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6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2004 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Allan Rossgreen1 sentence2004See also United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1523 (11th Cir.1994) ("The need for fair, efficient, and orderly administration of justice overcomes the right to counsel of choice where an attorney has an actual conflict of interest, such as when he has previously represented a person who will be called as a witness against a current client at a criminal trial" (citation omitted)); United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 750 (3d Cir.1991) ("Thus, not only when an actual conflict is found, but when there is a showing of a serious potential for conflict ... the presumption in favor of a defendant’ | 1 | 1 |
United States v. David O'Malleygreen1 sentence2004While an in camera hearing of the type Mr. Wood suggested “may be advisable in some cases, we do not believe that such hearings are constitutionally required in all cases.” United States v. O’Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 793 (7th Cir.1986). 7 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. John P. Mosconygreen1 sentence2004See also United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1523 (11th Cir.1994) ("The need for fair, efficient, and orderly administration of justice overcomes the right to counsel of choice where an attorney has an actual conflict of interest, such as when he has previously represented a person who will be called as a witness against a current client at a criminal trial" (citation omitted)); United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 750 (3d Cir.1991) ("Thus, not only when an actual conflict is found, but when there is a showing of a serious potential for conflict ... the presumption in favor of a defendant’ | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Louis C. Ostrergreen1 sentence2004See also United States v. Ross, 33 F.3d 1507, 1523 (11th Cir.1994) ("The need for fair, efficient, and orderly administration of justice overcomes the right to counsel of choice where an attorney has an actual conflict of interest, such as when he has previously represented a person who will be called as a witness against a current client at a criminal trial" (citation omitted)); United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 750 (3d Cir.1991) ("Thus, not only when an actual conflict is found, but when there is a showing of a serious potential for conflict ... the presumption in favor of a defendant’ | 1 | 1 |
Carter v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2000In Carter, supra, after praising the potential effectiveness of in camera review as a means of "reconciling the defendant’s need for disclosure with the government’s interest in maintaining the confidentiality of its observation posts,” we refused to require an in camera hearing. 2000Relying on United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 , 109 S.Ct. 2619 , 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989), a Supreme Court case which addressed the issue of in camera review in a different context, we *860 held that "the trial court should require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support the request for an in camera hearing.” See Carter, supra, 614 A.2d at 916 . | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1992See Thompson v. United States, supra, 472 A.2d at 901 (trial court was “well within its discretion in refusing to entertain” defense counsel’s request for an in camera hearing); Hicks v. United States, supra, 431 A.2d at 22 n. 2. 1992See Thompson v. United States, supra, 472 A.2d at 901 (trial court was “well within its discretion in refusing to entertain” defense counsel’s request for an in camera hearing); Hicks v. United States, supra, 431 A.2d at 22 n. 2. | 1 | 1 |
Sellars v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1984See Sellars v. United States, 401 A.2d 974, 978 (D.C.1979) (determination to reopen case within sound discretion of trial court). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Zolin
green
2 sentences2000Relying on United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 , 109 S.Ct. 2619 , 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989), a Supreme Court case which addressed the issue of in camera review in a different context, we *860 held that "the trial court should require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support the request for an in camera hearing.” See Carter, supra, 614 A.2d at 916 . 2000Relying on United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 , 109 S.Ct. 2619 , 105 L.Ed.2d 469 (1989), a Supreme Court case which addressed the issue of in camera review in a different context, we *860 held that "the trial court should require a showing of a factual basis adequate to support the request for an in camera hearing.” See Carter, supra, 614 A.2d at 916 . | 2 | 1992–2000 |
Hicks v. United States
green
2 sentences1992See Thompson v. United States, supra, 472 A.2d at 901 (trial court was “well within its discretion in refusing to entertain” defense counsel’s request for an in camera hearing); Hicks v. United States, supra, 431 A.2d at 22 n. 2. 1984Although counsel, after both sides had rested, attempted to urge relevant grounds for disclosure (now saying there were trees in the area) and to request an in camera hearing on the issue, see Hicks, supra, 431 A.2d at 22 n. 2, the trial court was well within its discretion in refusing to entertain those arguments, since counsel had failed to raise them at the time of the original request for disclosure and had declined to continue his cross-examination of Watkins about his vantage point after the court’s initial denial of his disclosure request. | 2 | 1984–1992 |
United States v. William H. Hockridge, Charles Petri and Stephen K. Easton
green
1 sentence1997Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. John Doe A/K/A 'Lagas' Robert Tarango Lujan
green
2 sentences1993In short, we hold that under the circumstances presented here, requiring the informant to respond, under oath, to written questions submitted by the defense, was “an appropriate device to aid the court in striking the Roviaro balance.” Doe, supra, 525 F.2d at 880 . 1993In short, we hold that under the circumstances presented here, requiring the informant to respond, under oath, to written questions submitted by the defense, was “an appropriate device to aid the court in striking the Roviaro balance.” Doe, supra, 525 F.2d at 880 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Anderson v. United States
green
1 sentence1992Carter’s argument about the observation post is defeated by this court’s recent decision in Anderson v. United States, 607 A.2d 490 (D.C.1992), which outlines the showing of need required to defeat the government’s privilege not to reveal the post’s location. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.