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48 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1904–2026 13 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Swaingreen2 sentences2023Swain, 288 Mich App at 631 . 2020See Swain, 288 Mich App at 631 . | 1 | 2 |
Daugherty v. Stategreen2 sentences1986The good cause requirement for setting aside a default judgment includes: (1) a substantial defect or irregularity in the proceedings upon which the default was based; (2) a reasonable excuse for failure to comply with the requirements which created the default; (3) some other reason showing that manifest injustice would result from permitting the default to stand. 2 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), Comments, p 662; Jones, supra, pp 161-162 ; Daugherty v State of Michigan (After Remand), 133 Mich App 593, 597-598 ; 350 NW2d 291 (1984). 1986The good cause requirement for setting aside a default judgment includes: (1) a substantial defect or irregularity in the proceedings upon which the default was based; (2) a reasonable excuse for failure to comply with the requirements which created the default; (3) some other reason showing that manifest injustice would result from permitting the default to stand. 2 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), Comments, p 662; Jones, supra, pp 161-162 ; Daugherty v State of Michigan (After Remand), 133 Mich App 593, 597-598 ; 350 NW2d 291 (1984). | 1 | 2 |
In Re Utreragreen1 sentence2026See In re Utrera, 281 Mich App at 11 ; see also In re Patillo/Rious/Gee-Darden, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 14, 2012 (Docket No. 307558), p 2 (finding that the respondent failed to meet the good cause standard of MCR 3.923(G)(1) because “incarceration . . . was not a legally sufficient reason to adjourn” and because respondent’s “speculation that she might have a job or housing when she was released from jail was not based on any supportable facts”).1 Further, the trial court properly took into consideration the best interests of the child, see MCR 3.923 | 1 | 1 |
Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v. Bach Services & Manufacturinggreen1 sentence2026This Court has articulated several factors to consider regarding the good-cause requirement: The trial court should consider a list of factors in determining whether there was good cause: whether the party completely failed to respond or simply missed the deadline; if the party simply missed the deadline, how long afterward the party filed; how long the movant took to move to set aside the default; whether there was defective process or notice; the circumstances behind the failure to file or timely file; whether the failure was knowing or intentional; the size of the judgment; whether the judg | 1 | 1 |
People of Michigan v. Paul Edward Whitegreen1 sentence2026See id. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Reedgreen1 sentence2024The good cause prong of MCR 6.508(D)(3) may be “established by proving ineffective assistance of appellate counsel . . . or by showing that some external factor prevented counsel from previously raising the issue.” Reed, 449 Mich at 387 (citation omitted). “[R]egardless of whether a defendant files a prior motion in propria persona or with representation, he or she is required to fulfill the good cause requirement in MCR 6.508(D)(3).” People v Clark, 274 Mich App 248, 254 ; 732 NW2d 605 (2007). | 1 | 1 |
People of Michigan v. Ronald Edward Owens Jrgreen1 sentence2024Owens, 338 Mich App at 113; Simon, 339 Mich App at 580. -3- 2. | 1 | 1 |
Brooks Williamson & Associates, Inc. v. Mayflower Construction Co.green1 sentence2020“The good cause requirement . . . may be satisfied by demonstrating a procedural irregularity or defect or a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the requirements that led to the default judgment.” Brooks Williamson, 308 Mich App at 25 (quotation marks and citations omitted; ellipses in original). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Watrobagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Alken-Ziegler, Inc. v. Waterbury Headers Corp.
green
2 sentences2016Alken-Ziegler, Inc v Waterbury Headers Corp, 461 Mich 219, 229 ; 600 NW2d 638 (1999). “ ‘The good cause requirement . . . may be satisfied by demonstrating a procedural irregularity or defect or a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the requirements that led to the default judgment.’ ” Bullington v Corbell, 293 Mich App 549 , 560- 561; 809 NW2d 657 (2011) (citations omitted). “[M]anifest injustice is the result that would occur if a default were to be allowed to stand where a party has satisfied the ‘meritorious defense’ and ‘good cause’ requirements of the court rule.” Alken-Ziegler, 2016Alken-Ziegler, Inc v Waterbury Headers Corp, 461 Mich 219, 229 ; 600 NW2d 638 (1999). “ ‘The good cause requirement . . . may be satisfied by demonstrating a procedural irregularity or defect or a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the requirements that led to the default judgment.’ ” Bullington v Corbell, 293 Mich App 549 , 560- 561; 809 NW2d 657 (2011) (citations omitted). “[M]anifest injustice is the result that would occur if a default were to be allowed to stand where a party has satisfied the ‘meritorious defense’ and ‘good cause’ requirements of the court rule.” Alken-Ziegler, | 5 | 2003–2024 |
People v. Ginther
green
2 sentences2017Dennis pleaded guilty of unlawful imprisonment, carjacking, and felony-firearm, and Tyrese pleaded guilty of carjacking and felony-firearm. 2 See People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -2- In his brief on appeal, defendant does not cite MCR 2.503(B) or the good cause factors. 2017Dennis pleaded guilty of unlawful imprisonment, carjacking, and felony-firearm, and Tyrese pleaded guilty of carjacking and felony-firearm. 2 See People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443 ; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). -2- In his brief on appeal, defendant does not cite MCR 2.503(B) or the good cause factors. | 3 | 2017–2026 |
Shawl v. SPENCE BROS., INC.
green
2 sentences2026This Court has articulated several factors to consider regarding the good-cause requirement: The trial court should consider a list of factors in determining whether there was good cause: whether the party completely failed to respond or simply missed the deadline; if the party simply missed the deadline, how long afterward the party filed; how long the movant took to move to set aside the default; whether there was defective process or notice; the circumstances behind the failure to file or timely file; whether the failure was knowing or intentional; the size of the judgment; whether the judg 2026This Court has articulated several factors to consider regarding the good-cause requirement: The trial court should consider a list of factors in determining whether there was good cause: whether the party completely failed to respond or simply missed the deadline; if the party simply missed the deadline, how long afterward the party filed; how long the movant took to move to set aside the default; whether there was defective process or notice; the circumstances behind the failure to file or timely file; whether the failure was knowing or intentional; the size of the judgment; whether the judg | 3 | 2018–2026 |
Bullington v. Corbell
green
2 sentences2025“The good cause requirement . . . may be satisfied by demonstrating a procedural irregularity or defect or a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the requirements that led to the default judgment.” Bullington v Corbell, 293 Mich App 549, 560-561 ; 809 NW2d 657 (2011). 2025“The good cause requirement . . . may be satisfied by demonstrating a procedural irregularity or defect or a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the requirements that led to the default judgment.” Bullington v Corbell, 293 Mich App 549, 560-561 ; 809 NW2d 657 (2011). | 3 | 2014–2025 |
People v. Burwick
green
2 sentences2017“Having thus fully addressed all known witnesses and provided for notice of their existence and a designation of who will be produced, the statute contemplates that the defense will seek production of the witnesses it desires and allows the prosecutor to delete from or add to the list of witnesses it will produce ‘at any time’ as long as the good-cause requirement of MCL 767.40a(1) is satisfied.” Id. 2017“Having thus fully addressed all known witnesses and provided for notice of their existence and a designation of who will be produced, the statute contemplates that the defense will seek production of the witnesses it desires and allows the prosecutor to delete from or add to the list of witnesses it will produce ‘at any time’ as long as the good-cause requirement of MCL 767.40a(1) is satisfied.” Id. | 3 | 1998–2017 |
People v. Cress
green
2 sentences2026In order for a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show that: (1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial. [Id. at 566, citing People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 692 ; 664 NW2d 174 (2003) (quotation marks omitted).] “As our Supreme Court has explained, Cress’s first three prongs relate to the goo 2026By contrast, under Cress, 468 Mich at 692 , a defendant seeking a new trial on grounds of newly discovered evidence must show that: (1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different result probable on retrial. [Quotation marks and citation omitted.] The good-cause exception of MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) and the required elements of a Cress claim are similar in that both require | 2 | 2026–2026 |
In Re MKK
green
2 sentences2019Viviano, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). *183 For the reasons set forth in my dissent in In re MGR , --- Mich. ----, 928 N.W.2d 184 (2019) (Docket No. 157821), I would apply the good-cause analysis set forth In re MKK , 286 Mich. App. 546 , 781 N.W.2d 132 (2009), to determine whether the putative father's paternity action should have been stayed in favor of the adoption proceedings. 2019Viviano, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). *183 For the reasons set forth in my dissent in In re MGR , --- Mich. ----, 928 N.W.2d 184 (2019) (Docket No. 157821), I would apply the good-cause analysis set forth In re MKK , 286 Mich. App. 546 , 781 N.W.2d 132 (2009), to determine whether the putative father's paternity action should have been stayed in favor of the adoption proceedings. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Tucker
green
2 sentences2018Defendant’s objection to counsel’s factual inaccuracy does not constitute a “[g]enuine disagreement between counsel and the defendant over the use of a substantial defense or a fundamental trial tactic [that would] satisf[y] the good cause requirement . . . .” People v Tucker, 181 Mich App 246, 255 ; 448 NW2d 811 (1989), remanded on other grounds by People v Musick, 437 Mich 867 (1990). 2018Defendant’s objection to counsel’s factual inaccuracy does not constitute a “[g]enuine disagreement between counsel and the defendant over the use of a substantial defense or a fundamental trial tactic [that would] satisf[y] the good cause requirement . . . .” People v Tucker, 181 Mich App 246, 255 ; 448 NW2d 811 (1989), remanded on other grounds by People v Musick, 437 Mich 867 (1990). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Lukity
green
2 sentences2018Additionally, an evidentiary error does not merit reversal in a criminal case unless, after review of the case, it appears that it is “more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.” Lukity, 460 Mich at 495-496 . 2018Additionally, an evidentiary error does not merit reversal in a criminal case unless, after review of the case, it appears that it is “more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.” Lukity, 460 Mich at 495-496 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
J. A. Utley Co. v. Saginaw Circuit Judge
neutral
2 sentences1970A. Utley Company v. Saginaw Circuit Judge (1964), 372 Mich 367 , 126 NW2d 696 .” 2 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated 2d ed, 1969, Supp, p 31. 20 As the advisory committee on the new Federal rules observed, the courts had been unable to distinguish clearly the two verbally-distinct requirements of justification: the good cause requirement and the showings required to validate production of work product. 1970A. Utley Company v. Saginaw Circuit Judge (1964), 372 Mich 367 , 126 NW2d 696 .” 2 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated 2d ed, 1969, Supp, p 31. 20 As the advisory committee on the new Federal rules observed, the courts had been unable to distinguish clearly the two verbally-distinct requirements of justification: the good cause requirement and the showings required to validate production of work product. | 2 | 1970–1986 |
Saffian v. Simmons
green
1 sentence2026Saffian, 477 Mich at 15 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Clark
green
2 sentences2024The good cause prong of MCR 6.508(D)(3) may be “established by proving ineffective assistance of appellate counsel . . . or by showing that some external factor prevented counsel from previously raising the issue.” Reed, 449 Mich at 387 (citation omitted). “[R]egardless of whether a defendant files a prior motion in propria persona or with representation, he or she is required to fulfill the good cause requirement in MCR 6.508(D)(3).” People v Clark, 274 Mich App 248, 254 ; 732 NW2d 605 (2007). 2024The good cause prong of MCR 6.508(D)(3) may be “established by proving ineffective assistance of appellate counsel . . . or by showing that some external factor prevented counsel from previously raising the issue.” Reed, 449 Mich at 387 (citation omitted). “[R]egardless of whether a defendant files a prior motion in propria persona or with representation, he or she is required to fulfill the good cause requirement in MCR 6.508(D)(3).” People v Clark, 274 Mich App 248, 254 ; 732 NW2d 605 (2007). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Lanzo Construction Co. v. Department of Labor
green
2 sentences2024Id. at 416-417 . 2024In Lanzo, 86 Mich App at 415-416 , this Court held that the Board could exercise discretion and consider an untimely appeal when “an employer shows ‘good cause’ for having failed to meet the 15-working-day deadline and that it has a meritorious defense.” This Court left “it to the wisdom of the Board to determine” the good-cause standard. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Janczyk v. Davis
green
1 sentence2022Janczyk, 125 Mich App at 691 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Lawton
green
2 sentences2020In relation to the good cause requirement for a motion to adjourn based on the unavailability of a witness, a trial court must consider “ ‘whether defendant (1) asserted a constitutional right, (2) had a legitimate reason for asserting the right, (3) had been negligent, and (4) had requested previous adjournments.’ ” People v Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 18 ; 669 NW2d 831 (2003), quoting People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 348 ; 492 NW2d 810 (1992). 2020In relation to the good cause requirement for a motion to adjourn based on the unavailability of a witness, a trial court must consider “ ‘whether defendant (1) asserted a constitutional right, (2) had a legitimate reason for asserting the right, (3) had been negligent, and (4) had requested previous adjournments.’ ” People v Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 18 ; 669 NW2d 831 (2003), quoting People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 348 ; 492 NW2d 810 (1992). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Coy
green
2 sentences2020In relation to the good cause requirement for a motion to adjourn based on the unavailability of a witness, a trial court must consider “ ‘whether defendant (1) asserted a constitutional right, (2) had a legitimate reason for asserting the right, (3) had been negligent, and (4) had requested previous adjournments.’ ” People v Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 18 ; 669 NW2d 831 (2003), quoting People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 348 ; 492 NW2d 810 (1992). 2020In relation to the good cause requirement for a motion to adjourn based on the unavailability of a witness, a trial court must consider “ ‘whether defendant (1) asserted a constitutional right, (2) had a legitimate reason for asserting the right, (3) had been negligent, and (4) had requested previous adjournments.’ ” People v Coy, 258 Mich App 1, 18 ; 669 NW2d 831 (2003), quoting People v Lawton, 196 Mich App 341, 348 ; 492 NW2d 810 (1992). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In re MGR
neutral
1 sentence2019Viviano, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). *183 For the reasons set forth in my dissent in In re MGR , --- Mich. ----, 928 N.W.2d 184 (2019) (Docket No. 157821), I would apply the good-cause analysis set forth In re MKK , 286 Mich. App. 546 , 781 N.W.2d 132 (2009), to determine whether the putative father's paternity action should have been stayed in favor of the adoption proceedings. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Kimble
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 308 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2015MCR 6.508(D)(3). -8- In his discussion of MCR 6.508(D)(3), Freeman simply asserts that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose the photos in violation of the decision in Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 ; 83 S Ct 1194 ; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963), prevented him from raising the issue earlier, which satisfied the good cause requirement. 2015MCR 6.508(D)(3). -8- In his discussion of MCR 6.508(D)(3), Freeman simply asserts that the prosecutor’s failure to disclose the photos in violation of the decision in Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 ; 83 S Ct 1194 ; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963), prevented him from raising the issue earlier, which satisfied the good cause requirement. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lawrence M Clarke, Inc v. Richco Construction, Inc
green
2 sentences2014A court “ ‘cannot adjudicate [an in personam] controversy without first having obtained jurisdiction [over the] defendant by service of process . . . .’ ” Lawrence M Clarke, Inc v Richco Constr, Inc, 489 Mich 265, 274 ; 803 NW2d 151 (2011), quoting Eisner v Williams, 298 Mich 215, 220-221 ; 298 NW 507 (1941). 2014A court “ ‘cannot adjudicate [an in personam] controversy without first having obtained jurisdiction [over the] defendant by service of process . . . .’ ” Lawrence M Clarke, Inc v Richco Constr, Inc, 489 Mich 265, 274 ; 803 NW2d 151 (2011), quoting Eisner v Williams, 298 Mich 215, 220-221 ; 298 NW 507 (1941). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Carswell v. Share House, Inc green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
ISB Sales Co. v. Dave's Cakes
green
2 sentences2014B Under MCR 2.603(D)(1), “[a] motion to set aside a default or a default judgment. .. shall be granted only if good cause is shown and an affidavit of facts showing a meritorious defense is filed.” “ ‘The good cause requirement .. . may be satisfied by demonstrating a procedural irregularity or defect or a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the requirements that led to the default judgment.’ ” Bullington v Corbell, 293 Mich App 549, 560-561 ; 809 NW2d 657 (2011), quoting ISB Sales Co v Dave’s Cakes, 258 Mich App 520, 533 ; 672 NW2d 181 (2003). *26 1 Defendants’ claim that they were n 2014B Under MCR 2.603(D)(1), “[a] motion to set aside a default or a default judgment. .. shall be granted only if good cause is shown and an affidavit of facts showing a meritorious defense is filed.” “ ‘The good cause requirement .. . may be satisfied by demonstrating a procedural irregularity or defect or a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the requirements that led to the default judgment.’ ” Bullington v Corbell, 293 Mich App 549, 560-561 ; 809 NW2d 657 (2011), quoting ISB Sales Co v Dave’s Cakes, 258 Mich App 520, 533 ; 672 NW2d 181 (2003). *26 1 Defendants’ claim that they were n | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Eisner v. Williams
green
2 sentences2014A court “ ‘cannot adjudicate [an in personam] controversy without first having obtained jurisdiction [over the] defendant by service of process . . . .’ ” Lawrence M Clarke, Inc v Richco Constr, Inc, 489 Mich 265, 274 ; 803 NW2d 151 (2011), quoting Eisner v Williams, 298 Mich 215, 220-221 ; 298 NW 507 (1941). 2014A court “ ‘cannot adjudicate [an in personam] controversy without first having obtained jurisdiction [over the] defendant by service of process . . . .’ ” Lawrence M Clarke, Inc v Richco Constr, Inc, 489 Mich 265, 274 ; 803 NW2d 151 (2011), quoting Eisner v Williams, 298 Mich 215, 220-221 ; 298 NW 507 (1941). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Bush v. Beemer green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Komejan v. Suburban Softball, Inc green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Moore green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| United States v. Tucker yellow | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Leary neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Davis v. O'BRIEN green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Hunley v. Phillips green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Reed v. Walsh green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Jones yellow | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Daniels v. Allen Industries, Inc yellow | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Covington Mutual Insurance v. Copeland green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Jones v. Philip Atkins Construction Co. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| In the Matter of Dixon green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Borovoy v. Bursar Realty Corp. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Glasner v. Griffin green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Sawtelle green | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.