good cause requirement in North Carolina

2022See, e.g., 287 N.C. at 728 (“The writ of certiorari may be issued in appropriate circumstances by either appellate court to permit review of . . . orders of trial tribunals when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take timely action[.]”) (emphasis added); In re Snelgrove, 208 N.C. at 672 , 182 S.E. at 336 (“Simply because a party has not appealed, or has lost his right of appeal, even through no fault of his own, is not sufficient to entitle him to a certiorari.”) (emphasis added). ¶ 33 Since the best evidence of the inference that the drafters of Rule 21 of the Rules

2022See, e.g., 287 N.C. at 728 (“The writ of certiorari may be issued in appropriate circumstances by either appellate court to permit review of . . . orders of trial tribunals when the right to prosecute an appeal has been lost by failure to take timely action[.]”) (emphasis added); In re Snelgrove, 208 N.C. at 672 , 182 S.E. at 336 (“Simply because a party has not appealed, or has lost his right of appeal, even through no fault of his own, is not sufficient to entitle him to a certiorari.”) (emphasis added). ¶ 33 Since the best evidence of the inference that the drafters of Rule 21 of the Rules

2022App. P. 21(c), “elaborate upon the more sketchy descriptions of the practice contained in former Sup[erior] C[ourt] R[ule] 34[,]” 287 N.C. at 730 , which refers to the good cause requirement that had to be met before a trial court could enter an order granting a motion to compel production of discovery prior to 1975, Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 459 , 215 S.E.2d 30, 38 (1975). ¶ 30 In 1975, the Rules of Appellate Procedure—and specifically, the operative language of Rule 21(a) that remains unchanged today—were adopted, and the previously existing good cause requirement of Rule 34 of the

2022App. P. 21(c), “elaborate upon the more sketchy descriptions of the practice contained in former Sup[erior] C[ourt] R[ule] 34[,]” 287 N.C. at 730 , which refers to the good cause requirement that had to be met before a trial court could enter an order granting a motion to compel production of discovery prior to 1975, Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 459 , 215 S.E.2d 30, 38 (1975). ¶ 30 In 1975, the Rules of Appellate Procedure—and specifically, the operative language of Rule 21(a) that remains unchanged today—were adopted, and the previously existing good cause requirement of Rule 34 of the

2022Although “application of the expressio unius canon depends . . . on context,” Cooper v. Berger, 371 N.C. 799, 810 , 822 S.E.2d 286, 296 (2018) (internal marks and citation omitted), “[t]he doctrine properly applies [] when the unius (or technically, unum, the thing specified) can reasonably be thought to be an expression of all that shares in the grant or prohibition involved[,]” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 107. ¶ 36 I do not believe it is a stretch to infer from the elimination of the good cause requirement in Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1975 in the “rewrit[ing] [of] the Rules o

2022Although “application of the expressio unius canon depends . . . on context,” Cooper v. Berger, 371 N.C. 799, 810 , 822 S.E.2d 286, 296 (2018) (internal marks and citation omitted), “[t]he doctrine properly applies [] when the unius (or technically, unum, the thing specified) can reasonably be thought to be an expression of all that shares in the grant or prohibition involved[,]” Scalia & Garner, supra, at 107. ¶ 36 I do not believe it is a stretch to infer from the elimination of the good cause requirement in Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in 1975 in the “rewrit[ing] [of] the Rules o

2020See id.

2019In Swan Beach , this Court held "the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply the good cause standard when it denied [the d]efendant's motion to set aside the entry of default." Id . at ----, 805 S.E.2d at 749 .