procedural due process claim in Illinois

2025Cardona, 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 15 . ¶ 28 In evaluating a procedural due process claim, courts should consider and balance the familiar factors under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): (1) the private interest that will be affected; (2) the risk that the procedures used will result in an erroneous deprivation of the private interest and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including any additional burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

2024We find this disturbing, -8- and it poses too high a risk respondent will be erroneously deprived of his freedom of movement in this case. ¶ 24 Finally, we consider the third factor under the procedural due process framework—the government’s interest, “including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 .

2024Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 201 (2009) (quoting Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 272 (2004), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). ¶ 83 “When a fundamental right or suspect classification based upon race or national origin is involved, strict scrutiny analysis applies” to a procedural due process claim.

2024Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 201 (2009) (quoting Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 272 (2004), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). ¶ 83 “When a fundamental right or suspect classification based upon race or national origin is involved, strict scrutiny analysis applies” to a procedural due process claim.

2024Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 201 (2009) (quoting Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 272 (2004), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). ¶ 83 “When a fundamental right or suspect classification based upon race or national origin is involved, strict scrutiny analysis applies” to a procedural due process claim.

2024Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 201 (2009) (quoting Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 272 (2004), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). ¶ 83 “When a fundamental right or suspect classification based upon race or national origin is involved, strict scrutiny analysis applies” to a procedural due process claim.

2025Cleeton v. SIU Healthcare, Inc., 2023 IL 128651, ¶ 26 ; see People v. Cardona, 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 15 (holding that a procedural due process claim presents a legal question that is also subject to de novo review). ¶ 26 B.

2025Cardona, 2013 IL 114076, ¶ 15 . ¶ 28 In evaluating a procedural due process claim, courts should consider and balance the familiar factors under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): (1) the private interest that will be affected; (2) the risk that the procedures used will result in an erroneous deprivation of the private interest and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including any additional burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

2020Alleged Violation of Due Process ¶ 28 Plaintiff maintains he sufficiently stated a cause of action for certiorari and mandamus relief based on defendants’ alleged violations of his due process rights. ¶ 29 “When presented with an alleged procedural due process violation in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, the first step in our analysis involves determining whether a liberty or property interest has been interfered with by the State, for if there is not, no process is due.” Trevino v. Baldwin, 2020 IL App (4th) 180682, ¶ 20 ; see also Hill v. Walker, 241 Ill. 2d 479, 485 , 948 N.

2020Alleged Violation of Due Process ¶ 28 Plaintiff maintains he sufficiently stated a cause of action for certiorari and mandamus relief based on defendants’ alleged violations of his due process rights. ¶ 29 “When presented with an alleged procedural due process violation in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, the first step in our analysis involves determining whether a liberty or property interest has been interfered with by the State, for if there is not, no process is due.” Trevino v. Baldwin, 2020 IL App (4th) 180682, ¶ 20 ; see also Hill v. Walker, 241 Ill. 2d 479, 485 , 948 N.

2022As was similarly true in Stoecker, the procedural due process violation at issue is not “necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate” and “does not necessarily render the proceedings automatically unfair or unreliable.” See Stoecker, 2020 IL 124807, ¶ 25 .

2021Where defendant was on notice generally that his hearing was approaching— and had been so aware for a number of months—we cannot say that any error is so serious as to “necessarily render the proceedings automatically unfair or unreliable.” Stoecker, 2020 IL 124807, ¶ 25 (holding that the procedural due process claim did not amount to structural error, and was thus subject to harmless error analysis). ¶ 52 Even accepting as true the assertion that defendant did not learn about the December 13, 2018, hearing until that morning, it is difficult to discern any prejudice he suffered.

2021Consistent with this precedent, we find that some evidence must be shown to support the length of time that the State seeks to administer psychotropic medication, in order to meet its statutory burden to prove that the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm. - 20 - ¶ 97 Having found that the trial court’s action led to erroneous deprivation of Rob’s liberty interest, we consider the third and final factor under the procedural due process framework— the State’s interest, “ ‘including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedura

2014Ace argues that it was denied a meaningful hearing in that the Commissioner failed to consider Kim’s lack of knowledge of his employee’s illegal conduct, which suggests a procedural due process challenge, but relies on Brennan v. Illinois Racing Board, 42 Ill. 2d 352 (1969), which involved a substantive due process analysis. ¶ 56 When determining whether an individual has received procedural due process, courts look to three factors: (1) “ ‘the private interest that will be affected by the official action’ ”; (2) “ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures u

2024Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 201 (2009) (quoting Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 272 (2004), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). ¶ 83 “When a fundamental right or suspect classification based upon race or national origin is involved, strict scrutiny analysis applies” to a procedural due process claim.

2024Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 201 (2009) (quoting Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 272 (2004), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). ¶ 83 “When a fundamental right or suspect classification based upon race or national origin is involved, strict scrutiny analysis applies” to a procedural due process claim.

2023“Procedural due process is founded upon the notion that prior to a deprivation of life, liberty or property, a party is entitled to ‘ “notice and opportunity for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” ’” Passalino v. City of Zion, 237 Ill. 2d 118, 124 (2010) (quoting Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006), quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)).

2010To plead a procedural-due-process claim, plaintiffs must show (1) a life, liberty, or property interest; (2) a deprivation of that property interest; and (3) insufficient “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Passalino v. City of Zion, 237 Ill. 2d 118, 124 , 928 N.E.2d 814, 818 (2009) (quoting Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006)).

2010To plead a procedural-due-process claim, plaintiffs must show (1) a life, liberty, or property interest; (2) a deprivation of that property interest; and (3) insufficient “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Passalino v. City of Zion, 237 Ill. 2d 118, 124 , 928 N.E.2d 814, 818 (2009) (quoting Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006)).

2010To plead a procedural-due-process claim, plaintiffs must show (1) a life, liberty, or property interest; (2) a deprivation of that property interest; and (3) insufficient “notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Passalino v. City of Zion, 237 Ill. 2d 118, 124 , 928 N.E.2d 814, 818 (2009) (quoting Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006)).

2021Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 2010).

2021Palka v. Shelton, 623 F.3d 447, 452 (7th Cir. 2010).

2018See People v. Cardona , 2013 IL 114076 , ¶ 17, 369 Ill.Dec. 117 , 986 N.E.2d 66 ("a procedural due process claim asserts that the deprivation at issue is constitutionally invalid because the process leading up to it was deficient, whereas a substantive due process claim asserts that the deprivation at issue is constitutionality invalid in and of itself, irrespective of the process leading up to it"); see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights , 503 U.S. 115 , 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992). ¶ 14 Where a statute is challenged on due process grounds, the initial step of our analysi

2018See People v. Cardona , 2013 IL 114076 , ¶ 17, 369 Ill.Dec. 117 , 986 N.E.2d 66 ("a procedural due process claim asserts that the deprivation at issue is constitutionally invalid because the process leading up to it was deficient, whereas a substantive due process claim asserts that the deprivation at issue is constitutionality invalid in and of itself, irrespective of the process leading up to it"); see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights , 503 U.S. 115 , 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061 , 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992). ¶ 14 Where a statute is challenged on due process grounds, the initial step of our analysi

2017Hayashi, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 40 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); Consiglio, 2013 IL App (1st) 121142, ¶ 18 . ¶ 24 This court and the supreme court have determined that section 2105-165(a) of the Act does not violate procedural due process in Consiglio and Hayashi, respectively.

2017Hayashi, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 40 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); Consiglio, 2013 IL App (1st) 121142, ¶ 18 . &24 This court and the supreme court have determined that section 2105-165(a) of the Act does not violate procedural due process in Consiglio and Hayashi, respectively.

2014Finally, in City of Rock Island v. Human Rights Comm’n, 297 Ill.

2014Finally, in City of Rock Island v. Human Rights Comm’n, 297 Ill.

2011As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained, in a procedural due process analysis, “the framework of Greenholtz (and our holding in Heidelberg) distinguishes between discretionary parole systems and those that establish legitimate claims of entitlement based on specific criteria.” Grennier v. Frank, 453 F.3d 442, 446 (7th Cir. 2006). -4- In Illinois, this court has consistently held that parole is not a right (Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 276 (1996)), but a matter of grace and executive clemency.

2011In Illinois, this court has consistently held that parole is not a right (Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 276 (1996)), but a matter of grace and executive clemency.

2011As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained, in a procedural due process analysis, “the framework of Greenholtz (and our holding in Heidelberg) distinguishes between discretionary parole systems and those that establish legitimate claims of entitlement based on specific criteria.” Grennier v. Frank, 453 F.3d 442, 446 (7th Cir. 2006). -4- In Illinois, this court has consistently held that parole is not a right (Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill. 2d 268, 276 (1996)), but a matter of grace and executive clemency.

2011As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained, in a procedural due process analysis, “the framework of Greenholtz (and our holding in Heidelberg) distinguishes between discretionary parole systems and those that establish legitimate claims of entitlement based on specific criteria.” Grennier v. Frank, 453 F.3d 442, 446 (7th Cir. 2006).

2015“The first step in a procedural due process challenge is to determine whether an individual has been deprived of life or a protected liberty or property interest.” Stanley, 369 Ill.

2008"The first step in a procedural due process challenge is to determine whether an individual has been deprived of life or a protected liberty or property interest." Stanley, 369 Ill.

2019Procedural Due Process ¶ 30 Defendant next contends that the SORA statutory scheme violates his procedural due process guarantees because there is no opportunity afforded for individualized assessment prior to subjecting him to a lifetime of registration requirements, nor is there a mechanism to petition for removal from the registry. ¶ 31 "The procedural due process clause entitles individuals to certain procedures before the State may deprive them of a life, liberty, or property interest." Avila-Briones, 2015 IL App (1st) 132221, ¶ 88 .

2019He asserts that additional procedural safeguards would ensure state resources are not wasted and the additional costs would be minimal if the length of registration is determined by the trial court at the time of sentencing. ¶ 33 In Avila-Briones, 2015 IL App (1st) 132221, ¶ 90 , this court rejected a similar procedural due process challenge.

2019See also Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d at 200-06 (SORA registration obligations did not violate juvenile offender’s procedural due process rights and additional procedural safeguard of a trial was not required); In re J.R., 341 Ill.

2016Id. at 797-98 .

2018City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 264 Ill.

2017City of Chicago v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n , 264 Ill.

2018In re J.W. , 204 Ill. 2d 50 , 66-67, 272 Ill.Dec. 561 , 787 N.E.2d 747 (2003).

2018In re J.W. , 204 Ill. 2d 50 , 66-67, 272 Ill.Dec. 561 , 787 N.E.2d 747 (2003).