camera hearing in Massachusetts

2020See Long, 454 Mass. at 552 ; Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511, 522 (1990) (judge has discretion "to order an in camera hearing where the defendant by affidavit asserts facts which cast a reasonable doubt on the veracity of material representations made by the affiant concerning a confidential informant"). 11 Rodriguez.

2014“In Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511, 522, 525 (1990), the Supreme Judicial Court held that a defendant, under a less stringent test than Franks , may be entitled to an in camera hearing to determine whether he or she must receive a Franks hearing.” Commonwealth v. DeMatos, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 733 (2010).

2020When, for example, a judge conducts an in camera hearing on a witness's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination pursuant to Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 504-505 (1996), the transcript of that hearing is a part of the record on appeal and is reviewed by the appellate court but is not accessible to the parties under any circumstances.

2017The judge found that statement was not sufficiently reliable. 15 In light of the defendant's acquittal on the kidnapping and assault charges on November 9, 2013, we need not address the reliability of Jane's statements regarding those allegations. 16 The judge conducted an in camera hearing with Rodriguez and her counsel pursuant to Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496 (1996), to determine whether the invocation of her Fifth Amendment privilege was valid.

1993See Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 409 Mass. 867, 882-883 (1991). * Language in brackets applies only to records of the Department of Social Services (DSS) or other State agencies, which must comply with the Fair Information Practices Act, G.

1991L. c. 119, §§ 51A and 5IB, records regarding the underlying notification and investigation of the alleged abuse, 6 Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 409 Mass. 867, 884 (1991), indicates that Arthur’s counsel may, under an appropriate protective order, be permitted to examine the DSS records to search for evidence of the complainant’s bias, prejudice, motive to lie, or prior inconsistent statements; the admissibility of any such evidence is to be passed on by the trial judge at an in camera hearing. 7 3.

2015“The nature of the in camera hearing is left to the discretion of the judge, who may, in light of the particular facts, determine whether the presence of counsel is necessary or appropriate.” Id. at 472 n.15, citing Commonwealth v. Lugo, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 494, 504 (1987), S.C., 406 Mass. 565 (1990).

2008See Commonwealth v. Douzanis, 384 Mass. 434, 443 (1981) (“except in an in camera proceeding,” judge should not require “disclosure of the identity of an informant. . . without some reason apparent on the record”); Commonwealth v. Lugo, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 494 (1987), S.C., 406 Mass. 565 (1990) (court vacated ruling on motion in limine and directed trial judge to hold in camera hearing to determine whether defendant was entitled to disclosure of surveillance location analogous to informant privilege, when it was unclear on record whether judge acted within discretion in granting Commonwealth’s mo

2008As to the judge’s decision to conduct an in camera hearing, this court noted that “[wjhere disclosure of a confidential informant is at issue, ‘[t]he use of an in camera procedure has been recognized in the Commonwealth, by other courts, and by commentators.’ ” Id. at 705 n.6, quoting Commonwealth v. Douzanis, supra at 441-442 .

2008In Commonwealth v. Douzanis, 384 Mass. 434 , 442 n.13 (1981), in the context of a hearing contending the truthfulness of information contained in a search warrant affidavit, under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), where the defendant’s guilt was not at stake, “we [thought] the judge in his discretion may permit the prosecutor to be present.” In Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511, 525 (1990), the Court determined, also in the Franks context, that the judge may conduct the in camera hearing without counsel, or he may permit the prosecutor, but not defense counsel, to attend the hearing.

1993Such a requirement would produce a less-inclusive result in that possibly material, or even exculpatory, communications would remain undiscovered. 7 We do not encroach on the well-settled principle that “the government has the obligation to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 404 Mass. 339, 343 (1989), quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987). 8 The judge may postpone a decision on a pretrial request to discover privileged records, thereby allowing the issue to mature. 9 We pause

1991Cf. Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 269 (1986); Commonwealth v. Jones, supra at 345 (Lynch, J. dissenting).

1990See, e.g., United States v. Kiser, 716 F.2d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Hurse, 453 F.2d 128, 130-131 (8th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); United States v. Brian, supra at 766 . [10] Other courts have held that a defendant is entitled to an in camera hearing even absent the "substantial preliminary showing" of falsity required by Franks .

1990Other courts have held that a defendant is entitled to an in camera hearing even absent the “substantial preliminary showing” of falsity required by Franks , See State v. Casal, 103 Wash. 2d 812, 818-820 (1985) (where defendant “casts a reasonable doubt” as to veracity of material representations made by the affiant, judge should exercise discretion to conduct in camera hearing on veracity issue); United States v. Brian, supra at 766 (where defendant makes “some minimal showing of inconsistency on the face of the government’s material” which supports assertion of deliberate or reckless disrega

2018"In a case where it is not clear from the record that disclosure of an informant's identity would provide something material to the defense, a judge may hold an in camera hearing to assist in making that determination." Commonwealth v. Dias , 451 Mass. 463 , 472 (2008).

2015“The nature of the in camera hearing is left to the discretion of the judge, who may, in light of the particular facts, determine whether the presence of counsel is necessary or appropriate.” Id. at 472 n.15, citing Commonwealth v. Lugo, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 494, 504 (1987), S.C., 406 Mass. 565 (1990).

2015See generally Commonwealth v. Shaughessy, 455 Mass. 346, 354 (2009), and cases cited. 25 Any second-stage balancing in which the judge may have engaged implicitly was premature and, consequently, misplaced. 26 If the pretrial motion was not meritorious, but new circumstances permit the informant’s identity to be disclosed (whether now or in the future), the defendant may seek a new trial upon a showing that newly discovered evidence “would probably have been a real factor in the jury’s deliberations.” Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 617 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 3

1989I agree with the court that this result is not mandated by Commonwealth v. Liebman, 388 Mass. 483 (1983).

2001“In any case, the judge shall set forth in writing the reasons for the decision in a memorandum of decision.” Commonwealth v. Bishop, supra at 183 .* ****** 8 But the parties were not required to provide the Stage Four written motions; the judge did not set forth in writing the reasons for her decision; and, as far as the record reveals, no hearing (in court or in camera) was held.

1993Such is not the case in Stage 3 (“access to relevant material”) where the SJC specifically includes “the prosecutor," or Stage 4 (“disclosure of relevant communications”) where the judge is directed to make a decision based on “written motions by the parties and an in camera hearing as the judge sees necessary.” Id. at 183 (emphasis added).

2020See Long, 454 Mass. at 552 ; Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511, 522 (1990) (judge has discretion "to order an in camera hearing where the defendant by affidavit asserts facts which cast a reasonable doubt on the veracity of material representations made by the affiant concerning a confidential informant"). 11 Rodriguez.

2020See Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 827 , 834- 835 (2009); Commonwealth v. Pixley, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 628 (2010).

2020See Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 827 , 834- 835 (2009); Commonwealth v. Pixley, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 628 (2010).

2015See Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290, 295-296 (2008).

2015See Commonwealth v. Sanders, 451 Mass. 290 , 295–296 (2008).

2015See generally Commonwealth v. Shaughessy, 455 Mass. 346, 354 (2009), and cases cited. 25 Any second-stage balancing in which the judge may have engaged implicitly was premature and, consequently, misplaced. 26 If the pretrial motion was not meritorious, but new circumstances permit the informant’s identity to be disclosed (whether now or in the future), the defendant may seek a new trial upon a showing that newly discovered evidence “would probably have been a real factor in the jury’s deliberations.” Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 617 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 3

2015See generally Commonwealth v. Shaughessy, 455 Mass. 346, 354 (2009), and cases cited. 25 Any second-stage balancing in which the judge may have engaged implicitly was premature and, consequently, misplaced. 26 If the pretrial motion was not meritorious, but new circumstances permit the informant’s identity to be disclosed (whether now or in the future), the defendant may seek a new trial upon a showing that newly discovered evidence “would probably have been a real factor in the jury’s deliberations.” Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 617 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 3

2015See generally Commonwealth v. Shaughessy, 455 Mass. 346, 354 (2009), and cases cited. 25 Any second-stage balancing in which the judge may have engaged implicitly was premature and, consequently, misplaced. 26 If the pretrial motion was not meritorious, but new circumstances permit the informant’s identity to be disclosed (whether now or in the future), the defendant may seek a new trial upon a showing that newly discovered evidence “would probably have been a real factor in the jury’s deliberations.” Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 617 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 3

2015See generally Commonwealth v. Shaughessy, 455 Mass. 346, 354 (2009), and cases cited. 25 Any second-stage balancing in which the judge may have engaged implicitly was premature and, consequently, misplaced. 26 If the pretrial motion was not meritorious, but new circumstances permit the informant’s identity to be disclosed (whether now or in the future), the defendant may seek a new trial upon a showing that newly discovered evidence “would probably have been a real factor in the jury’s deliberations.” Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 617 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 3

2015See generally Commonwealth v. Shaughessy, 455 Mass. 346, 354 (2009), and cases cited. 25 Any second-stage balancing in which the judge may have engaged implicitly was premature and, consequently, misplaced. 26 If the pretrial motion was not meritorious, but new circumstances permit the informant’s identity to be disclosed (whether now or in the future), the defendant may seek a new trial upon a showing that newly discovered evidence “would probably have been a real factor in the jury’s deliberations.” Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 617 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 3

2015See generally Commonwealth v. Shaughessy, 455 Mass. 346, 354 (2009), and cases cited. 25 Any second-stage balancing in which the judge may have engaged implicitly was premature and, consequently, misplaced. 26 If the pretrial motion was not meritorious, but new circumstances permit the informant’s identity to be disclosed (whether now or in the future), the defendant may seek a new trial upon a showing that newly discovered evidence “would probably have been a real factor in the jury’s deliberations.” Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 617 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 3

2009Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 146 (2006).