good cause standard in Kansas

2025He accurately concludes that while good cause to withdraw a plea may occur if a defendant is represented by incompetent counsel, the three-factor Edgar test should not be read to "transform the lower good cause standard of the statute's plain language into a constitutional gauntlet." Aguilar, 290 Kan. at 513 ; see Edgar, 281 Kan. at 36 .

2024The Kansas Supreme Court has found that "[t]he Edgar factors do not transform the lower good cause standard of the statute's plain language into a constitutional gauntlet." 290 Kan. at 513 .

2020The panel explained that State v. Denmark- Wagner, 292 Kan. 870 , 258 P.3d 960 (2011), and Williams v. State, 197 Kan. 708 , 421 P.2d 194 (1966), supported this proposition for two reasons: "First, it is clear that general 9 familial pressure does not constitute coercion.

2020The panel explained that State v. Denmark- Wagner, 292 Kan. 870 , 258 P.3d 960 (2011), and Williams v. State, 197 Kan. 708 , 421 P.2d 194 (1966), supported this proposition for two reasons: "First, it is clear that general 9 familial pressure does not constitute coercion.

2015Ed. 2d 291 , reh. denied 535 U.S. 1074 [2002]); Sharkey, 299 Kan. at 96, 100-01 (in considering motions for new trial, court applied Mickens); State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 513 , 231 P.3d 563 (2010) (court distinguished the K.S.A. 22-3210[d] manifest injustice standard governing a post- sentence plea withdrawal motion, which requires meeting the Mickens constitutional ineffective assistance standard, from the good cause standard governing a presentence plea withdrawal motion where "[m]erely lackluster advocacy . . . may be plenty to support" the judge's exercise of discretion to allow the pl

2015Ed. 2d 291 , reh. denied 535 U.S. 1074 [2002]); Sharkey, 299 Kan. at 96, 100-01 (in considering motions for new trial, court applied Mick- ens); State v. Aguilar, 290 Kan. 506, 513 , 231 P.3d 563 (2010) (court distinguished the K.S.A. 22-3210[d] manifest injustice standard governing a post-sentence plea withdrawal motion, which requires meeting the Mickens constitutional ineffective assistance standard, from the good cause standard governing a presentence plea withdrawal motion where “[m]erely lackluster advocacy . . . may be plenty to support” the judge’s exercise of discretion to allow the p

2015The line of cases regarding a request for new counsel is largely premised on the principle that the Sixth Amendment does "not guarantee the defendant the right to choose which attorney will be appointed to represent the defendant." Brown, 300 Kan. at 575 .

2015The line of cases regarding a request for new counsel is largely premised on the principle that the Sixth Amendment does “not guarantee the defendant the right to choose which attorney will be appointed to represent the defendant.” Brown, 300 Kan. at 575 .

2026State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36 , 127 P.3d 986 (2006); State v. Hill, 247 Kan. 377, 385 , 799 P.2d 997 (1990) (discussing adoption of ABA standards for plea negotiations in State v. Byrd, 203 Kan. 45, 50-52 , 453 P.2d 22 [1969]).

2026State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36 , 127 P.3d 986 (2006); State v. Hill, 247 Kan. 377, 385 , 799 P.2d 997 (1990) (discussing adoption of ABA standards for plea negotiations in State v. Byrd, 203 Kan. 45, 50-52 , 453 P.2d 22 [1969]).

2026State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36 , 127 P.3d 986 (2006); State v. Hill, 247 Kan. 377, 385 , 799 P.2d 997 (1990) (discussing adoption of ABA standards for plea negotiations in State v. Byrd, 203 Kan. 45, 50-52 , 453 P.2d 22 [1969]).

2026State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36 , 127 P.3d 986 (2006); State v. Hill, 247 Kan. 377, 385 , 799 P.2d 997 (1990) (discussing adoption of ABA standards for plea negotiations in State v. Byrd, 203 Kan. 45, 50-52 , 453 P.2d 22 [1969]).

2024Harrison argues that rather than applying the good cause standard to the third Edgar factor, the district court erroneously applied the more stringent constitutional competency to stand trial standard, as provided in Dusky v. United 13 States, 362 U.S. 402 , 80 S. Ct. 788 , 4 L.

2024Harrison argues that rather than applying the good cause standard to the third Edgar factor, the district court erroneously applied the more stringent constitutional competency to stand trial standard, as provided in Dusky v. United 13 States, 362 U.S. 402 , 80 S. Ct. 788 , 4 L.

2024The Act provides "a comprehensive set of statutes that define the rights of employees to compensation for work-place injuries and the procedures they must follow to obtain compensation." Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Karns, 52 Kan.

2020The panel explained that State v. Denmark- Wagner, 292 Kan. 870 , 258 P.3d 960 (2011), and Williams v. State, 197 Kan. 708 , 421 P.2d 194 (1966), supported this proposition for two reasons: "First, it is clear that general 9 familial pressure does not constitute coercion.

2020The panel explained that State v. Denmark- Wagner, 292 Kan. 870 , 258 P.3d 960 (2011), and Williams v. State, 197 Kan. 708 , 421 P.2d 194 (1966), supported this proposition for two reasons: "First, it is clear that general 9 familial pressure does not constitute coercion.

2011In State v. Harned, 281 Kan. 1023 , 135 P.3d 1169 (2006), this court also reviewed a motion to withdraw a plea under the good cause standard.

2011In State v. Harned, 281 Kan. 1023 , 135 P.3d 1169 (2006), this court also reviewed a motion to withdraw a plea under the good cause standard.

2009The court noted that in interpreting the good cause requirement of Rule 4(j), federal courts “have consistently held that, to be entitled to a ‘good cause’ extension, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has made reasonable and diligent efforts to serve process prior to seeking an extension of time. [Citations omitted.]” (Emphasis added.) 141 F.R.D. at 325-26 . *287 In looking at the facts of its case, the Fidelity court found that there was nothing to indicate that the plaintiff even attempted to serve the defendants before seeking the 30-day extension under K.S.A. 60-203(a)(1).

2007The Court of Appeals based its decision upon the following: “(1) [T]he apparent practice in McPherson District Court, or at least on one prior occasion, to accommodate 60-203(a) requests of counsel upon little orno showing, thus causing counsel to reasonably believe that her extension order was valid; (2) despite what the district court characterized as ‘reckless disregard’ for the true facts in establishing good cause, counsel’s conduct was found to be less culpable than an outright misrepresentation or fraud on the court; (3) the lack of any real prejudice to defendants by reason of being se

2006In evaluating whether good cause has been shown for a plea withdrawal, the trial court should consider whether “ ‘(1) the defendant was represented by competent counsel, (2) the defendant was misled, coerced, mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of, and (3) the plea was fairly and understandingly made. [Citation omitted.]’ ” State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36 , 127 P.3d 986 (2006) (quoting Bey, 270 Kan. at 545 ).

1899(The State v. Beatty, 45 Kan. 492 , 25 Pac. 889 ; The State v. Snodgrass, 52 id. 174, 34 Pac. 750 ; The State v. Vogan, 56 id. 61, 42 Pac. 352 ; The State v. Beuerman, 59 id. 586, 53 Pac. 874 .) The difficulty of securing a jury because so many of the residents of the county in which the offense was committed are foreigners who do not understand the English language is urged as a reason why the rulings of the court should be overlooked, but this consideration cannot weigh, as under the constitution every one charged with a criminial offense has a right to be tried by an impartial jury, and the

1899(The State v. Beatty, 45 Kan. 492 , 25 Pac. 889 ; The State v. Snodgrass, 52 id. 174, 34 Pac. 750 ; The State v. Vogan, 56 id. 61, 42 Pac. 352 ; The State v. Beuerman, 59 id. 586, 53 Pac. 874 .) The difficulty of securing a jury because so many of the residents of the county in which the offense was committed are foreigners who do not understand the English language is urged as a reason why the rulings of the court should be overlooked, but this consideration cannot weigh, as under the constitution every one charged with a criminial offense has a right to be tried by an impartial jury, and the

1899(The State v. Beatty, 45 Kan. 492 , 25 Pac. 889 ; The State v. Snodgrass, 52 id. 174, 34 Pac. 750 ; The State v. Vogan, 56 id. 61, 42 Pac. 352 ; The State v. Beuerman, 59 id. 586, 53 Pac. 874 .) The difficulty of securing a jury because so many of the residents of the county in which the offense was committed are foreigners who do not understand the English language is urged as a reason why the rulings of the court should be overlooked, but this consideration cannot weigh, as under the constitution every one charged with a criminial offense has a right to be tried by an impartial jury, and the