procedural due process claim in Minnesota

2019Safety , 600 N.W.2d 720 , 723-24 (Minn. 1999) (applying Mathews to evaluate whether a mandatory 30-day waiting period for a limited license under the license revocation statutes satisfied procedural due process); Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching , 545 N.W.2d 901 , 908-09 (Minn. 1996) (applying Mathews to a procedural due process challenge to the use of offensive collateral estoppel in a teaching license revocation matter); Martin v. Itasca County , 448 N.W.2d 368 , 370 (Minn. 1989) (applying Mathews in evaluating a procedural due process challenge to a leave-of-absence policy); Violette v. Mid

1996Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 59 (Minn.1983) (adopting the Mathews analysis).

2007In re Conservatorship of Foster, 547 N.W.2d 81, 85 (Minn.1996).

2006In re Conservatorship of Foster, 547 N.W.2d 81, 85 (Minn.1996).

2018In reviewing a procedural-due-process challenge, we first "identify whether the government has deprived the individual of a protected life, liberty, or property interest," and if so, whether the " 'procedures followed ... were constitutionally sufficient.' " Sawh , 823 N.W.2d at 632 (quoting Swarthout v. Cooke , 562 U.S. 216 , 219, 131 S.Ct. 859 , 861, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011) ). "[T]he government must provide an individual with notice and an 'opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 , 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 , 902, 47

2018In reviewing a procedural-due-process challenge, we first "identify whether the government has deprived the individual of a protected life, liberty, or property interest," and if so, whether the " 'procedures followed ... were constitutionally sufficient.' " Sawh , 823 N.W.2d at 632 (quoting Swarthout v. Cooke , 562 U.S. 216 , 219, 131 S.Ct. 859 , 861, 178 L.Ed.2d 732 (2011) ). "[T]he government must provide an individual with notice and an 'opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' " Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 , 333, 96 S.Ct. 893 , 902, 47

2025See Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 , 633–35 (Minn. 2012) (applying “the three-factor balancing test from Mathews” in considering a procedural-due-process claim in a certiorari appeal).

2024When we evaluate a procedural-due-process claim, we must first identify “whether the government has deprived the individual of a protected life, liberty, or property interest.” Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012).

2019Safety , 600 N.W.2d 720 , 723-24 (Minn. 1999) (applying Mathews to evaluate whether a mandatory 30-day waiting period for a limited license under the license revocation statutes satisfied procedural due process); Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching , 545 N.W.2d 901 , 908-09 (Minn. 1996) (applying Mathews to a procedural due process challenge to the use of offensive collateral estoppel in a teaching license revocation matter); Martin v. Itasca County , 448 N.W.2d 368 , 370 (Minn. 1989) (applying Mathews in evaluating a procedural due process challenge to a leave-of-absence policy); Violette v. Mid

1986Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 903 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Machacek v. Voss, 361 N.W.2d 861, 863 (Minn.1985).

2016When considering a procedural due-process claim, we “first determine whether a protected liberty or property interest is implicated and then determine what process is due by applying a balancing test.” State v. Ness, 819 N.W.2d 219, 225 (Minn. App. 2012), aff’d, 834 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 2013).

2015When considering a procedural due-process claim, we “first determine whether a protected liberty or property interest is implicated and then determine what process is due by applying a balancing test.” State v. Ness, 819 N.W.2d 219, 225 (Minn. App. 2012), aff’d, 834 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 2013).

2016Safety, 745 N.W.2d 869, 877 (Minn. App. 2008) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. May 20, 2008).

2008Safety, 745 N.W.2d 869, 877 (Minn.App.2008) (quoting Davis, 509 N.W.2d at 391 ), review denied (Minn. May 20, 2008).

2016Hoard cites State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989), to support his argument that the state’s use of unreliable scientific testing methods implicate a liberty interest that is subject to due-process protections.

2015Katra relies on State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 426 (Minn. 1989), to support her argument that the state’s use of unreliable scientific testing methods affects a liberty interest that is subject to due-process protections.

2011State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481, 492 (Minn.1998).

2002State v. Mitchell, 577 N.W.2d 481, 492 (Minn.1998).

2001See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 568-75 , 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2704-08 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (concluding university did not violate nontenured teacher’s protected liberty interest by deciding not to re-employ him without stating its reasons or providing hearing).

2001See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 568-75 , 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2704-08 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (concluding university did not violate nontenured teacher’s protected liberty interest by deciding not to re-employ him without stating its reasons or providing hearing).

2019See, e.g. , Gams , 884 N.W.2d at 619 (naming Mathews as the balancing test used to assess a procedural due process claim); Rew v. Bergstrom , 845 N.W.2d 764 , 785-86 (Minn. 2014) (applying Mathews in a procedural due process challenge); Sawh , 823 N.W.2d 627 , 632 (Minn. 2012) (noting that Mathews sets forth the test for the "constitutional adequacy of specific procedures"); State v. Wiltgen , 737 N.W.2d 561 , 568 (Minn. 2007) ("Since 1982 ... we have consistently employed the three-part test established in Mathews ... to determine whether prehearing revocations violate due process."); Bendorf

2019See, e.g. , Gams , 884 N.W.2d at 619 (naming Mathews as the balancing test used to assess a procedural due process claim); Rew v. Bergstrom , 845 N.W.2d 764 , 785-86 (Minn. 2014) (applying Mathews in a procedural due process challenge); Sawh , 823 N.W.2d 627 , 632 (Minn. 2012) (noting that Mathews sets forth the test for the "constitutional adequacy of specific procedures"); State v. Wiltgen , 737 N.W.2d 561 , 568 (Minn. 2007) ("Since 1982 ... we have consistently employed the three-part test established in Mathews ... to determine whether prehearing revocations violate due process."); Bendorf

1989See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 , 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1016 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (public assistance); Sniadach v. Family Fin.

1989See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 , 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1016 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (public assistance); Sniadach v. Family Fin.

2025We therefore turn to an analysis of the second element—whether Brown’s “interest has been interfered with to an extent that violates the Due Process Clause.” In re Individual 35W Bridge Litig., 806 N.W.2d 820, 829 (Minn. 2011).

2024Denial of a continuance amounts to a procedural due-process violation when “the [party] has been in some manner embarrassed or prejudiced in preparing his defense so as to materially affect the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 238-39 (quoting State v. Huber, 148 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Minn. 1967)).

2019See, e.g. , Gams , 884 N.W.2d at 619 (naming Mathews as the balancing test used to assess a procedural due process claim); Rew v. Bergstrom , 845 N.W.2d 764 , 785-86 (Minn. 2014) (applying Mathews in a procedural due process challenge); Sawh , 823 N.W.2d 627 , 632 (Minn. 2012) (noting that Mathews sets forth the test for the "constitutional adequacy of specific procedures"); State v. Wiltgen , 737 N.W.2d 561 , 568 (Minn. 2007) ("Since 1982 ... we have consistently employed the three-part test established in Mathews ... to determine whether prehearing revocations violate due process."); Bendorf

2019See, e.g. , Gams , 884 N.W.2d at 619 (naming Mathews as the balancing test used to assess a procedural due process claim); Rew v. Bergstrom , 845 N.W.2d 764 , 785-86 (Minn. 2014) (applying Mathews in a procedural due process challenge); Sawh , 823 N.W.2d 627 , 632 (Minn. 2012) (noting that Mathews sets forth the test for the "constitutional adequacy of specific procedures"); State v. Wiltgen , 737 N.W.2d 561 , 568 (Minn. 2007) ("Since 1982 ... we have consistently employed the three-part test established in Mathews ... to determine whether prehearing revocations violate due process."); Bendorf

2019See, e.g. , Gams , 884 N.W.2d at 619 (naming Mathews as the balancing test used to assess a procedural due process claim); Rew v. Bergstrom , 845 N.W.2d 764 , 785-86 (Minn. 2014) (applying Mathews in a procedural due process challenge); Sawh , 823 N.W.2d 627 , 632 (Minn. 2012) (noting that Mathews sets forth the test for the "constitutional adequacy of specific procedures"); State v. Wiltgen , 737 N.W.2d 561 , 568 (Minn. 2007) ("Since 1982 ... we have consistently employed the three-part test established in Mathews ... to determine whether prehearing revocations violate due process."); Bendorf

2019See, e.g. , Gams , 884 N.W.2d at 619 (naming Mathews as the balancing test used to assess a procedural due process claim); Rew v. Bergstrom , 845 N.W.2d 764 , 785-86 (Minn. 2014) (applying Mathews in a procedural due process challenge); Sawh , 823 N.W.2d 627 , 632 (Minn. 2012) (noting that Mathews sets forth the test for the "constitutional adequacy of specific procedures"); State v. Wiltgen , 737 N.W.2d 561 , 568 (Minn. 2007) ("Since 1982 ... we have consistently employed the three-part test established in Mathews ... to determine whether prehearing revocations violate due process."); Bendorf