camera hearing in Illinois

2020See id. ¶ 35 After the in camera hearing, the court conducted a pretrial conference to resolve any disputed issues relevant to the allocation of disputed parental responsibilities.

2017The Reed court did not reference Rule 415, but rather, cited Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984), for the proposition that it is the appellant’s burden to provide a record adequate to support his claims of error, and that in the absence of an adequate record, all doubts must be resolved against the appellant and it must be presumed that the trial court’s ruling had a sufficient legal and factual basis.

2017App. 3d at 332 , 343 Ill.Dec. 544 , 935 N.E.2d 552 and In re Manuel M. , 2017 IL App (1st) 162381 , ¶ 26, 410 Ill.Dec. 852 , 71 N.E.3d 1131 , we found that the in camera hearing should occur "outside the presence of both the State and the defense." These cases have expressly concluded that the State may not have any role during the hearing. ¶ 34 Illustrative in resolving this conflict are other criminal cases in which a privilege has been invoked to prevent the disclosure of certain evidence.

2017App. 3d at 332 , 343 Ill.Dec. 544 , 935 N.E.2d 552 and In re Manuel M. , 2017 IL App (1st) 162381 , ¶ 26, 410 Ill.Dec. 852 , 71 N.E.3d 1131 , we found that the in camera hearing should occur "outside the presence of both the State and the defense." These cases have expressly concluded that the State may not have any role during the hearing. ¶ 34 Illustrative in resolving this conflict are other criminal cases in which a privilege has been invoked to prevent the disclosure of certain evidence.

2017People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 81 (1990). -8­ No. 1-16-2381 ¶ 26 In Knight, the court held that, in balancing the public’s interest in nondisclosure of a surveillance point against the need of the defendant for disclosure in order to defend himself, “the trial court should order an in camera hearing out of the presence of defendant and defense counsel ***[, at which] the State witness must reveal the surveillance location from which the defendant was watched.” Knight, 323 Ill.

2017People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 81 (1990). ¶ 25 In Knight, the court held that, in balancing the public’s interest in nondisclosure of a surveillance point against the need of the defendant for disclosure in order to defend himself, “the trial court should order an in camera hearing out of the presence of defendant and defense counsel ***[, at which] the State witness must reveal the surveillance location from which the defendant was watched.” Knight, 323 Ill.

2018Id. ¶ 25 In determining whether the privilege applies, the trial court may conduct an in camera hearing, outside the presence of the State and the defense.

2017People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 81 (1990). ¶ 25 In Knight, the court held that, in balancing the public’s interest in nondisclosure of a surveillance point against the need of the defendant for disclosure in order to defend himself, “the trial court should order an in camera hearing out of the presence of defendant and defense counsel ***[, at which] the State witness must reveal the surveillance location from which the defendant was watched.” Knight, 323 Ill.

2018The in camera hearing is intended to be a limited inquiry of the surveillance officer on potentially privileged matters (see In re Manuel M., 2017 IL App (1st) 162381, ¶ 26 ), not expanded into the functional equivalent of that officer’s trial testimony.

2018App. 3d at 332 , and In re Manuel M., 2017 IL App (1st) 162381, ¶ 26 , we found that the in camera hearing should occur “outside the presence of both the State and the defense.” These cases have expressly concluded that the State may not have any role during the hearing. ¶ 34 Illustrative in resolving this conflict are other criminal cases in which a privilege has been invoked to prevent the disclosure of certain evidence.

2018See id. ¶ 20 Moreover, even if the State had argued that defendant forfeited his specific claim that, during the in camera hearing, the trial court improperly failed to ascertain Frano’s exact surveillance location, we would likewise find such an argument meritless.

2017See id. ¶ 20 Moreover, even if the State had argued that defendant forfeited his specific claim that, during the in camera hearing, the trial court improperly failed to ascertain Frano's exact surveillance location, we would likewise find such an argument meritless.

2002See In re Estate of Bagus , 294 Ill.

2002See In re Estate of Bagus, 294 Ill.

2001At this hearing "the State must make a preliminary showing that disclosure of the surveillance location would harm the public interests and should therefore remain privileged." State v. Zenquis , 131 N.J. 84, 88 ; 618 A.2d 335, 337 (1993).

2001At this hearing "the State must make a preliminary showing that disclosure of the surveillance location would harm the public interests and should therefore remain privileged." State v. Zenquis , 131 N.J. 84, 88 ; 618 A.2d 335, 337 (1993).

2018For example, in People v. Holmes, 155 Ill.

2017For example, in People v. Holmes , 155 Ill.

2026Mnookin, 2018 IL App (1st) 171107, ¶¶ 1, 7-13 . ¶ 37 In summary, we find no indication in any of these cases that the appellate court has intended to authorize a procedure whereby the trial court is placed in the position of conducting an in camera privilege review of hundreds or thousands of pages of documents without receiving affidavits to establish the facts necessary to show that the information under review is within the scope of the Medical Studies Act privilege.

2024“The cross-examination of a witness is necessarily exploratory and the attorney often cannot know in advance what facts may be elicited on cross- examination.” People v. Kellas, 72 Ill.

2020Rather, there must be prejudice in the absence to warrant reversal.”); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 875 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding, inter alia, that “if there be a -6- category of plain errors affecting substantial rights ‘independent of any prejudicial impact,’ absence from portions of a jury voir dire is not among them”); United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980, 987 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that “[a]n in-chambers conference concerning the dismissal of a juror, while a stage of the trial within the meaning of [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43], is not a stage of the trial when the ab

2020See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the district court judge’s meeting with a juror regarding possible misconduct outside the defendant’s presence did not deprive him of any constitutional or statutory right and may have actually encouraged the juror to speak openly); United States v. Long, 301 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that a district court did not err when it allowed the defendant’s counsel to represent him at an in camera inquiry into possible juror misconduct); United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 535 (6th Cir.

2020See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the district court judge’s meeting with a juror regarding possible misconduct outside the defendant’s presence did not deprive him of any constitutional or statutory right and may have actually encouraged the juror to speak openly); United States v. Long, 301 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that a district court did not err when it allowed the defendant’s counsel to represent him at an in camera inquiry into possible juror misconduct); United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 535 (6th Cir.

2020See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the district court judge’s meeting with a juror regarding possible misconduct outside the defendant’s presence did not deprive him of any constitutional or statutory right and may have actually encouraged the juror to speak openly); United States v. Long, 301 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (holding that a district court did not err when it allowed the defendant’s counsel to represent him at an in camera inquiry into possible juror misconduct); United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 535 (6th Cir.

2020Rather, there must be prejudice in the absence to warrant reversal.”); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 875 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding, inter alia, that “if there be a -6- category of plain errors affecting substantial rights ‘independent of any prejudicial impact,’ absence from portions of a jury voir dire is not among them”); United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980, 987 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that “[a]n in-chambers conference concerning the dismissal of a juror, while a stage of the trial within the meaning of [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43], is not a stage of the trial when the ab

2012Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391 (1984); see also People v. Fair, 193 Ill. 2d 256, 264 (2000) (applying Foutch in criminal appeal).

2009Considering the public’s interest in keeping the surveillance location a secret, the relative insignificance of the exact point of surveillance in light of the specificity uncovered on cross-examination and the court’s examination (.People v. Quinn, 332 Ill.

2009See Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d at 210 .