39 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1948–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
James v. Brumlopgreen2 sentences2020Atomic Co., 1980-NMSC-094 , ¶ 10, 96 N.M. 155 , 629 P.2d 231 (“[T]his Court fully expects compliance with its rules of procedure in general and its specific orders in particular[.]”); James v. Brumlop, 1980-NMCA-043 , ¶¶ 14-15, 94 N.M. 291 , 609 P.2d 1247 (holding that, once a local rule deadline was waived for 4RLBA, however, contends that the sanction provision in Rule LR2-602(G) is more forgiving than the attendance provision and that sanctions therefore are only mandatory when a representative with full settlement authority is absent. 2020Atomic Co., 1980-NMSC-094 , ¶ 10, 96 N.M. 155 , 629 P.2d 231 (“[T]his Court fully expects compliance with its rules of procedure in general and its specific orders in particular[.]”); James v. Brumlop, 1980-NMCA-043 , ¶¶ 14-15, 94 N.M. 291 , 609 P.2d 1247 (holding that, once a local rule deadline was waived for 4RLBA, however, contends that the sanction provision in Rule LR2-602(G) is more forgiving than the attendance provision and that sanctions therefore are only mandatory when a representative with full settlement authority is absent. | 4 | 6 |
Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp.green2 sentences2008The Sanctions Were Not an Abuse of Discretion {22} Patterson argues that the district court erred by construing the good faith requirement to require Patterson “to accept a judicially predetermined amount for settlement, in excess of the amount Patterson believed to be the settlement value of [the] case.” Patterson relies on federal case law to support its position, particularly the case of Dawson v. United States, 68 F.3d 886, 887 (5th Cir.1995), which overturned sanctions for failing to offer to settle pursuant to a local rule requiring a “good-faith effort to settle.” In support of the sanc 2008The Sanctions Were Not an Abuse of Discretion {22} Patterson argues that the district court erred by construing the good faith requirement to require Patterson “to accept a judicially predetermined amount for settlement, in excess of the amount Patterson believed to be the settlement value of [the] case.” Patterson relies on federal case law to support its position, particularly the case of Dawson v. United States, 68 F.3d 886, 887 (5th Cir.1995), which overturned sanctions for failing to offer to settle pursuant to a local rule requiring a “good-faith effort to settle.” In support of the sanc | 3 | 3 |
State v. Harpergreen2 sentences2023On the state’s appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that the local rule conflicted with State v. Harper, 2011-NMSC- 044, ¶ 21, 150 N.M. 745 , 266 P.3d 25 , which requires courts to consider lesser sanctions before excluding witnesses or dismissing a case without prejudice for violating discovery orders. 2023On the state’s appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s argument that the local rule conflicted with State v. Harper, 2011-NMSC- 044, ¶ 21, 150 N.M. 745 , 266 P.3d 25 , which requires courts to consider lesser sanctions before excluding witnesses or dismissing a case without prejudice for violating discovery orders. | 2 | 7 |
State v. Le Miergreen2 sentences2019See Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 20 . 14 (“Courts must evaluate the considerations identified in Harper—culpability, 15 prejudice, and lesser sanctions— . . . and must explain their decision . . . within the 16 framework articulated in Harper, but it is not the case that [a severe sanction is] 17 justified only if all of the Harper considerations weigh in favor of [the sanction].”). 18 We have since considered the interplay of Le Mier with the local rule and found no 19 conflict, stating that “culpability, prejudice, and lesser sanctions are appropriate 20 tools for evaluating the type of sanctio 2019Le Mier, 2017-NMSC-017, ¶ 20 ; State v. Lewis, 2018-NMCA-019 , ¶ 8, 413 P.3d 484 (stating that “culpability, prejudice, and lesser sanctions are appropriate tools for evaluating the type of sanction that the district court may impose” pursuant to the local rule). | 2 | 3 |
Enriquez v. Cochrangreen2 sentences2017See Enriquez, 1998-NMCA-157, ¶¶ 20-21 ; Bartlett, 18 1990-NMCA-024 , ¶ 4. 19 1 {27} As we have stated, the local rule requires that “copies of documentary 2 evidence, and audio, video, and audio-video recordings made by law enforcement 3 officers or otherwise in possession of the state” be provided to Defendant at the time 4 of arraignment or within five days of a written waiver of arraignment. 2017See Enriquez, 1998-NMCA-157, ¶¶ 20-21 ; Bartlett, 1990-NMCA-024 , ¶ 4. {27} As we have stated, the local rule requires that “copies of documentary evidence, and audio, video, and audio-video recordings made by law enforcement officers or otherwise in or without prejudice, where “the state proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is a danger to the community” and “the failure to comply with th[e] rule is caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of the parties”). 10 possession of the state” be provided to Defendant at the time of arraignment or within five days | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2021See LR2-308; see also State v. Lewis, 2018-NMCA-019 , ¶ 5, 413 P.3d 484 (explaining that “[t]he rules of criminal procedure and existing case law apply . . . only to the extent they do not conflict” with the local rule (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2019State v. Lewis, 2018- 15 NMCA-019, ¶ 5, 413 P.3d 484 (applying abuse of discretion review to imposition 16 of sanctions under the local rule), cert. denied, 2018-NMCERT- ___ (No. S-1-SC- 17 36798, Jan. 9, 2018); State v. Lucero, 2017-NMCA-079 , ¶ 14, 406 P.3d 530 18 (reviewing imposition of sanction of dismissal without prejudice under the local 19 rule for abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 2017-NMCERT- ___ (No. S-1-SC- 20 36448, Aug. 3, 2017). 6 1 II. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Torresgreen2 sentences2021We will avoid undue reiteration here, and instead focus on the content of the memorandum in opposition. {3} As an initial matter, we understand Defendant to contend that the district court’s references to the local rule and good cause for extension of deadlines reflect an improper presumption against granting the requested continuance. [MIO 5, 8-9] Defendant further suggests that this is “in tension” with our prior decision, in which we expressed concern about this prospect. [MIO 9] However, in our prior decision we did not take the position that the local rule was in conflict with the relevan 2021We will avoid undue reiteration here, and instead focus on the content of the memorandum in opposition. {3} As an initial matter, we understand Defendant to contend that the district court’s references to the local rule and good cause for extension of deadlines reflect an improper presumption against granting the requested continuance. [MIO 5, 8-9] Defendant further suggests that this is “in tension” with our prior decision, in which we expressed concern about this prospect. [MIO 9] However, in our prior decision we did not take the position that the local rule was in conflict with the relevan | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cardenasgreen2 sentences2020See James, 1980-NMCA-043 , ¶ 15 (concluding that while “[i]t is not the function of a reviewing court to substitute its own interpretation of a local rule for that of the court which promulgated the rule[,]” “the rule, once waived with respect to one party, should be considered waived as to both in the absence of any contrary indication [to the affected party] by the court”); see also State v. Cardenas, 2003-NMCA-051, ¶¶ 6, 10 , 133 N.M. 516 , 64 P.3d 543 (holding that, notwithstanding our usual deference to a district court’s interpretation of its local rules, a party would not be expected to 2020See James, 1980-NMCA-043 , ¶ 15 (concluding that while “[i]t is not the function of a reviewing court to substitute its own interpretation of a local rule for that of the court which promulgated the rule[,]” “the rule, once waived with respect to one party, should be considered waived as to both in the absence of any contrary indication [to the affected party] by the court”); see also State v. Cardenas, 2003-NMCA-051, ¶¶ 6, 10 , 133 N.M. 516 , 64 P.3d 543 (holding that, notwithstanding our usual deference to a district court’s interpretation of its local rules, a party would not be expected to | 1 | 2 |
State v. Vialpandogreen2 sentences2022See State v. Vialpando, 1979-NMCA-083 , ¶ 6, 93 N.M. 289 , 599 P.2d 1086 (stating that a motion to suppress could have properly been denied on untimeliness grounds); State v. Helker, 1975-NMCA-141 , ¶ 7, 88 N.M. 650 , 545 P.2d 1028 (“[W]e hold that rules of criminal procedure can put a time limitation on the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.”); see also City of Santa Fe v. Marquez, 2012-NMSC- 031, ¶ 28, 285 P.3d 637 (noting that Rule 5-212(C) NMRA requires that motions to suppress be filed sixty days before trial). {8} Thus, because Defendant failed to file his motion to suppress 2022See State v. Vialpando, 1979-NMCA-083 , ¶ 6, 93 N.M. 289 , 599 P.2d 1086 (stating that a motion to suppress could have properly been denied on untimeliness grounds); State v. Helker, 1975-NMCA-141 , ¶ 7, 88 N.M. 650 , 545 P.2d 1028 (“[W]e hold that rules of criminal procedure can put a time limitation on the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.”); see also City of Santa Fe v. Marquez, 2012-NMSC- 031, ¶ 28, 285 P.3d 637 (noting that Rule 5-212(C) NMRA requires that motions to suppress be filed sixty days before trial). {8} Thus, because Defendant failed to file his motion to suppress | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ngogreen2 sentences2020See Cherryhomes, 1992- NMCA-111, ¶¶ 1, 10 (observing that “[w]e must first determine whether an order existed that was sufficient to put [the sanctioned attorney] on notice of what was required of him[,]” prior to affirming a contempt sanction); see also Ngo, 2001-NMCA-041 , ¶¶ 13- 14, 16-21 (affirming one sanction against an attorney where he “knew of his duty to disclose [a] witness,” yet failed to, and reversing a second sanction where the district court failed to give him a specific warning that his conduct would constitute a violation of its evidentiary ruling). {26} In sum, RLBA lacked n 2020See Cherryhomes, 1992- NMCA-111, ¶¶ 1, 10 (observing that “[w]e must first determine whether an order existed that was sufficient to put [the sanctioned attorney] on notice of what was required of him[,]” prior to affirming a contempt sanction); see also Ngo, 2001-NMCA-041 , ¶¶ 13- 14, 16-21 (affirming one sanction against an attorney where he “knew of his duty to disclose [a] witness,” yet failed to, and reversing a second sanction where the district court failed to give him a specific warning that his conduct would constitute a violation of its evidentiary ruling). {26} In sum, RLBA lacked n | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vigilgreen1 sentence2019See State v. Vigil, 2014-NMCA-096, ¶ 20 , 336 P.3d 380 (stating that “a trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises its discretion based on a misunderstanding of the law”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Salazargreen1 sentence2019See Salazar, 2007-NMSC-004, ¶ 26 (permitting a district court to consider the merits of a motion for a continuance “independently” of case-management tools). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Duttlegreen1 sentence2019See State v. Duttle, 2017-NMCA-001, ¶ 15 , 387 P.3d 885 (“For this Court to rule on an inadequately briefed constitutional issue would essentially require it to do the work on behalf of [the parties].”); see also State v. Guerra, 2012- NMSC-014, ¶ 21, 278 P.3d 1031 (explaining that appellate courts do not review unclear or undeveloped arguments). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Morrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Aguilera v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Homer F. v. Jeremiah E.green | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Adoption of Homer F.green | 1 | 1 |
| H-B-S Partnership v. Aircoa Hospitality Services, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Dawson v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Montano v. Enciniasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lopez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Lowery v. Atterburygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kenneth Ray Meade v. Grubbs, Badge No. 128, Individually and as a Deputy Sheriff of the County of Oklahomagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lewis Ex Rel. Lewis v. Samsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Skelton v. Graygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Porter v. Robert Porter & Sons, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Reed v. Bennett
green
2 sentences2014In the middle of the quote from Reed appears the sentence that the district court below relied on for its ruling: “By failing to file a response within the time specified by the local rule, the nonmoving party waives the right to respond or to controvert the facts asserted in the summary judgment motion.” Id. 2014In the middle of the quote from Reed appears the sentence that the district 14 court below relied on for its ruling: “By failing to file a response within the time 15 specified by the local rule, the nonmoving party waives the right to respond or to 16 controvert the facts asserted in the summary judgment motion.” Id. 17 {26} This sentence does not represent New Mexico’s approach to considering 18 summary judgment motions. | 3 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Valles
green
2 sentences2019See Torres, 1999-NMSC-010, ¶ 10 (recognizing that a defendant’s constitutional rights must be balanced against “the court’s interest in controlling its docket and the public’s interest in the efficient administration of justice without unnecessary delay”); State v. Valles, 2004-NMCA-118 , 140 N.M. 458 , 143 P.3d 496 (stating that where a rule conflicts with substantive law, “the Supreme Court rule is not binding” and that “[g]enerally, a substantive law creates, defines, or regulates rights while procedural law outlines the means for enforcing those rights”). {8} Because the district court’s o 2019See Torres, 1999-NMSC-010, ¶ 10 (recognizing that a defendant’s constitutional rights must be balanced against “the court’s interest in controlling its docket and the public’s interest in the efficient administration of justice without unnecessary delay”); State v. Valles, 2004-NMCA-118 , 140 N.M. 458 , 143 P.3d 496 (stating that where a rule conflicts with substantive law, “the Supreme Court rule is not binding” and that “[g]enerally, a substantive law creates, defines, or regulates rights while procedural law outlines the means for enforcing those rights”). {8} Because the district court’s o | 2 | 2016–2019 |
State v. Romero
green
2 sentences2025“For purposes of this rule, a ‘technical violation’ means any violation that does not involve new criminal charges.” Id. {5} According to Defendant’s brief in chief, Defendant pled no contest in August 2022 to one count of criminal sexual contact of a minor. [BIC 2; RP 49] The State recommended sex offender supervised probation, which the district court approved. [BIC 2; RP 50, 93-94] Defendant also filed a notice of his acceptance of automatic sanctions for probationers, in which he accepted automatic sanctions for technical violations, pursuant to Rule 5-508(C) and LR11-302. [BIC 3; RP 91] I 2025“For purposes of this rule, a ‘technical violation’ means any violation that does not involve new criminal charges.” Id. {5} According to Defendant’s brief in chief, Defendant pled no contest in August 2022 to one count of criminal sexual contact of a minor. [BIC 2; RP 49] The State recommended sex offender supervised probation, which the district court approved. [BIC 2; RP 50, 93-94] Defendant also filed a notice of his acceptance of automatic sanctions for probationers, in which he accepted automatic sanctions for technical violations, pursuant to Rule 5-508(C) and LR11-302. [BIC 3; RP 91] I | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Gomez
green
2 sentences2025In addition, “we review the terms of the plea agreement de novo.” State v. Gomez, 2011-NMCA-120, ¶ 9 , 267 P.3d 831 . {4} Rule 5-805(C) NMRA allows judicial districts to establish a technical violation program (TVP) by a local rule. 2025In addition, “we review the terms of the plea agreement de novo.” State v. Gomez, 2011-NMCA-120, ¶ 9 , 267 P.3d 831 . {4} Rule 5-805(C) NMRA allows judicial districts to establish a technical violation program (TVP) by a local rule. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Aslin
green
2 sentences2025Having considered the brief in chief, concluding the briefing submitted to this Court provides no possibility for reversal, and determining that this case is appropriate for resolution on Track 1 as defined in that order, we affirm for the following reasons. {2} Defendant appeals from the district court’s revocation of his probation and order requiring Defendant to serve the balance of the sentence imposed. [BIC 1] Specifically, he argues that the district court erred in revoking his probation because he had already served the requisite jail time for his violations under the Eleventh Judicial 2025Having considered the brief in chief, concluding the briefing submitted to this Court provides no possibility for reversal, and determining that this case is appropriate for resolution on Track 1 as defined in that order, we affirm for the following reasons. {2} Defendant appeals from the district court’s revocation of his probation and order requiring Defendant to serve the balance of the sentence imposed. [BIC 1] Specifically, he argues that the district court erred in revoking his probation because he had already served the requisite jail time for his violations under the Eleventh Judicial | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Rodriguez v. El Paso Electric Co.
green
2 sentences2024Co., 1992-NMCA- 042, ¶ 8, 113 N.M. 672 , 831 P.2d 608 (“[P]arties may not complain about actions taken at hearings of which they had notice but did not attend.”). {4} Defendant continues to assert that the district court erred in refusing to consider the “Objection and Motion to Dismiss” that she filed after the default judgment was entered. [MIO 3] However, as we previously observed, [CN 3-4] neither objections nor motions to dismiss are among the matters that district court judges are authorized to hear following the appointment of arbitrators under the applicable local rule. 2024Co., 1992-NMCA- 042, ¶ 8, 113 N.M. 672 , 831 P.2d 608 (“[P]arties may not complain about actions taken at hearings of which they had notice but did not attend.”). {4} Defendant continues to assert that the district court erred in refusing to consider the “Objection and Motion to Dismiss” that she filed after the default judgment was entered. [MIO 3] However, as we previously observed, [CN 3-4] neither objections nor motions to dismiss are among the matters that district court judges are authorized to hear following the appointment of arbitrators under the applicable local rule. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Seigling
green
2 sentences2023Seigling, 2017-NMCA-035, ¶ 23 . 2023The Court reasoned that the local rule “clearly contemplate[d] that dismissals without prejudice will be utilized” by the district court and would “warn[] the [s]tate that further failures to adhere to the requirements of the local rule may result in the [s]tate being disallowed from prosecuting [the d]efendant.” Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Helker
green
2 sentences2022See State v. Vialpando, 1979-NMCA-083 , ¶ 6, 93 N.M. 289 , 599 P.2d 1086 (stating that a motion to suppress could have properly been denied on untimeliness grounds); State v. Helker, 1975-NMCA-141 , ¶ 7, 88 N.M. 650 , 545 P.2d 1028 (“[W]e hold that rules of criminal procedure can put a time limitation on the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.”); see also City of Santa Fe v. Marquez, 2012-NMSC- 031, ¶ 28, 285 P.3d 637 (noting that Rule 5-212(C) NMRA requires that motions to suppress be filed sixty days before trial). {8} Thus, because Defendant failed to file his motion to suppress 2022See State v. Vialpando, 1979-NMCA-083 , ¶ 6, 93 N.M. 289 , 599 P.2d 1086 (stating that a motion to suppress could have properly been denied on untimeliness grounds); State v. Helker, 1975-NMCA-141 , ¶ 7, 88 N.M. 650 , 545 P.2d 1028 (“[W]e hold that rules of criminal procedure can put a time limitation on the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.”); see also City of Santa Fe v. Marquez, 2012-NMSC- 031, ¶ 28, 285 P.3d 637 (noting that Rule 5-212(C) NMRA requires that motions to suppress be filed sixty days before trial). {8} Thus, because Defendant failed to file his motion to suppress | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Freeman v. Fairchild
green
1 sentence2021Cf. Lujan v. City of Albuquerque, 2003- NMCA-104, ¶¶ 8, 11-12, 134 N.M. 207 , 75 P.3d 423 (discussing with approval a Tenth Circuit opinion reversing under similar circumstances, where a district court dismissed an action for failure to timely respond to motions to dismiss as required under a local rule). {8} Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s failure to request an extension of time in this case warrants a departure from Freeman. [MIO 10, 12, 13-14] However, Freeman indicates that failure to request an extension is material if the non-moving party receives adequate notice and opportun | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Lujan v. City of Albuquerque
green
2 sentences2021Cf. Lujan v. City of Albuquerque, 2003- NMCA-104, ¶¶ 8, 11-12, 134 N.M. 207 , 75 P.3d 423 (discussing with approval a Tenth Circuit opinion reversing under similar circumstances, where a district court dismissed an action for failure to timely respond to motions to dismiss as required under a local rule). {8} Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s failure to request an extension of time in this case warrants a departure from Freeman. [MIO 10, 12, 13-14] However, Freeman indicates that failure to request an extension is material if the non-moving party receives adequate notice and opportun 2021Cf. Lujan v. City of Albuquerque, 2003- NMCA-104, ¶¶ 8, 11-12, 134 N.M. 207 , 75 P.3d 423 (discussing with approval a Tenth Circuit opinion reversing under similar circumstances, where a district court dismissed an action for failure to timely respond to motions to dismiss as required under a local rule). {8} Second, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s failure to request an extension of time in this case warrants a departure from Freeman. [MIO 10, 12, 13-14] However, Freeman indicates that failure to request an extension is material if the non-moving party receives adequate notice and opportun | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2021Cf. State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 13 , 134 N.M. 172 , 74 P.3d 1064 (stating that “[n]o rule of construction necessitates our acceptance of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd consequences[,]” and that we do not construe statutes, or in this case rules, “in a manner contrary to the intent of the [promulgating entity] and in a manner that leads to absurd or unreasonable results” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). {11} Lastly, to the extent the State argues that the district court should rely on the bind-over order’s filing date in district court in order to limit co 2021Cf. State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 13 , 134 N.M. 172 , 74 P.3d 1064 (stating that “[n]o rule of construction necessitates our acceptance of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd consequences[,]” and that we do not construe statutes, or in this case rules, “in a manner contrary to the intent of the [promulgating entity] and in a manner that leads to absurd or unreasonable results” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). {11} Lastly, to the extent the State argues that the district court should rely on the bind-over order’s filing date in district court in order to limit co | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Weiss v. THI of N.M. at Valle Norte, L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2020See State v. Lucero, 2017-NMCA-079 , ¶¶ 14, 15, 406 P.3d 530 (reviewing for abuse of discretion a district court’s application of a local rule requiring sanctions); Weiss v. THI of N.M. at Valle Norte, LLC, 2013-NMCA-054, ¶ 15 , 301 P.3d 875 (applying an abuse of discretion standard on review of Rule 1-037(B)(2) NMRA sanctions); Landess v. Gardner Turf Grass, Inc., 2008-NMCA-159, ¶ 16 , 145 N.M. 372 , 198 P.3d 871 (same, but for Rule 1-011 NMRA sanctions). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Tue Thi Tran v. Bennett
green
1 sentence2020“An abuse of discretion occurs when the court’s ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances of the case or is based on a misunderstanding of the law.” Tran v. Bennett, 2018-NMSC-009 , ¶ 30, 411 P.3d 345 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {10} RLBA makes various arguments to support its position that the sanction against it is unwarranted—including that the district court erred in determining RLBA’s conduct violated the referral order and that the district court erred in applying Rule LR2-602(G) in this case. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez Ex Rel. Mendez
green
2 sentences2020Ctr. v. Mendez, 1991-NMSC-002 , ¶ 17, 111 N.M. 336 , 805 P.2d 603 (observing that “it is always within the discretion of a court or an administrative agency to relax or modify its procedural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of business before it when in a given case the ends of justice require it” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). {22} When, however, a district court relaxes or waives the requirements of a local rule, the court may not then reimpose those requirements without first giving notice to the affected party. 2020Ctr. v. Mendez, 1991-NMSC-002 , ¶ 17, 111 N.M. 336 , 805 P.2d 603 (observing that “it is always within the discretion of a court or an administrative agency to relax or modify its procedural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of business before it when in a given case the ends of justice require it” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). {22} When, however, a district court relaxes or waives the requirements of a local rule, the court may not then reimpose those requirements without first giving notice to the affected party. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co.
green
2 sentences2020Atomic Co., 1980-NMSC-094 , ¶ 10, 96 N.M. 155 , 629 P.2d 231 (“[T]his Court fully expects compliance with its rules of procedure in general and its specific orders in particular[.]”); James v. Brumlop, 1980-NMCA-043 , ¶¶ 14-15, 94 N.M. 291 , 609 P.2d 1247 (holding that, once a local rule deadline was waived for 4RLBA, however, contends that the sanction provision in Rule LR2-602(G) is more forgiving than the attendance provision and that sanctions therefore are only mandatory when a representative with full settlement authority is absent. 2020Atomic Co., 1980-NMSC-094 , ¶ 10, 96 N.M. 155 , 629 P.2d 231 (“[T]his Court fully expects compliance with its rules of procedure in general and its specific orders in particular[.]”); James v. Brumlop, 1980-NMCA-043 , ¶¶ 14-15, 94 N.M. 291 , 609 P.2d 1247 (holding that, once a local rule deadline was waived for 4RLBA, however, contends that the sanction provision in Rule LR2-602(G) is more forgiving than the attendance provision and that sanctions therefore are only mandatory when a representative with full settlement authority is absent. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Cherryhomes
green
2 sentences2020Contempt § 24 (2020) (“While a court’s order which requires inferences or conclusions about which reasonable persons might differ is insufficient to support a judgment of contempt, only reasonable alternative constructions prevent enforcement of the order.”); cf. State v. Cherryhomes, 1992-NMCA-111 , ¶¶ 1, 4, 10, 13, 114 N.M. 495 , 840 P.2d 1261 (affirming a sanction against an attorney for wearing a bandanna as a tie in court, where the attorney, who was under a local rule-based order to wear a “tie” while in court, timely understood that the court interpreted the term to not include a bandan 2020Contempt § 24 (2020) (“While a court’s order which requires inferences or conclusions about which reasonable persons might differ is insufficient to support a judgment of contempt, only reasonable alternative constructions prevent enforcement of the order.”); cf. State v. Cherryhomes, 1992-NMCA-111 , ¶¶ 1, 4, 10, 13, 114 N.M. 495 , 840 P.2d 1261 (affirming a sanction against an attorney for wearing a bandanna as a tie in court, where the attorney, who was under a local rule-based order to wear a “tie” while in court, timely understood that the court interpreted the term to not include a bandan | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Landess v. GARDNER TURF GRASS, INC.
green
2 sentences2020See State v. Lucero, 2017-NMCA-079 , ¶¶ 14, 15, 406 P.3d 530 (reviewing for abuse of discretion a district court’s application of a local rule requiring sanctions); Weiss v. THI of N.M. at Valle Norte, LLC, 2013-NMCA-054, ¶ 15 , 301 P.3d 875 (applying an abuse of discretion standard on review of Rule 1-037(B)(2) NMRA sanctions); Landess v. Gardner Turf Grass, Inc., 2008-NMCA-159, ¶ 16 , 145 N.M. 372 , 198 P.3d 871 (same, but for Rule 1-011 NMRA sanctions). 2020See State v. Lucero, 2017-NMCA-079 , ¶¶ 14, 15, 406 P.3d 530 (reviewing for abuse of discretion a district court’s application of a local rule requiring sanctions); Weiss v. THI of N.M. at Valle Norte, LLC, 2013-NMCA-054, ¶ 15 , 301 P.3d 875 (applying an abuse of discretion standard on review of Rule 1-037(B)(2) NMRA sanctions); Landess v. Gardner Turf Grass, Inc., 2008-NMCA-159, ¶ 16 , 145 N.M. 372 , 198 P.3d 871 (same, but for Rule 1-011 NMRA sanctions). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Herald v. Board of Regents of the University green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Guerra green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Frederick v. Sun 1031, LLC green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Armijo green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Starko. Inc. v. N.M. Human Servs. Dep't green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Muse v. Muse green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Crutchfield v. New Mexico Department of Taxation & Revenue green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Pitman v. Brinker International, Inc. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Silva v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| United States v. John Butler green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Alabama Public Service Commission v. Redwing Carriers, Inc. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| State v. Vallejos green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Galvan v. City of Albuquerque green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.