good cause requirement in Florida

2023No action or inaction by the Commission caused the untimeliness of [appellant’s] appeal, and [appellant] has not otherwise asserted the existence of circumstances tantamount to a due process violation.”) (footnote omitted); Javier v. Goodwill Indus. of S. Fla., Inc., 882 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that a claimant who was confused by the Unemployment Appeals Commission paperwork, and was unable to translate the documents, was not entitled to a good cause exception). 2

2022See Javier v. Goodwill Indus. of S. Fla., Inc., 882 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that a claimant who was confused 2 See Colson v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 76 So. 3d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (Commission contribution to untimeliness of appeal); Dumorange v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals, 947 So. 2d 472, 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (due process violation). 3 by the Unemployment Appeals Commission paperwork, and was unable to translate the documents, was not entitled to a good cause exception).

2016Small v. State, 630 So.2d 1087, 1088-89 (Fla.1994) (emphasis in original) (footnote added) (internal citations omitted).

1995Id. at 1089 (citation omitted).

2002A similar position was rejected by the court in Lenion v. Calohan, 652 So.2d 461, 462 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), which held "[c]ounsel's falling ill on the 364th day *609 does not constitute good cause." Lenion cited Grossman v. Segal, 270 So.2d 746, 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), which held: The one year period established in RCP 1.420(e) is liberal enough to contemplate a misfortune such as illness because the litigants have sufficient time to readjust themselves to this type of calamity (citation omitted) and a temporary illness will not work an extreme hardship that would satisfy the good cause require

1980See Grossman v. Segal, 270 So.2d 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972).

2025Schs., 804 So. 2d 559, 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“Dismissal without prejudice is final if its effect is to bring an end to judicial labor.”). 5 to provide, in writing, its reasons for its lack of prosecution, which must be considered under the higher good cause standard of rule 1.420(e). 4 See Paedae v. Voltaggio, 472 So. 2d 768, 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“The ‘good cause’ standard applied in failure to prosecute cases is much stricter than the ‘excusable neglect’ standard utilized to vacate a default judgment.”).

2025Schs., 804 So. 2d 559, 560 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“Dismissal without prejudice is final if its effect is to bring an end to judicial labor.”). 5 to provide, in writing, its reasons for its lack of prosecution, which must be considered under the higher good cause standard of rule 1.420(e). 4 See Paedae v. Voltaggio, 472 So. 2d 768, 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“The ‘good cause’ standard applied in failure to prosecute cases is much stricter than the ‘excusable neglect’ standard utilized to vacate a default judgment.”).

2023We caution the trial court, however, that reliance on a generic assertion of lab delay in the face of what was represented to the trial court as a significant, almost two-week delay in submitting the substances to the lab, without more, may fail to take into account “the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.” Davis, 162 So. 3d at 93 (quoting State v. Boyd, 846 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 2003)). 3 The State argues that any error in finding good cause was cured by the filing of an information on November 22, 2023, two days after the trial court’s good cause hearing.

2023The State relies on Ford v. Campbell, 697 So. 2d 1301, 1302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), for the proposition that the filing of an information moots the relief requested.

2022See Javier v. Goodwill Indus. of S. Fla., Inc., 882 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that a claimant who was confused 2 See Colson v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 76 So. 3d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (Commission contribution to untimeliness of appeal); Dumorange v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals, 947 So. 2d 472, 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (due process violation). 3 by the Unemployment Appeals Commission paperwork, and was unable to translate the documents, was not entitled to a good cause exception).

2022See Javier v. Goodwill Indus. of S. Fla., Inc., 882 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that a claimant who was confused 2 See Colson v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 76 So. 3d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (Commission contribution to untimeliness of appeal); Dumorange v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals, 947 So. 2d 472, 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (due process violation). 3 by the Unemployment Appeals Commission paperwork, and was unable to translate the documents, was not entitled to a good cause exception).

2022See Javier v. Goodwill Indus. of S. Fla., Inc., 882 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that a claimant who was confused 2 See Colson v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 76 So. 3d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (Commission contribution to untimeliness of appeal); Dumorange v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals, 947 So. 2d 472, 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (due process violation). 3 by the Unemployment Appeals Commission paperwork, and was unable to translate the documents, was not entitled to a good cause exception).

2022See Javier v. Goodwill Indus. of S. Fla., Inc., 882 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (holding that a claimant who was confused 2 See Colson v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 76 So. 3d 1042, 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (Commission contribution to untimeliness of appeal); Dumorange v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals, 947 So. 2d 472, 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (due process violation). 3 by the Unemployment Appeals Commission paperwork, and was unable to translate the documents, was not entitled to a good cause exception).

2014See Beard v. State Dep’t of Commerce, Div. of Emp’t Sec., 369 So.2d 382, 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (“[T]he legislature, when it added the phrase ‘attributable to the employer’ to the good cause requirement for voluntary termination, must have intended to remove domestic obligations as good cause for voluntary termination.”); Marchese v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 946 So.2d 123, 124 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (recognizing a “family emergency exception” so that an employee may voluntarily take time off work to care for an ill family member or because a death occurred but holding that a mother’s leave of

2014This rule allows a party to obtain documents “that are otherwise protected by the work product privilege if it can show that it ‘has need of the materials in the preparation of the case and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.’ ” Id., 101 So.3d at 414 (citations omitted); see also Fla. R.

2014See, e.g., Bush v. State, 74 So.3d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Sikes v. McMillian, 564 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), Kelsey v. McMillan, 560 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).

2014See Beard v. State Dep’t of Commerce, Div. of Emp’t Sec., 369 So.2d 382, 385 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (“[T]he legislature, when it added the phrase ‘attributable to the employer’ to the good cause requirement for voluntary termination, must have intended to remove domestic obligations as good cause for voluntary termination.”); Marchese v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 946 So.2d 123, 124 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (recognizing a “family emergency exception” so that an employee may voluntarily take time off work to care for an ill family member or because a death occurred but holding that a mother’s leave of

2010Cf. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Rosenthal, 908 So.2d 602, 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (holding that “Rosenthal’s second DWLS offense was ... subject to a criminal penalty pursuant to section 322.34(2) and therefore not subject to disposition as a noncriminal traffic infraction under chapter 318”).

2008Bd., 338 So.2d 890, 893 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (rejecting the School Board's assertion that a transfer recommendation does not trigger the good cause standard for rejection) (emphasis added).

2007See Stanick v. T & B Metal Works, Inc., 867 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (reversing where the referee analyzed the good cause requirement without acknowledging that good cause statutorily includes illness or disability requiring separation from work).

2004See Vajda v. Fla. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 610 So.2d 645, 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (explaining that "[u]nder the Unemployment Compensation Law, `good cause' for leaving a job includes `illness or disability of the individual requiring separation from his work'").

2002A similar position was rejected by the court in Lenion v. Calohan, 652 So.2d 461, 462 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), which held "[c]ounsel's falling ill on the 364th day *609 does not constitute good cause." Lenion cited Grossman v. Segal, 270 So.2d 746, 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), which held: The one year period established in RCP 1.420(e) is liberal enough to contemplate a misfortune such as illness because the litigants have sufficient time to readjust themselves to this type of calamity (citation omitted) and a temporary illness will not work an extreme hardship that would satisfy the good cause require

2001A plaintiff in a negligence action who asserts mental or physical injury places that mental or physical injury clearly in controversy and provides the defendant with good cause for an examination to determine the existence and extent of such asserted injury (citation omitted). 379 U.S. at 118 , 85 S.Ct. at 243 . 642 So.2d 594, 595-96 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (emphasis added). [4] See, e.g., Broward County Sch.

1996See Loveland v. Kremer, 464 N.W.2d 306, 309 (Minn.Ct.App.1990) (denying second independent medical examination when both doctors practiced in the same specialty, the same injury was to be evaluated, and the second exam was not part of a comprehensive examination; dissatisfaction with the first independent exam falls short of the good cause requirement).