2d 371 (1971); Silverman v. Mayor of Savannah, 125 Ga. App. 41, 186 S.E.2d 447 (1971); Gordon v. Green, 228 Ga. 505, 186 S.E.2d 719 (1972); Marietta Broadcasting Co. v. Advance Mktg. Research, Inc., 231 Ga. 13, 200 S.E.2d 134 (1973); Webb v. Board of Comm'rs, 231 Ga. 365, 201 S.E.2d 462 (1973); Hodges v. Hodges, 231 Ga. 810, 204 S.E.2d 291 (1974); Edwards v. Bullard, 131 Ga. App. 34, 205 S.E.2d 115 (1974); Jackson v. Inman, 232 Ga. 566, 207 S.E.2d 475 (1974); Powell v. Board of Comm'rs of Rds. & Revenues, 234 Ga. 183, 214 S.E.2d 905 (1975); Sellers v. Home Furnishing Co., 235 Ga. 831, 222 S.E.2d 34 (1976); Evans v. City of Tifton, 138 Ga. App. 374, 226 S.E.2d 471 (1976); Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976); City of Atlanta v. Associated Bldrs. & Contractors, 143 Ga. App. 115, 237 S.E.2d 601 (1977); Thompson v. Hill, 143 Ga. App. 272, 238 S.E.2d 271 (1977); City of Atlanta v. Myers, 240 Ga. 261, 240 S.E.2d 60 (1977); Williams v. Richmond County, 241 Ga. 89, 243 S.E.2d 55 (1978); State v. Ramsey, 147 Ga. App. 150, 248 S.E.2d 289 (1978); Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. Odom, 242 Ga. 169, 249 S.E.2d 545 (1978); Lambert v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 645, 250 S.E.2d 456 (1978); Edmonds v. City of Albany, 242 Ga. 648, 250 S.E.2d 458 (1978); Cochran v. City of Rockmart, 242 Ga. 732, 251 S.E.2d 259 (1978); Savage v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 671, 251 S.E.2d 268 (1978); Gleason v. City Council, 242 Ga. 796, 251 S.E.2d 536 (1979); City of Columbus v. Ronald A. Edwards Constr. Co., 155 Ga. App. 502, 271 S.E.2d 643 (1980); McSears v. State, 247 Ga. 48, 273 S.E.2d 847 (1981); Chatham County v. Kiley, 249 Ga. 110, 288 S.E.2d 551 (1982); Clark & Stephenson v. State Personnel Bd., 252 Ga. 548, 314 S.E.2d 658 (1984); Bowen v. City of Columbus, 256 Ga. 462, 349 S.E.2d 740 (1986); Terrell County v. Albany/Dougherty Hosp. Auth., 256 Ga. 627, 352 S.E.2d 378 (1987); Brophy v. McCranie, 264 Ga. 187, 442 S.E.2d 230 (1994); Weldon v. Board of Comm'rs, 212 Ga. App. 885, 443 S.E.2d 513 (1994); Franklin County v. Fieldale Farms Corp., 270 Ga. 272, 507 S.E.2d 460 (1998); Nash v. Pierce, 238 Ga. App. 466, 519 S.E.2d 462 (1999); In re Estate of Dasher, 259 Ga. App. 201, 575 S.E.2d 921 (2002); City of Buford v. Ga. Power Co., 276 Ga. 590, 581 S.E.2d 16 (2003); Wheatley v. Moe's Southwest Grill, LLC, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2008); Smart v. State, 318 Ga. App. 882, 732 S.E.2d 850 (2012); Wilbros, LLC v. State, 294 Ga. 514, 755 S.E.2d 145 (2014); City of Brookhaven v. City of Chamblee, 329 Ga. App. 346, 765 S.E.2d 33 (2014); Zarate-Martinez v. Echemendia, 299 Ga. 301, 788 S.E.2d 405 (2016).

What constitutes general law.

- A law, to be general under this paragraph, must operate uniformly, throughout the whole state, upon the subject or class of subjects with which it proposes to deal. Lorentz & Rittler v. Alexander, 87 Ga. 444, 13 S.E. 632 (1891); Union Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga. 606, 34 S.E. 217 (1899) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV).

This paragraph requires a law to have uniform operation. Hortman v. Yarbrough, 214 Ga. 693, 107 S.E.2d 202 (1959); Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966); Cragg v. State, 224 Ga. 196, 160 S.E.2d 817 (1968); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV).

Uniformity does not mean universality. Hortman v. Yarbrough, 214 Ga. 693, 107 S.E.2d 202 (1959); Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975).

This paragraph does not mean that general laws may have no exceptions. McAllister v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 240 Ga. 246, 240 S.E.2d 247 (1977) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV).

Requirements for constitutional uniformity.

- A law shall apply to all persons, matters or things which it is intended to affect. Hortman v. Yarbrough, 214 Ga. 693, 107 S.E.2d 202 (1959); Nash v. National Preferred Life Ins. Co., 222 Ga. 14, 148 S.E.2d 402 (1966); Cragg v. State, 224 Ga. 196, 160 S.E.2d 817 (1968); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975).

This provision is complied with when the law operates uniformly upon all persons who are brought within the relations and circumstances provided by it. Hortman v. Yarbrough, 214 Ga. 693, 107 S.E.2d 202 (1959); Cragg v. State, 224 Ga. 196, 160 S.E.2d 817 (1968); Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975).

If an Act operates generally upon the entire class of subjects with which it deals, uniformly throughout the state, there is no merit in a constitutional attack based upon this paragraph. City of Calhoun v. North Ga. Elec. Membership Corp., 233 Ga. 759, 213 S.E.2d 596 (1975) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV).

If a law operates alike on all who come within the scope of its provisions, constitutional uniformity is secured. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975).

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-29.5(c) does not violate the uniformity provision of the Georgia Constitution, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV(a), because it is a general law; it operates uniformly upon all health care liability claims arising from emergency medical care, and classification of the designated class is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Gliemmo v. Cousineau, 287 Ga. 7, 694 S.E.2d 75 (2010).

School districts.

- There is no lack of uniformity in a section which applies to every board of education throughout the state in precisely the same way. Bedingfield v. Parkerson, 212 Ga. 654, 94 S.E.2d 714 (1956).

Independent school systems constitute one class and uniformity requires that they be treated alike. Rice v. Cook, 222 Ga. 499, 150 S.E.2d 822 (1966).

Abolition of local school districts by repeal of their corporate charters does not violate constitutional uniformity requirement. Upson County Sch. Dist. v. City of Thomaston, 248 Ga. 98, 281 S.E.2d 537 (1981).

General law may except certain persons or things.

- A law operating uniformly throughout the state, but from which the General Assembly excepts certain persons or things, is still a general law. McAllister v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 240 Ga. 246, 240 S.E.2d 247 (1977).

To be territorially general, law may not exclude any county.

- It is not necessary that every county in the state, at the time of the passage of a law, should fall within its operation, but it is necessary that none should be excepted in such a way that it can never fall within its provisions. Shadrick v. Bledsoe, 186 Ga. 345, 198 S.E. 535 (1938).

If a statute should except from its operation even one county, either by name, or by the use of such words as clearly indicate that the law can never apply to such county, the Act is lacking in the feature of territorial generality, and is therefore not a general law. Davis v. Board of Educ., 203 Ga. 44, 45 S.E.2d 429 (1947).

The exception of five named counties from the provisions of an Act prevented the Act from having uniform operation throughout the state. Davis v. Board of Educ., 203 Ga. 44, 45 S.E.2d 429 (1947).

Municipal charters need not be uniform.

- There is no requirement in the Constitution that there be uniformity in the charters of the municipalities. Harris v. McMillan, 186 Ga. 529, 198 S.E. 250 (1938).

O.C.G.A.

§ 9-11-68 is a general law and does not violate the uniformity clause. - The Tort Reform Act of 2005, O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68, does not violate the uniformity clause of the Georgia Constitution, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV(a), because § 9-11-68 is a general law since it applies uniformly throughout the state to all tort cases; the purpose of the general law to encourage litigants in tort cases to make and accept good faith settlement proposals in order to avoid unnecessary litigation is a legitimate legislative purpose, consistent with the state's strong public policy of encouraging negotiations and settlements, and the fact that the statute applies to tort cases, but not other civil actions, does not render it an impermissible special law. Smith v. Baptiste, 287 Ga. 23, 694 S.E.2d 83 (2010).

Exception to hotel/motel tax cap proper.

- O.C.G.A. § 48-13-51(a)(5)(B) was not unconstitutional under the Uniformity Clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV(a), but was a proper exception to the general law of § 48-13-51(a)(1)(D), which imposed a three percent cap on Hotel/Motel taxes, in that the statute applied uniformly on all taxing authorities within the scope of the statute's provisions, and because the classification made by the statute was not arbitrary or unreasonable. Cottrell v. Atlanta Dev. Auth., 297 Ga. 1, 770 S.E.2d 616 (2015).

Constitution does not prohibit special laws per se.

- The legislature may enact special laws affecting special classes, but it cannot do so if it has previously legislated in that area by general law nor may it do so if the classification of those affected is unreasonable. Lasseter v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 253 Ga. 227, 319 S.E.2d 824 (1984).

Special law conflicting with existing general law invalid.

- A special or local law dealing with a subject as to which provision has already been made by an existing general law is in conflict with that section and invalid. Cheatham v. Palmer, 176 Ga. 227, 167 S.E. 522 (1933).

Touching anything whatever of a local nature, there may be a local law, provided no existing general statute applies to it, but the same thing cannot be regulated one way by a general statute, and another way by a subsequent local statute. City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 19 S.E.2d 508 (1942).

An Act which deals with a subject matter for which provision has been made by an existing general law is repugnant to this paragraph, and is therefore null and void. Studstill v. Gary, 216 Ga. 268, 116 S.E.2d 213 (1960) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV).

Paragraph applies to all fields covered by general law.

- This paragraph is not limited to those fields and subjects which have been completely exhausted by a general law. It embraces every field and subject which has been covered, though superficially, by a general law. City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 19 S.E.2d 508 (1942) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV).

Paragraph applies to element embraced but not specifically dealt with in general law.

- The mere fact that a special law deals with some remote segment or element of the general subject embraced in the general law, which segment or element is not dealt with by the general law, does not alter the fact that such special law is enacted in a case where provision has been made by an existing general law. City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 19 S.E.2d 508 (1942); Giles v. Gibson, 208 Ga. 850, 69 S.E.2d 774 (1952); Pace v. City of Atlanta, 135 Ga. App. 399, 218 S.E.2d 128 (1975).

Conflict required.

- A special law does not conflict with a general law if it does not detract from or hinder the operation of the general law, but rather augments and strengthens it. Grovenstein v. Effingham County, 262 Ga. 45, 414 S.E.2d 207 (1992).

A local ordinance that effectively prohibited sales of alcoholic beverages to minors in a more restrictive manner than under O.C.G.A. § 3-3-2 was not a special law that was preempted by a general law. The local ordinance was authorized by Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV, and O.C.G.A. § 3-3-2 and did not result in a conflict. Grovenstein v. Effingham County, 262 Ga. 45, 414 S.E.2d 207 (1992).

Special or local law cannot repeal or modify general law.

- A general law may be repealed or modified by another general law, but it cannot be repealed or modified by a special or local law. City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 19 S.E.2d 508 (1942); Hood v. Burson, 194 Ga. 30, 20 S.E.2d 755 (1942); Irwin County Elec. Membership Corp. v. Haddock, 214 Ga. 682, 107 S.E.2d 195 (1959).

While a special law may not conflict with the general law in the sense that it has the effect of repealing some portion of the general law, nevertheless if the special law modifies it in any manner, either by expanding or contracting its meaning, such special law is obnoxious to the Constitution and cannot be sustained. City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 19 S.E.2d 508 (1942).

In the eye of the Constitution, every local law is special relative to a general law. City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 19 S.E.2d 508 (1942).

Special laws cannot change grand jury.

- The powers and duties of grand jury bodies, as stated by general laws, cannot be altered by any special laws to enlarge, diminish, modify, or change them. Bussell v. Youngblood, 239 Ga. 553, 238 S.E.2d 89 (1977).

Law territorially general cannot be made territorially special.

- General statutes can be killed, but not mutilated. The smallest of their territorial members cannot be cut off. City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 19 S.E.2d 508 (1942); Davis v. Board of Educ., 203 Ga. 44, 45 S.E.2d 429 (1947).

A law which is general by reason of its territorial comprehensiveness only can no more be limited in its operation territorially by a subsequent special law than can one which is general in the nature of its subject matter. Hood v. Burson, 194 Ga. 30, 20 S.E.2d 755 (1942).

There is no way to convert a statute territorially general into one territorially special. It may be altered at will, save that, whilst it has life it must live over the state with equal vigor, and can be excluded from no nook or corner in which there is a subject matter for its operation, and any of its attributes may be changed or destroyed except its territorial generality and uniformity, which must be as enduring as its life. Davis v. Board of Educ., 203 Ga. 44, 45 S.E.2d 429 (1947).

General law can only be affected by another general law.

- If a general law is not exhaustive and fails to reach every minute element of the subject dealt with, the only constitutional remedy for a more exhaustive legislative treatment is by amendment of the general law by a general enactment. It cannot be done by amending or supplementing the general law by a special law. City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 19 S.E.2d 508 (1942).

A general statute cannot cease to be general other than by another general statute repealing it. City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 19 S.E.2d 508 (1942); Hood v. Burson, 194 Ga. 30, 20 S.E.2d 755 (1942).

Terms of superior courts.

- When the legislature deals with superior courts in fixing the terms at which they are to be held in the several counties, it does so by general and not by special legislation. Burge v. Mangum, 134 Ga. 307, 67 S.E. 857 (1910); Geer v. Bush, 146 Ga. 701, 92 S.E. 47 (1917); Geer v. Colquitt Hdwe. & Furn. Co., 146 Ga. 811, 92 S.E. 515 (1917); Norris v. McDaniel, 207 Ga. 232, 60 S.E.2d 329 (1950).

Act fixing terms of a superior court and providing for attendance of grand juries thereat is a general law. Long v. State, 160 Ga. 292, 127 S.E. 842 (1925); Brown v. State, 242 Ga. 602, 250 S.E.2d 491 (1978).

Payment of clerk's salary based on local act versus general statute.

- 2007 Local Act was not unconstitutional based on the fact that subsection (a) of the 2007 Local Act authorized the superior court clerk to be paid less than what was required by O.C.G.A. § 15-6-88 because, according to the statute's plain language, the 2007 Local Act did not establish $56,000 as the salary for the clerk as the statute simply stated that the clerk's salary could not be less than $56,000; thus, it was not inconsistent on the statute's face with the terms of the statute requiring a clerk to be paid no less than the amount set by the county population schedule set forth in § 15-6-88. Chatham County v. Massey, 299 Ga. 595, 791 S.E.2d 85 (2016).

O.C.G.A.

§ 3-7-43 held unconstitutional. - O.C.G.A. § 3-7-43, pursuant to which a city and a county were issuing alcoholic beverage licenses to private clubs without previous voter approval, is unconstitutional as a special law in conflict with existing general law. Regency Club v. Stuckey, 253 Ga. 583, 324 S.E.2d 166 (1984).

Statute allowing claims against manufacturers or suppliers of asbestos.

- O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30.1, providing for the revival or extension of actions against manufacturers or suppliers of asbestos, does not meet constitutional standards because it singles out for special treatment property claims against manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos and differentiates them from all other claims that might be based upon other hazardous or toxic substances. Celotex Corp. v. St. Joseph Hosp., 259 Ga. 108, 376 S.E.2d 880 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S. Ct. 1138, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1990).

Zoning ordinances.

- The Zoning Procedures Law, O.C.G.A. § 36-66-1 et seq., preempted the provisions in a city charter for the purposes of the adoption and amendment of zoning ordinances. Little v. City of Lawrenceville, 272 Ga. 340, 528 S.E.2d 515 (2000).

Annexations properly invalidated.

- Judgment invalidating the City of Atlanta's attempted annexation of five areas was affirmed because the trial court correctly held that the annexations were invalid since at the time the annexations would have become effective, the areas in question were already part of the newly incorporated City of South Fulton and thus ineligible for annexation by Atlanta. City of Atlanta v. Mays, 301 Ga. 367, 801 S.E.2d 1 (2017).

War on Terrorism Local Assistance Act.

- Legislation enacting the War on Terrorism Local Assistance Act, O.C.G.A. § 36-75-11(c), does not violate Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV because the legislation and § 36-75-11(c) are logically related and do not embrace discordant subjects when the legislation generally pertains to public safety and judicial facilities authorities, and § 36-75-11(c) applies to authorities in counties that have activated public safety and judicial facilities authorities; it was the legislature's decision to enact a statute imposing a referendum requirement on any authority that has been authorized to incur bonded indebtedness in a county with an activated public safety and judicial facilities authority when that authority has constructed or operates buildings or facilities for use by a department, agency, division or commission of such county. Dev. Auth. v. State, 286 Ga. 36, 684 S.E.2d 856 (2009).

Provided classification relates to object of legislation.

- In order to constitutionally classify for legislation, the basis for classification must relate to the object or purpose of the legislation. City of Atlanta v. Wilson, 209 Ga. 527, 74 S.E.2d 455 (1953).

The basis of classification must have some reasonable relation to the subject matter of the law, and must furnish a legitimate ground of differentiation. City of Atlanta v. Gower, 216 Ga. 368, 116 S.E.2d 738 (1960); Jones v. City of College Park, 223 Ga. 778, 158 S.E.2d 384 (1967).

Classification cannot be unreasonable or arbitrary.

- Mere arbitrary discriminations are not permissible under the Constitution. City of Atlanta v. Gower, 216 Ga. 368, 116 S.E.2d 738 (1960).

A classification is valid if it relates to the subject matter of the legislation and is not unreasonable or arbitrary. Strickland v. Richmond County, 243 Ga. 462, 254 S.E.2d 844 (1979).

Must operate uniformly.

- A tax is not violative of this paragraph if applied uniformly. Underwriters Salvage Co. v. City of Atlanta, 174 Ga. 678, 163 S.E. 893 (1932) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV).

A law which operates uniformly upon all persons of a designated class is a general law within the meaning of the Constitution, provided that the classification thus made is not arbitrary or unreasonable. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Mann, 234 Ga. 884, 218 S.E.2d 593 (1975).

To be constitutional, it is necessary only that the law applies uniformly to the class or classes of persons or things affected by it, and that the classes included or excluded from its general effect are reasonable and not arbitrary. McAllister v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 240 Ga. 246, 240 S.E.2d 247 (1977).

Classification may not restrict Act's application to single county.

- While the legislature may make a classification for the purposes of legislation, and pass general laws with respect to different classes, it cannot place one county in a class for such purposes. If the attempted classification is so hedged about and restricted that the Act applies to only one county, and other counties cannot come within the class created, it is a local law and not a general one having operation throughout the state. Marbut v. Hollingshead, 172 Ga. 531, 158 S.E. 28 (1931).

May not restrict application to single county unless other counties may enter class.

- An Act is not unconstitutional as a special law at the time it is passed if it is reasonable and not arbitrary, and it provides that the class may be enlarged when other counties attain the characteristic of the member of the class. It is not necessarily a special law, even though it applies to but one county. Lawson v. State, 242 Ga. 744, 251 S.E.2d 304 (1978).

Effect of population bill carried forward from 1945 constitution.

- A 1952 amendment to the 1945 constitution, allowing the establishment of a joint board of tax assessors in a population category applying only to Fulton County and the City of Atlanta, was carried forward in the present constitution, and neither the amendment nor a 1952 implementing statute was unconstitutional. However, subsequent amendments which attempted to establish by local act any appeal system other than that specified in the 1952 amendment, and other amendments that attempted to change the population category affected by the 1952 amendment, were unconstitutional and void. Lomax v. Lee, 261 Ga. 575, 408 S.E.2d 788 (1991).

Classification of property for tax purposes.

- The General Assembly may fix the taxing situs of all tangible or intangible personal property, but it must be by general law, and classified according to the nature of the property, and not according to the nature of the owner. County of Walton v. County of Morgan, 120 Ga. 548, 48 S.E. 243 (1904).

Professions.

- Separate classification and treatment of architects, engineers, and contractors by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-51 from owners, tenants, and manufacturers is reasonable and not arbitrary. Mullis v. Southern Co. Servs., 250 Ga. 90, 296 S.E.2d 579 (1982).

Editor's notes.

- The cases noted under this heading were decided prior to the 1983 Constitution, which provides that no population bill shall be passed except as defined by the General Assembly.

Requirements for valid classification of counties by population are that: the bases of classification must have some reasonable relation to the subject matter of the law, and must furnish a legitimate ground of differentiation; the classification must be open to let in counties subsequently falling within the class, as well as open to let out a county which, either by increase or decrease of population, ceases to have the required population; and the law must apply uniformly to all counties within the class, and must not be so hedged about and restricted that the Act applies only to one county. Estes v. Jones, 203 Ga. 686, 48 S.E.2d 99 (1948).

The legislature would be authorized to make a classification of cities on the basis of population, and pass a general law with reference to such classification, provided the basis of classification has some reasonable relation to the subject matter of the law, and furnishes a legitimate ground for differentiation, and provided that the Act is so framed as to let in all cities coming within the population classification, and let out all cities falling below the classification. City of Atlanta v. Gower, 216 Ga. 368, 116 S.E.2d 738 (1960).

Reasonable relation to subject matter of legislation.

- A classification upon the basis of population is a reasonable and natural classification where it is adjusted to the purpose or subject matter of the legislation and, consequently, does not violate the Constitution. Orr v. Hapeville Realty Invs., Inc., 211 Ga. 235, 85 S.E.2d 20 (1954), overruled on other grounds, East Lands, Inc. v. Floyd County, 244 Ga. 761, 262 S.E.2d 51 (1979).

A population classification of not less than 145,000 but not more than 165,000 has no reasonable relationship to the subject matter of a statute. Strickland v. Richmond County, 243 Ga. 462, 254 S.E.2d 844 (1979).

Depends upon particular facts.

- Whether or not classification by population bears a reasonable relation to the subject matter of the statute depends largely upon the facts of each particular case. Strickland v. Richmond County, 243 Ga. 462, 254 S.E.2d 844 (1979).

Classification must be open to let in new county or city.

- Where the basis of classification is that of population, in order to be a general law it is necessary that such classification shall be open to let in any county or city which by any future census might have the stipulated population. Barge v. Camp, 209 Ga. 38, 70 S.E.2d 360 (1952); Commissioners of Rds. & Revenues v. Davis, 213 Ga. 792, 102 S.E.2d 180 (1958).

An Act which makes a classification by population must be open to let in counties subsequently falling within the class. Humthlett v. Reeves, 211 Ga. 210, 85 S.E.2d 25 (1954).

Classification which does not allow new county or city is not general law.

- Where a classification is made on the basis of population as to counties or cities, and the Act is so limited and restricted that all counties or cities which may come within the population class cannot come within the provisions of the Act, it is not a general law. City of Atlanta v. Gower, 216 Ga. 368, 116 S.E.2d 738 (1960).

Classification of counties based upon population of an adjoining county is purely arbitrary. Humthlett v. Reeves, 211 Ga. 210, 85 S.E.2d 25 (1954).

The population of one county cannot have any reasonable relation to the subject matter of a statute dealing with establishing cemeteries so as to make it applicable to an adjoining county. Humthlett v. Reeves, 211 Ga. 210, 85 S.E.2d 25 (1954).

Classification by population permitted.

- Acts providing for a cadastral survey in certain counties would not have been unconstitutional, illegal, and void even had such Acts named certain counties rather than fixing a classification based on population since the purpose of such Acts was to confer upon the proper governing authority of counties falling within the fixed classification additional powers and duties. Hutchins v. Candler, 209 Ga. 415, 73 S.E.2d 191 (1952).

O.C.G.A. § 15-9-120(2), granting the right to a jury trial in the probate courts of counties with a certain population according to the 1990 decennial census "or any future such census", was not an unconstitutional special law, under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV(a), because the statute's use of the disjunctive "or" gave the statute the elasticity required to make the statute a general law as this allowed counties to move into or out of this class of counties according to the latest census. Ellis v. Johnson, 291 Ga. 127, 728 S.E.2d 200 (2012).

Classification not permitted.

- A section purporting to create a classification of counties for the purpose of levying a school tax solely upon the basis of population is unconstitutional. Southern Ry. v. Harrison, 172 Ga. 465, 157 S.E. 462 (1931).

Population as the sole basis for the attempted classification of counties to be excluded from the privilege of fishing noncommercially on Sunday is discriminatory and repugnant. McAllister v. State, 220 Ga. 570, 140 S.E.2d 828 (1965).

The portion of a section allowing tax collectors in counties of certain populations to retain a different percentage of school taxes collected than that specified in the general law for the collection of county school taxes was a special law in violation of a general law and was held invalid because the population bracket used applied to only one county and there was no rational relationship between the population bracket used and the subject matter of the law. Board of Comm'rs v. Clayton County Sch. Dist., 250 Ga. 244, 297 S.E.2d 724 (1982).

For a classification by population to render a statute general instead of special, the statute must not only be open to let in counties later falling within the class, but must be open to let out a county that by increase or decrease according to the last census ceases to have the required population, so as not to freeze a county within the original population restriction. Dougherty Co. v. Bush, 227 Ga. 137, 179 S.E.2d 343 (1971).

Municipal ordinance is "special law."

- A municipal ordinance which deals with matters covered by a general law is a special law within the meaning of this paragraph. Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758, 75 S.E.2d 815 (1953) (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV).

Generally, a municipal ordinance passed in pursuance of express legislative authority is a law within the meaning of the Constitution, and has the same effect as a local law duly enacted by the state legislature. Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758, 75 S.E.2d 815 (1953).

A municipal ordinance is nothing more than a special law limiting its application to the territory embraced within the municipality. Pace v. City of Atlanta, 135 Ga. App. 399, 218 S.E.2d 128 (1975).

Penal ordinance yields to state law.

- A municipal ordinance which penalizes an act made penal by existing state law covering the same subject matter must yield to the state law. City of Albany v. Key, 124 Ga. App. 16, 183 S.E.2d 20 (1971).

Ordinance may not infringe upon acts made penal by state law. Harper v. State, 135 Ga. App. 924, 219 S.E.2d 636 (1975).

Municipal ordinance must differ from state statute.

- Where a municipal ordinance and a public criminal statute operate upon the same state of physical acts, the ordinance is invalid unless the offense created thereby contains some characterizing ingredient not contained in the state offense. Jenkins v. Jones, 209 Ga. 758, 75 S.E.2d 815 (1953).

A municipality may by ordinance penalize an act which is forbidden by the penal laws of the state, if there is in the municipal offense some essential ingredient not essential to the state offense, or if the municipal offense lacks some ingredient essential to the state offense. Goldstein v. City of Atlanta, 141 Ga. App. 701, 234 S.E.2d 344, cert. dismissed, 239 Ga. 843, 240 S.E.2d 551 (1977).

Municipalities may not penalize an act which is also forbidden by a state penal law unless there is an "essential" or "characterizing" ingredient in the municipal offense which is not essential to or contained in the state offense. This is the test intended to be applied in determining the validity of a local ordinance, when there exists a general law on the same subject, and there is no express legislative authorization for the special law. Akin v. Hardison, 245 Ga. 57, 262 S.E.2d 814 (1980).

Municipal ordinance must affect peace and good order of municipality.

- The act which the municipality seeks to punish as a municipal offense must be such as affects the peace and good order of the municipality and contain some characterizing ingredient not contained in the state offense. Gordon v. Green, 228 Ga. 505, 186 S.E.2d 719 (1972).

Power of municipality conferred by general legislative Act.

- The ordinance of a city penalizing a lesser speed than is penalized by the statute of the state is merely supplemental to the statute. The legislative Acts regulating the speed of motor vehicles within the state specifically authorize municipalities to regulate traffic within the municipal limits. Walters v. State, 90 Ga. App. 360, 83 S.E.2d 48 (1954).

The power of a municipality to punish as a municipal offense that which is by general law of the state also a state offense must be conferred by a general rather than a special Act of the legislature and the grant of such power must be clearly expressed. Gordon v. Green, 228 Ga. 505, 186 S.E.2d 719 (1972).

Authority must be clear and unequivocal.

- The General Assembly may authorize the punishment of an act as a city offense which would also be a state offense, provided the terms of the Act conferring the authority are clear and unequivocal and manifest a legislative intent to confer authority for the punishment of such act. Akin v. Hardison, 245 Ga. 57, 262 S.E.2d 814 (1980).

Municipal ordinance that augments general law.

- There is no unconstitutional conflict between the state minimum wage law and a city ordinance where the ordinance does not detract from or hinder the operation of the minimum wage law, but rather it augments and strengthens it. City of Atlanta v. Associated Bldrs. & Contractors, 240 Ga. 655, 242 S.E.2d 139 (1978).

Municipal charter's authority insufficient.

- The mere authority granted in a municipal charter to enact ordinances for the general welfare is not a sufficient delegation of the municipality's authority. Gordon v. Green, 228 Ga. 505, 186 S.E.2d 719 (1972).

Special ordinances, conflicting with a general ordinance, may be passed. Brown v. Atlanta Ry. & Power Co., 113 Ga. 462, 39 S.E. 71 (1901); Sawyer v. City of Blakely, 2 Ga. App. 159, 58 S.E. 399 (1907).

Express authorization for ordinance.

- Subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 3-3-2 constituted an express authorization by general law for Effingham County to exercise by local ordinance the police power of revoking licenses for the sale of beer and wine, provided that the ordinance met the requirement of subsection (a) of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV. Grovenstein v. Effingham County, 262 Ga. 45, 414 S.E.2d 207 (1992).

Municipality's unconstitutional regulation of practice of law.

- An occupational tax ordinance levied on professionals and requiring registration and a fee payment at the beginning of each year, prior to the transaction of business, operated as an unconstitutional precondition on the practice of law. Sexton v. City of Jonesboro, 267 Ga. 571, 481 S.E.2d 818 (1997).

Ordinance holding surety liable on criminal appearance bond until fine collected deemed constitutional.

- Section 4-1009(6) of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Macon, which seeks to hold the surety liable on a criminal appearance bond until the fine imposed is collected, does not conflict with Georgia case law, is authorized by O.C.G.A. § 36-32-4, which authorizes municipal corporations to make provision by ordinance as to what constitutes the forfeiture of bonds given by offenders for their appearance before municipal courts, and does not conflict with O.C.G.A. § 17-6-31 (surrender on surety bonds); for these reasons, there has not been preemption by the state in this area of regulatory activity. Therefore, § 4-1009(6) is not unconstitutional under Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV. City of Macon v. Davis, 251 Ga. 332, 305 S.E.2d 116 (1983).

Ordinance providing certain insurance benefits for dependents of city employees who qualified and registered as domestic partners, which defined "dependent" consistent with state law, did not violate the Georgia Constitution or the Municipal Home Rule Act. City of Atlanta v. Morgan, 268 Ga. 586, 492 S.E.2d 193 (1997).

City's ordinances prohibiting the use of amphibious vehicles as tour vehicles in parts of the city were not preempted by the state law giving the Public Service Commission the authority to issue certificates of public convenience and necessity; the ordinances fall within the constitutional exception to the doctrine of preemption since the General Assembly enacted general laws authorizing the local government to exercise its police powers and enact the local laws at issue. Old South Duck Tours, Inc. v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah, 272 Ga. 869, 535 S.E.2d 751 (2000).

County ordinance was proper use of police power.

- Since the stated purpose of Gwinnett County, Ga., Ord. No. 82-11 was to impede the sale of stolen property, and its requirements were designed to achieve that end, it was a proper use of the county's police power; further, by expressly preserving local laws in O.C.G.A. § 44-12-135, which included county ordinances, the legislature had in effect "authorized" them, and so Gwinnett County, Ga., Ord. No. 82-11 did not conflict with O.C.G.A. § 44-12-138. Pawnmart, Inc. v. Gwinnett County, 279 Ga. 19, 608 S.E.2d 639 (2005).

City ordinance regarding discontinuance of water service pre-empted.

- Pursuant to the uniformity clause of Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV(a), § 154-120(1) of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Ga., which authorized the discontinuance of water service until a bill was paid, was pre-empted by O.C.G.A. § 36-60-17(a), which did not allow a supplier to refuse to supply water to a water meter because of a prior owner's indebtedness. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 285 Ga. 189, 674 S.E.2d 905 (2009).

City ordinance regulating age of persons who could enter adult entertainment establishments.

- Trial court erred by rejecting entertainers' challenge under the uniformity clause, Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV(a), to a city's ordinance prohibiting persons aged 18 to 21 from entering adult entertainment establishments where alcohol was served because the ordinance conflicted with O.C.G.A. § 3-3-24(a), allowing persons over 18 to work in such establishments. Willis v. City of Atlanta, 285 Ga. 775, 684 S.E.2d 271 (2009).

Ordinance did not impair operation of state law.

- Definition of "public sidewalk" found in City of Forest Park, Ga., Ordinance § 9-8-45(f) is not unconstitutional as conflicting with state law because nothing in § 9-8-45 impairs the operation of O.C.G.A. § 40-1-1(57); by its specific terms, § 40-1-1(57), is not intended to be a definition of general application, but defines the term "sidewalk" in the context of Title 40 of the Georgia Code, which is labeled "Motor Vehicles and Traffic," and it does not appear that the definition set forth in § 40-1-1(57) would apply elsewhere in the Code in which the word "sidewalk" is used in other contexts. Braley v. City of Forest Park, 286 Ga. 760, 692 S.E.2d 595 (2010).

Ordinance not preempted by statute.

- Miller County, Ga., Ordinance No. 10-01, § 3 could not be preempted by O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14 because § 3 did not impair the statute's operation but rather strengthened and augmented the statute; the exception in § 3 was more narrow than in O.C.G.A. § 36-1-14, requiring that a majority of the Board of Commissioners of Miller County approve the contract or transaction after establishing that the goods, and the County had authority, as an incident of the county's home rule power, to amend Ga. L. 1983, p. 4594, § 14. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Callan, 290 Ga. 327, 720 S.E.2d 608 (2012).

Ordinance imposing an occupational tax.

- City ordinance imposing an occupational tax on attorneys who maintain an office and practice law in the city did not violate constitutional equal protection because the tax paid for a variety of city services that benefited all citizens within the city, including attorneys, it was reasonable for the city to require attorneys with offices inside city limits to help pay for city services from which the attorneys benefit, and all attorneys subject to the ordinance were taxed uniformly. Moss v. City of Dunwoody, 293 Ga. 858, 750 S.E.2d 326 (2013).

Editor's notes.

- In light of the similarity of the provisions, decisions under former Ga. Const. 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Para. VII, Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Paras. VI and VII, and antecedent provisions, are included in the annotations for this paragraph. The 1983 Constitution now provides that counties shall have such governing authorities as are provided by the 1983 Constitution (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. I) and by law.

No requirement as to uniformity.

- There is no constitutional requirement as to uniformity where the duties and powers of county commissioners are concerned. Deason v. DeKalb County, 222 Ga. 63, 148 S.E.2d 414 (1966).

Paragraph does not apply.

- There is good reason to construe Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VI (no comparable provision) as being separate and distinct in its requirements from the provisions of this paragraph prohibiting the passing of special laws where there is already an existing general law. Toole v. Anderson, 177 Ga. 814, 171 S.E. 714 (1933).

The purpose of this paragraph was to ordain the uniform operation throughout the state of all the general laws; but to this general rule the Constitution itself made an exception as to county commissioners (Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Para. VII [no comparable provision]), which sanctions the utmost diversity consistent with the needs of the particular county that may require them. Bradford v. Hammond, 179 Ga. 40, 175 S.E. 18 (1934); Hutchins v. Candler, 209 Ga. 415, 73 S.E.2d 191 (1952).

The constitutional provision prohibiting special laws in cases for which provision has been made by general law does not apply to statutes defining the powers of a county governing authority. SCA Servs. of Ga., Inc. v. Fulton County, 238 Ga. 154, 231 S.E.2d 774 (1977).

Creation of duties by special Acts.

- There is no limitation or restriction upon the General Assembly in the creation by special law of county commissioners, and in fixing their jurisdiction, powers, and duties. Hutchins v. Candler, 209 Ga. 415, 73 S.E.2d 191 (1952).

Local law invalidated in compensation dispute.

- Trial court correctly held that a county solicitor general was improperly compensated beginning in July 2007 but erred in calculating the back pay due to him as of January 1, 2009, based on an amended local law because the amended local law irreconcilably conflicted with O.C.G.A. § 15-18-67(b), which prohibited the reduction of a solicitor-general's compensation during his term of office. Inagawa v. Fayette County, 291 Ga. 715, 732 S.E.2d 421 (2012).

This paragraph has been construed together with Ga. Const. 1976, Art. IX, Sec. I, Paras. VI and VII (no comparable provisions) to impose very little restriction on the General Assembly in creating and defining the duties of county commissioners by special Act. The General Assembly has the power to pass separate and distinct laws creating county commissioners for every county in Georgia. Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975).

Inapplicability of general laws.

- General laws, so far as they refer to county commissioners, are subject to qualification by special Acts, and the special Acts need not be uniform. Robitzsch v. State, 189 Ga. 637, 7 S.E.2d 387 (1940); Moore v. Whaley, 189 Ga. 647, 7 S.E.2d 394 (1940).

The provisions of general laws enacted by the legislature do not apply to county commissioners, unless made so by the special laws creating them. Humthlett v. Reeves, 211 Ga. 210, 85 S.E.2d 25 (1954); Smith v. Abercrombie, 235 Ga. 741, 221 S.E.2d 802 (1975).

Intent of paragraph.

- This paragraph was intended to ensure that once the legislature enters a field by enacting a general law, that field is thereafter to be reserved exclusively for general legislation and cannot be open to special or local laws. Thus, once the General Assembly has legislated in an area, such legislation preempts additional action in the form of special or local laws. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-150.

Local ordinance covering same subject as a general law must conform with the provisions of the general law, but may exact additional requirements. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-149.

General air pollution law does not preclude local ordinances.

- The existence of general air pollution laws does not necessarily preclude the adoption of local ordinances on the same subject provided such ordinances are of a nonpenal nature, are provided for the protection of the health, safety, and comfort of the community and are not prohibited by express or implied language in the general law. 1971 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 71-149.

Invalidation of special laws.

- A local or special law is invalidated by the second clause of this paragraph only where a general law covering the subject already exists, while the first clause of this paragraph invalidates local or special legislation even where no general law dealing with the subject matter exists. 1954-56 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 375 (see Ga. Const. 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Para. IV).

Local law providing for salary.

- Local legislation can be used to supplement by salary the fees of the ordinary (now judge of the probate court) and sheriff of a particular county. 1952-53 Op. Att'y Gen. p. 24.

Municipal ordinances creating status of domestic partnership.

- Municipal ordinances which create the status of domestic partnership are violative of constitutional and statutory provisions precluding municipal legislation relating to legal status and relationship; thus, group health insurance coverage provided pursuant to such ordinances is violative of the public policy of this state. 1993 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 93-26.

Glue sniffing ordinance prohibited.

- A city may not adopt an ordinance prohibiting glue sniffing, already denounced by a state statute. 1970 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U70-59.

Local Act requiring special election before expiration of 29 days between call of election and election itself is invalid. 1980 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-27.

Evacuation to protect lives and property is exercise of government's inherent "police powers." 1983 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 83-60.

Fire ordinances for day care centers.

- The authority of local governments to enact fire ordinances for day care centers is preempted by former O.C.G.A. § 49-5-14 which gave the Board of Human Resources authority to adopt fire safety codes for day care centers. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-9.

Residency requirements for candidates for Board of Commissioners.

- The provisions of the local Act establishing a requirement that candidates for the Board of Commissioners of Clay County be residents of the commissioner districts from which they are seeking election for a period of at least five years immediately preceding the date of the election is unenforceable as being a local Act in derogation of general law. 1984 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U84-31.

Local regulation of air pollutants.

- While local governments are not preempted from regulating in the area of air quality control, any ordinance in this area which contradicts or detracts from the Georgia Air Quality Act, O.C.G.A. § 12-9-1 et seq., would be unconstitutional and void. 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U86-22.

Local licensing of journeymen electricians.

- The State Construction Industry Licensing Board Act, O.C.G.A. Ch. 14, T. 43, prohibits a municipality or county from establishing licensing requirements for journeyman electricians since any local provision would constitute a local law in conflict with the general provision. 1987 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 87-3.

Payroll deduction programs for public employees.

- Political subdivisions may establish payroll deduction programs for public employees provided that there is statutory authority to do so and that the programs are not unconstitutional gratuities. The General Assembly, by acting in this area through various general statutory provisions, intended to permit local governments to utilize payroll deduction plans only in limited circumstances as outlined in those kinds of general laws; there is no general law authorizing local governments to undertake payroll deduction programs either through the passage of local law or through local ordinances. Absent authority to engage in such programs through the enactment of local laws, the most appropriate method for their implementation would be through the passage of general laws. 2014 Op. Att'y Gen. No. U2014-3.

Am. Jur. 2d.

- 16A Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, §§ 284 et seq., 312 et seq., 319 et seq.

C.J.S.

- 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 280.

ALR.

- Constitutional provisions against special legislation relating to counties or municipalities as affected by the distinction between their political and nonpolitical character, 50 A.L.R. 1163.

Constitutional provision prohibiting local or special legislation as applied to statutes relating to juries, 155 A.L.R. 789.

Validity of statutory classifications based on population - intoxicating liquor statutes, 100 A.L.R.3d 850.