28 Nevada opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hathaway v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute 2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute | 9 | 10 |
LABARBERA VS. WYNN LAS VEGAS, LLCgreen2 sentences2021See id. 2021See id. | 2 | 2 |
Father M v. Various Tort (In Re Roman Catholic Archbishop)green2 sentences2020In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). 2020In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Or., 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011). | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Davis v. State, 107 Nev. 600, 606 , 817 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012-13 , 103 P.2d 25 , 33 (2004). 4 No direct appeal was taken: SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A Appellant claimed he had good cause to overcome the procedural bars because he-learned new information related to the grand jury proceedings at an evidentiary hearing in September 2011. 2013See Davis v. State, 107 Nev. 600, 606 , 817 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012-13 , 103 P.2d 25 , 33 (2004). 4 No direct appeal was taken: SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A Appellant claimed he had good cause to overcome the procedural bars because he-learned new information related to the grand jury proceedings at an evidentiary hearing in September 2011. | 2 | 2 |
Means v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Davis v. State, 107 Nev. 600, 606 , 817 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012-13 , 103 P.2d 25 , 33 (2004). 4 No direct appeal was taken: SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A Appellant claimed he had good cause to overcome the procedural bars because he-learned new information related to the grand jury proceedings at an evidentiary hearing in September 2011. 2013See Davis v. State, 107 Nev. 600, 606 , 817 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012-13 , 103 P.2d 25 , 33 (2004). 4 No direct appeal was taken: SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A Appellant claimed he had good cause to overcome the procedural bars because he-learned new information related to the grand jury proceedings at an evidentiary hearing in September 2011. | 2 | 2 |
Shelton v. Lambgreen2 sentences2024Further, as already established by Shelton, the justice court may take into account the needs of the court when determining whether good cause exists for a delay, including the court's calendar and the pendency of other cases. 85 Nev. at 620, 460 P.2d at 157; Stevenson, 92 Nev. at 537, 554 P.3d at 255.5 5We note that a defendant may waive the right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days, see NRS 171.196(2), in which case a good cause analysis is not required. 2024Further, as already established by Shelton, the justice court may take into account the needs of the court when determining whether good cause exists for a delay, including the court's calendar and the pendency of other cases. 85 Nev. at 620, 460 P.2d at 157 ; Stevenson, 92 Nev. at 537 , 554 P.3d at 255.5 5We note that a defendant may waive the right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days, see NRS 171.196(2), in which case a good cause analysis is not required. | 1 | 1 |
City of North Las Vegas v. Central Telephone Co.green2 sentences2024Further, as already established by Shelton, the justice court may take into account the needs of the court when determining whether good cause exists for a delay, including the court's calendar and the pendency of other cases. 85 Nev. at 620, 460 P.2d at 157; Stevenson, 92 Nev. at 537, 554 P.3d at 255.5 5We note that a defendant may waive the right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days, see NRS 171.196(2), in which case a good cause analysis is not required. 2024Further, as already established by Shelton, the justice court may take into account the needs of the court when determining whether good cause exists for a delay, including the court's calendar and the pendency of other cases. 85 Nev. at 620, 460 P.2d at 157 ; Stevenson, 92 Nev. at 537 , 554 P.3d at 255.5 5We note that a defendant may waive the right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days, see NRS 171.196(2), in which case a good cause analysis is not required. | 1 | 1 |
Stevenson v. Sheriffgreen2 sentences2024Further, as already established by Shelton, the justice court may take into account the needs of the court when determining whether good cause exists for a delay, including the court's calendar and the pendency of other cases. 85 Nev. at 620, 460 P.2d at 157; Stevenson, 92 Nev. at 537, 554 P.3d at 255.5 5We note that a defendant may waive the right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days, see NRS 171.196(2), in which case a good cause analysis is not required. 2024Further, as already established by Shelton, the justice court may take into account the needs of the court when determining whether good cause exists for a delay, including the court's calendar and the pendency of other cases. 85 Nev. at 620, 460 P.2d at 157 ; Stevenson, 92 Nev. at 537 , 554 P.3d at 255.5 5We note that a defendant may waive the right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days, see NRS 171.196(2), in which case a good cause analysis is not required. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Eighth Judicial District Courtgreen2 sentences2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356, 360, 351 P.3d 725, 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192, 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91, 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235, 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatutesr suc 2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute | 1 | 1 |
Rippo v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356, 360, 351 P.3d 725, 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192, 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91, 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235, 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatutesr suc 2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dist. Ct.green2 sentences2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356, 360, 351 P.3d 725, 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192, 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91, 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235, 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatutesr suc 2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute | 1 | 1 |
Pellegrini v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See id. | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Carpentergreen1 sentence2016A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may provide good cause but only where there is a right to counsel (statutory or constitutional) and the right to the effective assistance of counsel, see Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303 , 934 P.2d 247, 253 (1997); McKague SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0)1947A et. v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159 , 165 n.5, 912 P.2d 255 , 258 n.5 (1996), and only where the good cause claim explains the procedural defects and is not itself procedurally barred, Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252 , 71 P.3d at 506 ; see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 453 (2000) (explaining | 1 | 1 |
Crump v. Wardengreen2 sentences2016A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may provide good cause but only where there is a right to counsel (statutory or constitutional) and the right to the effective assistance of counsel, see Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303 , 934 P.2d 247, 253 (1997); McKague SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0)1947A et. v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159 , 165 n.5, 912 P.2d 255 , 258 n.5 (1996), and only where the good cause claim explains the procedural defects and is not itself procedurally barred, Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252 , 71 P.3d at 506 ; see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 453 (2000) (explaining 2016A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may provide good cause but only where there is a right to counsel (statutory or constitutional) and the right to the effective assistance of counsel, see Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303 , 934 P.2d 247, 253 (1997); McKague SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0)1947A et. v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159 , 165 n.5, 912 P.2d 255 , 258 n.5 (1996), and only where the good cause claim explains the procedural defects and is not itself procedurally barred, Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252 , 71 P.3d at 506 ; see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 453 (2000) (explaining | 1 | 1 |
Murray v. Carriergreen1 sentence2016A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may provide good cause but only where there is a right to counsel (statutory or constitutional) and the right to the effective assistance of counsel, see Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303 , 934 P.2d 247, 253 (1997); McKague SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0)1947A et. v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159 , 165 n.5, 912 P.2d 255 , 258 n.5 (1996), and only where the good cause claim explains the procedural defects and is not itself procedurally barred, Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252 , 71 P.3d at 506 ; see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 453 (2000) (explaining | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315-16 , 535 P.2d 797, 798-99 (1975). 2013See Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315-16 , 535 P.2d 797, 798-99 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Breedon v. Maryland State Department of Educationgreen1 sentence2009App. Ct. 1986) (finding, under a good cause standard, it was proper for lower court to refuse to supplement the record to include additional evidence in a workers’ compensation matter); Pannoni v. Board of Trustees, 90 P.3d 438, 449-50 (Mont. 2004) (concluding, under a good reasons standard, that good reasons had not been established when the failure to present the evidence was due to a tactical decision); Breedon v. Maryland State Dept. of Ed., 411 A.2d 1073, 1080 (Md. | 1 | 1 |
Pannoni v. Board of Trustees, Browning School District No. 9green1 sentence2009App. Ct. 1986) (finding, under a good cause standard, it was proper for lower court to refuse to supplement the record to include additional evidence in a workers’ compensation matter); Pannoni v. Board of Trustees, 90 P.3d 438, 449-50 (Mont. 2004) (concluding, under a good reasons standard, that good reasons had not been established when the failure to present the evidence was due to a tactical decision); Breedon v. Maryland State Dept. of Ed., 411 A.2d 1073, 1080 (Md. | 1 | 1 |
Sandy v. Fifth Judicial District Courtgreen2 sentences2006But see Ridenour, 397 F.3d at 935-36 (declining to "engraft a good cause requirement on a government motion to dismiss," but nevertheless adopting the Sequoia standard for dismissal). [51] Laraway, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d at 831 . [52] Cf. Sheriff v. Marcus, 116 Nev. 188 , 995 P.2d 1016 (2000) (discussing prosecutorial discretion in light of statutory amendments to good cause for dismissal requirements in a criminal matter); Sandy v. District Court, 113 Nev. 435, 439-42 , 935 P.2d 1148, 1150-52 (1997) (discussing the district judge's role as the protector of the public interest when exercising authori 2006But see Ridenour, 397 F.3d at 935-36 (declining to "engraft a good cause requirement on a government motion to dismiss," but nevertheless adopting the Sequoia standard for dismissal). [51] Laraway, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d at 831 . [52] Cf. Sheriff v. Marcus, 116 Nev. 188 , 995 P.2d 1016 (2000) (discussing prosecutorial discretion in light of statutory amendments to good cause for dismissal requirements in a criminal matter); Sandy v. District Court, 113 Nev. 435, 439-42 , 935 P.2d 1148, 1150-52 (1997) (discussing the district judge's role as the protector of the public interest when exercising authori | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Ninth Judicial District Courtgreen2 sentences2006But see Ridenour, 397 F.3d at 935-36 (declining to "engraft a good cause requirement on a government motion to dismiss," but nevertheless adopting the Sequoia standard for dismissal). [51] Laraway, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d at 831 . [52] Cf. Sheriff v. Marcus, 116 Nev. 188 , 995 P.2d 1016 (2000) (discussing prosecutorial discretion in light of statutory amendments to good cause for dismissal requirements in a criminal matter); Sandy v. District Court, 113 Nev. 435, 439-42 , 935 P.2d 1148, 1150-52 (1997) (discussing the district judge's role as the protector of the public interest when exercising authori 2006But see Ridenour, 397 F.3d at 935-36 (declining to "engraft a good cause requirement on a government motion to dismiss," but nevertheless adopting the Sequoia standard for dismissal). [51] Laraway, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d at 831 . [52] Cf. Sheriff v. Marcus, 116 Nev. 188 , 995 P.2d 1016 (2000) (discussing prosecutorial discretion in light of statutory amendments to good cause for dismissal requirements in a criminal matter); Sandy v. District Court, 113 Nev. 435, 439-42 , 935 P.2d 1148, 1150-52 (1997) (discussing the district judge's role as the protector of the public interest when exercising authori | 1 | 1 |
| Salas v. Sheriff, Clark Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co.green | 1 | 1 |
Laraway v. SUTRO & CO. INC.green2 sentences2006Laraway, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831 . 2006But see Ridenour, 397 F.3d at 935-36 (declining to "engraft a good cause requirement on a government motion to dismiss," but nevertheless adopting the Sequoia standard for dismissal). [51] Laraway, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d at 831 . [52] Cf. Sheriff v. Marcus, 116 Nev. 188 , 995 P.2d 1016 (2000) (discussing prosecutorial discretion in light of statutory amendments to good cause for dismissal requirements in a criminal matter); Sandy v. District Court, 113 Nev. 435, 439-42 , 935 P.2d 1148, 1150-52 (1997) (discussing the district judge's role as the protector of the public interest when exercising authori | 1 | 1 |
Sheriff, Washoe County v. Marcusgreen1 sentence2006But see Ridenour, 397 F.3d at 935-36 (declining to "engraft a good cause requirement on a government motion to dismiss," but nevertheless adopting the Sequoia standard for dismissal). [51] Laraway, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d at 831 . [52] Cf. Sheriff v. Marcus, 116 Nev. 188 , 995 P.2d 1016 (2000) (discussing prosecutorial discretion in light of statutory amendments to good cause for dismissal requirements in a criminal matter); Sandy v. District Court, 113 Nev. 435, 439-42 , 935 P.2d 1148, 1150-52 (1997) (discussing the district judge's role as the protector of the public interest when exercising authori | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253 , 1259 (9th Cir. 2010). 2025The good cause inquiry “is a non-rigorous standard that has been construed broadly across procedural and statutory contexts.” Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253 , 1259 (9th Cir. 2010). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Ormound v. Sheriff, Clark County
green
2 sentences1997Ormound stood for the proposition that “[w]here a legal means of compelling the attendance of a witness is available, that method must be used before the good cause requirement ... is met.” Ormound, 95 Nev. at 175 , 591 P.2d at 259 . 1997Ormound stood for the proposition that “[w]here a legal means of compelling the attendance of a witness is available, that method must be used before the good cause requirement ... is met.” Ormound, 95 Nev. at 175 , 591 P.2d at 259 . | 2 | 1995–1997 |
Moseley v. Eighth Judicial District Court
green
2 sentences2025Generally, “[g]ood cause ...is established when it is shown that the circumstances causing the failure to act are beyond the individual's control.” Moseley, 124 Nev. at 668 n.66, 188 P.3d at 1146 n.66; see also Spar Bus. 2025Generally, “[g]ood cause ...is established when it is shown that the circumstances causing the failure to act are beyond the individual's control.” Moseley, 124 Nev. at 668 n.66, 188 P.3d at 1146 n.66; see also Spar Bus. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Townsend
green
2 sentences2021Therefore, he has not rebutted the presumption of prejudice statute on other grounds as s tated in State v. Townsend, 897 A.2d 316 (N.J. 2006). 5To the extent the district court suggested the actual innocence gateway is subject to a good cause requirement, we conclude the district court erred. 2021Therefore, he has not rebutted the presumption of prejudice statute on other grounds as s tated in State v. Townsend, 897 A.2d 316 (N.J. 2006). 5To the extent the district court suggested the actual innocence gateway is subject to a good cause requirement, we conclude the district court erred. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Huebler
green
2 sentences2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute 2021See generally Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411 , 423 P.3d 1084 (2018) (discussing procedural bars and availability of a postconviction-counsel claim as good cause and prejudice); see also Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 360, 351 P.3d 725 , 728 (2015) (stating that a good-cause claim based on a Brady violation must be raised within a reasonable time after the claim became available); State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192 , 198 n.3, 275 P.3d 91 , 95 n.3 (2012) (same); Riker, 121 Nev. at 235 , 112 P.3d at 1077 (explaining that a postconviction-counsel claim is not "immune to other procedural default fstatute | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Dist. Ct.
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 967 , 11 P.3d at 1217 . 2017Id. at 967 , 11 P.3d at 1217 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
McKague v. Whitley
green
2 sentences2016A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may provide good cause but only where there is a right to counsel (statutory or constitutional) and the right to the effective assistance of counsel, see Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303 , 934 P.2d 247, 253 (1997); McKague SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0)1947A et. v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159 , 165 n.5, 912 P.2d 255 , 258 n.5 (1996), and only where the good cause claim explains the procedural defects and is not itself procedurally barred, Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252 , 71 P.3d at 506 ; see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 453 (2000) (explaining 2016A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may provide good cause but only where there is a right to counsel (statutory or constitutional) and the right to the effective assistance of counsel, see Crump v. Warden, 113 Nev. 293, 303 , 934 P.2d 247, 253 (1997); McKague SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0)1947A et. v. Warden, 112 Nev. 159 , 165 n.5, 912 P.2d 255 , 258 n.5 (1996), and only where the good cause claim explains the procedural defects and is not itself procedurally barred, Hathaway, 119 Nev. at 252 , 71 P.3d at 506 ; see also Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451, 453 (2000) (explaining | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sparks v. State
green
2 sentences2006But see Ridenour, 397 F.3d at 935-36 (declining to "engraft a good cause requirement on a government motion to dismiss," but nevertheless adopting the Sequoia standard for dismissal). [51] Laraway, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d at 831 . [52] Cf. Sheriff v. Marcus, 116 Nev. 188 , 995 P.2d 1016 (2000) (discussing prosecutorial discretion in light of statutory amendments to good cause for dismissal requirements in a criminal matter); Sandy v. District Court, 113 Nev. 435, 439-42 , 935 P.2d 1148, 1150-52 (1997) (discussing the district judge's role as the protector of the public interest when exercising authori 2006But see Ridenour, 397 F.3d at 935-36 (declining to "engraft a good cause requirement on a government motion to dismiss," but nevertheless adopting the Sequoia standard for dismissal). [51] Laraway, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d at 831 . [52] Cf. Sheriff v. Marcus, 116 Nev. 188 , 995 P.2d 1016 (2000) (discussing prosecutorial discretion in light of statutory amendments to good cause for dismissal requirements in a criminal matter); Sandy v. District Court, 113 Nev. 435, 439-42 , 935 P.2d 1148, 1150-52 (1997) (discussing the district judge's role as the protector of the public interest when exercising authori | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Sheriff v. Terpstra green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.