141 California opinions name it 4 courts 1937–2026 44 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fresno County Department of Children & Family Sevices v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2009Where the ICWA applies, the juvenile court must adhere to the placement preferences set forth in the act absent good cause to the contrary. ( 25 U.S.C. § 1915 ; Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 5.664(k).) 6 “[A]ny party claiming a good cause exception to the placement preference bears the burden of proof . . . .” (Fresno County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 626, 632 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 155 ] (Fresno County DCFS).) Our review of a juvenile court’s finding of good cause to modify the placement preference order is subject to the substantial evidence tes 2009Where the ICWA applies, the juvenile court must adhere to the placement preferences set forth in the act absent good cause to the contrary. ( 25 U.S.C. § 1915 ; Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 5.664(k).) 6 “[A]ny party claiming a good cause exception to the placement preference bears the burden of proof . . . .” (Fresno County Dept. of Children & Family Services v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 626, 632 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.3d 155 ] (Fresno County DCFS).) Our review of a juvenile court’s finding of good cause to modify the placement preference order is subject to the substantial evidence tes | 4 | 4 |
Warrick v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2026(Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 158-159; id. at pp. 158-161.) Drawing on the Pitchess standard, Young “conclude[d] that in order to establish good cause for discovery under the Racial Justice Act, a defendant is required only to advance a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the Racial Justice Act ‘could or might have occurred’ in this case.” (Young, at p. 159, quoting Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1016 .) Young held that the good cause standard under section 745(d) is “even more relaxed than” the Pitchess standard in the following 2025Code, § 1043, subd. (a), (b)(3).) The information must be requested with “adequate specificity to preclude the possibility that [the] defendant is engaging in a ‘fishing expedition.’ ” (Pitchess, at p. 538.) In Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1025 (Warrick), our Supreme Court clarified the good-cause requirement for discovery of police personnel records. | 3 | 11 |
California Highway Patrol v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2015This procedure would effectively abrogate the good cause requirement set forth in the Evidence Code and approved and applied by our Supreme Court, by permitting fishing expeditions into the arresting officers’ personnel records in virtually every criminal case.” (California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1024 .) As to C.V.’s Brady request for exculpatory or impeachment evidence favorable to the defense, the prosecution has an independent legal obligation to produce that material. 2014This is because Wheeler does not eliminate the good cause requirement of the Evidence Code, and “only documentation of past officer misconduct which is similar to the misconduct alleged by defendant in the pending litigation is relevant and therefore subject to discovery.” (California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1021, 1024 [seeking all Wheeler evidence “would effectively abrogate the good cause requirement . . . by permitting fishing expeditions into the arresting officers’ personnel records in virtually every criminal case”].) 1 In Wheeler, supra, 4 Cal.4th 28 | 3 | 7 |
City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Courtgreen2 sentences2020Code, §§ 1043–1045.) The defendant must file a motion supported by a declaration showing “good cause for the discovery.” (§ 1043, subd. (b)(3).) This is a “ ‘relatively low threshold for discovery.’ ” ( Warrick, supra, at p. 1019 .) The “relatively relaxed” standards “insure the production for inspection of all potentially relevant documents.” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84 .) The California Supreme Court analyzed the good cause requirement in Warrick. 2014Code, §§ 1043-1045.) Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (b)(3) requires “[a]ffidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information from the records.” The California Supreme Court has held that the good cause requirement embodies a “relatively low threshold” for discovery and the supporting declaration may include allegations based on “information and belief.” (City of Santa Cru | 3 | 6 |
People v. Winsongreen2 sentences2025(See Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 713−714.) Parkin argues for a contrary conclusion, relying on Shepherd, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1202 in support. 2025(See Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 713−714.) Parkin argues for a contrary conclusion, relying on Shepherd, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1202 in support. | 2 | 6 |
People v. Shepherdgreen2 sentences2025(Shepherd, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197 .) Division 3 of our court held that both the testimony regarding defendant’s alcohol consumption and the testimony regarding defendant’s failed alcohol test was testimonial hearsay and, as such, the good cause standard set forth in Winson and Arreola applied. ( Shepherd, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1201−1203.) In the absence of a good cause showing, we concluded the trial court erred in admitting the probation officer’s testimony as defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the program administrator or observe her demeanor. 2025(Shepherd, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197 .) Division 3 of our court held that both the testimony regarding defendant’s alcohol consumption and the testimony regarding defendant’s failed alcohol test was testimonial hearsay and, as such, the good cause standard set forth in Winson and Arreola applied. ( Shepherd, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1201−1203.) In the absence of a good cause showing, we concluded the trial court erred in admitting the probation officer’s testimony as defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the program administrator or observe her demeanor. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Makigreen2 sentences2025(Id. at p. 621.) Documentary Evidence In contrast to the good cause standard for testimonial hearsay, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Maki (1985) 39 Cal.3d 707, 709 (Maki) that documentary hearsay evidence may be admitted at a probation or parole revocation proceeding if there are “sufficient indicia of reliability regarding the proffered material.” In coming to this conclusion, the court noted that the right of confrontation is not absolute, that revocation proceedings should be flexible enough to allow for conventional substitutes for live testimony (including affidavits, depo 2025(Id. at p. 621.) Documentary Evidence In contrast to the good cause standard for testimonial hearsay, the California Supreme Court held in People v. Maki (1985) 39 Cal.3d 707, 709 (Maki) that documentary hearsay evidence may be admitted at a probation or parole revocation proceeding if there are “sufficient indicia of reliability regarding the proffered material.” In coming to this conclusion, the court noted that the right of confrontation is not absolute, that revocation proceedings should be flexible enough to allow for conventional substitutes for live testimony (including affidavits, depo | 2 | 3 |
Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2000Proc., § 2016 et seq.) 2 Assuming that the 1986 Civil Discovery Act has application in the SVP context, Code of Civil Procedure section 2032, subdivision (d) requires a good cause requirement to conduct a mental examination. {Vinson v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 840 .) “[T]he good cause which must be shown should be such that will satisfy an impartial tribunal that the request may be granted without abuse of the inherent rights of the adversary.” {Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 388 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 364 P.2d 266 ], italics added.) Code of Civil Procedure 2000Proc., § 2016 et seq.) 2 Assuming that the 1986 Civil Discovery Act has application in the SVP context, Code of Civil Procedure section 2032, subdivision (d) requires a good cause requirement to conduct a mental examination. {Vinson v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 840 .) “[T]he good cause which must be shown should be such that will satisfy an impartial tribunal that the request may be granted without abuse of the inherent rights of the adversary.” {Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 388 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 364 P.2d 266 ], italics added.) Code of Civil Procedure | 2 | 3 |
Shapira v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2000Proc., § 2016 et seq.) 2 Assuming that the 1986 Civil Discovery Act has application in the SVP context, Code of Civil Procedure section 2032, subdivision (d) requires a good cause requirement to conduct a mental examination. {Vinson v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 840 .) “[T]he good cause which must be shown should be such that will satisfy an impartial tribunal that the request may be granted without abuse of the inherent rights of the adversary.” {Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 388 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 364 P.2d 266 ], italics added.) Code of Civil Procedure 2000Proc., § 2016 et seq.) 2 Assuming that the 1986 Civil Discovery Act has application in the SVP context, Code of Civil Procedure section 2032, subdivision (d) requires a good cause requirement to conduct a mental examination. {Vinson v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 840 .) “[T]he good cause which must be shown should be such that will satisfy an impartial tribunal that the request may be granted without abuse of the inherent rights of the adversary.” {Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 388 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 90 , 364 P.2d 266 ], italics added.) Code of Civil Procedure | 2 | 3 |
Barragan v. County of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2025(See Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304 , 327–328 (Robinson); Lewow v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn., Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 128 , 135–136.) “Rule 3.1702(d) is ‘remedial’ and is to be given a liberal, rather than strict interpretation.” (Id. at p. 135.) “Remedial” in this context means that “wherever possible cases should be heard on their merits.” (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1778 ; Barragan v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1382 [“ ‘modern trend of judicial decisions’ ” favors granting relief for a prote 2020(Robinson, at p. 326.) This rule is “ ‘ “remedial” and is to be given a liberal, rather than strict interpretation.’ ” (Ibid.; Lewow, at p. 135; see also Barragan v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1373 , 1382 10 [“modern trend of judicial decisions” favors granting relief for a protected party under a remedial statute “unless absolutely forbidden by statute”].) Factors relevant to the good-cause analysis include whether counsel acted reasonably; whether the court found counsel’s explanation credible; and whether the defendant suffered any prejudice from the delay. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Dungogreen2 sentences2025(See Dungo, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 619 [statements that record objective facts generally not testimonial].) As such, the letter was not testimonial and 9 the good cause standard for admitting testimonial hearsay did not apply. 2025(See Dungo, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 619 [statements that record objective facts generally not testimonial].) As such, the letter was not testimonial and 9 the good cause standard for admitting testimonial hearsay did not apply. | 2 | 2 |
| Crockett v. Superior Courtgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Abel L.green | 2 | 2 |
| People v. JEFELOgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Simmsgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Townsel v. Superior Courtgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Jonesgreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Granishgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Garcia v. Superior Courtgreen | 2 | 2 |
Pitchess v. Superior Courtred2 sentences2025Code, § 1043, subd. (b); see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 [(Pitchess)]), we hold that Young may claim entitlement to discovery under section 745[(d)] if he makes a plausible case, based on specific facts, that any of the four enumerated violations of section 745, subdivision (a) could or might have occurred. (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)–(4).)” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 144.) But, under the RJA, “a showing of plausible justification is merely a threshold consideration [of the good cause standard]. ‘The trial court, in deciding whether the defendant shall be permitted to obt 2025The court explained that, under Pitchess, good cause “exists when a defendant shows both ‘ “materiality” to the subject matter of the pending litigation and a “reasonable belief” that the agency has the type of information sought.’ [Citation.] Pitchess ‘good cause’ is a ‘relatively relaxed standard[]’ intended to ‘insure the production for inspection of all potentially relevant documents.’ ” (Young, at p. 158.) The Pitchess good cause standard does not require a showing that alleged misconduct “was ‘probable’ or ‘apparently 4 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 .Pitchess discovery | 1 | 4 |
People v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2021Further, the only proceeding expressly excluded from the good cause requirement appears at subdivision (k),9 which applies to preliminary hearings set fewer than 10 court days from the date of arraignment (§ 1050, subd. (k)) and does not reference motions to suppress. 8 The Court of Appeal in Henderson acknowledged that “defendant may argue that [Assembly Bill No. 1273] effectively changed existing law” (Henderson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 936 ) but then asserted “the amendments are entirely consistent with the cases below that show that a dismissal is a disfavored and possibly unauthorize 2021Further, the only proceeding expressly excluded from the good cause requirement appears at subdivision (k),9 which applies to preliminary hearings set fewer than 10 court days from the date of arraignment (§ 1050, subd. (k)) and does not reference motions to suppress. 8 The Court of Appeal in Henderson acknowledged that “defendant may argue that [Assembly Bill No. 1273] effectively changed existing law” (Henderson, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 936 ) but then asserted “the amendments are entirely consistent with the cases below that show that a dismissal is a disfavored and possibly unauthorize | 1 | 4 |
City of San Jose v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2013Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(2), (3); City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1142-1143 .) “The statutory scheme carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer‟s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant‟s equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to the defense.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 53 .) In Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011 , our Supreme Court clarified the good-cause requirement for discovery of police personnel records. 2005Some Courts of Appeal have described the good cause inquiry in language that hews rigorously to descriptive terms this court used in Santa Cruz , and they assess good cause under a two-part test requiring a "specific factual scenario" that establishes a "plausible factual foundation." (See, e.g., California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1020-1023 , 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 379 ; City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1146-1150 , 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 .) Other Courts of Appeal have framed the good cause inquiry around the statutory formulation of mater | 1 | 4 |
City of Alhambra v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2026The court further remarked that, because appellants were charged with multiple murders, “it was almost a given that they would be charged with special circumstances.” It found the San Diego County statistics relevant but concluded that “[a four] percent difference across all homicide filings in San Diego County for nearly 20 years does not in and of itself provide a plausible justification for the violation of [the] RJA, especially because in this case, unlike Young, no case-specific facts toward racial discrimination are cited.” As an additional basis for denial, the court found appellants ha 2025Code, § 1043, subd. (b); see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 [(Pitchess)]), we hold that Young may claim entitlement to discovery under section 745[(d)] if he makes a plausible case, based on specific facts, that any of the four enumerated violations of section 745, subdivision (a) could or might have occurred. (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)–(4).)” (Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 144.) But, under the RJA, “a showing of plausible justification is merely a threshold consideration [of the good cause standard]. ‘The trial court, in deciding whether the defendant shall be permitted to obt | 1 | 3 |
City of San Jose v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016(See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 54 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 73 , 850 P.2d 621 ] [the Legislature’s intent in adopting the statutory scheme governing discovery of peace officer personnel records “manifestly was to protect such records against ‘fishing expeditions’ ”].) The City’s argument fundamentally misconceives the Pitchess discovery process. 2013Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(2), (3); City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1142-1143 .) “The statutory scheme carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer‟s just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant‟s equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to the defense.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 47, 53 .) In Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011 , our Supreme Court clarified the good-cause requirement for discovery of police personnel records. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Accredited Surety & Casualty Co.green2 sentences2016Allowing courts to consider the likelihood of apprehension does not convert the good cause standard from a " 'low threshold' " ( Fairmont , supra , 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1027 , 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 421 ; Accredited , supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1358 , 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 892 ) into an impossible demand for clairvoyance. 2016Allowing courts to consider the likelihood of apprehension does not convert the good cause standard from a " 'low threshold' " ( Fairmont , supra , 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1027 , 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 421 ; Accredited , supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 1358 , 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 892 ) into an impossible demand for clairvoyance. | 1 | 3 |
Lewow v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Ass'n., Inc.green2 sentences2025(See Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304 , 327–328 (Robinson); Lewow v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn., Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 128 , 135–136.) “Rule 3.1702(d) is ‘remedial’ and is to be given a liberal, rather than strict interpretation.” (Id. at p. 135.) “Remedial” in this context means that “wherever possible cases should be heard on their merits.” (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1778 ; Barragan v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1382 [“ ‘modern trend of judicial decisions’ ” favors granting relief for a prote 2020Nothing in this rule suggests that the Legislature intended to “import” section 473 procedures and requirements into the good-cause standard. ( Robinson, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 326-327; see also Lewow, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 134-136; Gonzalez v. Santa Clara Dept. of Social Services (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 162, 168 ; Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee Awards (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2018) § 11.40.) Price relies on Russell v. Trans Pacific Group (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1717 (Russell), which held that under a predecessor rule (former rule 870) a trial court had no discretion to disregard compliance with | 1 | 2 |
Del Castillo v. City of S.F.green2 sentences2025Specifically, “[a]lthough section 859b includes a good-cause exception to the 10-court-day rule, there is no exception from the 60-day rule.” (Del Castillo, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 1120 .) We agree this is a critical difference, and one that plainly “indicates the Legislature did not intend a good-cause exception can apply to the 60-day rule.” (Ibid.; see Lacayo, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 400 [“the 60-day rule is absolute and there is no good-cause exception to the rule”].) 9 Section 859b clearly contemplates that an arraignment or a plea on a complaint triggers the right to a preliminar 2021(Ramos, at pp. 731, 735.) We reasoned, “[N]othing in section 1050.1 . . . signals an intent to provide a good-cause exception to the strict 60-day rule in section 859b . . . .” (Ramos, at p. 722; accord, Lacayo v. Superior Court (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 396 , 400 [“the 60-day rule is absolute and there is no good-cause exception to the rule”]; Del Castillo v. Superior Court (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1120 [“Although section 859b includes a good-cause exception to the 10-court-day rule, there is no exception from the 60-day rule, which indicates the Legislature did not intend a good-cause excepti | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Whartongreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Gainesgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Weigle v. Devon T.green | 1 | 2 |
| Native Village of Tununak v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Servicesgreen | 1 | 2 |
| In Re Interest of Bird Headgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Rojas v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Crawford v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Browngreen | 1 | 2 |
| Jackson v. Superior Court of Riverside Cnty.green | 1 | 1 |
| LAZARIN v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Petrus v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Awadgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nat. Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc. v. State of Californiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Arreola
green
2 sentences2024(Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1159 ; see also People v. Shepherd (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1201, fn. 4 (Shepherd) [“the good cause standard recognizes that a third party’s unsworn verbal statements are the least reliable type of hearsay, and thus requires a greater showing to support use of such evidence in probation revocation hearings”].) This standard can be satisfied when: (1) the declarant is unavailable under the traditional hearsay standard (see Evid. 2007(See generally, Cohen et al., The Law of Probation and Parole (1983 ed.) § 9.32, at pp. 466-467.)” (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1160 .) Moreover, the good cause showing must be considered together with other relevant circumstances, including the purpose for which the evidence is offered, the significance of the evidence to the factual determination upon which the alleged probation violation is based, and whether other admissible evidence, including the probationer’s admissions, corroborates the evidence. 3 (Ibid.) The Arreola court rejected the Attorney General’s suggestion that Maki modif | 6 | 2007–2024 |
Ramos v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2020The court noted at the hearing that the prosecution could always re-file charges at least once, and expressed agreement with defense counsel’s statement it was “premature to address the issue,” which “would be more properly addressed” in the event there was a re-filing and “a second dismissal and an attempt to [re-file] again.” The parties do not discuss in any papers submitted to our court whether any dismissal should be with or without prejudice under section 1387 subdivision (c)(1). 3 1117, 1120, italics added, quoting Ramos v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 719, 730 .) There is no g 2019DISCUSSION "The magistrate shall dismiss the complaint if the preliminary examination is set or continued more than 60 days from the date of the arraignment, plea, or reinstatement of criminal proceedings pursuant to Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 1367) of Title 10 of Part 2, unless the defendant personally waives his or her right to a preliminary examination within the 60 days." ( § 859b.) "[O]n its face section 859b's 60-day rule is absolute and requires dismissal of a felony complaint against a non-consenting defendant whose preliminary hearing is set or continued more than 60 days from | 5 | 2019–2021 |
McGrory v. Applied Signal Technology, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021Unless at-will employers are to be held to a good-cause standard for termination, no inference of discrimination [or retaliation] can reasonably be drawn from the mere lack of conclusive evidence of misconduct by the employee.” (McGrory v. Applied Signal Technology, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1533 .) The trial court did not err in concluding Poker Flat was entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Garcia’s wrongful termination and retaliation causes of action. 19 B. 2020But in the context of at-will employment, it is not enough to attack the employer’s rationale for dismissal as “[in]adequately substantiated”; to the contrary, that “is not the standard . . . when an at-will employee is terminated.” ( McGrory, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1532-1533.) Rather, the guiding principle is that ‘“there must be evidence supporting a rational inference that intentional [retaliation] . . . was the true cause of the employer’s actions.’” (Id. at p. 1531.) Or, put another way, “Unless at-will employers are to be held to a good-cause standard for termination, no inference | 4 | 2014–2021 |
Waters v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2025The good cause may be equated to a good reason for a party’s failure to perform that specific requirement from which he seeks to be excused.” (Waters v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 885, 893 .) We also consider the First District’s discussion of good cause under Rule 3.1702(d). 2024(People v. McGirr (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 629, 636 .) Our Supreme Court has stated that a good cause requirement “should not be enshrined in legal formalism.” (Waters v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 885, 893 .) The parties have not acknowledged this statement and have not explicitly addressed the threshold legal question of whether the term “good cause” is ambiguous. | 3 | 2024–2025 |
People v. Accredited Surety Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences2017Accredited, supra , 230 Cal.App.4th 548 , 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 the only published case available on section 1305.6 (enacted in 2012), analyzed the good cause requirement as a matter of first impression. ( See id. at p. 557, 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 .) Both parties cite to its good cause standard, which we apply. 2017Accredited, supra , 230 Cal.App.4th 548 , 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 the only published case available on section 1305.6 (enacted in 2012), analyzed the good cause requirement as a matter of first impression. ( See id. at p. 557, 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 .) Both parties cite to its good cause standard, which we apply. | 3 | 2017–2024 |
Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021(See former § 1050 (Stats. 2002, ch. 788, § 1).) 17 In short, section 1050 does not contain any exceptions referencing either the 60- day trial rule or, critically for this appeal, section 1538.5. “ ‘Under the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if exemptions are specified in a statute, we may not imply additional exemptions unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary.’ ” (Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627 , 635–636.) The legislative history makes clear that the Legislature explicitly declined to expand the list of hearings 2021(See former § 1050 (Stats. 2002, ch. 788, § 1).) 17 In short, section 1050 does not contain any exceptions referencing either the 60- day trial rule or, critically for this appeal, section 1538.5. “ ‘Under the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if exemptions are specified in a statute, we may not imply additional exemptions unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary.’ ” (Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627 , 635–636.) The legislative history makes clear that the Legislature explicitly declined to expand the list of hearings | 3 | 2021–2021 |
Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California
green
2 sentences2025(See Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304 , 327–328 (Robinson); Lewow v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn., Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 128 , 135–136.) “Rule 3.1702(d) is ‘remedial’ and is to be given a liberal, rather than strict interpretation.” (Id. at p. 135.) “Remedial” in this context means that “wherever possible cases should be heard on their merits.” (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1778 ; Barragan v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1382 [“ ‘modern trend of judicial decisions’ ” favors granting relief for a prote 2020Nothing in this rule suggests that the Legislature intended to “import” section 473 procedures and requirements into the good-cause standard. ( Robinson, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 326-327; see also Lewow, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at pp. 134-136; Gonzalez v. Santa Clara Dept. of Social Services (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 162, 168 ; Pearl, Cal. Attorney Fee Awards (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2018) § 11.40.) Price relies on Russell v. Trans Pacific Group (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1717 (Russell), which held that under a predecessor rule (former rule 870) a trial court had no discretion to disregard compliance with | 2 | 2020–2025 |
United States v. Decastro
green
2 sentences2023While we agree with the ultimate conclusion expressed in Rodriguez—California’s criminal penalties for possession of a loaded firearm are not unconstitutional on account of the holding in Bruen that a good cause requirement to obtain a license to carry a concealed weapon is invalid—we reach that conclusion by adjudicating the facial challenge on the merits.9 The decision in United States v. DeCastro (2d Cir. 2012) 682 F.3d 160 (DeCastro), cited by the Attorney General, is also unhelpful in the present context. 2023While we agree with the ultimate conclusion expressed in Rodriguez—California’s criminal penalties for possession of a loaded firearm are not unconstitutional on account of the holding in Bruen that a good cause requirement to obtain a license to carry a concealed weapon is invalid—we reach that conclusion by adjudicating the facial challenge on the merits. 9 The decision in United States v. DeCastro (2d Cir. 2012) 682 F.3d 160 (DeCastro), cited by the Attorney General, is also unhelpful in the present context. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Drew
green
2 sentences2023The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Determining Garcia Failed To Establish Good Cause for His Delay in Filing His Petition As the court of appeal explained in Drew, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at page 257 , section 1170.126’s inclusion of a limitations period subject to a good cause exception constituted an implied determination “that not every delay in filing a recall petition would be excusable.” Evaluating the factors generally used by courts in determining good cause, the Drew court held the superior court had not abused its discretion in finding the petitioner failed to demonstra 2023The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Determining Garcia Failed To Establish Good Cause for His Delay in Filing His Petition As the court of appeal explained in Drew, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at page 257 , section 1170.126’s inclusion of a limitations period subject to a good cause exception constituted an implied determination “that not every delay in filing a recall petition would be excusable.” Evaluating the factors generally used by courts in determining good cause, the Drew court held the superior court had not abused its discretion in finding the petitioner failed to demonstra | 2 | 2022–2023 |
Look v. Penovatz
green
2 sentences2023Even assuming Blum had objected to her requests as violating his right to privacy in his finances, that privacy interest can be overcome where “the party seeking discovery of the information” has shown “that the information is ‘directly relevant’ to a cause of action or defense, such that disclosure is ‘essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.’ ” (Look v. Penovatz (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 61, 73 .) Here, the trial court explained how the discovery Herbstman sought, i.e., information regarding Blum’s assets and finances, was “directly relevant to the reserved issue of Smith/Ostler arrears. 2023Even assuming Blum had objected to her requests as violating his right to privacy in his finances, that privacy interest can be overcome where “the party seeking discovery of the information” has shown “that the information is ‘directly relevant’ to a cause of action or defense, such that disclosure is ‘essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.’ ” (Look v. Penovatz (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 61, 73 .) Here, the trial court explained how the discovery Herbstman sought, i.e., information regarding Blum’s assets and finances, was “directly relevant to the reserved issue of Smith/Ostler arrears. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Mora & Rangel
green
2 sentences2022Just as the court cannot grant a party’s motion to continue without a showing of good cause, it cannot order a 12 continuance on its own motion without good cause.” (People v. Santamaria (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 269, 277 (Santamaria).) “A trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny continuances.” (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 508 .) The trial court’s determination that good cause existed to continue the trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 2019Co. v. Superior Court (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1047, 1052 .) "The waiver of an important right must be a voluntary and knowing act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." (Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330, 343 (Roberts).) "Thus, any waiver must be narrowly construed and limited to matters 'as to which, based upon [the patient's] disclosures, it can reasonably be said [the patient] no longer retains a privacy interest.' " (San Diego Trolley, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092 .) Even when there has been a "waiver of a statutory privilege, a | 2 | 2019–2022 |
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| Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. J.E. green | 2 | 2016–2016 |
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| In Re CH green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Wilson green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
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| In Interest of AE green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
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| Vinson v. Superior Court green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
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Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.