camera hearing in New York

2017Next, the defendant contends that the County Court erred in failing to conduct an in camera inquiry of each juror to determine his or her ability to continue to serve impartially after jurors were overheard discussing the case during recesses and breaks (see CPL 270.25 [1]; People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299 [1987]).

2013It recognizes that there are juror irregularities, the trivial character of which is plain and undisputed, and which do not trigger the requirement for an in camera inquiry ( 69 NY2d at 299 n 4).

2016The child supported the petition and asked for an in camera hearing (see Matter of Lincoln v Lincoln, 24 NY2d 270 [1969]).

2012“Inasmuch as ‘the record is not sufficient to enable this Court to make the requisite findings of fact,’ ” we reverse the order and remit the matter to Family Court for a new hearing on the petition (Bradbury, 77 AD3d at 1425 ), including a new in camera hearing with the children (see Matter of Lincoln v Lincoln, 24 NY2d 270 [1969]).

2019Although defendant had a right to be present during the court's in camera inquiry into an impaneled juror's continuing fitness to serve because defendant was acting pro se ( see generally People v Harris , 99 NY2d 202, 212 [2002]), he waived that right by expressly agreeing to the court's proposal that it conduct an in camera interview alone with the juror ( see People v Pennisi , 217 AD2d 562, 563 [*2][2d Dept 1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 800 [1995]) and also failed to object when the court described that interview and determined that no further action was necessary.

2016At the outset, with respect to counsel’s right to be present during the questioning of the sworn juror (see People v Harris, 99 NY2d 202, 212 [2002]; People v Darby, 75 NY2d 449, 453 [1990]; People v Mullen, 44 NY2d 1 , 5-6 [1978]), the People correctly contend that such right was waived when counsel expressly consented to allow the Supreme Court to conduct the in camera inquiry alone with the juror (see People v Pennisi, 217 AD2d 562, 563 [1995]; People v Bailey, 146 AD2d 788, 789 [1989]).

2017In any event, considering the child’s young age as well as the testimony that she was being coached on what to say to the court, an in camera hearing with the child would not be helpful in determining the child’s preferences (see Matter of Thillman v Mayer, 85 AD3d 1624, 1625 [2011]; see generally Matter of Walters v Francisco, 63 AD3d 1610, 1611 [2009]).

2017In any event, considering the child’s young age as well as the testimony that she was being coached on what to say to the court, an in camera hearing with the child would not be helpful in determining the child’s preferences (see Matter of Thillman v Mayer, 85 AD3d 1624, 1625 [2011]; see generally Matter of Walters v Francisco, 63 AD3d 1610, 1611 [2009]).

2014Turning to the merits, the misbehavior report, the hearing testimony of the victim and both the in camera and hearing testimony of the correction officer who investigated the incident and authored the misbehavior report provide substantial evidence supporting the determination of guilt (see Matter of Hardy v Smith, 87 AD3d 779, 780 [2011]; Matter of France v Bezio, 78 AD3d 1357, 1357 [2010]).

2014Turning to the merits, the misbehavior report, the hearing testimony of the victim and both the in camera and hearing testimony of the correction officer who investigated the incident and authored the misbehavior report provide substantial evidence supporting the determination of guilt (see Matter of Hardy v Smith, 87 AD3d 779, 780 [2011]; Matter of France v Bezio, 78 AD3d 1357, 1357 [2010]).

2014Turning to the merits, the misbehavior report, the hearing testimony of the victim and both the in camera and hearing testimony of the correction officer who investigated the incident and authored the misbehavior report provide substantial evidence supporting the determination of guilt (see Matter of Hardy v Smith, 87 AD3d 779, 780 [2011]; Matter of France v Bezio, 78 AD3d 1357, 1357 [2010]).

2014Turning to the merits, the misbehavior report, the hearing testimony of the victim and both the in camera and hearing testimony of the correction officer who investigated the incident and authored the misbehavior report provide substantial evidence supporting the determination of guilt (see Matter of Hardy v Smith, 87 AD3d 779, 780 [2011]; Matter of France v Bezio, 78 AD3d 1357, 1357 [2010]).

2014Petitioner’s denial of the charge presented a credibility issue for the Hearing Officer to resolve (see Matter of Ford v Prack, 101 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2012]).

2014Petitioner’s denial of the charge presented a credibility issue for the Hearing Officer to resolve (see Matter of Ford v Prack, 101 AD3d 1276, 1277 [2012]).

2021Other hearsay information was purportedly received from two confidential informants, but it is well settled that, "once an appropriate challenge by the defense has been raised, the People are required to produce the police informant for an in camera inquiry unless they can demonstrate that the informant is unavailable and cannot be produced through the exercise of due diligence" ( People v Adrion , 82 NY2d 628, 634 [1993]; see generally People v Edwards , 95 NY2d 486, 493 [2000]).

2000The court properly exercised its discretion in not conducting an in camera hearing to examine the confidential informant (see, People v Darden, 34 NY2d 177 ) since the defendant made no showing to warrant such an examination (see, People v Adrion, 82 NY2d 628 ).

2015Contrary to defendant’s contention, we conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion in conducting an in camera inquiry and in sua sponte excusing a venireperson who expressed fear of retribution during jury selection (see People v Wilson, 88 NY2d 363, 378-379 [1996]; People v Stone, 239 AD2d 872, 873 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 943 [1997]), and we conclude that defendant was not deprived of his right to counsel or to the selection of an impartial jury thereby (see Wilson, 88 NY2d at 378-379 ).

2015Contrary to defendant’s contention, we conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion in conducting an in camera inquiry and in sua sponte excusing a venireperson who expressed fear of retribution during jury selection (see People v Wilson, 88 NY2d 363, 378-379 [1996]; People v Stone, 239 AD2d 872, 873 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 943 [1997]), and we conclude that defendant was not deprived of his right to counsel or to the selection of an impartial jury thereby (see Wilson, 88 NY2d at 378-379 ).

2021Other hearsay information was purportedly received from two confidential informants, but it is well settled that, "once an appropriate challenge by the defense has been raised, the People are required to produce the police informant for an in camera inquiry unless they can demonstrate that the informant is unavailable and cannot be produced through the exercise of due diligence" ( People v Adrion , 82 NY2d 628, 634 [1993]; see generally People v Edwards , 95 NY2d 486, 493 [2000]).

2007In any event, at the suppression hearing, the identity of the informant whose statement supported the warrant application was revealed, thereby obviating the need for an in camera hearing to establish the existence of the informant or to protect her identity (see People v Edwards, 95 NY2d 486, 492-494 [2000]; People v Serrano, 93 NY2d 73, 77 [1999]).

2017In any event, considering the child’s young age as well as the testimony that she was being coached on what to say to the court, an in camera hearing with the child would not be helpful in determining the child’s preferences (see Matter of Thillman v Mayer, 85 AD3d 1624, 1625 [2011]; see generally Matter of Walters v Francisco, 63 AD3d 1610, 1611 [2009]).

2017In any event, considering the child’s young age as well as the testimony that she was being coached on what to say to the court, an in camera hearing with the child would not be helpful in determining the child’s preferences (see Matter of Thillman v Mayer, 85 AD3d 1624, 1625 [2011]; see generally Matter of Walters v Francisco, 63 AD3d 1610, 1611 [2009]).

2017With respect to appeal No. 2, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, and we therefore affirm the order (see Matter of Walker v Carroll, 140 AD3d 1669, 1669 [2016]).

2017With respect to appeal No. 2, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, and we therefore affirm the order (see Matter of Walker v Carroll, 140 AD3d 1669, 1669 [2016]).

2015Contrary to defendant’s contention, we conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion in conducting an in camera inquiry and in sua sponte excusing a venireperson who expressed fear of retribution during jury selection (see People v Wilson, 88 NY2d 363, 378-379 [1996]; People v Stone, 239 AD2d 872, 873 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 943 [1997]), and we conclude that defendant was not deprived of his right to counsel or to the selection of an impartial jury thereby (see Wilson, 88 NY2d at 378-379 ).

2015Contrary to defendant’s contention, we conclude that the court properly exercised its discretion in conducting an in camera inquiry and in sua sponte excusing a venireperson who expressed fear of retribution during jury selection (see People v Wilson, 88 NY2d 363, 378-379 [1996]; People v Stone, 239 AD2d 872, 873 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 943 [1997]), and we conclude that defendant was not deprived of his right to counsel or to the selection of an impartial jury thereby (see Wilson, 88 NY2d at 378-379 ).

2012We therefore remit the matter to Supreme Court to give the court the opportunity, at a minimum, to conduct a Lincoln hearing with the child, who is now old enough to provide insight as to her interaction with each of her parents in the home (see Matter of Tamara FF. v John FF., 75 AD3d 688, 690 [2010]; Matter of Flood v Flood, 63 AD3d 1197, 1199 [2009]).

2012We therefore remit the matter to Supreme Court to give the court the opportunity, at a minimum, to conduct a Lincoln hearing with the child, who is now old enough to provide insight as to her interaction with each of her parents in the home (see Matter of Tamara FF. v John FF., 75 AD3d 688, 690 [2010]; Matter of Flood v Flood, 63 AD3d 1197, 1199 [2009]).

2012We therefore remit the matter to Supreme Court to give the court the opportunity, at a minimum, to conduct a Lincoln hearing with the child, who is now old enough to provide insight as to her interaction with each of her parents in the home (see Matter of Tamara FF. v John FF., 75 AD3d 688, 690 [2010]; Matter of Flood v Flood, 63 AD3d 1197, 1199 [2009]).

2012We therefore remit the matter to Supreme Court to give the court the opportunity, at a minimum, to conduct a Lincoln hearing with the child, who is now old enough to provide insight as to her interaction with each of her parents in the home (see Matter of Tamara FF. v John FF., 75 AD3d 688, 690 [2010]; Matter of Flood v Flood, 63 AD3d 1197, 1199 [2009]).

2019Although defendant had a right to be present during the court's in camera inquiry into an impaneled juror's continuing fitness to serve because defendant was acting pro se ( see generally People v Harris , 99 NY2d 202, 212 [2002]), he waived that right by expressly agreeing to the court's proposal that it conduct an in camera interview alone with the juror ( see People v Pennisi , 217 AD2d 562, 563 [*2][2d Dept 1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 800 [1995]) and also failed to object when the court described that interview and determined that no further action was necessary.

2016At the outset, with respect to counsel’s right to be present during the questioning of the sworn juror (see People v Harris, 99 NY2d 202, 212 [2002]; People v Darby, 75 NY2d 449, 453 [1990]; People v Mullen, 44 NY2d 1 , 5-6 [1978]), the People correctly contend that such right was waived when counsel expressly consented to allow the Supreme Court to conduct the in camera inquiry alone with the juror (see People v Pennisi, 217 AD2d 562, 563 [1995]; People v Bailey, 146 AD2d 788, 789 [1989]).

2014In addition, the “trial court’s reasons for its ruling should be placed on the record . . . [and] the court may not speculate as to possible partiality of the juror” (People v Buford, 69 NY2d at 299 ; see People v Rodriguez, 71 NY2d 214, 219-220 [1988]).

2010During that second inquiry, the Supreme Court properly conducted “a probing and tactful inquiry” of each juror individually in camera in the presence of the attorneys and the defendant ( 69 NY2d at 299 ; see People v Rodriguez, 71 NY2d at 219 ; cf. People v Ruggiero, 279 AD2d 538 [2001]).

2013Respondent’s contention that the matter should be remanded for an in camera hearing is unpersuasive, as there is no requirement that the Family Court conduct an in camera hearing with the child (see Matter of Jayden C. [Michelle R.], 82 AD3d 674, 675 [1st Dept 2011]).

2013Respondent’s contention that the matter should be remanded for an in camera hearing is unpersuasive, as there is no requirement that the Family Court conduct an in camera hearing with the child (see Matter of Jayden C. [Michelle R.], 82 AD3d 674, 675 [1st Dept 2011]).

2012The defendant’s contentions that the Supreme Court erred in responding to oral questions posed to it by an individual juror in the presence of the attorneys and the defendant without first giving defense counsel a meaningful opportunity to be heard and then giving the jury, in effect, an Allen charge (see Allen v United States, 164 US 492 [1896]), and in not conducting an in camera inquiry to determine whether one of the jurors was “grossly unqualified to serve” (CPL 270.35 [1]; see People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299 [1987]), and that various comments made by the prosecutor during her summation

2012The defendant’s contentions that the Supreme Court erred in responding to oral questions posed to it by an individual juror in the presence of the attorneys and the defendant without first giving defense counsel a meaningful opportunity to be heard and then giving the jury, in effect, an Allen charge (see Allen v United States, 164 US 492 [1896]), and in not conducting an in camera inquiry to determine whether one of the jurors was “grossly unqualified to serve” (CPL 270.35 [1]; see People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299 [1987]), and that various comments made by the prosecutor during her summation

2012The defendant’s contentions that the Supreme Court erred in responding to oral questions posed to it by an individual juror in the presence of the attorneys and the defendant without first giving defense counsel a meaningful opportunity to be heard and then giving the jury, in effect, an Allen charge (see Allen v United States, 164 US 492 [1896]), and in not conducting an in camera inquiry to determine whether one of the jurors was “grossly unqualified to serve” (CPL 270.35 [1]; see People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299 [1987]), and that various comments made by the prosecutor during her summation

2012The defendant’s contentions that the Supreme Court erred in responding to oral questions posed to it by an individual juror in the presence of the attorneys and the defendant without first giving defense counsel a meaningful opportunity to be heard and then giving the jury, in effect, an Allen charge (see Allen v United States, 164 US 492 [1896]), and in not conducting an in camera inquiry to determine whether one of the jurors was “grossly unqualified to serve” (CPL 270.35 [1]; see People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299 [1987]), and that various comments made by the prosecutor during her summation

2012The defendant’s contentions that the Supreme Court erred in responding to oral questions posed to it by an individual juror in the presence of the attorneys and the defendant without first giving defense counsel a meaningful opportunity to be heard and then giving the jury, in effect, an Allen charge (see Allen v United States, 164 US 492 [1896]), and in not conducting an in camera inquiry to determine whether one of the jurors was “grossly unqualified to serve” (CPL 270.35 [1]; see People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299 [1987]), and that various comments made by the prosecutor during her summation

2012The defendant’s contentions that the Supreme Court erred in responding to oral questions posed to it by an individual juror in the presence of the attorneys and the defendant without first giving defense counsel a meaningful opportunity to be heard and then giving the jury, in effect, an Allen charge (see Allen v United States, 164 US 492 [1896]), and in not conducting an in camera inquiry to determine whether one of the jurors was “grossly unqualified to serve” (CPL 270.35 [1]; see People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299 [1987]), and that various comments made by the prosecutor during her summation

2023This procedure is "designed to protect against the contingency, of legitimate concern to a defendant, that the informer might have been wholly imaginary and the communication from him [or her] entirely fabricated" ( People v Darden , 34 NY2d at 182 ; see People v Nettles , 172 AD3d at 1103). "[T]he court should conduct an in camera inquiry outside the presence of defendant and his [or her] counsel, and make a summary report regarding the existence of the informer and communications made by the CI to the police, taking precautions to protect the anonymity of the CI to the maximum extent possibl

2023ORDERED that the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for an in camera hearing and inquiry in accordance with the guidelines set forth in People v Darden ( 34 NY2d 177 ), and thereafter a report to this Court containing the Supreme Court's findings following the hearing and inquiry, and the appeal is held in abeyance in the interim.

1990Therefore the trial court should have conducted an in camera inquiry in accordance with the guidelines set forth in People v Darden (supra; see also, People v Patti, 59 AD2d 949 ), and we remit the matter for such a hearing and report.

1978By order dated November 28, 1977, this court (1) remitted the case to the Criminal Term for the holding of an in camera hearing and the furnishing of a report to this court in accordance with the guidelines set forth in People v Darden ( 34 NY2d 177 ) and (2) directed that the appeal be held in abeyance in the interim (People v Patti, 59 AD2d 949 ).

2023This procedure is "designed to protect against the contingency, of legitimate concern to a defendant, that the informer might have been wholly imaginary and the communication from him [or her] entirely fabricated" ( People v Darden , 34 NY2d at 182 ; see People v Nettles , 172 AD3d at 1103). "[T]he court should conduct an in camera inquiry outside the presence of defendant and his [or her] counsel, and make a summary report regarding the existence of the informer and communications made by the CI to the police, taking precautions to protect the anonymity of the CI to the maximum extent possibl

2019This procedure is "designed to protect against the contingency, of legitimate concern to a defendant, that the informer might have been wholly imaginary and the communication from him [or her] entirely fabricated" ( People v Darden , 34 NY2d at 182 ). "[T]he court should conduct an in camera inquiry outside the presence of defendant and his [or her] counsel, and make a summary report regarding the existence of the informer and communications made by the CI to the police, taking precautions to protect the anonymity of the CI to the maximum extent possible" ( People v Crooks , 27 NY3d at 613 ).

2016At the outset, with respect to counsel’s right to be present during the questioning of the sworn juror (see People v Harris, 99 NY2d 202, 212 [2002]; People v Darby, 75 NY2d 449, 453 [1990]; People v Mullen, 44 NY2d 1 , 5-6 [1978]), the People correctly contend that such right was waived when counsel expressly consented to allow the Supreme Court to conduct the in camera inquiry alone with the juror (see People v Pennisi, 217 AD2d 562, 563 [1995]; People v Bailey, 146 AD2d 788, 789 [1989]).

1993In any event, contrary to the defendant’s contentions on appeal, an in camera inquiry by the court and counsel into an impaneled juror’s continuing fitness to serve is not a material stage of the proceedings and, therefore, the defendant’s presence is not required (see, People v Aguilera, 82 NY2d 23 ; People v Torres, 80 NY2d 944 ; People v Darby, 75 NY2d 449 ; People v Mullen, 44 NY2d 1 ; People v Mardis, 190 AD2d 866 ; People v Christenson, 188 AD2d 659 ; CPL 270.35).

2015As the Appellate Division noted, the trial court's "inquiry was not a hearing, nor part of the trial, and it did not involve the determination of any issue requiring input from defendant or his counsel" (People v Carr, 111 AD3d 472 [1st Dept 2013]).

2015As the Appellate Division noted, the trial court’s “inquiry was not a hearing, nor part of the trial, and it did not involve the determination of any issue requiring input from defendant or his counsel” (People v Carr, 111 AD3d 472, 472 [1st Dept 2013]).