41 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People of Michigan v. Lovell Charles Sharpegreen2 sentences2026If new information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the evidence described in subsection (1)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1). -9- In People v Sharpe, 502 Mich 313, 327 ; 918 NW2d 504 (2018), our Supreme Court explained: The rape-shield statute generally prohibits the admission of “[(1)] [e]vidence of specific instances of the complainant’s sexual conduct, [(2)] opinion evidence of the complainant’s sexual conduct, and [(3)] reputation evidence of the complainan 2026If new information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the evidence described in subsection (1)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1). -9- In People v Sharpe, 502 Mich 313, 327 ; 918 NW2d 504 (2018), our Supreme Court explained: The rape-shield statute generally prohibits the admission of “[(1)] [e]vidence of specific instances of the complainant’s sexual conduct, [(2)] opinion evidence of the complainant’s sexual conduct, and [(3)] reputation evidence of the complainan | 2 | 3 |
People v. Underwoodgreen2 sentences2025In People v Underwood, 447 Mich 695, 706 ; 526 NW2d 903 (1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted), our Supreme Court determined that when disclosure of an informant’s identity was requested, a balancing should occur that involves an in camera hearing: Thus, where the government invokes the privilege in the face of a defense request for disclosure, and where the accused is able to demonstrate a possible need for the informant’s testimony, the trial judge should require production of the informant and conduct a hearing in chambers, and out of the presence of the defendant. 2025In People v Underwood, 447 Mich 695, 706 ; 526 NW2d 903 (1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted), our Supreme Court determined that when disclosure of an informant’s identity was requested, a balancing should occur that involves an in camera hearing: Thus, where the government invokes the privilege in the face of a defense request for disclosure, and where the accused is able to demonstrate a possible need for the informant’s testimony, the trial judge should require production of the informant and conduct a hearing in chambers, and out of the presence of the defendant. | 1 | 6 |
Chambers v. Mississippigreen2 sentences1982If new information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the evidence described in subsection (l)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge may order an in camera hearing to determine, whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1).” II Defendant contends that these statutory prohibitions infringe upon his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, see Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308 ; 94 S Ct 1105 ; 39 L Ed 2d 347 (1974), Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284 ; 93 S Ct 1038 ; 35 L Ed 2d 297 (1973). *8 In Chambers, supra, 295 , the Supreme Court stated: "The right of cross-ex 1982If new information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the evidence described in subsection (l)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge may order an in camera hearing to determine, whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1).” II Defendant contends that these statutory prohibitions infringe upon his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, see Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308 ; 94 S Ct 1105 ; 39 L Ed 2d 347 (1974), Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284 ; 93 S Ct 1038 ; 35 L Ed 2d 297 (1973). *8 In Chambers, supra, 295 , the Supreme Court stated: "The right of cross-ex | 1 | 3 |
Davis v. Alaskagreen2 sentences1982If new information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the evidence described in subsection (l)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge may order an in camera hearing to determine, whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1).” II Defendant contends that these statutory prohibitions infringe upon his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, see Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308 ; 94 S Ct 1105 ; 39 L Ed 2d 347 (1974), Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284 ; 93 S Ct 1038 ; 35 L Ed 2d 297 (1973). *8 In Chambers, supra, 295 , the Supreme Court stated: "The right of cross-ex 1982If new information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the evidence described in subsection (l)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge may order an in camera hearing to determine, whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1).” II Defendant contends that these statutory prohibitions infringe upon his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, see Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308 ; 94 S Ct 1105 ; 39 L Ed 2d 347 (1974), Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284 ; 93 S Ct 1038 ; 35 L Ed 2d 297 (1973). *8 In Chambers, supra, 295 , the Supreme Court stated: "The right of cross-ex | 1 | 2 |
People v. Shipleygreen1 sentence2026See Shipley, 256 Mich App at 373 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Davis-Christiangreen1 sentence2024See Davis-Christian, 316 Mich App at 212-213 (providing, “Unlike defendant Caruso, who arguably articulated a need to ascertain a specific piece of evidence to prove a fact material to his defense, defendant’s assertion of need merely voices a hope of corroborating evidence, untethered to any articulable facts”). | 1 | 1 |
Davila v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Tollett therefore bars this claim.”); United States v Bohn, 956 F2d 208, 209 (CA 9,1992) (holding that the defendant’s plea waived the argument that he was deprived of Sixth Amendment counsel during an in camera hearing that determined the validity of one of his defenses); Davila v State, 831 P2d 204, 206 (Wy, 1992) (“Denial of the right to representation does not implicate ‘the very power of the state to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him,’ and would not have prevented a trial.”) (citation omitted); State v Spates, 64 Ohio St 3d 269, 273; 595 NE2d 351 (199 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Colegreen2 sentences2023See People v Cole, 491 Mich 325 , 332 n 6; 817 NW2d 497 (2012) (“No-contest pleas are essentially admissions of all the elements of the charged offense and are treated the same as guilty pleas for purposes of the case in which the no-contest plea is entered.”), citing New, 427 Mich at 493 n 10. 3 either before trial or as part of the plea process. 2023See People v Cole, 491 Mich 325 , 332 n 6; 817 NW2d 497 (2012) (“No-contest pleas are essentially admissions of all the elements of the charged offense and are treated the same as guilty pleas for purposes of the case in which the no-contest plea is entered.”), citing New, 427 Mich at 493 n 10. 3 either before trial or as part of the plea process. | 1 | 1 |
Delaware v. Van Arsdallgreen2 sentences2009This process is found at MCL 750.520j(2); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 153 , 111 S.Ct. 1743 , 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991). [50] Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). [51] Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). [52] Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). 2009This process is found at MCL 750.520j(2); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 153 , 111 S.Ct. 1743 , 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991). [50] Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). [51] Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). [52] Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Lucasgreen2 sentences2009This process is found at MCL 750.520j(2); see also Michigan v Lucas, 500 US 145, 153 (1991). 2009This process is found at MCL 750.520j(2); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 153 , 111 S.Ct. 1743 , 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991). [50] Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). [51] Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). [52] Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dutton v. Evansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roviaro v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hackett
green
2 sentences2026If new information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the evidence described in subsection (1)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge -3- may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1). [Footnote omitted.] “In exercising its discretion, the trial court should be mindful of the significant legislative purposes underlying the rape-shield statute and should always favor exclusion of evidence of a complainant’s sexual conduct where its exclusion would not unconstitutionally abridge the defendant’s right to confrontation 2026If new information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the evidence described in subsection (1)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge -3- may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1). [Footnote omitted.] “In exercising its discretion, the trial court should be mindful of the significant legislative purposes underlying the rape-shield statute and should always favor exclusion of evidence of a complainant’s sexual conduct where its exclusion would not unconstitutionally abridge the defendant’s right to confrontation | 8 | 1993–2026 |
People v. Morse
green
2 sentences2025Finding this authority persuasive, Morse held that, when determining the admissibility of evidence that is otherwise inadmissible under the rape-shield statute for the purpose of complying with a defendant’s right of confrontation, courts are required to conduct an in camera hearing to determine whether “(1) defendant’s proffered evidence is relevant, (2) defendant can show that another person was convicted of criminal sexual conduct involving the complainant[], and (3) the facts underlying the previous conviction are significantly similar to be relevant to the instant proceeding.” Morse, 231 2023At this in camera hearing, the trial court must determine whether (1) defendant’s proffered evidence is relevant, (2) defendant can show that another person was convicted of criminal sexual conduct involving the complainants, and (3) the facts underlying the previous conviction are significantly similar to be relevant to the instant proceeding. [Morse, 231 Mich App at 437 .] The trial court held an in camera hearing and concluded that evidence of prior sexual abuse by Uncle Robby did not satisfy the Morse test for admissibility because there was no evidence of a conviction related to the prior | 6 | 2016–2025 |
People v. Arenda
green
2 sentences2018The statute also reflects a belief that "inquiries into sex histories, even when minimally relevant, carry a danger of unfairly prejudicing and misleading the jury." Arenda , 416 Mich. at 10 , 330 N.W.2d 814 . 2018The statute also reflects a belief that "inquiries into sex histories, even when minimally relevant, carry a danger of unfairly prejudicing and misleading the jury." Arenda , 416 Mich. at 10 , 330 N.W.2d 814 . | 6 | 2017–2018 |
People v. Henry
green
2 sentences2024As this Court has explained, “Generally, the people are not required to disclose the identity of confidential informants,” People v Henry (After Remand), 305 Mich App 127, 156 ; 854 NW2d 114 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted), but “when a defendant demonstrates a possible need for the informant’s testimony, a trial court should order the informant produced and conduct an in camera hearing to determine if the informant could offer any testimony beneficial to the defense,” id., citing Underwood, 447 Mich at 705-706 . 2024But if a defendant establishes “a possible need for the informant’s testimony, a trial court should order the informant produced and conduct an in camera hearing to determine if the informant could offer any testimony beneficial to the defense.” Id. | 3 | 2016–2024 |
People v. Stander
green
2 sentences1994The proper procedure for determining the appropriateness of disclosure was explained in People v Stander, 73 Mich App 617, 622-623 ; 251 NW2d 258 (1977): The procedural vehicle generally recognized as being the most useful for helping a trial judge to strike the appropriate balance between these competing interests is the in camera hearing .... [Citations omitted.] Thus, where the government invokes the privilege in the face of a defense request for disclosure, and where the accused is able to demonstrate a possible need for the informant’s testimony, the trial judge should require production 1994The proper procedure for determining the appropriateness of disclosure was explained in People v Stander, 73 Mich App 617, 622-623 ; 251 NW2d 258 (1977): The procedural vehicle generally recognized as being the most useful for helping a trial judge to strike the appropriate balance between these competing interests is the in camera hearing .... [Citations omitted.] Thus, where the government invokes the privilege in the face of a defense request for disclosure, and where the accused is able to demonstrate a possible need for the informant’s testimony, the trial judge should require production | 3 | 1979–1998 |
People v. Byrne
green
2 sentences2023This Court has held that an in camera hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence of a complainant’s past sexual conduct must be held “on the record, but outside the presence of the jury and the public, thereby facilitating the task of appellate review.” Byrne, 199 Mich App at 679 . 2023This Court has held that an in camera hearing to determine the admissibility of evidence of a complainant’s past sexual conduct must be held “on the record, but outside the presence of the jury and the public, thereby facilitating the task of appellate review.” Byrne, 199 Mich App at 679 . | 2 | 1994–2023 |
People v. Duenaz
green
2 sentences2017When a defendant seeks admission of evidence excluded by the rape-shield statute, trial courts must “inform their exercise of discretion in regard to such a constitutional claim by conducting an in camera hearing.” Duenaz, 306 Mich App at 93 , citing People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 349 ; 365 NW2de 120 (1984). 2017When a defendant seeks admission of evidence excluded by the rape-shield statute, trial courts must “inform their exercise of discretion in regard to such a constitutional claim by conducting an in camera hearing.” Duenaz, 306 Mich App at 93 , citing People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 349 ; 365 NW2de 120 (1984). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Watkins; People v. Pullen
green
2 sentences2017As written, the statute represents “a valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy.” People v Watkins, 491 Mich 450, 480 ; 818 NW2d 296 (2012) (citation omitted). 2017As written, the statute represents “a valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy.” People v Watkins, 491 Mich 450, 480 ; 818 NW2d 296 (2012) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Burghdoff v. Burghdoff
green
2 sentences2001Were it not for the precedential effect of Hilliard, a majority of the Molloy panel would have reversed the trial court’s decision under the best interest factors and remanded for a new child custody hearing pursuant to Burghdoff v Burghdoff, 66 Mich App 608 ; 239 NW2d 679 (1976), which held that an in camera hearing should be confined to those matters reasonably necessary to enable the judge to determine the preference of the child. 2 We resolve this conflict by holding that the purpose and questioning of an in camera interview is limited to determining the child’s preference. 2001Were it not for the precedential effect of Hilliard, a majority of the Molloy panel would have reversed the trial court’s decision under the best interest factors and remanded for a new child custody hearing pursuant to Burghdoff v Burghdoff, 66 Mich App 608 ; 239 NW2d 679 (1976), which held that an in camera hearing should be confined to those matters reasonably necessary to enable the judge to determine the preference of the child. 2 We resolve this conflict by holding that the purpose and questioning of an in camera interview is limited to determining the child’s preference. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Fassihi v. St. Mary Hospital
green
2 sentences1999We find it unnecessary to remand for an in camera hearing before the trial court pursuant to Fassihi, supra at 16 . 1991In support of his argument that the tax returns should have been produced for an in camera hearing, plaintiff cites Fassihi v St Mary Hosp of Livonia, 121 Mich App 11 ; 328 NW2d 132 (1982). | 2 | 1991–1999 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2025However, this would equate with the “fishing expedition” that is warned against in Butler, 513 Mich at 31, and Williams, 191 Mich App at 273-274 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Powell v. State
green
1 sentence2023Tollett therefore bars this claim.”); United States v Bohn, 956 F2d 208, 209 (CA 9,1992) (holding that the defendant’s plea waived the argument that he was deprived of Sixth Amendment counsel during an in camera hearing that determined the validity of one of his defenses); Davila v State, 831 P2d 204, 206 (Wy, 1992) (“Denial of the right to representation does not implicate ‘the very power of the state to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him,’ and would not have prevented a trial.”) (citation omitted); State v Spates, 64 Ohio St 3d 269, 273; 595 NE2d 351 (199 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. New
green
1 sentence2023See People v Cole, 491 Mich 325 , 332 n 6; 817 NW2d 497 (2012) (“No-contest pleas are essentially admissions of all the elements of the charged offense and are treated the same as guilty pleas for purposes of the case in which the no-contest plea is entered.”), citing New, 427 Mich at 493 n 10. 3 either before trial or as part of the plea process. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Spates
green
1 sentence2023Tollett therefore bars this claim.”); United States v Bohn, 956 F2d 208, 209 (CA 9,1992) (holding that the defendant’s plea waived the argument that he was deprived of Sixth Amendment counsel during an in camera hearing that determined the validity of one of his defenses); Davila v State, 831 P2d 204, 206 (Wy, 1992) (“Denial of the right to representation does not implicate ‘the very power of the state to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him,’ and would not have prevented a trial.”) (citation omitted); State v Spates, 64 Ohio St 3d 269, 273; 595 NE2d 351 (199 | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Stanaway
green
2 sentences2016For this reason, an in camera hearing is not necessary if a defendant fails to state “specific articulable facts that would indicate that the requested confidential communications were necessary to a preparation of his defense.” Id. at 681-682 . 2016Id. at 681 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Laws
green
2 sentences2016People v Phillips, 468 Mich 583, 587 ; 663 NW2d 463 (2003); People v Laws, 218 Mich App 447, 455 ; 554 NW2d 586 (1996). 2016People v Phillips, 468 Mich 583, 587 ; 663 NW2d 463 (2003); People v Laws, 218 Mich App 447, 455 ; 554 NW2d 586 (1996). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Phillips
green
2 sentences2016People v Phillips, 468 Mich 583, 587 ; 663 NW2d 463 (2003); People v Laws, 218 Mich App 447, 455 ; 554 NW2d 586 (1996). 2016People v Phillips, 468 Mich 583, 587 ; 663 NW2d 463 (2003); People v Laws, 218 Mich App 447, 455 ; 554 NW2d 586 (1996). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hilliard v. Schmidt
green
2 sentences2001Specifically, this Court held in Hilliard, supra, pp. 320-321 , 586 N.W.2d 263 : While Lesauskis, supra, and Burghdoff, supra, dealt with the propriety of in camera interviews to determine the reasonable preference of a child whose custody was at issue, we conclude that such in camera interviews should not be limited to aiding in the assessment of that single best interests of the child factor. 2001Specifically, this Court held in Hilliard, supra, pp 320-321: While Lesauskis, supra, and Burghdoff, supra, dealt with the propriety of in camera interviews to determine the reasonable preference of a child whose custody was at issue, we conclude that such in camera interviews should not be limited to aiding in the assessment of that single best interests of the child factor. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Lesauskis v. Lesauskis
green
1 sentence2001Specifically, this Court held in Hilliard, supra, pp 320-321: While Lesauskis, supra, and Burghdoff, supra, dealt with the propriety of in camera interviews to determine the reasonable preference of a child whose custody was at issue, we conclude that such in camera interviews should not be limited to aiding in the assessment of that single best interests of the child factor. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Schechet v. Kesten
green
1 sentence2000We don’t know where the disclosure will lead, perhaps nowhere, but the trial judge can amply protect privi *475 leged information in the in camera proceeding. [Id., 624-625.] In dissent, Judge Mackenzie argued that the majority’s opinion took an unjustifiably narrow reading of the psychiatrist-patient privilege and ran contrary to Schechet, supra. Id., 626-627. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Porter v. Michigan Osteopathic Hospital Ass'n neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Lucas green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Bruton v. United States green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| People v. Aldridge green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Wechsler v. United States green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Pennsylvania v. Felton green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.