camera hearing in Texas

2013So, the trial court was obligated to conduct “an in camera hearing to determine whether the informer could, in fact, supply such information.” 1 Id.

2010See Bodin v. State , 807 S.W.2d 313, 318-19 ( Tex.Crim.App . 1991) (holding that once a defendant meets the initial requirement of a plausible showing of how informer’s information may be important, an in camera hearing is required).

2007In Wofford , the Dallas court of appeals also found no reversible error in a trial court's failure to conduct an in camera hearing. 903 S.W.2d at 800 .

2007In Wofford, the Dallas court of appeals also found no reversible error in a trial court’s failure to conduct an in camera hearing. 903 S.W.2d at 800 .

2005See , e.g. , Pinson v. State , 778 S.W.2d 91, 92-93 (Tex. Crim.

2005See, e.g., Pin-son v. State, 778 S.W.2d 91, 92-93 (Tex.Crim.

2005Id.

2004See Heard v. State, 995 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. ref'd).

2009Shedden v. State, 268 S.W.3d 717, 733 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref’d).

2009Shedden v. State , 268 S.W.3d 717, 733 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref’d).

2020Olivarez v. State, 171 S.W.3d 283, 292 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).

2019Olivarez v. State , 171 S.W.3d 283 , 292 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). *636 Much like in the analysis in issue one regarding a claimed Brady violation, when it is shown that an informant was an eyewitness to an alleged offense, then the informant can give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issues of guilt or innocence.

2015Ml of those cases rely on Kesterson v. State, 959 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.), in which the Dallas Court of Appeals held that “an appellant is not entitled to review the sealed record from an in camera hearing conducted pursuant to rule 412 to determine what complaints to raise on appeal.” Id. at 249 .

2015Ml of those cases rely on Kesterson v. State, 959 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.), in which the Dallas Court of Appeals held that “an appellant is not entitled to review the sealed record from an in camera hearing conducted pursuant to rule 412 to determine what complaints to raise on appeal.” Id. at 249 .

2008Hall v. State, 778 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd). “[T]he trier of fact, in this case the trial court, is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be afforded their testimony.” Id.; see also Ashorn v. State, 802 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1991, no pet.) Shedden and Montignani argue that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion to discover the informant’s identity, or alternatively, in refusing to hold an in camera hearing to question the informant.

2008Hall v. State , 778 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd). "[T]he trier of fact, in this case the trial court, is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be afforded their testimony." Id. ; see also Ashorn v. State , 802 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no pet.) Shedden and Montignani argue that the trial court abused its discretion by denying their motion to discover the informant's identity, or alternatively, in refusing to hold an in camera hearing to question the informant.

2007The trial judge, after hearing appellant's proposed testimony and theory of motive, did not conduct an in camera hearing. (3) In Young v. State , a case decided shortly after Texas enacted its first rape shield statute, the court of criminal appeals upheld the exclusion of evidence of past sexual conduct even though the statutory procedures were not followed. 547 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Tex. Crim.

2007The trial judge, after hearing appellant’s proposed testimony and theory of motive, did not conduct an in camera hearing.3 In Young v. State, a case decided shortly after Texas enacted its first rape shield statute, the court of criminal appeals upheld the exclusion of evidence of past sexual conduct even though the statutory procedures were not followed. 547 S.W.2d 23, 25 (Tex. Crim.

1999See Bailey v. State , 804 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1991, no pet.); Cannon v. State , 807 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.); Smith v. State , 781 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.).

1993Only after such a showing is the trial court required to hold an in camera hearing. 781 S.W.2d at 421 .

2020“Only after a defendant makes a plausible showing is the trial court required to hold an in camera hearing to determine whether disclosure is necessary.” Coleman, 577 S.W.3d at 635 ; Haggerty, 429 S.W.3d at 8 ; see Menefee v. State, 928 S.W.2d 274, 279 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no pet.) (concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining conduct in camera hearing or by refusing to order disclosure of informant’s identity—in case where defendant alleged that informant could have provided information about whether defendant was entrapped—because “the only testimony was that the a

2020“Only after a defendant makes a plausible showing is the trial court required to hold an in camera hearing to determine whether disclosure is necessary.” Coleman, 577 S.W.3d at 635 ; Haggerty, 429 S.W.3d at 8 ; see Menefee v. State, 928 S.W.2d 274, 279 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no pet.) (concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining conduct in camera hearing or by refusing to order disclosure of informant’s identity—in case where defendant alleged that informant could have provided information about whether defendant was entrapped—because “the only testimony was that the a

2019The court must then conduct an in camera hearing, recorded by a court reporter, and determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible.” The Court of Criminal Appeals has found that “the in camera proceeding contemplated by Rule 412 is an adversarial hearing at which the parties are present and the attorneys are permitted to question witnesses.” LaPointe v. State, 225 S.W.3d 513, 523-24 (Tex. Crim.

2019Unlike the situation in LaPointe, 225 S.W.3d at 515 , on which appellant relies, both counsel and appellant were present at the 412 hearing.

2014EVID. 508(c)(3). 3 “If it appears . . . the informer may be able to give . . . relevant testimony [as to guilt or innocence], an in camera hearing is required where the State has the opportunity to show that the testimony is not necessary to a fair determination of the issues of guilt and innocence.” Murray v. State, 864 S.W.2d 111, 118 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1993, pet. ref’d).

2014After Bussey confirmed that he had no additional grounds to advance in support of his claim of entitlement to the confidential informant’s identity, the trial court denied Bussey’s request, stating, “I don’t think that it meets the requisites under . . . 508(c)(3).” On appeal, Bussey does not argue that the trial court’s ruling under Rule 508(c)(3) was improper. 5 Instead, Bussey now contends that the trial court should have required disclosure 4 Bussey did not challenge the issuance of the search warrant itself and did not seek to suppress evidence obtained as a result of its execution. 5 “Ru

2013"A person does not have a constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction, but if state law does provide for appeal, then ‘a defendant’s right of appeal must remain unfettered.’ ” Lebo v. State, 90 S.W.3d 324, 328 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (quoting Ex parte Canada, 754 S.W.2d 660, 667 (Tex.Crim.App.1988)), In a footnote, the Lebo court noted that the Canada opinion relied on the Fifth Circuit's holding in Robinson v. Beto that " ‘[d]ue process requires that a state, once it establishes avenues of appellate review, must keep those avenues free of unreasoned distinctions that impede open and equa

2013P. 166(b), 793–794 S.W.2d (Tex. Cases) XXXI, XXXII–XXXIII (1990, repealed 1998). [9] We note that it is not entirely clear from the Kesterson opinion whether the parties participated in the in camera hearing. [10] “A person does not have a constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction, but if state law does provide for appeal, then ‘a defendant’s right of appeal must remain unfettered.’” Lebo v. State , 90 S.W.3d 324, 328 (Tex. Crim.

2013"A person does not have a constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction, but if state law does provide for appeal, then ‘a defendant’s right of appeal must remain unfettered.’ ” Lebo v. State, 90 S.W.3d 324, 328 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (quoting Ex parte Canada, 754 S.W.2d 660, 667 (Tex.Crim.App.1988)), In a footnote, the Lebo court noted that the Canada opinion relied on the Fifth Circuit's holding in Robinson v. Beto that " ‘[d]ue process requires that a state, once it establishes avenues of appellate review, must keep those avenues free of unreasoned distinctions that impede open and equa

2013"A person does not have a constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction, but if state law does provide for appeal, then ‘a defendant’s right of appeal must remain unfettered.’ ” Lebo v. State, 90 S.W.3d 324, 328 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (quoting Ex parte Canada, 754 S.W.2d 660, 667 (Tex.Crim.App.1988)), In a footnote, the Lebo court noted that the Canada opinion relied on the Fifth Circuit's holding in Robinson v. Beto that " ‘[d]ue process requires that a state, once it establishes avenues of appellate review, must keep those avenues free of unreasoned distinctions that impede open and equa

2012See Holland v. State, 802 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (en banc); cf. McNaspy v. State, No. 14-96-01317-CR, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 5594 , at *2–4 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 29, 1999, pet. ref’d) (concluding that appellant failed to preserve his federal and state constitutional complaints when “the record [did] 17 not reflect that appellant objected on any grounds to his exclusion from the trial court’s in camera hearing”).

2012See Holland v. State, 802 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (en banc); cf. McNaspy v. State, No. 14-96-01317-CR, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 5594 , at *2 - 4 (Tex.App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] July 29, 1999, pet. ref'd) (concluding that appellant failed to preserve his federal and state constitutional complaints when "the record [did] not reflect that appellant objected on any grounds to his exclusion from the trial court's in camera hearing").

2017"A trial court's failure to afford the parties the opportunity to be present at the in camera hearing and examine the alleged victim regarding specific instances of previous sexual conduct violates the defendant's confrontation rights." LaPointe v. State, 166 S.W.3d 287, 297 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. dism'd) (abatement order).

2015The purpose of the in camera hearing is to ensure that the court “can first hear and evaluate the probity of evidence of an alleged victim’s sexual history in a private setting before allowing that sensitive information to be interjected into the public domain.” Id. at 295 .

2020“Only after a defendant makes a plausible showing is the trial court required to hold an in camera hearing to determine whether disclosure is necessary.” Coleman, 577 S.W.3d at 635 ; Haggerty, 429 S.W.3d at 8 .

2020“Only after a defendant makes a plausible showing is the trial court required to hold an in camera hearing to determine whether disclosure is necessary.” Coleman, 577 S.W.3d at 635 ; Haggerty, 429 S.W.3d at 8 ; see Menefee v. State, 928 S.W.2d 274, 279 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, no pet.) (concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining conduct in camera hearing or by refusing to order disclosure of informant’s identity—in case where defendant alleged that informant could have provided information about whether defendant was entrapped—because “the only testimony was that the a

2024We believe that, if the confidential informant is known and allowed to testify, that that person can come in and negate some of the elements of possession in the fact whether Mr. Tarver was present at the house, whether he participated in the sale, or whether he was in care, custody, or control of any narcotics in this particular case.” After conducting an in camera hearing, the trial court denied Tarver’s motion, stating, “the court cannot find and does not find that reasonable probability exists that the informant can give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the guilt or innocence

2007See Ford v. State , 179 S.W.3d 203, 210 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd).

2018TEX.R.EVID. 508(c)(2); Southwell, 80 S.W.3d at 650 .

2011Kesterson v. State, 959 S.W.2d 247, 248-49 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1997, no pet.) (holding “an appellant is not entitled to review the sealed record from an in camera hearing conducted pursuant to rule 412 to determine what complaints to raise on appeal”); Escobar v. State, No. 05-07-1716-CR, 2009 Tex. App. Lexis 8118, at *3-*4 (Tex.App.--Dallas Oct. 21, 2009, pet. refused) (op. on reh’g, not designated for publication) (following Kesterson ); McNaspy v. State, No. 14-96-1317-CR, 1999 Tex. App. Lexis 5594, at *5-*9 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] July 29, 1999, pet. refused) (not designated for publ

2016Id.

1995Brokenberry v. State, 853 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd); Mills v. State, 847 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1993, pet. ref'd); Smith v. State, 781 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no pet.).

2013Subsection (c) provides: "The court shall seal the record of the in camera hearing required in Subsection (b) ... for delivery to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.” Id. at 889 n. 1; see Act of May 15, 1975, 64th Leg., R.S., ch. 203, § 3, 1975 Tex. Gen.

2013Subsection (c) provides: “The court shall seal the record of the in camera hearing required in Subsection (b) . . . for delivery to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.” Id. at 889 n.1; see Act of May 15, 1975, 64th Leg., R.S., ch. 203, § 3, 1975 Tex. Gen.

2012Adanandus, 866 S.W.2d at 219–20. 22 Likewise, here, the trial court held the in camera hearing to determine issues related to possible juror misconduct.

2012See Adanandus, 866 S.W.2d at 220 .

2012We are, therefore, left with the issue of appellant’s absence from the in camera hearing raised in terms of article 33.03, which generally affords greater protection than federal and state constitutional provisions in terms of waiver of the right to be present and which requires essentially the same substantive analysis. 5 See Roden v. State, 338 S.W.3d 626 , 631 n.1 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d) (addressing only statutory complaint even though appellant also raised federal and state constitutional issue because article 33.03 arguably offers greater protection of rights and also ackno

2012See Roden v. State, 338 S.W.3d 626 , 631 n.1 (Tex.App. -- Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref'd) (addressing only statutory complaint even though appellant also raised federal and state constitutional issue because article 33.03 arguably offers greater protection of rights and also acknowledging that the analysis is largely the same).