good cause exception in Maine

2014Nor did the Superi- or Court abuse its discretion in declining to apply the good cause exception we recognized in Keating v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Saco, 325 A.2d 521, 524 (Me.1974), to extend the time for appeal from the Commissioner’s decision granting the Walshes’ permit application.

2006The Superior Court concluded that the appeal from the February 13 issuance of the permit was timely pursuant to the good cause exception in Keating v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Saco, 325 A.2d 521 (Me.1974), and that the appeal from the reissuance of the permit in October 2003 was appropriate.

2007The excusable neglect standard for lifting default judgments under Rule 60(b)(1) is more stringent than the good cause standard for lifting an entry of default under Rule 55(c) "because it implicates the rule favoring finality of judgments." Hamby v. Thomas Realty Assoc., 617 A.2d 562, 564 (Me. 1992).

2004DISCUSSION Rule 55(c) provides that “for good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).” “To meet the good cause standard of Rule 55(c) a party generally must show both a good excuse for his untimeliness in pleading . . . and the existence of a meritorious defense.” Hamby v. Thomas Realty Associates, 617 A.2d 562, 563-64 (Me. 1992) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Design Build of Maine v. Paul, 601 A.2d 1089, 1091 (Me. 1992)).

2016The determination of whether the good cause exception applies to an otherwise untimely appeal is made "in light of all the circumstances bearing on all the equities of the situation." Gagne v. Lewiston Crushed Stone Co., 367 A.2d 613, 619 (Me. 1976).

2006The exception as it was announced in the Keating case, and as it has been applied in subsequent cases, is a determination of whether the appeal should be allowed “in light of all the circumstances bearing on all the equities of the situation.” Gagne v. Lewiston Crushed Stone Co., 367 A.2d 613, 619 (Me.1976). [¶ 11] Our cases mention several factors to be considered when determining whether the good cause exception is appropriate.

2023That said, it is the courts’ job to interpret the language of the Ordinance in order to conclude whether the facts as found by the Board establish a predicate to apply that test. 14 [¶25] “The need for a good cause exception primarily stems from the lack of notice of the issuance of the building permit to abutting landowners or other persons who may be aggrieved by its issuance.” Viles, 2006 ME 107, ¶ 12 , 905 A.2d 298 .

2023That said, it is the courts’ job to interpret the language of the Ordinance in order to conclude whether the facts as found by the Board establish a predicate to apply that test. 14 [¶25] “The need for a good cause exception primarily stems from the lack of notice of the issuance of the building permit to abutting landowners or other persons who may be aggrieved by its issuance.” Viles, 2006 ME 107, ¶ 12 , 905 A.2d 298 .

2023See Wilgram v. Sedgwick, 592 A.2d 487, 488 (Me. 1991) (determining that the good cause exception could not save an abutter’s untimely appeal that was filed seven months after the issuance of the building permit and seventy-six days after the 16 abutter obtained actual notice of the project).

2016Wilgram v. Sedgwick, 592 A.2d 487, 488 (Me. 1991).

2016Theriault v. Gauthier, 634 A.2d 1255, 1256-57 (Me. 1993).

1995"The excusable neglect standard of Rule 60(b)(1) is more stringent than the good cause standard of Rule 55(c)." Theriault v. Gauthier, 634 A.2d 1255, 1256-57 (Me.1993) (citing Hamby v. Thomas Realty Assocs., 617 A.2d at 563-64 ); Michaud v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins.

2006We have referred to this exception to the appeal time limit as the "flagrant miscarriage of justice" exception, Gagne v. Cianbro Corp., 431 A.2d 1313, 1317 (Me.1981), and the "good cause exception," Brackett v. Town of Rangeley, 2003 ME 109, ¶ 14 , 831 A.2d 422, 427 . [¶ 9] When we review the application of the good cause exception, we review the decision of the Superior Court because the application of the exception is a judicial, and not an administrative, decision.

2006We have referred to this exception to the appeal time limit as the “flagrant miscarriage of justice” exception, Gagne v. Cianbro Corp., 431 A.2d 1313, 1317 (Me.1981), and the “good cause exception,” Brackett v. Town of Rangeley, 2003 ME 109, ¶ 14 , 831 A.2d 422, 427 . [¶ 9] When we review the application of the good cause exception, we review the decision of the Superior Court because the application of the exception is a judicial, and not an administrative, decision.

2007Id. at 790-91 .

1995Co., 505 A.2d 786, 790 (Me.1986). 3 . 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2904 (1990) provides in pertinent part: Whenever any person ... recovers a final judgment against any other person for any loss or damage specified in section 2903, the judgment creditor shall be entitled to have the insurance money applied to the satisfaction and the judgment by bringing a civil action ... against the insurer to reach and apply the insurance money....

2022When the CEO issued the stop work order some three months later, he cited “a deviation from the building design permitted by this office on June 8, 2020, under building permit 20-41.” The order made no finding reviewable on appeal identifying the nature of the deviation or what corrections would be necessary, saying only that Harbor Crossing was required to submit “a revised plan” showing the building’s specifications. period for appeal has expired.”); Brackett v. Town of Rangeley, 2003 ME 109, ¶ 24 , 831 A.2d 422 (“When a town violates its own ordinance as to process and on the merits, equity

2022When the CEO issued the stop work order some three months later, he cited “a deviation from the building design permitted by this office on June 8, 2020, under building permit 20-41.” The order made no finding reviewable on appeal identifying the nature of the deviation or what corrections would be necessary, saying only that Harbor Crossing was required to submit “a revised plan” showing the building’s specifications. period for appeal has expired.”); Brackett v. Town of Rangeley, 2003 ME 109, ¶ 24 , 831 A.2d 422 (“When a town violates its own ordinance as to process and on the merits, equity

2003Subsequently, in Wright v. Town of Kennebunkport, 1998 ME 184 , 715 A.2d 162 , we reserved for a case with different facts the question of whether a court can grant an extension of time within which to appeal to an aggrieved party who does not have knowledge of the issuance of a permit until after the appeal period has expired in those situation[s] in which the applicable ordinance designates an appeal period but does not provide for a waiver of the limitations period upon a showing of good cause.

2003Subsequently, in Wright v. Town of Kennebunkport, 1998 ME 184 , 715 A.2d 162 , we reserved for a case with different facts the question of whether a court can grant an extension of time within which to appeal to an aggrieved party who does not have knowledge of the issuance of a permit until after the appeal period has expired in those situation[s] in which the applicable ordinance designates an appeal period but does not provide for a waiver of the limitations period upon a showing of good cause.

2023Occupational Exch., Inc. v. Bureau of Rehab., 473 A.2d 406, 408-09 (Me. 1984); Cushing v. Smith, 457 A.2d 816, 821 (Me. 1983); Levesque v. Town of Eliot, 448 A.2d 876, 878 (Me. 1982). [¶31] In sum, the Board misapprehended the scope of the good cause exception, and the exception does not apply to the factual predicate reflected in the Board’s findings as to the cause of Tominsky’s delay in appealing.6 6 Even if the appeal had been timely and we could have reviewed the Board’s merits determination, the Board’s decision would have been affirmed.

2023Occupational Exch., Inc. v. Bureau of Rehab., 473 A.2d 406, 408-09 (Me. 1984); Cushing v. Smith, 457 A.2d 816, 821 (Me. 1983); Levesque v. Town of Eliot, 448 A.2d 876, 878 (Me. 1982). [¶31] In sum, the Board misapprehended the scope of the good cause exception, and the exception does not apply to the factual predicate reflected in the Board’s findings as to the cause of Tominsky’s delay in appealing.6 6 Even if the appeal had been timely and we could have reviewed the Board’s merits determination, the Board’s decision would have been affirmed.

2023Occupational Exch., Inc. v. Bureau of Rehab., 473 A.2d 406, 408-09 (Me. 1984); Cushing v. Smith, 457 A.2d 816, 821 (Me. 1983); Levesque v. Town of Eliot, 448 A.2d 876, 878 (Me. 1982). [¶31] In sum, the Board misapprehended the scope of the good cause exception, and the exception does not apply to the factual predicate reflected in the Board’s findings as to the cause of Tominsky’s delay in appealing.6 6 Even if the appeal had been timely and we could have reviewed the Board’s merits determination, the Board’s decision would have been affirmed.

2023As to the standard of review, language in Otis v. Town of Sebago, 645 A.2d 3, 5 (Me. 1994) suggests that we give deference to a board’s determination whether the good cause exception 12 has been met.

2019Which court is best positioned to adjudicate a child protection proceeding-or any matter-necessarily involves a case-by-case consideration of the availability of the evidence, as the court performed here. 13 See Shanoski v. Miller , 2001 ME 139 , ¶ 22, 780 A.2d 275 ; see also In re Robert T. , 200 Cal.App.3d 657 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 168 , 174 (1988) ; In re Interest of J.W. , 528 N.W.2d 657 , 660 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). [¶ 25] Numerous other jurisdictions have held that "[g]ood cause to deny transfer of the proceedings to the tribal court may arise from geographical obstacles." In re Interest of J.R.

2019Which court is best positioned to adjudicate a child protection proceeding-or any matter-necessarily involves a case-by-case consideration of the availability of the evidence, as the court performed here. 13 See Shanoski v. Miller , 2001 ME 139 , ¶ 22, 780 A.2d 275 ; see also In re Robert T. , 200 Cal.App.3d 657 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 168 , 174 (1988) ; In re Interest of J.W. , 528 N.W.2d 657 , 660 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). [¶ 25] Numerous other jurisdictions have held that "[g]ood cause to deny transfer of the proceedings to the tribal court may arise from geographical obstacles." In re Interest of J.R.

2019See Curtis v. Medeiros , 2016 ME 180 , ¶ 14, 152 A.3d 605 .

2019See Curtis v. Medeiros , 2016 ME 180 , ¶ 14, 152 A.3d 605 .