camera hearing in Georgia

2004Once this threshold has been met, the trial court must conduct an in camera hearing of the Cl’s testimony under the mandates set forth in Thornton [v. State, 238 Ga. 160 ( 231 SE2d 729 ) (1977)], and Moore, supra. (Citation, punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Harvey v. State, 232 Ga. App. 21, 23 ( 500 SE2d 916 ) (1998).

1998Once this threshold has been met, the trial court must conduct an in camera hearing of the Cl’s testimony [and apply the balancing test] set forth in Thornton [v. State, 238 Ga. 160 ( 231 SE2d 729 )], and Moore [v. State, 187 Ga. App. 387, 388 (2), 389], supra.” (Emphasis omitted.) Grant v. State, 230 Ga. App. 330 (1), 331 ( 496 SE2d 325 ).

2016Hernandez, 291 Ga. App. at 569 (3) (punctuation omitted); see also Browner, 265 Ga. App. at 792 (2) (“Once this threshold has been met, the trial court must conduct an in camera hearing of the Cl’s testimony. . . .”).

2014It is the movant who bears the burden of establishing “the relevance, materiality, and necessity of the identity of the informant as a predicate for disclosure,” Browner v. State, 265 Ga. App. 788, 792 (2) ( 595 SE2d 610 ) (2004), and if the movant carries this burden the trial court must then “conduct an in camera hearing of the informant’s testimony and balance the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the defendant’s right to prepare his defense.” (Footnote omitted.) Turner, 247 Ga. App. at 777 (2).

2014See Little v. State, 230 Ga. App. 803, 808-810 (3) ( 498 SE2d 284 ) (1998) (concluding that the threshold requirements for an in camera hearing were met, where the police officer’s testimony was in conflict with the defense witness’s testimony that the defendant was not at the drug scene and thus could not have participated in the drug transaction, and where the confidential informant was the only available witness to the drug transaction who could have amplified or contradicted their testimony; noting further that the defendant elected not to testify); Hampton v. State, 215 Ga. App. 57 -58 (

2014See Little v. State, 230 Ga. App. 803, 808-810 (3) ( 498 SE2d 284 ) (1998) (concluding that the threshold requirements for an in camera hearing were met, where the police officer’s testimony was in conflict with the defense witness’s testimony that the defendant was not at the drug scene and thus could not have participated in the drug transaction, and where the confidential informant was the only available witness to the drug transaction who could have amplified or contradicted their testimony; noting further that the defendant elected not to testify); Hampton v. State, 215 Ga. App. 57 -58 (

2007If this threshold is met, the trial court must then conduct an in camera hearing of the informant’s testimony and balance “the public interest in protecting the flow of information to law enforcement officials” against “the right of the accused to a full and fair opportunity to defend himself.” Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160, 164 (2) ( 231 SE2d 729 ) (1977).

2007If this threshold is met, the trial court must then conduct an in camera hearing of the informant’s testimony and balance “the public interest in protecting the flow of information to law enforcement officials” against “the right of the accused to a full and fair opportunity to defend himself.” Thornton v. State, 238 Ga. 160, 164 (2) ( 231 SE2d 729 ) (1977).

2014It is the movant who bears the burden of establishing “the relevance, materiality, and necessity of the identity of the informant as a predicate for disclosure,” Browner v. State, 265 Ga.App. 788, 792 (2) ( 595 SE2d 610 ) (2004), and if the movant carries this burden the trial court must then “conduct an in camera hearing of the informant’s testimony and balance the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the defendant’s right to prepare his defense.” (Footnote omitted.) Turner, 247 Ga. App. at 777 (2).

2014It is the movant who bears the burden of establishing “the relevance, materiality, and necessity of the identity of the informant as a predicate for disclosure,” Browner v. State, 265 Ga. App. 788, 792 (2) ( 595 SE2d 610 ) (2004), and if the movant carries this burden the trial court must then “conduct an in camera hearing of the informant’s testimony and balance the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the defendant’s right to prepare his defense.” (Footnote omitted.) Turner, 247 Ga. App. at 777 (2).

2016Cf. Sorrells v. State, 326 Ga. App. 888, 897-98 (2) (b) ( 755 SE2d 586 ) (2014) (physical precedent only) (“The record here shows that, contrary to the trial court’s determination otherwise, the threshold requirements for an in camera hearing were satisfied.

2016Cf. Sorrells v. State, 326 Ga. App. 888, 897-98 (2) (b) ( 755 SE2d 586 ) (2014) (physical precedent only) (“The record here shows that, contrary to the trial court’s determination otherwise, the threshold requirements for an in camera hearing were satisfied.

2004The state is privileged to keep the identity of an informant confidential; subject, however, to “where the disclosure of. an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause.” (Punctuation omitted.) Moore v. State, 187 Ga. App. 387, 389 (2) ( 370 SE2d 511 ) (1988), quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53, 60-61 (77 SC 623, 1 LE2d 639) (1957).

1998However, since this case was reversed by our decision in Division 2, the trial court is directed, prior to proceeding with a new trial, to conduct an in camera hearing of the confidential informant’s testimony in order that a proper balancing may be made between the accused’s right to a full and fair opportunity to defend himself and the State’s privilege not to disclose the name of the confidential informant, pursuant to the mandates of Roviaro v. United States, supra; Thornton v. State, supra; and Moore v. State, supra. Under the facts of this case, if the informant’s testimony is exculpator

2016As the Supreme Court of Georgia observed, “if the confidential informant acts as the entrapper, and if the defendant can show that he has an arguably persuasive defense of entrapment — the [S]tate might have a duty to produce such a witness.” Boatright v. State, 260 Ga. 534, 536 (1) (c) ( 397 SE2d 689 ) (1990).

2016As the Supreme Court of Georgia observed, “if the confidential informant acts as the entrapper, and if the defendant can show that he has an arguably persuasive defense of entrapment — the [S]tate might have a duty to produce such a witness.” Boatright v. State, 260 Ga. 534, 536 (1) (c) ( 397 SE2d 689 ) (1990).

2016Hernandez, 291 Ga. App. at 569 (3) (punctuation omitted); see also Browner, 265 Ga. App. at 792 (2) (“Once this threshold has been met, the trial court must conduct an in camera hearing of the Cl’s testimony. . . .”).

2014Turpin v. Christenson, 269 Ga. 226, 239 (12) (A) ( 497 SE2d 216 ) (1998) (“An attorney is not ineffective because he fails to follow every evidentiary lead, but an attorney’s strategic decision is not reasonable when the attorney has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2014Turpin v. Christenson, 269 Ga. 226, 239 (12) (A) ( 497 SE2d 216 ) (1998) (“An attorney is not ineffective because he fails to follow every evidentiary lead, but an attorney’s strategic decision is not reasonable when the attorney has failed to investigate his options and make a reasonable choice between them.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2013At any rate, we cannot see how defendant was prejudiced by the in camera hearing which the trial court afforded him.8 the trial court’s conclusion that defendant could not reasonably have believed that the victims willingly had sex with him). 8 Ford v. State, 189 Ga. App. 395 (1) ( 376 SE2d 418 ) (1988) (citations omitted); see Brown v. State, 260 Ga. App. 77, 80 (3) ( 579 SE2d 87 ) (2003). 10 3.

2013At any rate, we cannot see how defendant was prejudiced by the in camera hearing which the trial court afforded him.8 the trial court’s conclusion that defendant could not reasonably have believed that the victims willingly had sex with him). 8 Ford v. State, 189 Ga. App. 395 (1) ( 376 SE2d 418 ) (1988) (citations omitted); see Brown v. State, 260 Ga. App. 77, 80 (3) ( 579 SE2d 87 ) (2003). 10 3.

2007Ezzard v. State, 230 Ga. App. at 148 (1). 3.

2004Once this threshold has been met, the trial court must conduct an in camera hearing of the Cl’s testimony under the mandates set forth in Thornton [v. State, 238 Ga. 160 ( 231 SE2d 729 ) (1977)], and Moore, supra. (Citation, punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Harvey v. State, 232 Ga. App. 21, 23 ( 500 SE2d 916 ) (1998).

2004Once this threshold has been met, the trial court must conduct an in camera hearing of the Cl’s testimony under the mandates set forth in Thornton [v. State, 238 Ga. 160 ( 231 SE2d 729 ) (1977)], and Moore, supra. (Citation, punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Harvey v. State, 232 Ga. App. 21, 23 ( 500 SE2d 916 ) (1998).

1994See Harris v. State, 257 Ga. 666 (1), supra. Defendant has made no argument as to how either change in the statute has rendered it unconstitutional and, in the absence of any such argument, we find this enumeration to be without merit. 2.

1994See Harris v. State, 257 Ga. 666 (1), supra. Defendant has made no argument as to how either change in the statute has rendered it unconstitutional and, in the absence of any such argument, we find this enumeration to be without merit. 2.

1993(Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 155-156 (98 SC 2674, 57 LE2d 667)) [(1978)].’ [Cit.]” English v. State, 202 Ga. App. 751, 758 (11) ( 415 SE2d 659 ) (1992).

1993(Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 155-156 (98 SC 2674, 57 LE2d 667)) [(1978)].’ [Cit.]” English v. State, 202 Ga. App. 751, 758 (11) ( 415 SE2d 659 ) (1992).

1993(Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 155-156 (98 SC 2674, 57 LE2d 667)) [(1978)].’ [Cit.]” English v. State, 202 Ga. App. 751, 758 (11) ( 415 SE2d 659 ) (1992).

1992“This court has held that a defendant must make a motion to reveal the identity of a confidential informant, and the trial court must conduct an in camera hearing at which the defendant must show both the materiality and necessity of the witness’ testimony to the defense before the trial court decides whether the identity of an informant must be revealed. [Cits.]” State v. Morris, 202 Ga. App. 344, 345 (3) ( 414 SE2d 656 ) (1991).

1992“This court has held that a defendant must make a motion to reveal the identity of a confidential informant, and the trial court must conduct an in camera hearing at which the defendant must show both the materiality and necessity of the witness’ testimony to the defense before the trial court decides whether the identity of an informant must be revealed. [Cits.]” State v. Morris, 202 Ga. App. 344, 345 (3) ( 414 SE2d 656 ) (1991).

1988See generally Evans v. State, 180 Ga. App. 1 ( 348 SE2d 561 ).

1988See generally Evans v. State, 180 Ga. App. 1 ( 348 SE2d 561 ).

1988See OCGA § 24-2-3 (c). "`Before a trial court can be faulted for refusing an in-camera hearing required by the Code, the court must be placed on notice as to the intent of the defense to seek to introduce such evidence, and the defense must specifically notify the court of the need for an in-camera hearing for its offer of proof.' Tucker v. State, 173 Ga. App. 742, 744 (3) ( 327 SE2d 852 ).

1988See OCGA § 24-2-3 (c). "`Before a trial court can be faulted for refusing an in-camera hearing required by the Code, the court must be placed on notice as to the intent of the defense to seek to introduce such evidence, and the defense must specifically notify the court of the need for an in-camera hearing for its offer of proof.' Tucker v. State, 173 Ga. App. 742, 744 (3) ( 327 SE2d 852 ).

1983“This procedure was not followed, as the defense did not express its intention of going into such matters, and did not request an in camera hearing to determine if such evidence was admissible.” Tenant v. State, 151 Ga. App. 891, 894 ( 262 SE2d 204 ).

1983“This procedure was not followed, as the defense did not express its intention of going into such matters, and did not request an in camera hearing to determine if such evidence was admissible.” Tenant v. State, 151 Ga. App. 891, 894 ( 262 SE2d 204 ).