camera hearing in West Virginia

1990We agree with the trial court’s ruling based on our holding in Syllabus Point 4 of Wilhelm v. Whyte, 161 W.Va. 67 , 289 S.E.2d 735 (1977): “ ‘A spontaneous statement by a defendant made prior to any action by a police officer and before an accusation, arrest or any custodial interrogation is made or undertaken by the police may be admitted into evidence without the volun-tariness thereof first having been determined in an in camera hearing.’ Syllabus Point 1, State v. Johnson, [159] W.Va. [682], 226 S.E.2d 442 (1976) [overruled on other grounds, State ex rel.

1988We held in Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Johnson, 159 W.Va. 682 , 226 S.E.2d 442 (1976) that: “A spontaneous statement by a defendant made prior to any action by a police officer or before an accusation, arrest or any custodial interrogation is made or undertaken by the police may be admitted into evidence without the voluntariness thereof first having been determined in an in camera hearing.” Although this spontaneous statement rule should be narrowly construed, see Mohn, supra, 168 W.Va. at 216-18, 283 S.E.2d at 917, particularly when the statement is made by a defendant whose sanity is in qu

2018Prior to admitting such evidence, however, the trial judge, upon request by either the State or the defendant, should hold an in camera hearing to determine whether the probative value of such evidence outweighs its possible prejudicial effect.” Syl. pt. 6, State v. Payne, 167 W.Va. 252 , 280 S.E.2d 72 (1981).

2018Prior to admitting such evidence, however, the trial judge, upon request by either the State or the defendant, should hold an in camera hearing to determine whether the probative value of such evidence outweighs its possible prejudicial effect.” Syl. pt. 6, State v. Payne, 167 W.Va. 252 , 280 S.E.2d 72 (1981).

2024Before admitting the evidence, the trial court should conduct an in camera hearing as stated in State v. Dolin, 176 W.Va. 688 , 347 S.E.2d 208 (1986) [, overruled on other grounds as stated in State v. Edward Charles L, 183 W.

2024Before admitting the evidence, the trial court should conduct an in camera hearing as stated in State v. Dolin, 176 W.Va. 688 , 347 S.E.2d 208 (1986) [, overruled on other grounds as stated in State v. Edward Charles L, 183 W.

2015This Court then set forth the following standard: “Where there is a failure to hold an in camera hearing on the defendant’s inculpatory statements, we recognize under Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), that the case will not be reversed for a new trial on this basis alone.

2015This Court then set forth the following standard: “Where there is a failure to hold an in camera hearing on the defendant’s inculpatory statements, we recognize under Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), that the case will not be reversed for a new trial on this basis alone.

1988White v. Mohn, 168 W.Va. 211 , 283 S.E.2d 914 (1981) where we overruled Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Fortner, 150 W.Va. 571 , 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966) stating that the failure to hold an in camera hearing on the voluntariness of a confession constitutes reversible error.

1988White v. Mohn, 168 W.Va. 211 , 283 S.E.2d 914 (1981) where we overruled Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Fortner, 150 W.Va. 571 , 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966) stating that the failure to hold an in camera hearing on the voluntariness of a confession constitutes reversible error.

2015However, petitioner’s argument ignores our subsequent holdings, including our direction that “Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Fortner, 150 W.Va. 571 , 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966), is overruled to the extent that it states that the failure to hold an in camera hearing on the voluntariness of a confession ‘constitutes reversible error.’” Syl.

2015However, petitioner’s argument ignores our subsequent holdings, including our direction that “Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Fortner, 150 W.Va. 571 , 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966), is overruled to the extent that it states that the failure to hold an in camera hearing on the voluntariness of a confession ‘constitutes reversible error.’” Syl.

1996Accordingly, the standards set forth in Michael K.T., supra, apply here as well: “We hold that when a putative father seeks to use blood test results to ... [prove] his paternity and rebut the presumption of legitimacy which has attached to a child bom of a valid marriage, an in camera hearing should be held in order for the circuit court to make a preliminary determination whether the equities surrounding the particular facts and circumstances of the case warrant admission of blood test results.” 182 W.Va. at 404 , 387 S.E.2d at 870-71 .

1996Accordingly, the standards set forth in Michael K.T., supra, apply here as well: “We hold that when a putative father seeks to use blood test results to ... [prove] his paternity and rebut the presumption of legitimacy which has attached to a child bom of a valid marriage, an in camera hearing should be held in order for the circuit court to make a preliminary determination whether the equities surrounding the particular facts and circumstances of the case warrant admission of blood test results.” 182 W.Va. at 404 , 387 S.E.2d at 870-71 .

1993In State v. Watson, 164 W.Va. 642 , 264 S.E.2d 628 (1980), we stated in Syllabus Point 1: "‘A defendant must be allowed an in camera hearing on the admissibility of a pending in-court identification when he challenges it because the witness was a party to pre-trial identification procedures that were allegedly constitutionally infirm.’ Syllabus Point 6, State v. Pratt, 161 W.Va. 530 , 244 S.E.2d 227 (1978).”

1993In State v. Watson, 164 W.Va. 642 , 264 S.E.2d 628 (1980), we stated in Syllabus Point 1: "‘A defendant must be allowed an in camera hearing on the admissibility of a pending in-court identification when he challenges it because the witness was a party to pre-trial identification procedures that were allegedly constitutionally infirm.’ Syllabus Point 6, State v. Pratt, 161 W.Va. 530 , 244 S.E.2d 227 (1978).”

1990The circuit court held an in camera hearing to determine the admissibility of the appellant’s confession, and ruled that the confession was given freely and voluntarily- In syllabus points 2 and 3 of State v. Vance, 162 W.Va. 467 , 250 S.E.2d 146 (1978), this Court held: 2.

1990The circuit court held an in camera hearing to determine the admissibility of the appellant’s confession, and ruled that the confession was given freely and voluntarily- In syllabus points 2 and 3 of State v. Vance, 162 W.Va. 467 , 250 S.E.2d 146 (1978), this Court held: 2.

1990We agree with the trial court’s ruling based on our holding in Syllabus Point 4 of Wilhelm v. Whyte, 161 W.Va. 67 , 289 S.E.2d 735 (1977): “ ‘A spontaneous statement by a defendant made prior to any action by a police officer and before an accusation, arrest or any custodial interrogation is made or undertaken by the police may be admitted into evidence without the volun-tariness thereof first having been determined in an in camera hearing.’ Syllabus Point 1, State v. Johnson, [159] W.Va. [682], 226 S.E.2d 442 (1976) [overruled on other grounds, State ex rel.

1981Va. 682 , 226 S.E.2d 442 (1976): “A spontaneous statement by a defendant made prior to any action by a police officer or before an accusation, arrest or any custodial interrogation is made or undertaken by the police may be admitted into evidence without the voluntariness thereof first having been determined in an in camera hearing.” See also, Wilhelm v. Whyte, 161 W.

1987The general rule regarding the admissibility of confessions was stated by this Court in Syllabus Point 5 of State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975), where we held: “The State must prove, at least by a preponderance of the evidence, that confessions or statements of an accused which amount to admissions of part or all of an offense were voluntary before such may be admitted into the evidence of a criminal case.” An in camera hearing is the method prescribed for a trial court to determine the voluntariness of an inculpa- *5 tory statement.

1987The general rule regarding the admissibility of confessions was stated by this Court in Syllabus Point 5 of State v. Starr, 158 W.Va. 905 , 216 S.E.2d 242 (1975), where we held: “The State must prove, at least by a preponderance of the evidence, that confessions or statements of an accused which amount to admissions of part or all of an offense were voluntary before such may be admitted into the evidence of a criminal case.” An in camera hearing is the method prescribed for a trial court to determine the voluntariness of an inculpa- *5 tory statement.

2021Petitioner further argues that he was entitled to an in camera hearing regarding the reliability of Ms. Compton’s and Ms. Munoz’s identifications of him, pursuant to Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Morgan, 168 W.

1982In syllabus point 6 of State v. Pratt, 161 W.Va. 530 , 244 S.E.2d 227 (1978), this Court held as follows: “A defendant must be allowed an in camera hearing on the admissibility of a pending in-court identification when he challenges it because the witness was a party to pre-trial identification procedures that were allegedly constitutionally infirm.” See also Syl. pt. 1, State v. Swiger, 169 W.Va. 724 , 289 S.E.2d 497 (1982); Syl. pt. 2, State v. Baker, 169 W.Va. 357 , 287 S.E.2d 497 (1982); Syl. pt. 1, State v. Morgan, 168 W.Va. 506 , 284 S.E.2d 924 (1981); Syl. pt. 1, State v. Watson, 164 W.

2013This hearing complied with the requirement this Court set forth in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Sutphin, 195 W.Va. 551 , 466 S.E.2d 402 (1995): In any case where there are allegations of any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about a matter pending before the jury not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial with full knowledge of the parties; it is the duty of the trial judge upon learning of the alleged communication, contact, or tampering, to conduct a h

2013This hearing complied with the requirement this Court set forth in Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Sutphin, 195 W.Va. 551 , 466 S.E.2d 402 (1995): In any case where there are allegations of any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about a matter pending before the jury not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial with full knowledge of the parties; it is the duty of the trial judge upon learning of the alleged communication, contact, or tampering, to conduct a h

1996See also syl. pt. 5, State v. Spence, 182 W.Va. 472 , 388 S.E.2d 498 (1989); syl. pt. 11, State v. Woodall, 182 W.Va. 15 , 385 S.E.2d 253 (1989); syl. pt. 6, State v. Plumley, 181 W.Va. 685 , 384 S.E.2d 130 (1989); syl. pt. 5, State v. Deskins, 181 W.Va. 112 , 380 S.E.2d 676 (1989); syl. pt. 2, State v. Jennings, 178 W.Va. 365 , 359 S.E.2d 593 (1987); syl. pt. 2, State v. Richey, 171 W.Va. 342 , 298 S.E.2d 879 (1982).

1996See also syl. pt. 5, State v. Spence, 182 W.Va. 472 , 388 S.E.2d 498 (1989); syl. pt. 11, State v. Woodall, 182 W.Va. 15 , 385 S.E.2d 253 (1989); syl. pt. 6, State v. Plumley, 181 W.Va. 685 , 384 S.E.2d 130 (1989); syl. pt. 5, State v. Deskins, 181 W.Va. 112 , 380 S.E.2d 676 (1989); syl. pt. 2, State v. Jennings, 178 W.Va. 365 , 359 S.E.2d 593 (1987); syl. pt. 2, State v. Richey, 171 W.Va. 342 , 298 S.E.2d 879 (1982).

2023Va. 909 , 230 S.E.2d 476 (1976) (abrogated on other grounds by State v. Persinger, 169 W.

1990White v. Mohn, 168 W.Va. 211 , 283 S.E.2d 914 (1981)].” The defendant challenges the admission of her second written statement given at approximately 10:00 a.m. at the police station. 3 The defendant asserts that she was not promptly presented before a magistrate in violation of W.Va.Code, 62-1-5 4 and Buie 5(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. 5 Consequently, she contends that her second written statement should have been suppressed under Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Guthrie, 173 W.Va. 290 , 315 S.E.2d 397 (1984): “ ‘The delay in taking a defendant to a magistrate may be a cr

2023AMBUSH & VOUCHING In his final assignment of error, Petitioner combines two complaints: (1) the State ambushed him when A.M. allegedly testified contrary to the discovery that was provided; and (2) the State improperly vouched for A.M.’s credibility during its closing arguments. 16 We find no merit to Petitioner’s arguments in this regard. acknowledges that “an in camera hearing would [have] be[en] meaningless … because the in-court identification had already occurred.” The in camera hearing Petitioner refers to is generally known as a “Casdorph hearing.” See State v. Casdorph, 159 W.

1982The in camera hearing discloses that prior to the inculpatory second confession, one of the interrogating officers told the defendant that if he cooperated with them, the officer would give a good recommendation to the probation officer at the time of the presentence investigation. 15 The trial court concluded this statement did not induce the confession citing State v. Casdorph, 159 W.

2015John’s Health Care Corp., 582 N.E.2d 464, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“The court should have conducted an in camera review on a document-by-document basis to determine whether the materials sought were protected by the peer review privilege.”); Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Iowa 1996) (“On January 9, after an in camera review of the documents, the district court determined they were privileged as peer review documents.”); McFall v. Peace, Inc., 15 S.W.3d 724, 726 (Ky. 2000) (“After holding an in camera hearing regarding the discovery of the QAR form and other hospital documents, the tria

2015John’s Health Care Corp., 582 N.E.2d 464, 474 (Ind.CtApp.1991) (“The court should have conducted an in camera review on a doeument-by-doeument basis to determine whether the materials sought were protected by the peer review privilege.”); Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Iowa 1996) (“On January 9, after an in camera review of the documents, the district court determined they were privileged as peer review documents.”); McFall v. Peace, Inc., 15 S.W.3d 724, 726 (Ky.2000) (“After holding an in camera hearing regarding the discovery of the QAR form and other hospital documents, the trial cou

2015For example, in State v. Holland, 178 W.Va. 744 , 364 S.E.2d 535 (1987), a witness for a State, who happened to be a State trooper, had a conversation with several jurors while the parties where engaged in an in camera hearing with the court.

2015For example, in State v. Holland, 178 W.Va. 744 , 364 S.E.2d 535 (1987), a witness for a State, who happened to be a State trooper, had a conversation with several jurors while the parties where engaged in an in camera hearing with the court.