procedural due process claim in Texas

2021“A procedural due process analysis is two-tiered.” Ex parte Montgomery, 894 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

2016He has also failed to include any argument in his brief under the traditional procedural due process analysis, see Ex parte Montgomery, 894 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (per curiam), and' has failed to identify the applicable standards for a compulsory process violation or how they apply to the, facts in this case.

2012Sch. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995)); Coastal, 294 S.W.3d at 286 (noting that “our first inquiry in a procedural due process claim is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a property or liberty interest deserving protection”).

2012Sch. v. Than , 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995)); Coastal , 294 S.W.3d at 286 (noting that "our first inquiry in a procedural due process claim is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a property or liberty interest deserving protection").

2019See In re R.M.T., 352 S.W.3d 12 , 16-18 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (discussing state and federal due process guarantees); see generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 (1976) (setting out the three factors required to evaluate a procedural due process claim: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value of additional safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrati

2019Mother identified a three-day window before expiration of the statutorily mandated hearing deadline that—in theory—would be 68 See In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107, 114 (Tex. 2017) (applying the procedural due process analysis from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), which involves balancing “three elements: the private interests at stake, the government’s interest supporting the challenged procedure, and the risk that the procedure will lead to erroneous decisions”). 69 Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996). 70 Id. 71 Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 3

2015Comm’n, 294 S.W.3d 276, 286 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (noting that “our first inquiry in a procedural due process claim is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a property or liberty interest deserving protection”).

2012Sch. v. Than , 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995)); Coastal , 294 S.W.3d at 286 (noting that "our first inquiry in a procedural due process claim is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a property or liberty interest deserving protection").

2009See Ex parte Robinson, 116 S.W.3d 794, 797-98 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).

2009See Ex parte Robinson , 116 S.W.3d 794 , 797–98 (Tex. Crim.

2006Than , 901 S.W.2d at 929 ; see also Trostle v. Combs , 104 S.W.3d 206, 213 (Tex. App.--Austin 2003, no pet.) ("The strictures of due process apply only to the threatened deprivation of liberty and property interests deserving the protection of the federal and state constitutions.").

2006Than, 901 S.W.2d at 929 ; see also Trostle v. Combs, 104 S.W.3d 206, 213 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003, no pet.) (“The strictures of due process apply only to the threatened deprivation of liberty and property interests deserving the protection of the federal and state constitutions.”).

1994Id.; see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 , 333-35 & n. 3, 106 S.Ct. 662 , 666-67 & n. 3, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).

1994Id.; see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 , 333-35 & n. 3, 106 S.Ct. 662 , 666-67 & n. 3, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986).

2012Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson , 490 U.S. 454, 460 , 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1908 (1989).

2012Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson , 490 U.S. 454, 460 , 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1908 (1989).

2012Rodriguez v. State, 21 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g) (citing Ex parte Montgomery, 894 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. Crim.

2012Rodriguez v. State , 21 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g) (citing Ex parte Montgomery , 894 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. Crim.

2009In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 547.

2009In re M.S. , 115 S.W.3d at 547 .

1998Federal Sign , 951 S.W.2d at 410 (explaining that due course of law exists to prevent the government from depriving persons of property without notice and a hearing); cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill , 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).

1998Federal Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 410 (explaining that due course of law exists to prevent the government from depriving persons of property without notice and a hearing); cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985).

1993In Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573-74 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494, 504 (1992), the Supreme Court stated that a court is obligated to award nominal damages when a plaintiff establishes a procedural due process violation but cannot prove actual injury.

1993In Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 566, 573-74 , 121 L.Ed.2d 494, 504 (1992), the Supreme Court stated that a court is obligated to award nominal damages when a plaintiff establishes a procedural due process violation but cannot prove actual injury.

2007Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 , 102 S.Ct. 1148 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982).

2007Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 , 102 S.Ct. 1148 , 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982).

2021See Patterson, 219 S.W.3d at 526 .

2008Id. at 526 .

2019Dist. v. Stamos , 695 S.W.2d 556 , 560-61 (Tex. 1985) (utilizing federal precedent in a procedural due process claim). *235 Courts have long recognized that due process "guarantees more than fair process" and "provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57 , 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (citations omitted).

1990A. Procedural Due Process In a procedural due process claim,' a person must show a deprivation of “life, liberty or property without due process of law.” Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Tex.1985), appeal dism’d, 475 U.S. 1001 , 106 S.Ct. 1170 , 89 L.Ed.2d 290 (1986); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 , 96 S.Ct. 893, 896 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).

1998Federal Sign , 951 S.W.2d at 410 (explaining that due course of law exists to prevent the government from depriving persons of property without notice and a hearing); cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill , 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985).

1998Federal Sign, 951 S.W.2d at 410 (explaining that due course of law exists to prevent the government from depriving persons of property without notice and a hearing); cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985).

2025See Glen Oaks Utils., Inc. v. City of Houston, 340 S.W.2d 783, 784 (Tex. 1960) (rejecting the city’s argument that the courts lacked jurisdiction to consider a procedural due process challenge to an ordinance that was “regular and valid” on its face because “otherwise the [challenger] would have a right without a remedy”). 8 The attorney general can also sue to “terminate the corporation” or to “enforce divestment of real property acquired or held contrary to the laws of this state.” TEX.

2025Unlike suspensions or dismissals of a purely academic nature, “[c]ourts frequently conclude that disciplinary suspensions and dismissals carry sufficient stigma to implicate a protected liberty interest.” Villarreal, 620 S.W.3d at 906 (first citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 575 ; and then citing Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579 , 599–600 (6th Cir. 2018)).

2023See De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 , 663-64 (W.D.

2022We cannot presume that Kimberley’s answers to questions about an extramarital affair or an agreement to date other people would have been favorable to William. 6 See Vautrain v. Vautrain, 646 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, writ dism’d) (concluding that court cannot presume that evidence of fault would have entitled party to greater portion of 6 In his reply brief, William argues that the trial court’s action of ruling before trial that there would be no fault and then considering fault in dividing the parties’ estate is “akin to a procedural due process violation” and that the tri