good cause standard in Utah

2021We stated that, ―[q]uintessentially, the Writ belongs to the judicial branch of government.‖ Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1033 .

2012In light of this language, it is clear that Hurst establishes as a threshold requirement a showing of the following: (1) the claims at issue are not frivolous; (2) claims that have been raised and decided in prior proceedings feature "unusual cireumstances" or "good cause"-the latter being a general term applying to all exceptions which Hurst enumerates, see 777 P.2d at 1037 ; and (8) the claims were not withheld for tactical reasons. 129 Carter is incorrect in arguing that the district court "conflated" the good-cause exception enumerated in Hurst with the required threshold showing.

2013The district court is required to give "appropriate weight to the extent to which a particular justification relates to factors within or beyond the party's control," applying "a more liberal good cause standard" when a proffered justification "implicates factors beyond the party's control." Id. 115 .

2013I 14, "tlo the extent a particular justification implicates factors beyond the party's control, a more liberal good cause standard should be applied." Id. 115 . {4 Defendants argue that the delay in filing their notice of appeal was attributable to actions of the district court and the small claims court and was therefore due to factors beyond their control.

1992In Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court adopted just such a liberal definition when asked to determine whether a trial court had violated Rule 16(a)(5) by ordering disclosure of certain evidence — money seized from the defendant — to the defense on less than "good cause shown." The State contended that, contrary to the good cause requirement of the Rule, "the defendant failed to offer any evidence that disclosure was necessary for the preparation of the defense." [17] Id. at 743 .

1992In Cannon v. Keller, 692 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court adopted just such a liberal definition when asked to determine whether a trial court had violated Rule 16(a)(5) by ordering disclosure of certain evidence — money seized from the defendant — to the defense on less than "good cause shown." The State contended that, contrary to the good cause requirement of the Rule, "the defendant failed to offer any evidence that disclosure was necessary for the preparation of the defense." [17] Id. at 743 .

2025Regarding the Board’s apparent determination that Jones’s reliance on a PTO payout was unreasonable, we note that there is substantial evidence in the record supporting such a finding, including information from a human resources representative that the updated PTO policy was found in the most recent employee handbook (issued in 2022) and that “[t]his was acknowledged electronically by all [employees] in 2022.” See generally Utah Code § 63G-4-403(5)(g) (providing for relief where “the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by s

2022R994-405-102(1)(b). ¶15 Additionally, even if the good cause standard is not met, “benefits may be allowed under the provisions of the equity and good conscience standard if” “there are mitigating circumstances,” “a denial of benefits would be unreasonably harsh or an affront to fairness,” and the claimant “acted reasonably” and “demonstrated a continuing attachment to the labor market.” Id.

2011Instead, the good cause provision "requires only a showing that disclosure of requested evidence is necessary to the proper preparation of the defense " and "such a showing is made whenever the trial court is apprised of the fact that the evidence is material to an issue to be raised at trial." State v. Spry, 2001 UT App 75, ¶ 21 , 21 P.3d 675 (emphasis added).

2011Instead, the good cause provision "requires only a showing that disclosure of requested evidence is necessary to the proper preparation of the defense " and "such a showing is made whenever the trial court is apprised of the fact that the evidence is material to an issue to be raised at trial." State v. Spry, 2001 UT App 75, ¶ 21 , 21 P.3d 675 (emphasis added).

2011Id.

2008Rule 65C does contain a good cause exception, which allows us to consider claims "that were not raised in a post-convietion petition when adherence to a procedural rule would come at the price of basic fairness." Id.

2005“It is well established that to warrant substitution of counsel, a defendant ‘must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.’ ” Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at ¶ 31 , 984 P.2d 382 (quoting United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973)).

2005“It is well established that to warrant substitution of counsel, a defendant ‘must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.’ ” Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at ¶ 31 , 984 P.2d 382 (quoting United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973)).

2004Finally, in State v. Houston, 2003 UT App 416 , 82 P.3d 219 , we engaged in a traditional good cause analysis because while the delay was initially caused by defense counsel's scheduling conflict, the extent of the delay was in part due to scheduling conflicts the trial court had.

2004Finally, in State v. Houston, 2003 UT App 416 , 82 P.3d 219 , we engaged in a traditional good cause analysis because while the delay was initially caused by defense counsel's scheduling conflict, the extent of the delay was in part due to scheduling conflicts the trial court had.

1990Id. (citations omitted).

1990Id. (citations omitted).

1988Much like in Chapman , the referee in this case, “after meticulously explaining why petitioner’s actions failed to measure up to the good cause standard,” 700 P.2d at 1102 , simply concluded summarily that petitioner’s “actions were not sufficiently reasonable as to conclude a denial of unemployment insurance benefits would be contrary to equity and good conscience.” 2 Unlike as in Chapman , however, we are unable to conclude “as a matter of law” that petitioner is entitled to benefits in equity and good conscience, id., nor can we conclude as a matter of law that petitioner is not entitled to

1988Much like in Chapman , the referee in this case, “after meticulously explaining why petitioner’s actions failed to measure up to the good cause standard,” 700 P.2d at 1102 , simply concluded summarily that petitioner’s “actions were not sufficiently reasonable as to conclude a denial of unemployment insurance benefits would be contrary to equity and good conscience.” 2 Unlike as in Chapman , however, we are unable to conclude “as a matter of law” that petitioner is entitled to benefits in equity and good conscience, id., nor can we conclude as a matter of law that petitioner is not entitled to

1979With respect to the contention that appellant Gentry was illegally 'compelled to appear in prison clothes at his trial, we note that it has been held by the United States Supreme Court that a state cannot compel an accused to stand trial before a jury dressed in prison clothes, Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 , 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976).

1979With respect to the contention that appellant Gentry was illegally 'compelled to appear in prison clothes at his trial, we note that it has been held by the United States Supreme Court that a state cannot compel an accused to stand trial before a jury dressed in prison clothes, Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 , 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976).