good cause requirement in Massachusetts

2023We review the judge's assessment of the reliability of that evidence for an abuse of presented, the good cause requirement is satisfied." Commonwealth v. Negron, 441 Mass. 685, 691 (2004). 4 discretion.

2023See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bukin, 467 Mass. 516, 520 (2014). "[I]f reliable hearsay is presented, the good cause requirement is satisfied." Id. at 522 , quoting Commonwealth v. Negron, 441 Mass. 685, 691 (2004).

2025The good cause standard requires a judge to "balance the rights of the parties based on the particular facts of each case." Boston Herald, Inc. v. Sharpe, 432 Mass. 593, 604 (2000).

2025I, supra at 248-249 ("the requestor bears the burden of demonstrating that the records should be released under the good cause standard of Rule 7"). b.

1995“The good cause exception to rule 4(j) applies only where there has been a diligent effort timely to effect service (emphasis added).” Id. at 26 .

1993The Appeals Court in Hull v. Attleboro Savings Bank, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 18, 26 (1992), has said that “. . . the good cause exception to rule 4(j) applies only when there has been diligent effort timely to effect service (emphasis supplied).” I cannot find that the plaintiff has made “diligent effort timely to effect service.” I recognize that in Hull there was no claim that the plaintiff even attempted to make service for three years and three months.

2025Once that standard has been satisfied, the obtaining, inspection, and review of the documents are governed by the protocol we established in Dwyer, 448 Mass. at 147 (Appendix).

2018Because Rule 7 requires a Juvenile Court judge to balance the rights of the parties based upon the specific facts presented in each case, there is no need to adopt standards and protocols similar to those set forth in Dwyer , 448 Mass. 122 , 859 N.E.2d 400 .

2023See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bukin, 467 Mass. 516, 520 (2014). "[I]f reliable hearsay is presented, the good cause requirement is satisfied." Id. at 522 , quoting Commonwealth v. Negron, 441 Mass. 685, 691 (2004).

2023See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bukin, 467 Mass. 516, 520 (2014). "[I]f reliable hearsay is presented, the good cause requirement is satisfied." Id. at 522 , quoting Commonwealth v. Negron, 441 Mass. 685, 691 (2004).

2014See Commonwealth v. Nunez, 446 Mass. 54, 58-59 (2006); Commonwealth v. Maggio, 414 Mass. 193, 197 (1993).

2008The Commonwealth correctly notes that the existence of reliable hearsay satisfies the requirement for good cause, obviating the need for confrontation. 6 See Commonwealth v. Nunez, 446 Mass. 54, 58-59 (2006), quoting from Commonwealth v. Ne gron, 441 Mass. 685, 691 (2004) (“if reliable hearsay is presented, the good cause requirement is satisfied”).

2014See Commonwealth v. Nunez, 446 Mass. 54, 58-59 (2006); Commonwealth v. Maggio, 414 Mass. 193, 197 (1993).

2008See also Commonwealth v. Maggio, 414 Mass. 193, 197 (1993).

2025If a defendant's probation is revoked based solely on hearsay evidence, "the proffered hearsay must have 'substantial indicia of reliability' to satisfy the good cause requirement." Costa, 490 Mass. at 124, quoting Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 482 . 5 In determining whether the hearsay evidence has the required indicia of reliability, the judge may consider: "(1) whether the evidence is based on personal knowledge or direct observation; (2) whether the evidence, if based on direct observation, was recorded close in time to the events in question; (3) the level of factual detail; (4) whether the sta

2025If a defendant's probation is revoked based solely on hearsay evidence, "the proffered hearsay must have 'substantial indicia of reliability' to satisfy the good cause requirement." Costa, 490 Mass. at 124, quoting Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 482 . 5 In determining whether the hearsay evidence has the required indicia of reliability, the judge may consider: "(1) whether the evidence is based on personal knowledge or direct observation; (2) whether the evidence, if based on direct observation, was recorded close in time to the events in question; (3) the level of factual detail; (4) whether the sta

2023See Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 491 Mass. 437 , 445 (2023), citing L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169 , 185 n.27 (2014).

2017Having concluded that the judge did not commit legal error in considering the defendant’s motion to impound under the good cause standard applicable to presumptively public judicial records, we now turn to the defendant’s claim that the judge abused his discretion in applying that standard. “[A] judge’s discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where we conclude the judge made ‘a clear error of judgment in weighing’ the factors relevant to the decision, . . . such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives.” L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169 , 185 n.

2014See also Commonwealth v. Durling, 407 Mass. 108, 116 (1990) (detailing the administrative burdens of holding full evidentiary hearings in all probation violation cases); Commonwealth v. Negron, 441 Mass. 685, 691 (2004) (“if reliable hearsay is presented, the good cause requirement is satisfied”).

2004We held in [Commonwealth v.] Durling, supra, that the existence of reliable hearsay evidence provides good cause to deny a defendant his right to confront and to cross-examine witnesses during a final probation revocation proceeding.” In other words, if reliable hearsay is presented, the good cause requirement is satisfied.

2025Despite the fact that the good cause standard of rule 55 (c) is "less stringent" than the excusable neglect standard of rule 60 (b) (1), see Institution for Sav. in Newburyport & Its Vicinity v. Langis, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 815, 822 (2018), and the judge's ruling applied rule 55 (c), the defendant again frames his appellate argument under the paradigm of rule 60 (b) (1).

2025Commonwealth v. Patton, 458 Mass. 119, 133 (2010).

2022Commonwealth v. Carter, 475 Mass. 512, 518 (2016). [Note 8] Contrary to the defendant's suggestion, our cases do not impose a good cause requirement for the use of arrays containing defining characteristics or for the use of repeated arrays. [Note 9] The following factors are relevant to the strength of an identification's independent source: "the quality of the witness's opportunity to observe the offender at the time of the crime, the amount of time between the crime and the identification, whether the witness's earlier description of the perpetrator matches the defendant, and whether the wi

2019See *1057 Clair v. Clair , 464 Mass. 205 , 214, 982 N.E.2d 32 (2013) ("appellate court may affirm a correct result based on reasons that are different from those articulated by the judge below").

2017Second, she concluded that they erred by failing to consider “whether the documents sought to be impounded were indeed public records, subject to a presumptive common[-]law right of access.” She declared that “[b]ecause the documents have been suppressed, there is scant, if any, basis to conclude that there is any public right of access to them.” The single justice quoted the assertion in United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 813 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom.

2017We also note *180 that, in the appeals to both single justices, the defendant appeared to acknowledge that the judge had applied the good cause standard, because he contended that the judge had abused his discretion in applying the good cause standard. 6 Nor do we agree with the suggestion of the single justice of the county court, citing McVeigh, 119 F.3d at 813 , that the video recording and transcript were not judicial records and therefore not presumptively public because they would be inadmissible in evidence at trial if the motion to suppress were granted, as it later was with respect to

2017Co., 512 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2008).

2016Rather, as indicated in Ambrose v. Detroit Edison Co., 65 Mich. App. 484, 488-489 (1975), on which we relied in the Phelps Steel case in initially adopting the good cause rule, the proper inquiry is whether, viewed objectively, the facts demonstrate the existence of good cause for withdrawal.

2016In Ambrose, supra at 487 , the withdrawing attorneys put forth four different grounds that they asserted supported their claim of good cause for withdrawal.

2014Court Dep’t, 403 Mass. 628, 631-632, 637-638 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066 (1989), and cases cited. 23 Although a good cause analysis requires consideration of similar factors as an analysis where the First Amendment is *313 implicated, see Republican Co., supra at 223 n.8; Sharpe, 432 Mass. at 605 n.24, the weight of the scales is more balanced, and the burden on the defendant somewhat lessened.

2014See Pixley v. Commonwealth, 453 Mass. 827 , 836 n.12 (2009) (discussing difference between sealing and impoundment). 24 It is worth discussing briefly the first paragraph of G.

2006With respect to a showing of good cause/reason or necessity for the singular identification procedure, the dissent in Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 Mass. 274, 301-302 (2006) (Cordy, J., dissenting), states as follows: “[T]he support for the good cause requirement adopted in [Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357, 361-362 (1995),] comes from 1 W.R.

2006With respect to a showing of good cause/reason or necessity for the singular identification procedure, the dissent in Commonwealth v. Martin, 447 Mass. 274, 301-302 (2006) (Cordy, J., dissenting), states as follows: “[T]he support for the good cause requirement adopted in [Commonwealth v. Austin, 421 Mass. 357, 361-362 (1995),] comes from 1 W.R.