18 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nguyen v. Industrial Claim Appeals Officegreen2 sentences2026See Nguyen, 174 P.3d at 849 ; see also Mohawk Data Scis. 2025Claim Appeals Off., 174 P.3d 847, 848-49 (Colo. App. 2007). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Estate of Beckergreen2 sentences2010See In re Estate of Becker, 32 P.3d 557, 568 (Colo.App. 2000) (one panel of the court of appeals is not obligated to follow precedent established by another). 2010See In re Estate of Becker, 32 P.3d 557, 563 (Colo.App. 2000) (one panel of the court of appeals is not obligated to follow precedent established by another). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Interest of Bird Headgreen2 sentences1994See People in Interest of Bird Head, 213 Neb. 741 , 331 N.W.2d 785 (1983); In re Robert T., supra . 1994See People in Interest of Bird Head, 213 Neb. 741 , 331 N.W.2d 785 (1983); In re Robert T., supra . | 2 | 2 |
Grandote Golf & Country Club, LLC v. Town of La Vetagreen1 sentence2016See, e.g., Grandote Golf & Country Club, LLC v. Town of La Veta, 252 P.3d 1196, 1201 (Colo. App. 2011) (noting that the existence of a good cause exception suggests strict compliance in the absence of good cause). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Livasgreen2 sentences2013Indeed, other courts, considering the phrase in the UMDDA or speedy trial context, have held only that it means "a substantial reason ... that rises to the level of a legal excuse." State v. Livas, 147 Idaho 547 , 211 P.3d 792, 794 (App.2009); see also State v. Rouse, 13 Neb.App. 90 , 688 N.W.2d 889, 890 (2004) ("Good cause means a substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse."). €30 Because it is amorphous, "[wlhether or not [the good cause standard] has been satisfied is largely dependent upon the facts of each individual case" and its "determination is entrusted to the sound and cons 2013Indeed, other courts, considering the phrase in the UMDDA or speedy trial context, have held only that it means "a substantial reason ... that rises to the level of a legal excuse." State v. Livas, 147 Idaho 547 , 211 P.3d 792, 794 (App.2009); see also State v. Rouse, 13 Neb.App. 90 , 688 N.W.2d 889, 890 (2004) ("Good cause means a substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse."). €30 Because it is amorphous, "[wlhether or not [the good cause standard] has been satisfied is largely dependent upon the facts of each individual case" and its "determination is entrusted to the sound and cons | 1 | 1 |
Laffey v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2013See Laffey, 55 Colo. at 577 , 136 P. 1031 at 1032 ("The objections urged were of a character which, if properly interposed in apt time, entitled the defendant to have the defects in the proceedings corrected, but such defects were not jurisdictional in the sense that they could not be waived."); People v. Butler, 251 P.3d 519, 520 (Colo.App.2010) ("A valid, unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional objections, including allegations that constitutional rights have been violated."). {19 In concluding that the good cause requirement is not jurisdictional, we rely upon Holmes v. Distr 2013See Laffey, 55 Colo. at 577 , 136 P. 1031 at 1032 ("The objections urged were of a character which, if properly interposed in apt time, entitled the defendant to have the defects in the proceedings corrected, but such defects were not jurisdictional in the sense that they could not be waived."); People v. Butler, 251 P.3d 519, 520 (Colo.App.2010) ("A valid, unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional objections, including allegations that constitutional rights have been violated."). {19 In concluding that the good cause requirement is not jurisdictional, we rely upon Holmes v. Distr | 1 | 1 |
Angelo Colasante v. Wells Fargo Corp.green1 sentence2013Indeed, other courts, considering the phrase in the UMDDA or speedy trial context, have held only that it means "a substantial reason ... that rises to the level of a legal excuse." State v. Livas, 147 Idaho 547 , 211 P.3d 792, 794 (App.2009); see also State v. Rouse, 13 Neb.App. 90 , 688 N.W.2d 889, 890 (2004) ("Good cause means a substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse."). €30 Because it is amorphous, "[wlhether or not [the good cause standard] has been satisfied is largely dependent upon the facts of each individual case" and its "determination is entrusted to the sound and cons | 1 | 1 |
People v. Butlergreen1 sentence2013See Laffey, 55 Colo. at 577 , 136 P. 1031 at 1032 ("The objections urged were of a character which, if properly interposed in apt time, entitled the defendant to have the defects in the proceedings corrected, but such defects were not jurisdictional in the sense that they could not be waived."); People v. Butler, 251 P.3d 519, 520 (Colo.App.2010) ("A valid, unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional objections, including allegations that constitutional rights have been violated."). {19 In concluding that the good cause requirement is not jurisdictional, we rely upon Holmes v. Distr | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rousegreen2 sentences2013Indeed, other courts, considering the phrase in the UMDDA or speedy trial context, have held only that it means "a substantial reason ... that rises to the level of a legal excuse." State v. Livas, 147 Idaho 547 , 211 P.3d 792, 794 (App.2009); see also State v. Rouse, 13 Neb.App. 90 , 688 N.W.2d 889, 890 (2004) ("Good cause means a substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse."). €30 Because it is amorphous, "[wlhether or not [the good cause standard] has been satisfied is largely dependent upon the facts of each individual case" and its "determination is entrusted to the sound and cons 2013Indeed, other courts, considering the phrase in the UMDDA or speedy trial context, have held only that it means "a substantial reason ... that rises to the level of a legal excuse." State v. Livas, 147 Idaho 547 , 211 P.3d 792, 794 (App.2009); see also State v. Rouse, 13 Neb.App. 90 , 688 N.W.2d 889, 890 (2004) ("Good cause means a substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse."). €30 Because it is amorphous, "[wlhether or not [the good cause standard] has been satisfied is largely dependent upon the facts of each individual case" and its "determination is entrusted to the sound and cons | 1 | 1 |
People v. Grantgreen1 sentence2013Indeed, other courts, considering the phrase in the UMDDA or speedy trial context, have held only that it means "a substantial reason ... that rises to the level of a legal excuse." State v. Livas, 147 Idaho 547 , 211 P.3d 792, 794 (App.2009); see also State v. Rouse, 13 Neb.App. 90 , 688 N.W.2d 889, 890 (2004) ("Good cause means a substantial reason; one that affords a legal excuse."). €30 Because it is amorphous, "[wlhether or not [the good cause standard] has been satisfied is largely dependent upon the facts of each individual case" and its "determination is entrusted to the sound and cons | 1 | 1 |
Riley v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2007We reaffirmed the existence of a good cause exception to dismissal of charges in Riley , but found it to be inapplicable in that case because the prosecution did not present any evidence of extraordinary circumstances that prevented the usual service provider of such blood draws from administering the test within the required two hour period. 104 P.3d at 219, 222 . 2007Gillett, 629 P.2d at 618 n. 9; Riley, 104 P.3d at 222 . | 1 | 1 |
Sands v. Industrial Claim Appeals Officegreen1 sentence1992See Sands v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, supra. Therefore, the order of the Panel is set aside, and the cause is remanded to it with directions to remand the cause to the Division of Employment and Training for a hearing officer to conduct a good cause hearing pursuant to Regulation 11.2.9. | 1 | 1 |
Cardiel v. Brittiangreen1 sentence1992See, e.g., Cardiel v. Brittian, 833 P.2d 748 (Colo.1992); Cordova v. People, 817 P.2d 66 (Colo.1991). | 1 | 1 |
Henderson v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1985See Henderson v. Industrial Commission, 35 Colo.App. 124 , 529 P.2d 651 (1974). 1985See Henderson v. Industrial Commission, 35 Colo.App. 124 , 529 P.2d 651 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Roberts
green
1 sentence2024The Hines division explained that, “[f]or that reason, whether the good cause standard has been satisfied depends on the facts of each case and is an inquiry left to the district court’s discretion.” Id. ¶ 25 But the Hines division did not hold that the court’s discretion is unbounded. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Gabriel Jiminez-Antunez
green
2 sentences2017Id. ¶23 The Jimenez-Antunez court held instead that “[a] defendant exercises the right to counsel of choice when he moves to dismiss retained .counsel, regardless of the type of counsel he wishes to, engage afterward.” Id. at 1271 . 2017Id. ¶23 The Jimenez-Antunez court held instead that “[a] defendant exercises the right to counsel of choice when he moves to dismiss retained .counsel, regardless of the type of counsel he wishes to, engage afterward.” Id. at 1271 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Valadez
green
1 sentence2016And “[u]sually the word ‘may” denotes a grant of discretion and is interpreted as permissive.” People v. Valadez, 2016 COA 62, ¶ 17 . ¶ 27 Thus, this subsection could be read as creating unbridled discretion to enforce an arbitration agreement, despite its deficiencies. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2013People v. Williams, 2012 COA 165, ¶ 13 , 297 P.3d 1011 . 1 32 In reviewing the good cause issue, we can apply principles derived from statutory speedy trial cases, unless the statutory speedy trial provisions of section 18-1-405, C.R.S.2012 conflict with those in the UMD-DA. 2013People v. Williams, 2012 COA 165, ¶ 13 , 297 P.3d 1011 . 1 32 In reviewing the good cause issue, we can apply principles derived from statutory speedy trial cases, unless the statutory speedy trial provisions of section 18-1-405, C.R.S.2012 conflict with those in the UMD-DA. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Borg v. District Court of the Second Judicial District, for the City & County of Denver
green
1 sentence2013See Laffey, 55 Colo. at 577 , 136 P. 1031 at 1032 ("The objections urged were of a character which, if properly interposed in apt time, entitled the defendant to have the defects in the proceedings corrected, but such defects were not jurisdictional in the sense that they could not be waived."); People v. Butler, 251 P.3d 519, 520 (Colo.App.2010) ("A valid, unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional objections, including allegations that constitutional rights have been violated."). {19 In concluding that the good cause requirement is not jurisdictional, we rely upon Holmes v. Distr | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Holmes v. District Court of Summit County
green
1 sentence2013See Laffey, 55 Colo. at 577 , 136 P. 1031 at 1032 ("The objections urged were of a character which, if properly interposed in apt time, entitled the defendant to have the defects in the proceedings corrected, but such defects were not jurisdictional in the sense that they could not be waived."); People v. Butler, 251 P.3d 519, 520 (Colo.App.2010) ("A valid, unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional objections, including allegations that constitutional rights have been violated."). {19 In concluding that the good cause requirement is not jurisdictional, we rely upon Holmes v. Distr | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Gillett
green
2 sentences2007Such exceptional circumstances “might include those circumstances which, for reasons beyond the control of the enforcement authority, preclude the timely withdrawal and testing of blood by a quali fied person and in accordance 'with the rules and regulations of the state board of health.” Id. at 618 n. 9. 2007Gillett, 629 P.2d at 618 n. 9; Riley, 104 P.3d at 222 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Watso v. Colorado Department of Social Services
green
1 sentence2002The good cause standard "requires objective evaluation of different interests in varied factual contexts, and its application is subject to judicial review." Watso v. Colorado Dep't of Social Services, supra, 841 P.2d at 311 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Cordova v. People
green
1 sentence1992See, e.g., Cardiel v. Brittian, 833 P.2d 748 (Colo.1992); Cordova v. People, 817 P.2d 66 (Colo.1991). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
green
2 sentences1987We issued a rule to show cause and now make the rule absolute in part, and remand to the trial court with directions to conduct a further hearing to determine whether a protective order should be entered under the good cause standard set forth in C.R.C.P. 26(c) and in light of Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 , 104 S.Ct. 2199 , 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984). 1 I. 1987We issued a rule to show cause and now make the rule absolute in part, and remand to the trial court with directions to conduct a further hearing to determine whether a protective order should be entered under the good cause standard set forth in C.R.C.P. 26(c) and in light of Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 , 104 S.Ct. 2199 , 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984). 1 I. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Ellis v. DISTRICT COURT IN & FOR NINETEENTH JUD. DIST.
green
2 sentences1979Counsel also relied on defendant’s statement to him on March 16 that he had “some mental problems.” The trial court ruled that these grounds were insufficient to meet the good cause requirement for a change of plea set forth in § 16-8-103(1), C.R.S.1973, and Crim.P. 11(e)(1), and as defined in Ellis v. District Court, 189 Colo. 123 , 538 P.2d 107 (1975). 1979Counsel also relied on defendant’s statement to him on March 16 that he had “some mental problems.” The trial court ruled that these grounds were insufficient to meet the good cause requirement for a change of plea set forth in § 16-8-103(1), C.R.S.1973, and Crim.P. 11(e)(1), and as defined in Ellis v. District Court, 189 Colo. 123 , 538 P.2d 107 (1975). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.