13 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Henrico Public Utilities v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2022See Taylor, 34 Va. App. at 243 (“Even though workers’ compensation proceedings may be more informal than judicial proceedings, “the [C]ommission must use procedures that ‘afford the parties minimal due process safeguards.’” (quoting WLR Foods, Inc. v. Cardosa, 26 Va. App. 220, 243 (1997))). 2022See Taylor, 34 Va. App. at 243 (“Even though workers’ compensation proceedings may be more informal than judicial proceedings, “the [C]ommission must use procedures that ‘afford the parties minimal due process safeguards.’” (quoting WLR Foods, Inc. v. Cardosa, 26 Va. App. 220, 243 (1997))). | 2 | 2 |
WLR Foods, Inc. v. Cardosagreen2 sentences2022See Taylor, 34 Va. App. at 243 (“Even though workers’ compensation proceedings may be more informal than judicial proceedings, “the [C]ommission must use procedures that ‘afford the parties minimal due process safeguards.’” (quoting WLR Foods, Inc. v. Cardosa, 26 Va. App. 220, 243 (1997))). 2022See Taylor, 34 Va. App. at 243 (“Even though workers’ compensation proceedings may be more informal than judicial proceedings, “the [C]ommission must use procedures that ‘afford the parties minimal due process safeguards.’” (quoting WLR Foods, Inc. v. Cardosa, 26 Va. App. 220, 243 (1997))). | 2 | 2 |
Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commissiongreen2 sentences1971See City of Norfolk v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 518 , 90 S.E.2d 140, 149 (1955), citing Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 301 U.S. 292 (1937). 1971See City of Norfolk Virginia Electric and Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 518 , 90 S.E.2d 140, 149 (1955), citing Ohio Bell Telephone Co. Public Utilities Comm., 301 U.S. 292 (1937). | 2 | 2 |
City of Norfolk v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.green2 sentences1971See City of Norfolk v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 518 , 90 S.E.2d 140, 149 (1955), citing Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 301 U.S. 292 (1937). 1971See City of Norfolk v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 197 Va. 505, 518 , 90 S.E.2d 140, 149 (1955), citing Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 301 U.S. 292 (1937). | 2 | 2 |
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermillgreen1 sentence2025See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 935 (1997) (noting that “[w]hether respondent was provided an adequately prompt post-suspension hearing . . . is a separate question” to whether he was entitled to a pre-suspension hearing (emphasis omitted)); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985) (holding that terminated plaintiff successfully stated a claim for a procedural due process violation based on inadequate pre-deprivation process but failed to state a claim based on delay between the termination and the full hearing). | 1 | 1 |
Gilbert v. Homargreen1 sentence2025See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 935 (1997) (noting that “[w]hether respondent was provided an adequately prompt post-suspension hearing . . . is a separate question” to whether he was entitled to a pre-suspension hearing (emphasis omitted)); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985) (holding that terminated plaintiff successfully stated a claim for a procedural due process violation based on inadequate pre-deprivation process but failed to state a claim based on delay between the termination and the full hearing). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Propertygreen1 sentence2022See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (allowing postponement of a due process hearing until after deprivation in extraordinary situations); see also Tri-County Paving v. Ashe, 281 F.3d 430, 438 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that the availability of post-deprivation procedures barred a landowner’s procedural due process claim). 6. | 1 | 1 |
Tri-County Paving, Incorporated v. Ashe County Ashe County Board of Commissionersgreen1 sentence2022See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (allowing postponement of a due process hearing until after deprivation in extraordinary situations); see also Tri-County Paving v. Ashe, 281 F.3d 430, 438 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that the availability of post-deprivation procedures barred a landowner’s procedural due process claim). 6. | 1 | 1 |
Riggins v. Nevadagreen1 sentence2021Therefore, if a defendant lacks the ability to reasonably communicate with counsel, he is likely unable to exercise many other “rights deemed essential to a fair trial.” Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 364 (1996) (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).7 Because competency evaluation procedures protect these essential rights, a defendant raises a procedural due process claim when he alleges he was wrongfully denied a competency evaluation. | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Oklahomagreen1 sentence2021Therefore, if a defendant lacks the ability to reasonably communicate with counsel, he is likely unable to exercise many other “rights deemed essential to a fair trial.” Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 364 (1996) (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).7 Because competency evaluation procedures protect these essential rights, a defendant raises a procedural due process claim when he alleges he was wrongfully denied a competency evaluation. | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. Coloradogreen1 sentence2019Under the United States Constitution, the procedural due process standard set forth in Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992), controls “‘the validity of state procedural rules’ that ‘are part of the criminal process.’” Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1255 (2017) (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 443 ). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Herreragreen2 sentences2008A defendant makes a procedural due process claim when he argues "that the trial court failed to hold a competency hearing after the defendant's mental competency was put in issue." [2] Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442, 459 (4th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Herrera, 481 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir.2007). 2008A defendant makes a procedural due process claim when he argues “that the trial court failed to hold a competency hearing after the defendant’s mental competency was put in issue.” 2 Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442, 459 (4th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Herrera, 481 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir.2007). | 1 | 1 |
Percy Levar Walton v. Ronald J. Angelonegreen2 sentences2008A defendant makes a procedural due process claim when he argues "that the trial court failed to hold a competency hearing after the defendant's mental competency was put in issue." [2] Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442, 459 (4th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Herrera, 481 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir.2007). 2008A defendant makes a procedural due process claim when he argues “that the trial court failed to hold a competency hearing after the defendant’s mental competency was put in issue.” 2 Walton v. Angelone, 321 F.3d 442, 459 (4th Cir.2003); see also United States v. Herrera, 481 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir.2007). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Morgangreen1 sentence1988The Court expressed the underlying rationale: “Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators ‘are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’ ” Id. at 55 quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Klimko v. Virginia Employment Commission
green
1 sentence2024The question at that step is whether the procedures at issue satisfied the “due process ‘fairness’ standard.” Bragg Hill Corp., 297 Va. at 585 (quoting Klimko, 216 Va. at 754 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Johnson v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2021Johnson, 53 Va. App. at 93 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Medina v. California
green
2 sentences2019Under the United States Constitution, the procedural due process standard set forth in Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992), controls “‘the validity of state procedural rules’ that ‘are part of the criminal process.’” Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1255 (2017) (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 443 ). 2019Under the United States Constitution, the procedural due process standard set forth in Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992), controls “‘the validity of state procedural rules’ that ‘are part of the criminal process.’” Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1255 (2017) (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 443 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
City of Suffolk Ex Rel. Herbert v. Board of Zoning Appeals
green
2 sentences2019Landowners only have a vested right in preexisting use of the land, they do not have a vested right "in the continuation of the land's existing zoning status." Board of Zoning Appeals v. CaseLin Sys., Inc. , 256 Va. 206 , 210, 501 S.E.2d 397 (1998), superseded on other grounds by statute , 1998 Acts ch. 801, as described in Suffolk , 266 Va. at 143 , 580 S.E.2d 796 . *494 Count III fails to state a procedural due process violation for two reasons. 2019Landowners only have a vested right in preexisting use of the land, they do not have a vested right "in the continuation of the land's existing zoning status." Board of Zoning Appeals v. CaseLin Sys., Inc. , 256 Va. 206 , 210, 501 S.E.2d 397 (1998), superseded on other grounds by statute , 1998 Acts ch. 801, as described in Suffolk , 266 Va. at 143 , 580 S.E.2d 796 . *494 Count III fails to state a procedural due process violation for two reasons. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Board of Zoning Appeals v. CaseLin Systems, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Landowners only have a vested right in preexisting use of the land, they do not have a vested right "in the continuation of the land's existing zoning status." Board of Zoning Appeals v. CaseLin Sys., Inc. , 256 Va. 206 , 210, 501 S.E.2d 397 (1998), superseded on other grounds by statute , 1998 Acts ch. 801, as described in Suffolk , 266 Va. at 143 , 580 S.E.2d 796 . *494 Count III fails to state a procedural due process violation for two reasons. 2019Landowners only have a vested right in preexisting use of the land, they do not have a vested right "in the continuation of the land's existing zoning status." Board of Zoning Appeals v. CaseLin Sys., Inc. , 256 Va. 206 , 210, 501 S.E.2d 397 (1998), superseded on other grounds by statute , 1998 Acts ch. 801, as described in Suffolk , 266 Va. at 143 , 580 S.E.2d 796 . *494 Count III fails to state a procedural due process violation for two reasons. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Withrow v. Larkin
green
2 sentences1988The fact that the same agency makes them in tandem and that they relate to the same issues does not result in a procedural due process violation.” Id. at 58 . 1988The Court expressed the underlying rationale: “Without a showing to the contrary, state administrators ‘are assumed to be men of conscience and intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’ ” Id. at 55 quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Burdett v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1978However, we do not agree that the verbal notice Davis received satisfied the procedural due process requirement. *398 In Burdett’s Case, 103 Va. 838 , 48 S.E. 878 , 68 L.R.A. 251 (1904), we said: “[T]he substantial difference between a direct and a constructive contempt is one of procedure. 1978However, we do not agree that the verbal notice Davis received satisfied the procedural due process requirement. *398 In Burdett’s Case, 103 Va. 838 , 48 S.E. 878 , 68 L.R.A. 251 (1904), we said: “[T]he substantial difference between a direct and a constructive contempt is one of procedure. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.