41 New York opinions name it 10 courts 1823–2025 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Waltongreen2 sentences2024Even if defendant had filed a grievance against his attorney, which was not established by the record, "any conflict was of defendant's own making, and he was not entitled to circumvent the good cause requirement by creating an artificial conflict" ( People v Walton , 14 AD3d 419, 420 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 796 [2005]; see also People v Ferrer , 166 AD3d 406 , 407 [1st Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1171 [2019]). 2024Even if defendant had filed a grievance against his attorney, which was not established by the record, "any conflict was of defendant's own making, and he was not entitled to circumvent the good cause requirement by creating an artificial conflict" ( People v Walton , 14 AD3d 419, 420 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 796 [2005]; see also People v Ferrer , 166 AD3d 406 , 407 [1st Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1171 [2019]). | 3 | 3 |
Mead v. Singlemangreen2 sentences2024The interest of justice standard is broader than the good cause standard (see Mead v. Singleman, 24 AD3d 1142, 1144 [3d Dept 2005]), as its factors also include the expiration of the statute of limitations, the meritorious nature of the action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a request by the plaintiff for an extension, and prejudice to the defendant (Bumpus v. New York City Transit Authority, 66 AD3d at 31-32, supra). 2024The interest of justice standard is broader than the good cause standard (see Mead v. Singleman, 24 AD3d 1142, 1144 [3d Dept 2005]), as its factors also include the expiration of the statute of limitations, the meritorious nature of the action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a request by the plaintiff for an extension, and prejudice to the defendant (Bumpus v. New York City Transit Authority, 66 AD3d at 31-32, supra). | 3 | 3 |
Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencergreen2 sentences2025Plaintiff relies on Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95 (2001), arguing that the interest of justice standard under CPLR § 306-b is broader and more flexible than the good cause standard, and that factors such as the meritorious nature of the claim, lack of prejudice to the Defendant, and legislative intent weigh in favor of permitting the case to proceed. 2020In deciding whether an extension should be granted in the interest of justice, "the court may consider diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor in making its determination, including expiration of the [s]tatute of [l]imitations, the meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff's request for the extension of time, and prejudice to defendant" ( Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer , 97 NY2d 95, 105-106 [2001]; see Mead v Singleman , 24 AD3d 1142, 1144 [2005]). | 2 | 4 |
Brill v. City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2024Moreover, defendants' mistaken belief that the court would deem the note of issue a nullity was insufficient to satisfy the good cause requirement ( see Brill v City of New York , 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; Ford v City of New York , 54 AD3d 263, 266-267 [1st Dept 2008]). 2005No excuse at all, or a perfunctory excuse, cannot be ‘good cause’ ” (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Danielsongreen2 sentences2024The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v Danielson , 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). 2024The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v Danielson , 9 NY3d 342, 348-349 [2007]). | 2 | 2 |
Monachelli v. DiNapoligreen2 sentences2014Despite petitioner’s testimony that he began treating with his physician a few months after the January 10, 2009 incident, he concedes that he did not notify his employer that he had sustained an injury or disability as a result of the incident until a year later, when his physician ultimately determined that he could not work (see Matter of Monachelli v DiNapoli, 84 AD3d 1687, 1688 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 802 [2011]). 1 Further, contrary to petitioner’s argument, we find nothing irrational or unreasonable about respondent’s interpretation of the regulation as providing that the event that t 2014Despite petitioner’s testimony that he began treating with his physician a few months after the January 10, 2009 incident, he concedes that he did not notify his employer that he had sustained an injury or disability as a result of the incident until a year later, when his physician ultimately determined that he could not work (see Matter of Monachelli v DiNapoli, 84 AD3d 1687, 1688 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 802 [2011]). 1 Further, contrary to petitioner’s argument, we find nothing irrational or unreasonable about respondent’s interpretation of the regulation as providing that the event that t | 2 | 2 |
Natoli v. Regangreen2 sentences2014Despite petitioner’s testimony that he began treating with his physician a few months after the January 10, 2009 incident, he concedes that he did not notify his employer that he had sustained an injury or disability as a result of the incident until a year later, when his physician ultimately determined that he could not work (see Matter of Monachelli v DiNapoli, 84 AD3d 1687, 1688 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 802 [2011]). 1 Further, contrary to petitioner’s argument, we find nothing irrational or unreasonable about respondent’s interpretation of the regulation as providing that the event that t 2014Despite petitioner’s testimony that he began treating with his physician a few months after the January 10, 2009 incident, he concedes that he did not notify his employer that he had sustained an injury or disability as a result of the incident until a year later, when his physician ultimately determined that he could not work (see Matter of Monachelli v DiNapoli, 84 AD3d 1687, 1688 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 802 [2011]). 1 Further, contrary to petitioner’s argument, we find nothing irrational or unreasonable about respondent’s interpretation of the regulation as providing that the event that t | 2 | 2 |
Matter of Martinez v. DiNapoligreen1 sentence2025As the documentary evidence upon which petitioner relies fails to describe the nature of the accident and the resulting injuries alleged, substantial evidence supports respondent's finding that petitioner cannot avail herself of the good cause exception ( see Matter of Martinez v DiNapoli , 219 AD3d at 993-994; cf. Matter of Cook v DiNapoli , 113 AD3d at 950-951 ; Matter of Wilson v New York State & Local Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Sys. , 288 AD2d at 603 ). | 1 | 1 |
Ford v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2024Moreover, defendants' mistaken belief that the court would deem the note of issue a nullity was insufficient to satisfy the good cause requirement ( see Brill v City of New York , 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; Ford v City of New York , 54 AD3d 263, 266-267 [1st Dept 2008]). | 1 | 1 |
The People v. Clevland Lovettgreen1 sentence2018Furthermore, counsel was not obligated to argue in favor of his client's plea withdrawal motion, which was meritless except to the limited extent the court granted it ( see People v Washington , 25 NY3d 1091, 1095 [2015]). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Finklegreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Spencergreen1 sentence2016The People draw support from various cases (People’s re-argument motion at 5-6), none of which involved a motion to permit a bodily intrusion implicating a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights (People v Jenkins, 98 NY2d 280, 284 [2002] [ballistics report]; Lewis, 44 AD3d at 423 [writing exemplar]; Finkle, 192 AD2d at 788 [writing exemplar]). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jenkinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Linaresgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re the Estate of Silvermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Frigentigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. O'Doherty
green
2 sentences1993Moreover, in view of the marked degree of attenuation between the Secret Service Agent to whom this statement was allegedly made and the Richmond County District Attorney’s office, it is the further opinion of this court that this is precisely the type of situation contemplated by the Court of Appeals in People v O’Doherty ( 70 NY2d 479, 486 ), when it observed that "[t]here may be instances where, given the time, place and context of the defendant’s statement to a police officer and an attenuated connection between that officer and the prosecutor [that] the untimely disclosure of the statemen 1993The Court of Appeals in People v O’Doherty ( 70 NY2d 479 [1987]) has held that the 15-day notice requirement must be strictly complied with in the absence of any established good cause for the delay. | 3 | 1988–1993 |
Feng Li v. Peng
neutral
2 sentences2025In contrast to the good cause standard, "the interest of justice . . . standard . . . does not require a showing of [reasonable diligence], and [instead] permits the court to consider many factors" ( Feng Li v Peng , 190 AD3d 950, 952 ; see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Labin , 232 AD3d 861 , 864). 2024In contrast to the good cause standard, "the interest of justice . . . standard . . . does not require a showing of [reasonable diligence], and [instead] permits the court to consider many factors" ( Feng Li v Peng , 190 AD3d 950, 952 ). | 2 | 2024–2025 |
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences2024Even if defendant had filed a grievance against his attorney, which was not established by the record, "any conflict was of defendant's own making, and he was not entitled to circumvent the good cause requirement by creating an artificial conflict" ( People v Walton , 14 AD3d 419, 420 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 796 [2005]; see also People v Ferrer , 166 AD3d 406 , 407 [1st Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1171 [2019]). 2024Even if defendant had filed a grievance against his attorney, which was not established by the record, "any conflict was of defendant's own making, and he was not entitled to circumvent the good cause requirement by creating an artificial conflict" ( People v Walton , 14 AD3d 419, 420 [1st Dept 2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 796 [2005]; see also People v Ferrer , 166 AD3d 406 , 407 [1st Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1171 [2019]). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Stock v. Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP
green
2 sentences2023Because plaintiffs were not the "real client" entitled to invoke the fiduciary exception, the good cause analysis of whether they are entitled to attorney-client communications is not applicable ( see Stock , 142 AD3d at 225-226 ). 2023Because plaintiffs were not the "real client" entitled to invoke the fiduciary exception, the good cause analysis of whether they are entitled to attorney-client communications is not applicable ( see Stock , 142 AD3d at 225-226 ). | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State of New York Mtge. Agency v. Braun
green
2 sentences2020Agency v Braun , 182 AD3d at 67 ; Furze v Stapen , 161 AD3d 827 , 828). 2020Agency v Braun , 182 AD3d 63 ), the court must engage in " a careful judicial analysis of the factual setting of the case and a balancing of the competing interests presented by the parties'" ( BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v Herbst , 180 AD3d 980, 981 , quoting Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer , 97 NY2d at 105 ). | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Koebel v. ew York State Comptroller
green
2 sentences2014Despite petitioner’s testimony that he began treating with his physician a few months after the January 10, 2009 incident, he concedes that he did not notify his employer that he had sustained an injury or disability as a result of the incident until a year later, when his physician ultimately determined that he could not work (see Matter of Monachelli v DiNapoli, 84 AD3d 1687, 1688 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 802 [2011]). 1 Further, contrary to petitioner’s argument, we find nothing irrational or unreasonable about respondent’s interpretation of the regulation as providing that the event that t 2014Despite petitioner’s testimony that he began treating with his physician a few months after the January 10, 2009 incident, he concedes that he did not notify his employer that he had sustained an injury or disability as a result of the incident until a year later, when his physician ultimately determined that he could not work (see Matter of Monachelli v DiNapoli, 84 AD3d 1687, 1688 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 802 [2011]). 1 Further, contrary to petitioner’s argument, we find nothing irrational or unreasonable about respondent’s interpretation of the regulation as providing that the event that t | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Massi v. DiNapoli
green
2 sentences2014Despite petitioner’s testimony that he began treating with his physician a few months after the January 10, 2009 incident, he concedes that he did not notify his employer that he had sustained an injury or disability as a result of the incident until a year later, when his physician ultimately determined that he could not work (see Matter of Monachelli v DiNapoli, 84 AD3d 1687, 1688 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 802 [2011]). 1 Further, contrary to petitioner’s argument, we find nothing irrational or unreasonable about respondent’s interpretation of the regulation as providing that the event that t 2014Despite petitioner’s testimony that he began treating with his physician a few months after the January 10, 2009 incident, he concedes that he did not notify his employer that he had sustained an injury or disability as a result of the incident until a year later, when his physician ultimately determined that he could not work (see Matter of Monachelli v DiNapoli, 84 AD3d 1687, 1688 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 802 [2011]). 1 Further, contrary to petitioner’s argument, we find nothing irrational or unreasonable about respondent’s interpretation of the regulation as providing that the event that t | 2 | 2014–2014 |
MATTER OF GOMEZ v. New York State Div. of Parole
green
2 sentences2014Despite petitioner’s testimony that he began treating with his physician a few months after the January 10, 2009 incident, he concedes that he did not notify his employer that he had sustained an injury or disability as a result of the incident until a year later, when his physician ultimately determined that he could not work (see Matter of Monachelli v DiNapoli, 84 AD3d 1687, 1688 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 802 [2011]). 1 Further, contrary to petitioner’s argument, we find nothing irrational or unreasonable about respondent’s interpretation of the regulation as providing that the event that t 2014Despite petitioner’s testimony that he began treating with his physician a few months after the January 10, 2009 incident, he concedes that he did not notify his employer that he had sustained an injury or disability as a result of the incident until a year later, when his physician ultimately determined that he could not work (see Matter of Monachelli v DiNapoli, 84 AD3d 1687, 1688 [2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 802 [2011]). 1 Further, contrary to petitioner’s argument, we find nothing irrational or unreasonable about respondent’s interpretation of the regulation as providing that the event that t | 2 | 2014–2014 |
In re the Estate of Lerner
green
2 sentences2000Weiner’s theory that the codicil resulted from the family’s actions is based upon speculation, which is not enough to satisfy the good cause requirement to challenge a propounded instrument (see, Matter of Hatzistefanou, 77 Misc 2d 594 ; Matter of Molnar, 76 Misc 2d 126 ; Matter of Lerner, 72 Misc 2d 592 ). 1996Some courts have permitted SCPA 1404 examinations by a fiduciary named in a prior will only where other objectants had requested such examinations (see, Matter of Silverman, supra, at 127; Matter of Molnar, 76 Misc 2d 126 ; Matter of Lerner, 72 Misc 2d 592 ), while other courts have refused to allow them where there were neutral parties (e.g., the Attorney-General) who could, but did not, pursue such opportunity (see, Matter of Lachman, 100 Misc 2d 21, 28 ). | 2 | 1996–2000 |
In re the Estate of Molnar
green
2 sentences2000Weiner’s theory that the codicil resulted from the family’s actions is based upon speculation, which is not enough to satisfy the good cause requirement to challenge a propounded instrument (see, Matter of Hatzistefanou, 77 Misc 2d 594 ; Matter of Molnar, 76 Misc 2d 126 ; Matter of Lerner, 72 Misc 2d 592 ). 1996Some courts have permitted SCPA 1404 examinations by a fiduciary named in a prior will only where other objectants had requested such examinations (see, Matter of Silverman, supra, at 127; Matter of Molnar, 76 Misc 2d 126 ; Matter of Lerner, 72 Misc 2d 592 ), while other courts have refused to allow them where there were neutral parties (e.g., the Attorney-General) who could, but did not, pursue such opportunity (see, Matter of Lachman, 100 Misc 2d 21, 28 ). | 2 | 1996–2000 |
Cook v. DiNapoli
green
1 sentence2025As the documentary evidence upon which petitioner relies fails to describe the nature of the accident and the resulting injuries alleged, substantial evidence supports respondent's finding that petitioner cannot avail herself of the good cause exception ( see Matter of Martinez v DiNapoli , 219 AD3d at 993-994; cf. Matter of Cook v DiNapoli , 113 AD3d at 950-951 ; Matter of Wilson v New York State & Local Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Sys. , 288 AD2d at 603 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Wilson v. New York State & Local Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement System
green
1 sentence2025As the documentary evidence upon which petitioner relies fails to describe the nature of the accident and the resulting injuries alleged, substantial evidence supports respondent's finding that petitioner cannot avail herself of the good cause exception ( see Matter of Martinez v DiNapoli , 219 AD3d at 993-994; cf. Matter of Cook v DiNapoli , 113 AD3d at 950-951 ; Matter of Wilson v New York State & Local Policemen's & Firemen's Retirement Sys. , 288 AD2d at 603 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Doe v. Ascend Charter Schs.
green
1 sentence2025Plaintiff further contends that the complaint sufficiently pleads causes of action for negligence, citing Doe v. Ascend Charter Schools, 121 NYS3d 285 (2d Dept 2020), where a motion to dismiss was denied despite general allegations of prior notice of sexual misconduct. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Cruz (Raphael)
green
1 sentence2022The court adjourned the matter to September 15, 2017, on which date the People were again not ready to proceed because, the prosecutor explained,{**78 Misc 3d at 12} the arresting officer was on vacation. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Emigrant Bank v. Estate of Robinson
green
1 sentence2020Here, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination that the plaintiffs were entitled to an extension of time to serve the defendants under either the good cause standard ( see Emigrant Bank v Estate of Robinson , 144 AD3d 1084, 1085 ) or the interest of justice standard ( see State of New York Mtge. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Herbst
green
1 sentence2020Agency v Braun , 182 AD3d 63 ), the court must engage in " a careful judicial analysis of the factual setting of the case and a balancing of the competing interests presented by the parties'" ( BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v Herbst , 180 AD3d 980, 981 , quoting Leader v Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer , 97 NY2d at 105 ). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Stubblefield
green
1 sentence2018When defendant made an unfounded ethics complaint against counsel, "any conflict was of defendant's own making, and he was not entitled to circumvent the good cause requirement by creating an artificial conflict" ( People v Walton , 14 AD3d 419, 420 [1st Dept 2015], lv denied 5 NY3d 795 [2005]). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences2018The Supreme Court's decision in Barker v. Wingo is particularly instructive on the good cause analysis, although there the Court ultimately concluded that Barker's speedy trial right was not violated, primarily because he did not assert that right and indeed "did not want a speedy trial" ( Barker , 407 U.S. at 534 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ). 2018The Supreme Court's decision in Barker v. Wingo is particularly instructive on the good cause analysis, although there the Court ultimately concluded that Barker's speedy trial right was not violated, primarily because he did not assert that right and indeed "did not want a speedy trial" ( Barker , 407 U.S. at 534 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Taranovich
green
2 sentences2018Unlike the federal speedy trial factors, the state Taranovich factors do not separately consider whether the defendant has asserted his or her right to a speedy trial ( compare *313 Taranovich , 37 N.Y.2d at 445 , 373 N.Y.S.2d 79 , 335 N.E.2d 303 , with Barker , 407 U.S. at 528 -530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ). 2018Unlike the federal speedy trial factors, the state Taranovich factors do not separately consider whether the defendant has asserted his or her right to a speedy trial ( compare *313 Taranovich , 37 N.Y.2d at 445 , 373 N.Y.S.2d 79 , 335 N.E.2d 303 , with Barker , 407 U.S. at 528 -530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| 1801 Weeks Avenue, Inc. v. Crawford green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| In re the Estate of Marks green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| In re the Estate of Baldwin neutral | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Sterling v. Minskoff green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Vasquez green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Busler v. Corbett green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Cuyler v. Sullivan green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| In re the Estate of Hatzistefanou green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| In re the Estate of Lachman green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Whitaker green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. De Conto neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Walker neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Riley-James green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Conto neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| People v. Ludolph green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Couch neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Bennett green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Feliciano neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Brooks neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Howard v. Wyman green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| In re Linda F. M. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.