good cause exception in Texas

2024Moreover, the good-cause exception generally “permits a trial court to excuse a failure to comply with discovery in difficult or impossible circumstances.” Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914 .

2024Good cause Wilson argues that good cause existed to explain her counsel’s “inadvertent failure to timely designate” Dr. Davis due to “calendaring issues that arose as a result of a large staff turnover.” But the good-cause exception is usually available only in “difficult or impossible circumstances.” Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914 ; Cresson Int., LLC v. Rooster, No. 02-21-00366-CV, 2022 WL 3904968 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

2015Clark v. Trailways, Inc. also involved the total failure to provide an address. 122 Further, even assuming that the misspelling of the last names and the attorney’s address and phone number did not satisfy disclosure requirements, the cases cited by Gibbons all applied the former version of the rule amended in 1999 and now found at 193.6, under which failure to supplement or amend could be excused only for good cause. 123 Under the current version of the rule, failure to supplement or amend is also excused if the failure will not unfairly surprise or unfairly prejudice the other party. 124 Gib

2015Clark v. Trailways, Inc. also involved the total failure to provide an address. 122 Further, even assuming that the misspelling of the last names and the attorney’s address and phone number did not satisfy disclosure requirements, the cases cited by Gibbons all applied the former version of the rule amended in 1999 and now found at 193.6, under which failure to supplement or amend could be excused only for good cause. 123 Under the current version of the rule, failure to supplement or amend is also excused if the failure will not unfairly surprise or unfairly prejudice the other party. 124 Gib

2024The good cause exception “allows a trial judge to excuse a party’s failure to comply with discovery obligations in difficult or impossible circumstances.” PopCap Games, Inc. v. MumboJumbo, LLC, 350 S.W.3d 699, 718 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied).

2024However, appellee argues, “Here, the record reflects uncontroverted evidence of good cause and no evidence of unfair surprise or prejudice.” The good cause exception “allows a trial judge to excuse a party's failure to comply with discovery obligations in difficult or impossible circumstances.” PopCap Games, Inc. v. MumboJumbo Distrib., LLC, 350 S.W.3d 699, 718 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied).

2000"The absence of surprise, unfairness, or ambush does not alone satisfy the good cause exception to the sanction of automatic exclusions." Broadway Nat'l Bank , 784 S.W.2d at 671 .

1997Tex.R.Civ.P. 168(5); Sharp, 784 S.W.2d at 671-72; see also Foster v. Cunningham, 825 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) (holding that failure to locate a witness until five days prior to trial does not satisfy the good cause requirement).

2024See Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc., 430 S.W.3d 384 , 390–91 (Tex. 2014) (“[W]e read the good cause exception of section 150.002(c) as flowing from compliance with the remainder of the subsection; it does not stand alone.”); Tex. Southern Univ., 577 S.W.3d at 577 (“Consequently, the trial court would have lacked discretion to grant any further extension in excess of thirty days for good cause under the last sentence of section 150.002(c) because that sentence applies only if the two conditions in the first sentence are met.”).

2023As stated, the issue in Crosstex was whether a plaintiff who files suit outside the ten-day window can claim protection of the good cause exception. 430 S.W.3d at 391 .

2010Although exclusion of testimony is a harsh consequence for failure to timely disclose or supplement, the good cause exception allows the trial court to excuse the failure to comply in “difficult or impossible circumstances.” Id. ; Harris County v. Inter Nos, Ltd. , 199 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

2010Although exclusion of testimony is a harsh consequence for failure to timely disclose or supplement, the good cause exception allows the trial court to excuse the failure to comply in “difficult or impossible circumstances.” Id.; Harris County v. Inter Nos, Ltd., 199 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

2021She argues that this Court should apply the good-cause standard set forth by the Texas Supreme Court in Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 688 (Tex. 2002).

2019See Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 688 (Tex. 2002) (applying the good-cause standard when a nonmovant sought leave to file an untimely response to a motion for summary judgment).

2015Clark v. Trailways, Inc. also involved the total failure to provide an address. 122 Further, even assuming that the misspelling of the last names and the attorney’s address and phone number did not satisfy disclosure requirements, the cases cited by Gibbons all applied the former version of the rule amended in 1999 and now found at 193.6, under which failure to supplement or amend could be excused only for good cause. 123 Under the current version of the rule, failure to supplement or amend is also excused if the failure will not unfairly surprise or unfairly prejudice the other party. 124 Gib

1994Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 916 n. 6. 4) "The lack of ... unfairness, or ambush does not alone satisfy the good cause exception to the sanction of automatic exclusion." Sharp v. Broadway Nat'l Bank, 784 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex.1990) (citing Morrow, 714 S.W.2d at 298 ).

1992However, “[although neither status as party nor the fact of a deposition are independently sufficient to establish good cause,.... these factors may combine to satisfy the good cause requirement.” Miller, 836 S.W.2d at 162 .

1992The court emphasized that “although neither status as party nor the fact of a deposition are independently sufficient to establish good cause ... these factors may combine to satisfy the good cause requirement.” Id.

1998Id. at 29 (Edelman, J., majority opinion).

1998However, at least one court has said that the good cause exception allows the State to present factors such as those set out in Barker v. Wingo. 6 See Norton v. State, 918 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. granted).

1992We therefore ... once again point out that the sanction of automatic exclusion of testimony of an undisclosed witness is subject to a good cause exception." 765 S.W.2d at 396 .

1992We therefore ... once again point out that the sanction of automatic exclusion of testimony of an undisclosed witness is subject to a good cause exception.” 765 S.W.2d at 396 .

2021In re C.M.V., 479 S.W.3d at 358–59; In re S.M.V., 287 S.W.3d at 447 ; In re M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d at 894–95.2 The Houston First and Fourteenth Courts of Appeals, however, have 2 But cf. In re S.M.-R., No. 02-15-00287-CV, 2016 WL 6900902 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 23, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The good cause requirement of section 160.636(e) tacitly includes the best-interest-of-the-child requirement of section 45.004(a)(1); indeed, ‘the best interest of a child will . . . be considered good cause for changing the child’s name.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson, 478 S.W.3d at

2016The good cause requirement of section 160.636(e) tacitly includes the best-interest-of-the-child requirement of section 45.004(a)(1); indeed, “the best interest of a child will . . . be considered good cause for changing the child’s name.” Anderson, 478 S.W.3d at 151 n.1 (quoting In re H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d 77 , 81 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)); In re M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d 891, 895 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (“[W]hen reviewing the decision of a trial court to determine whether good cause was shown for changing a child’s name in a proceeding to establish paternity unde

2019See Crosstex, 430 S.W.3d at 390-91 (“[W]e read the good cause exception of section 150.002(c) as flowing from compliance with the remainder of the subsection; it does not stand alone.”); see also Apex Geoscience, Inc. v. Arden Texarkana, LLC, 370 S.W.3d 14, 20 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. granted, 8 As excerpted supra, TSU stated in its petition that “such 10 year limitations period did not begin to run on July 31, 2007 because the building was not, in fact, substantially complete on that date.

2014Compare Apex Geoscience, Inc. v. Arden Texarkana, LLC, 370 S.W.3d 14 , 19-21 & n. 5 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2012, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (constraining the good cause extension to filings within ten days of the end of limitations), with WCM Grp., Inc. v. Brown, 305 S.W.3d 222, 230-31 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 2009, pet. dism’d) (holding that the good cause exception may operate for suits filed outside the ten-day window).

2011See Kahn v. Kahn, 813 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Tex.App.-Austin 1991, no writ) (evaluating whether good cause was shown to support a lump-sum award under former Texas Family Code 14.05(a) (Vernon 1991), which provided that the court “may order either or both parents to make periodic payments or, for good cause shown, order a lump-sum payment”).

2011See Kahn v. Kahn , 813 S.W.2d 708, 709 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, no writ) (evaluating whether good cause was shown to support a lump-sum award under former Texas Family Code 14.05(a) (Vernon 1991), which provided that the court “ may order either or both parents to make periodic payments or, for good cause shown, order a lump-sum payment”).

2010Good cause must be based on more than mere conjecture; it must have a firm foundation.” 31 S.W.3d 338, 340 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (holding that the defendant did not meet the good cause standard because he alleged only general allegations of jury misconduct); see also Cyr v. State, No. 04-08-00771-CR, 2009 WL 4840955 , at *8–9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 16, 2009, no pet.) (holding that a juror’s telling the media that she was not comfortable with her guilty verdict was not good cause for release of jurors’ information under article 35.29).

2010Good cause must be based on more than mere conjecture; it must have a firm foundation.” 31 S.W.3d 338, 340 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (holding that the defendant did not meet the good cause standard because he alleged only general allegations of jury misconduct); see also Cyr v. State , No. 04-08-00771-CR, 2009 WL 4840955 , at *8–9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 16, 2009, no pet.) (holding that a juror’s telling the media that she was not comfortable with her guilty verdict was not good cause for release of jurors’ information under article 35.29).

2010Good cause must be based on more than mere conjecture; it must have a firm foundation.” 31 S.W.3d 338, 340 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (holding that the defendant did not meet the good cause standard because he alleged only general allegations of jury misconduct); see also Cyr v. State, No. 04-08-00771-CR, 2009 WL 4840955 , at *8–9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 16, 2009, no pet.) (holding that a juror’s telling the media that she was not comfortable with her guilty verdict was not good cause for release of jurors’ information under article 35.29).

2010Good cause must be based on more than mere conjecture; it must have a firm foundation.” 31 S.W.3d 338, 340 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) (holding that the defendant did not meet the good cause standard because he alleged only general allegations of jury misconduct); see also Cyr v. State , No. 04-08-00771-CR, 2009 WL 4840955 , at *8–9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 16, 2009, no pet.) (holding that a juror’s telling the media that she was not comfortable with her guilty verdict was not good cause for release of jurors’ information under article 35.29).

2006David’s Healthcare Sys., L.P. , 185 S.W.3d 7, 11 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (testimony from untimely designated expert will be excluded “unless the trial court determines that the party seeking to introduce the evidence established either (1) the existence of good cause for its failure or (2) that it would not unfairly surprise or prejudice the other parties to admit the evidence”).

2006David’s Healthcare Sys., L.P., 185 S.W.3d 7, 11 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.) (testimony from untimely designated expert will be excluded “unless the trial court determines that the party seeking to introduce the evidence established either (1) the existence of good cause for its failure or (2) that it would not unfairly surprise or prejudice the other parties to admit the evidence”).

1998However, at least one court has expressly rejected such position, stating, “It would be improper to read the requirements of the unconstitutional Speedy Trial Act into article 32.01.” Ex parte Mallares, 953 S.W.2d 759, 764 (Tex.App.— Austin 1997, no pet.).

1998See id. at 763 .

1997Tex.R.Civ.P. 168(5); Sharp, 784 S.W.2d at 671-72; see also Foster v. Cunningham, 825 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) (holding that failure to locate a witness until five days prior to trial does not satisfy the good cause requirement).

1992Alvarado 830 S.W.2d at 914 ; Clark, 774 S.W.2d at 646 ; see also Holman & Keeling, Disclosure of Witnesses in Texas, 42 Baylor L.Rev. at 440, 442 (unforeseen events trigger good cause exception); Foster v. Cunningham, 825 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1992, writ pending) (“good cause exception is necessarily a narrow one requiring a showing of extraordinary cir- cumstances_ [T]he trial court’s discretion in the matter is limited to situations where one could not, in good faith and due diligence, immediately respond ... or where difficult or impossible circumstances prevented one from s

2025To satisfy the good cause requirement, “the movant must (1) show that the requested examination is relevant to issues in controversy and will produce or likely lead to relevant evidence, (2) establish a reasonable nexus between the requested examination and the condition in controversy, and (3) demonstrate that the desired information cannot be obtained by less intrusive means.” Id.

2018The good-cause requirement’s purpose is “to balance the movant’s right to a fair trial and the other party’s right to privacy.” Id.

2021In re C.M.V., 479 S.W.3d at 358–59; In re S.M.V., 287 S.W.3d at 447 ; In re M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d at 894–95.2 The Houston First and Fourteenth Courts of Appeals, however, have 2 But cf. In re S.M.-R., No. 02-15-00287-CV, 2016 WL 6900902 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 23, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The good cause requirement of section 160.636(e) tacitly includes the best-interest-of-the-child requirement of section 45.004(a)(1); indeed, ‘the best interest of a child will . . . be considered good cause for changing the child’s name.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson, 478 S.W.3d at

2016The good cause requirement of section 160.636(e) tacitly includes the best-interest-of-the-child requirement of section 45.004(a)(1); indeed, “the best interest of a child will . . . be considered good cause for changing the child’s name.” Anderson, 478 S.W.3d at 151 n.1 (quoting In re H.S.B., 401 S.W.3d 77 , 81 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.)); In re M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d 891, 895 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (“[W]hen reviewing the decision of a trial court to determine whether good cause was shown for changing a child’s name in a proceeding to establish paternity unde

2015See Crosstex, 430 S.W.3d at 390 ; Epco Holdings, Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 352 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. dism’d).

2012That is because, here, the Owners failed to make such allegation before the expiration of the thirty-day grace period. 15 Epco, 352 S.W.3d at 270 ; Ashkar Eng’g Corp., 2010 WL 376076 , at *3; Capital One, 344 S.W.3d at 480 .

2014Compare Apex Geoscience, Inc. v. Arden Texarkana, LLC, 370 S.W.3d 14 , 19-21 & n. 5 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2012, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (constraining the good cause extension to filings within ten days of the end of limitations), with WCM Grp., Inc. v. Brown, 305 S.W.3d 222, 230-31 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 2009, pet. dism’d) (holding that the good cause exception may operate for suits filed outside the ten-day window).

2012Id. at 230 .

1993See Clark v. Trailways, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 , 110 S.Ct. 1122 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1990).

1990Clark v. Trailways, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex.1989), ce rt. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1122 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1990).

1993See Clark v. Trailways, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 , 110 S.Ct. 1122 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1990).

1990Clark v. Trailways, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex.1989), ce rt. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1122 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1990).