49 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Emslie Leander Moore, United States of America v. Floyd Moore, United States of America v. Pieter Cornelis Pannekoekgreen2 sentences1986The court in State v. Casal, 103 Wn.2d 812, 819 , 699 P.2d 1234 (1985) held that because of the dilemma created for the defendant who is faced with a secret informant, an in camera hearing procedure should be utilized. *591 An in camera hearing serves to protect the interests of both the government and the defendant; "the Government can be protected from any significant, unnecessary impairment of . . . secrecy, yet the defendant can be saved from what could be serious police misconduct." United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 1975). 1985United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the in camera procedure provides an acceptable accommodation of the competing interests of the government and the accused in the situation presented here, wherein the question is whether the law officer has lied); United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that if the trial judge is satisfied that an in camera hearing is adequate to explore the foundations of the informant's information, then no disclosure is neces *819 sary); State v. Haywood, supra; United States v. Kiser, supra; United States v. Brian, | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Briangreen2 sentences1988See United States v. Brian, 507 F. Supp. 761 (D.R.I. 1981). 4 The issue here is whether the Whites' affidavits cast "a reasonable doubt on the veracity of material representations made by the affiant". 1985United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the in camera procedure provides an acceptable accommodation of the competing interests of the government and the accused in the situation presented here, wherein the question is whether the law officer has lied); United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that if the trial judge is satisfied that an in camera hearing is adequate to explore the foundations of the informant's information, then no disclosure is neces *819 sary); State v. Haywood, supra; United States v. Kiser, supra; United States v. Brian, | 2 | 2 |
State v. Casalgreen2 sentences2019In State v. Casal, 103 Wn.2d 812, 820 , 699 P.2d 1234 (1985), our Supreme Court held that when a defendant presents information that “casts a reasonable doubt on the veracity of material representations made by [a search warrant] affiant” regarding statements allegedly made by a confidential informant, a trial court should exercise its discretion to conduct an in camera hearing at which the State must disclose the identity of a confidential informant to the trial court.9 The purpose of this Casal hearing is for the trial court to determine whether the search warrant affiant truthfully reported 2019In State v. Casal, 103 Wn.2d 812, 820 , 699 P.2d 1234 (1985), our Supreme Court held that when a defendant presents information that “casts a reasonable doubt on the veracity of material representations made by [a search warrant] affiant” regarding statements allegedly made by a confidential informant, a trial court should exercise its discretion to conduct an in camera hearing at which the State must disclose the identity of a confidential informant to the trial court.9 The purpose of this Casal hearing is for the trial court to determine whether the search warrant affiant truthfully reported | 1 | 7 |
State v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2015Harris, 91 Wn.2d at 150 . 1994Harris, 91 Wn.2d at 151 . | 1 | 7 |
State v. Allengreen2 sentences1990App. 41, 45 , 615 P.2d 526 , review denied, 94 Wn.2d 1025 (1980). *395 The decision to hold an in camera hearing depends upon whether the informant is a material witness on the question of a defendant's guilt or innocence. 1986State v. Harris, supra at 150 ; CrR 4.7(h)(6). [1] However, an in camera hearing is only necessary where "`the defendant makes an initial showing that the confidential informant may have evidence that would be relevant to the defendant's innocence.'" State v. Allen, 27 Wn. | 1 | 7 |
United States v. Larry Dean Kisergreen2 sentences1985United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the in camera procedure provides an acceptable accommodation of the competing interests of the government and the accused in the situation presented here, wherein the question is whether the law officer has lied); United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that if the trial judge is satisfied that an in camera hearing is adequate to explore the foundations of the informant's information, then no disclosure is neces *819 sary); State v. Haywood, supra; United States v. Kiser, supra; United States v. Brian, 1985In United States v. Kiser, supra, the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court should hold an in camera hearing to verify the identity of the informant. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Vargasgreen2 sentences1994See Vargas, 58 Wn. 1992State v. Vargas, 58 Wn. | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Garciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fredrickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Roger Grishamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Dardengreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ivan Melchor Moreno and Rigoberto Melchor Morenogreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. David Wayne Freundgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Potter
green
2 sentences1986State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373, 382 , 635 P.2d 435 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982); State v. Harris, supra. The trial court exercises its discretion in determining whether an in camera hearing should be held; however, such a hearing is necessary if "the defendant makes an initial showing that the confidential informant may have evidence that would be relevant to the defendant's innocence." State v. Potter, 25 Wn. 1980NECESSITY OF HEARING An in camera hearing is necessary only when "the defendant makes an initial showing that the confidential informant may have evidence that would be relevant to the defendant's innocence." State v. Potter, 25 Wn. | 6 | 1980–2015 |
Roviaro v. United States
green
2 sentences1988In Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61 , 1 L. 1984Ed. 2d 639 , 77 S. Ct. 623 (1957). 3 Casal first argues that, at a minimum, his affidavit presented a sufficient showing to require the trial court to conduct an in camera hearing with the informant concerning the alleged waiver of the privilege. | 4 | 1980–1988 |
State v. Cleppe
green
2 sentences1986State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373, 382 , 635 P.2d 435 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982); State v. Harris, supra. The trial court exercises its discretion in determining whether an in camera hearing should be held; however, such a hearing is necessary if "the defendant makes an initial showing that the confidential informant may have evidence that would be relevant to the defendant's innocence." State v. Potter, 25 Wn. 1986State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373, 382 , 635 P.2d 435 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982); State v. Harris, supra. The trial court exercises its discretion in determining whether an in camera hearing should be held; however, such a hearing is necessary if "the defendant makes an initial showing that the confidential informant may have evidence that would be relevant to the defendant's innocence." State v. Potter, 25 Wn. | 3 | 1986–1990 |
Thompson v. Woltenberg
green
2 sentences1990"No hearing is necessary, however, if the accused's reasons for seeking the informant's testimony are only speculative, though the hearing judge should take into consideration the difficulty of explaining in a vacuum why the testimony is crucial." State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373, 382 , 635 P.2d 435 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982); see State v. Fredrick, 45 Wn. 1986State v. Cleppe, 96 Wn.2d 373, 382 , 635 P.2d 435 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982); State v. Harris, supra. The trial court exercises its discretion in determining whether an in camera hearing should be held; however, such a hearing is necessary if "the defendant makes an initial showing that the confidential informant may have evidence that would be relevant to the defendant's innocence." State v. Potter, 25 Wn. | 3 | 1986–1990 |
Cook v. King County
green
2 sentences1984App. 50, 53-54 , 510 P.2d 659 (1973); CrR 4.7(h)(6). 4 An in camera hearing is particularly appropriate in settling disputed questions of the applicability of the informant privilege. 1980A relevancy standard for making the determination of whether to conduct an in camera hearing has two bases: (1) the determination of whether evidence is privileged is a judicial function, Cook v. King County, 9 Wn. | 3 | 1980–1984 |
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. William D. Morgan
green
2 sentences2021State Farm, 199 Wn. 2018She cites to Pappas v. Holloway, as support for her contention that, if the material sought to be discovered is essential to the party's claim or defense, an exception to CR 26(b)(4) should apply.31 But Pappas concerned a legal malpractice action, 27 199 Wn. | 2 | 2018–2021 |
State v. Petrina
green
2 sentences2020State v. Petrina, 73 Wn. 2018App. 779 , 871 P.2d 637 (1994), Uiliata asked the trial court to conduct an in camera inquiry to determine whether the CI’s identity should be disclosed. | 2 | 2018–2020 |
State v. Vazquez
green
2 sentences2015State v. Vazquez, 66 Wn. 1994State v. Vazquez, 66 Wn. | 2 | 1994–2015 |
United States v. Fumo
green
2 sentences2014After an in camera hearing that included an interview of the juror, the judge found that the postings were in violation of instructions not to discuss the case with anyone outside the jury room, but were "nothing more than harmless ramblings having no prejudicial effect." Id. at 299 . 2014After an in camera hearing that included an interview of the juror, the judge found that the postings were in violation of instructions not to discuss the case with anyone outside the jury room, but were “ ‘nothing more than harmless ramblings having no prejudicial effect.’ ” Id. at 299 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
State v. White
green
2 sentences2013Furthermore, even if the Kinneys had presented information sufficient to cast a reasonable doubt on the veracity of the material 13 For instance, the trial court could easily review the CI's criminal history and other credibility or .reliability factors at an in camera hearing and, if necessary, provide defense counsel with redacted information that would have allowed the Kinneys to challenge the CI's credibility without having to disclose the CI' identity. s No. 43409 1 II 43412 1 II - - / - - representation in the search warrant, "[ he procedure for deciding whether to disclose the t] identi 1992State v. White, 50 Wn. | 2 | 1992–2013 |
State v. Berrysmith
green
2 sentences2005Berrysmith, 87 Wn. 2005Berrysmith, 87 Wash.App. at 276 , 944 P.2d 397 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Stenson
green
2 sentences2001Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 730-31 . 2001Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 731 . 9 The majority rejects Stenson’s claim concerning the lack of representation at the July 13, 1994 in camera hearing “because Wadsworth[ 10 ] may be distinguished from this case.” Majority at 739. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Uhthoff
neutral
2 sentences1990Redd , at 606 (citing State v. Uhthoff, 45 Wn. 1988State v. Uhthoff, 45 Wn. | 2 | 1988–1990 |
United States v. Eugene Lamar Jackson, United States of America v. Ruthjackson
green
2 sentences1985United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the in camera procedure provides an acceptable accommodation of the competing interests of the government and the accused in the situation presented here, wherein the question is whether the law officer has lied); United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that if the trial judge is satisfied that an in camera hearing is adequate to explore the foundations of the informant's information, then no disclosure is neces *819 sary); State v. Haywood, supra; United States v. Kiser, supra; United States v. Brian, 1978See, e.g., United States v. Freund, supra ; United States v. Rawlinson, 487 F.2d 5 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 , 39 L.Ed.2d 881 , 94 S.Ct. 1579 (1974); McLawhorn v. North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.1973); United States v. Soles, supra ; United States v. Hurse, 453 F.2d 128 (8th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 , 38 L.Ed.2d 146 , 94 S.Ct. 245 (1973); United States v. Lloyd, supra ; United States v. Jackson, supra . | 2 | 1978–1985 |
United States v. Edward Hurse
green
2 sentences1985United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the in camera procedure provides an acceptable accommodation of the competing interests of the government and the accused in the situation presented here, wherein the question is whether the law officer has lied); United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that if the trial judge is satisfied that an in camera hearing is adequate to explore the foundations of the informant's information, then no disclosure is neces *819 sary); State v. Haywood, supra; United States v. Kiser, supra; United States v. Brian, 1978See, e.g., United States v. Freund, supra ; United States v. Rawlinson, 487 F.2d 5 (9th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 984 , 39 L.Ed.2d 881 , 94 S.Ct. 1579 (1974); McLawhorn v. North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.1973); United States v. Soles, supra ; United States v. Hurse, 453 F.2d 128 (8th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 , 38 L.Ed.2d 146 , 94 S.Ct. 245 (1973); United States v. Lloyd, supra ; United States v. Jackson, supra . | 2 | 1978–1985 |
State v. Bone-Club
green
1 sentence2025App at 115 (“[W]here the external circumstances support the privilege 2 State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d 254 , 906 P.2d 325 (1995). 8 No. 85858-1-I/9 claim, an in camera hearing is not required.”) The “may” language in RCW 9.41.801(9)(b) is only relevant if the privilege is not covered under subsection (9)(a) and it is not apparent whether invoking the privilege is appropriate. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Bone-Club
green
1 sentence2025App at 115 (“[W]here the external circumstances support the privilege 2 State v. Bone-Club, 128 Wn.2d 254 , 906 P.2d 325 (1995). 8 No. 85858-1-I/9 claim, an in camera hearing is not required.”) The “may” language in RCW 9.41.801(9)(b) is only relevant if the privilege is not covered under subsection (9)(a) and it is not apparent whether invoking the privilege is appropriate. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Schaller
green
1 sentence2022Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Wolken
green
2 sentences2019Although the scope of discovery is within the trial court’s discretion, we do not “act as a rubber stamp for the trial court’s in camera hearing process.” State v. Wolken, 103 Wn.2d 823, 829 , 700 P.2d 319 (1985). 2019Although the scope of discovery is within the trial court’s discretion, we do not “act as a rubber stamp for the trial court’s in camera hearing process.” State v. Wolken, 103 Wn.2d 823, 829 , 700 P.2d 319 (1985). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Salinas
green
2 sentences2018SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR SCHOOL BUS ROUTE STOP ENHANCEMENT Uiliata claims the State failed to produce sufficient evidence that he committed the drug offenses within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop. 13 No. 34591-2-III State v. Uiliata When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the proper inquiry is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201 , 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). “[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn 2018SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR SCHOOL BUS ROUTE STOP ENHANCEMENT Uiliata claims the State failed to produce sufficient evidence that he committed the drug offenses within 1,000 feet of a school bus route stop. 13 No. 34591-2-III State v. Uiliata When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the proper inquiry is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201 , 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). “[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Wheat v. United States
green
2 sentences2014Cross, 156 Wn.2d at 610 . -20- 68534-1-1/21 United States. 486 U.S. 153, 159 , 108 S. Ct. 1692 , 100 L. 2014Cross, 156 Wn.2d at 610 . -20- 68534-1-1/21 United States. 486 U.S. 153, 159 , 108 S. Ct. 1692 , 100 L. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Cross
green
1 sentence2014Cross, 156 Wn.2d at 610 . -20- 68534-1-1/21 United States. 486 U.S. 153, 159 , 108 S. Ct. 1692 , 100 L. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Sinclair
green
1 sentence2014On appeal, Walker identifies no material fact "that would have been elicited had the court inquired further." Sinclair, 46 Wn. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Eriks v. Denver green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Stenson green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Brewer v. Remmers green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Goggins green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Enriquez neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Harris neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Helfrich green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Alabama v. McCurley green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| United States v. Eddie Leroy Anderson green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. Dick green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Franks v. Delaware green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| McSpadden v. Ohio green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| In Re Ellen Brogna green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Jencks v. United States green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Aguilar v. Texas red | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Brady v. Maryland green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.