18 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Douzanisgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Douzanis, 425 N.E.2d 326, 331 (Mass. 1981) (“[A] judge would not abuse his discretion in deciding to hold . . . a Franks-type hearing where, as here, a defendant under oath on the basis of personal knowledge challenges the truth of material statements attributed to the informant, and he also asserts . . . that there could have been no informant at all.”); State v. Casal, 699 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Wash. 1985) (“A more reasonable rule requires the trial court to exercise its discretion to order an in camera hearing where the defendant’s affidavit casts a reasonable doubt on 2021See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Douzanis, 425 N.E.2d 326, 331 (Mass. 1981) (“[A] judge would not abuse his discretion in deciding to hold . . . a Franks-type hearing where, as here, a defendant under oath on the basis of personal knowledge challenges the truth of material statements attributed to the informant, and he also asserts . . . that there could have been no informant at all.”); State v. Casal, 699 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Wash. 1985) (“A more reasonable rule requires the trial court to exercise its discretion to order an in camera hearing where the defendant’s affidavit casts a reasonable doubt on | 2 | 2 |
State v. Casalgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Douzanis, 425 N.E.2d 326, 331 (Mass. 1981) (“[A] judge would not abuse his discretion in deciding to hold . . . a Franks-type hearing where, as here, a defendant under oath on the basis of personal knowledge challenges the truth of material statements attributed to the informant, and he also asserts . . . that there could have been no informant at all.”); State v. Casal, 699 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Wash. 1985) (“A more reasonable rule requires the trial court to exercise its discretion to order an in camera hearing where the defendant’s affidavit casts a reasonable doubt on 2021See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Douzanis, 425 N.E.2d 326, 331 (Mass. 1981) (“[A] judge would not abuse his discretion in deciding to hold . . . a Franks-type hearing where, as here, a defendant under oath on the basis of personal knowledge challenges the truth of material statements attributed to the informant, and he also asserts . . . that there could have been no informant at all.”); State v. Casal, 699 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Wash. 1985) (“A more reasonable rule requires the trial court to exercise its discretion to order an in camera hearing where the defendant’s affidavit casts a reasonable doubt on | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Ramirezgreen2 sentences2021Over forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court in Franks recognized that the warrant requirement “would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer was able to use deliberately falsified allegations to demonstrate probable cause, and, having misled the magistrate, then was able to remain confident that the ploy was worthwhile.” 438 U.S. at 168 ; accord Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 617 N.E.2d 983, 990 (Mass. 1993) (“[T]he public interest in deterring police misconduct requires the trial judge to exercise his or her discretion to order an in camera hearing where the defendant by affidavit ass 2021Over forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court in Franks recognized that the warrant requirement “would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer was able to use deliberately falsified allegations to demonstrate probable cause, and, having misled the magistrate, then was able to remain confident that the ploy was worthwhile.” 438 U.S. at 168 ; accord Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 617 N.E.2d 983, 990 (Mass. 1993) (“[T]he public interest in deterring police misconduct requires the trial judge to exercise his or her discretion to order an in camera hearing where the defendant by affidavit ass | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Amralgreen2 sentences2021Over forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court in Franks recognized that the warrant requirement “would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer was able to use deliberately falsified allegations to demonstrate probable cause, and, having misled the magistrate, then was able to remain confident that the ploy was worthwhile.” 438 U.S. at 168 ; accord Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 617 N.E.2d 983, 990 (Mass. 1993) (“[T]he public interest in deterring police misconduct requires the trial judge to exercise his or her discretion to order an in camera hearing where the defendant by affidavit ass 2021Over forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court in Franks recognized that the warrant requirement “would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer was able to use deliberately falsified allegations to demonstrate probable cause, and, having misled the magistrate, then was able to remain confident that the ploy was worthwhile.” 438 U.S. at 168 ; accord Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 617 N.E.2d 983, 990 (Mass. 1993) (“[T]he public interest in deterring police misconduct requires the trial judge to exercise his or her discretion to order an in camera hearing where the defendant by affidavit ass | 2 | 2 |
State v. Scherzergreen2 sentences2010"Critical stages" have been defined as "`anything ... new to the proceeding and in conflict with ... [the] right to be confronted by the witnesses, to be represented by counsel, and to maintain... [the] defense upon the merits.'" State v. Trent, 157 N.J.Super. 231, 241 , 384 A. 2d 888 (App.Div.1978) (quoting State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 433 , 67 A. 2d 175 (1949)) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979); see also State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 447-48 , 694 A. 2d 196 (App.Div.) (critical stage includes portion of trial where court receives evidence) 2010"Critical stages" have been defined as "`anything ... new to the proceeding and in conflict with ... [the] right to be confronted by the witnesses, to be represented by counsel, and to maintain... [the] defense upon the merits.'" State v. Trent, 157 N.J.Super. 231, 241 , 384 A. 2d 888 (App.Div.1978) (quoting State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 433 , 67 A. 2d 175 (1949)) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979); see also State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 447-48 , 694 A. 2d 196 (App.Div.) (critical stage includes portion of trial where court receives evidence) | 1 | 1 |
State v. Penningtongreen1 sentence2010"Critical stages" have been defined as "`anything ... new to the proceeding and in conflict with ... [the] right to be confronted by the witnesses, to be represented by counsel, and to maintain... [the] defense upon the merits.'" State v. Trent, 157 N.J.Super. 231, 241 , 384 A. 2d 888 (App.Div.1978) (quoting State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 433 , 67 A. 2d 175 (1949)) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979); see also State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 447-48 , 694 A. 2d 196 (App.Div.) (critical stage includes portion of trial where court receives evidence) | 1 | 1 |
People v. Moltrergreen1 sentence2010The State urges that a material witness hearing is not a "critical stage" of the criminal proceedings because such hearings are ministerial in nature and are not concerned with evidentiary matters or the guilt or innocence of the defendant, citing People v. Moltrer, 893 P. 2d 1331, 1333-34 (Colo.App.1994), cert. denied, No. 94SC676, 1995 Colo. LEXIS 355 (Colo. May 8, 1995); People v. McDonald, 322 Ill.App.3d 244 , 255 Ill.Dec. 684 , 749 N.E. 2d 1066, 1069-71 (2001), appeal denied, 202 Ill. 2d 642 , 272 Ill.Dec. 349 , 787 N.E. 2d 164 (2002); Lester v. Commonwealth, 132 S.W. 3d 857, 860-62 (Ky.2 | 1 | 1 |
Lester v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2010The State urges that a material witness hearing is not a "critical stage" of the criminal proceedings because such hearings are ministerial in nature and are not concerned with evidentiary matters or the guilt or innocence of the defendant, citing People v. Moltrer, 893 P. 2d 1331, 1333-34 (Colo.App.1994), cert. denied, No. 94SC676, 1995 Colo. LEXIS 355 (Colo. May 8, 1995); People v. McDonald, 322 Ill.App.3d 244 , 255 Ill.Dec. 684 , 749 N.E. 2d 1066, 1069-71 (2001), appeal denied, 202 Ill. 2d 642 , 272 Ill.Dec. 349 , 787 N.E. 2d 164 (2002); Lester v. Commonwealth, 132 S.W. 3d 857, 860-62 (Ky.2 | 1 | 1 |
People v. McDonaldgreen2 sentences2010The State urges that a material witness hearing is not a "critical stage" of the criminal proceedings because such hearings are ministerial in nature and are not concerned with evidentiary matters or the guilt or innocence of the defendant, citing People v. Moltrer, 893 P. 2d 1331, 1333-34 (Colo.App.1994), cert. denied, No. 94SC676, 1995 Colo. LEXIS 355 (Colo. May 8, 1995); People v. McDonald, 322 Ill.App.3d 244 , 255 Ill.Dec. 684 , 749 N.E. 2d 1066, 1069-71 (2001), appeal denied, 202 Ill. 2d 642 , 272 Ill.Dec. 349 , 787 N.E. 2d 164 (2002); Lester v. Commonwealth, 132 S.W. 3d 857, 860-62 (Ky.2 2010The State urges that a material witness hearing is not a "critical stage" of the criminal proceedings because such hearings are ministerial in nature and are not concerned with evidentiary matters or the guilt or innocence of the defendant, citing People v. Moltrer, 893 P. 2d 1331, 1333-34 (Colo.App.1994), cert. denied, No. 94SC676, 1995 Colo. LEXIS 355 (Colo. May 8, 1995); People v. McDonald, 322 Ill.App.3d 244 , 255 Ill.Dec. 684 , 749 N.E. 2d 1066, 1069-71 (2001), appeal denied, 202 Ill. 2d 642 , 272 Ill.Dec. 349 , 787 N.E. 2d 164 (2002); Lester v. Commonwealth, 132 S.W. 3d 857, 860-62 (Ky.2 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Saundersgreen1 sentence1998Compare State v. G.S., 278 N.J.Super. 151, 169 , 650 A.2d 819 (App.Div.1994), reversed on other grounds, 145 N.J. 460 , 678 A.2d 1092 (1996), in which the child victim testified at the pretrial in camera hearing, and United States v. Saunders, 736 F.Supp. 698, 700 (E.D.Va.1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1105 , 112 S.Ct. 1199 , 117 L.Ed.2d 439 (1992), in which an FBI agent, the victim, and the defendant testified at the in camera hearing. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Henry Saundersgreen1 sentence1998Compare State v. G.S., 278 N.J.Super. 151, 169 , 650 A.2d 819 (App.Div.1994), reversed on other grounds, 145 N.J. 460 , 678 A.2d 1092 (1996), in which the child victim testified at the pretrial in camera hearing, and United States v. Saunders, 736 F.Supp. 698, 700 (E.D.Va.1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1105 , 112 S.Ct. 1199 , 117 L.Ed.2d 439 (1992), in which an FBI agent, the victim, and the defendant testified at the in camera hearing. | 1 | 1 |
State v. GSgreen2 sentences1998Compare State v. G.S., 278 N.J.Super. 151, 169 , 650 A.2d 819 (App.Div.1994), reversed on other grounds, 145 N.J. 460 , 678 A.2d 1092 (1996), in which the child victim testified at the pretrial in camera hearing, and United States v. Saunders, 736 F.Supp. 698, 700 (E.D.Va.1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1105 , 112 S.Ct. 1199 , 117 L.Ed.2d 439 (1992), in which an FBI agent, the victim, and the defendant testified at the in camera hearing. 1998Compare State v. G.S., 278 N.J.Super. 151, 169 , 650 A.2d 819 (App.Div.1994), reversed on other grounds, 145 N.J. 460 , 678 A.2d 1092 (1996), in which the child victim testified at the pretrial in camera hearing, and United States v. Saunders, 736 F.Supp. 698, 700 (E.D.Va.1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1105 , 112 S.Ct. 1199 , 117 L.Ed.2d 439 (1992), in which an FBI agent, the victim, and the defendant testified at the in camera hearing. | 1 | 1 |
State v. GSgreen2 sentences1998Compare State v. G.S., 278 N.J.Super. 151, 169 , 650 A.2d 819 (App.Div.1994), reversed on other grounds, 145 N.J. 460 , 678 A.2d 1092 (1996), in which the child victim testified at the pretrial in camera hearing, and United States v. Saunders, 736 F.Supp. 698, 700 (E.D.Va.1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1105 , 112 S.Ct. 1199 , 117 L.Ed.2d 439 (1992), in which an FBI agent, the victim, and the defendant testified at the in camera hearing. 1998Compare State v. G.S., 278 N.J.Super. 151, 169 , 650 A.2d 819 (App.Div.1994), reversed on other grounds, 145 N.J. 460 , 678 A.2d 1092 (1996), in which the child victim testified at the pretrial in camera hearing, and United States v. Saunders, 736 F.Supp. 698, 700 (E.D.Va.1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1105 , 112 S.Ct. 1199 , 117 L.Ed.2d 439 (1992), in which an FBI agent, the victim, and the defendant testified at the in camera hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Spence v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1998Compare State v. G.S., 278 N.J.Super. 151, 169 , 650 A.2d 819 (App.Div.1994), reversed on other grounds, 145 N.J. 460 , 678 A.2d 1092 (1996), in which the child victim testified at the pretrial in camera hearing, and United States v. Saunders, 736 F.Supp. 698, 700 (E.D.Va.1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1105 , 112 S.Ct. 1199 , 117 L.Ed.2d 439 (1992), in which an FBI agent, the victim, and the defendant testified at the in camera hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Casey v. Harrellgreen1 sentence1998Compare State v. G.S., 278 N.J.Super. 151, 169 , 650 A.2d 819 (App.Div.1994), reversed on other grounds, 145 N.J. 460 , 678 A.2d 1092 (1996), in which the child victim testified at the pretrial in camera hearing, and United States v. Saunders, 736 F.Supp. 698, 700 (E.D.Va.1990), aff'd, 943 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1105 , 112 S.Ct. 1199 , 117 L.Ed.2d 439 (1992), in which an FBI agent, the victim, and the defendant testified at the in camera hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Commitment of Edward S.green1 sentence1990At the heart of the concurrence is the concern that our ruling makes open hearings "virtually mandatory," post at 155, 570 A. 2d at 936 (Handler, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Blakegreen2 sentences1989A hearing is said to be in camera "either when the hearing is had before the judge in his private chambers or when all spectators are excluded from the courtroom." Ibid.; see also State v. Blake, 292 Or. 486 , 640 P. 2d 605, 606-607 (1982). 1989A hearing is said to be in camera "either when the hearing is had before the judge in his private chambers or when all spectators are excluded from the courtroom." Ibid.; see also State v. Blake, 292 Or. 486 , 640 P. 2d 605, 606-607 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
State v. RWgreen1 sentence1989It is true, as the State argues, that normally before granting defendant's application for a psychiatric expert, "[t]he court must balance the possible emotional trauma, embarrassment, and intimidation to the complainant, particularly an extremely young child, against the likelihood that the examination will produce material, as distinguished from speculative, evidence." State v. R.W., 104 N.J. 14, 28 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Ritchiegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Presentment of Essex Cty. Grand Jurygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape
red
2 sentences1991The Appellate Court in Ritchie ruled to grant defendant therein a similar right of inspection and also adopted the in camera procedures and substantive limitations established in PAAR, to wit: (1) only "notes that are verbatim accounts of the complainant's declarations and notes that the complainant has approved as accurately reflecting what she said" are to be inspected by defense counsel; (2) the trial court is to conduct an in camera inquiry to determine whether the matters contained in the rape crisis counselor's files are such verbatim only "statements"; (3) after the trial court identiti 1991The Appellate Court in Ritchie ruled to grant defendant therein a similar right of inspection and also adopted the in camera procedures and substantive limitations established in PAAR, to wit: (1) only "notes that are verbatim accounts of the complainant's declarations and notes that the complainant has approved as accurately reflecting what she said" are to be inspected by defense counsel; (2) the trial court is to conduct an in camera inquiry to determine whether the matters contained in the rape crisis counselor's files are such verbatim only "statements"; (3) after the trial court identiti | 3 | 1987–1991 |
Franks v. Delaware
green
2 sentences2021Over forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court in Franks recognized that the warrant requirement “would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer was able to use deliberately falsified allegations to demonstrate probable cause, and, having misled the magistrate, then was able to remain confident that the ploy was worthwhile.” 438 U.S. at 168 ; accord Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 617 N.E.2d 983, 990 (Mass. 1993) (“[T]he public interest in deterring police misconduct requires the trial judge to exercise his or her discretion to order an in camera hearing where the defendant by affidavit ass 2021Over forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court in Franks recognized that the warrant requirement “would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer was able to use deliberately falsified allegations to demonstrate probable cause, and, having misled the magistrate, then was able to remain confident that the ploy was worthwhile.” 438 U.S. at 168 ; accord Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 617 N.E.2d 983, 990 (Mass. 1993) (“[T]he public interest in deterring police misconduct requires the trial judge to exercise his or her discretion to order an in camera hearing where the defendant by affidavit ass | 2 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Ogburne
neutral
2 sentences2010"Critical stages" have been defined as "`anything ... new to the proceeding and in conflict with ... [the] right to be confronted by the witnesses, to be represented by counsel, and to maintain... [the] defense upon the merits.'" State v. Trent, 157 N.J.Super. 231, 241 , 384 A. 2d 888 (App.Div.1978) (quoting State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 433 , 67 A. 2d 175 (1949)) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979); see also State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 447-48 , 694 A. 2d 196 (App.Div.) (critical stage includes portion of trial where court receives evidence) 2010"Critical stages" have been defined as "`anything ... new to the proceeding and in conflict with ... [the] right to be confronted by the witnesses, to be represented by counsel, and to maintain... [the] defense upon the merits.'" State v. Trent, 157 N.J.Super. 231, 241 , 384 A. 2d 888 (App.Div.1978) (quoting State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 433 , 67 A. 2d 175 (1949)) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979); see also State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 447-48 , 694 A. 2d 196 (App.Div.) (critical stage includes portion of trial where court receives evidence) | 2 | 1991–2010 |
Johnson v. Schragger, Lavine, Nagy & Krasny
green
1 sentence2018Johnson v. Schragger, 340 N.J. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Milligan
green
2 sentences2018First, the decision in Casal is A-1083-17T1 15 not binding precedent. 3 Second, Casal is in direct conflict with our Supreme Court's holding in State v. Milligan, 71 N.J. 373 (1976), which is binding precedent.4 To the extent defendant’s Casal argument is an assertion that the denial of his request for an in camera hearing as to the identity of the CI was error, we disagree. 2018Even an in camera hearing "will effectively reduce cooperation with the police and defeat the purposes which underlie the informer's privilege." Milligan, 71 N.J. at 393 n.12. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Trent
green
2 sentences2010"Critical stages" have been defined as "`anything ... new to the proceeding and in conflict with ... [the] right to be confronted by the witnesses, to be represented by counsel, and to maintain... [the] defense upon the merits.'" State v. Trent, 157 N.J.Super. 231, 241 , 384 A. 2d 888 (App.Div.1978) (quoting State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 433 , 67 A. 2d 175 (1949)) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979); see also State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 447-48 , 694 A. 2d 196 (App.Div.) (critical stage includes portion of trial where court receives evidence) 2010"Critical stages" have been defined as "`anything ... new to the proceeding and in conflict with ... [the] right to be confronted by the witnesses, to be represented by counsel, and to maintain... [the] defense upon the merits.'" State v. Trent, 157 N.J.Super. 231, 241 , 384 A. 2d 888 (App.Div.1978) (quoting State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 433 , 67 A. 2d 175 (1949)) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979); see also State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 447-48 , 694 A. 2d 196 (App.Div.) (critical stage includes portion of trial where court receives evidence) | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Auld
green
2 sentences2010"Critical stages" have been defined as "`anything ... new to the proceeding and in conflict with ... [the] right to be confronted by the witnesses, to be represented by counsel, and to maintain... [the] defense upon the merits.'" State v. Trent, 157 N.J.Super. 231, 241 , 384 A. 2d 888 (App.Div.1978) (quoting State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 433 , 67 A. 2d 175 (1949)) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979); see also State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 447-48 , 694 A. 2d 196 (App.Div.) (critical stage includes portion of trial where court receives evidence) 2010"Critical stages" have been defined as "`anything ... new to the proceeding and in conflict with ... [the] right to be confronted by the witnesses, to be represented by counsel, and to maintain... [the] defense upon the merits.'" State v. Trent, 157 N.J.Super. 231, 241 , 384 A. 2d 888 (App.Div.1978) (quoting State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 433 , 67 A. 2d 175 (1949)) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979); see also State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 447-48 , 694 A. 2d 196 (App.Div.) (critical stage includes portion of trial where court receives evidence) | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Trent
green
2 sentences2010"Critical stages" have been defined as "`anything ... new to the proceeding and in conflict with ... [the] right to be confronted by the witnesses, to be represented by counsel, and to maintain... [the] defense upon the merits.'" State v. Trent, 157 N.J.Super. 231, 241 , 384 A. 2d 888 (App.Div.1978) (quoting State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 433 , 67 A. 2d 175 (1949)) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979); see also State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 447-48 , 694 A. 2d 196 (App.Div.) (critical stage includes portion of trial where court receives evidence) 2010"Critical stages" have been defined as "`anything ... new to the proceeding and in conflict with ... [the] right to be confronted by the witnesses, to be represented by counsel, and to maintain... [the] defense upon the merits.'" State v. Trent, 157 N.J.Super. 231, 241 , 384 A. 2d 888 (App.Div.1978) (quoting State v. Auld, 2 N.J. 426, 433 , 67 A. 2d 175 (1949)) (citations omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 79 N.J. 251 , 398 A. 2d 1271 (1979); see also State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J.Super. 363, 447-48 , 694 A. 2d 196 (App.Div.) (critical stage includes portion of trial where court receives evidence) | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2002The question of the credibility of W.A.R.'s out-of-court statements vis-a-vis his testimony at the in camera hearing was particularly appropriate for resolution by the trier of fact who has the "opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the `feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 161 , 199 A. 2d 809 . 2002The question of the credibility of W.A.R.'s out-of-court statements vis-a-vis his testimony at the in camera hearing was particularly appropriate for resolution by the trier of fact who has the "opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the `feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 161 , 199 A. 2d 809 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
In Re Liquidation of Integrity Ins.
green
2 sentences2000Id. at 416-19 , 729 A.2d 438 . 2000Id. at 416-19 , 729 A.2d 438 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Morton
green
1 sentence1998Due to counsel's conflict of interest in this case, see discussion, infra at 483, 715 A. 2d at 279 , the need for the court to conduct a probing voir dire to establish the waiver's voluntariness was especially vital in this case. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Addington v. Texas
green
2 sentences1990We note, in this connection, the dispute over the constitutionality of the difference in burden of proof applicable in these proceedings, a clear and convincing standard constitutionally required for civil committees, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), preponderance of the evidence — at least in New Jersey — for NGI committees. 1990We note, in this connection, the dispute over the constitutionality of the difference in burden of proof applicable in these proceedings, a clear and convincing standard constitutionally required for civil committees, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), preponderance of the evidence — at least in New Jersey — for NGI committees. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. White green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.