7 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1923–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re the Tax Appeal of Hawaiian Flour Mills, Inc.green2 sentences2006See In re Tax Appeal of Hawaiian Flour Mills, 76 Hawai'i 1, 15 , 868 P.2d 419, 433 (1994) (“Deployed on the front lines of litigation, the trial court ‘is best acquainted with the local bar’s litigation practices and thus best situated to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule ll’s goal of specific and general deterrence.’” (Citation omitted.)). 8 IV. 2006See In re Tax Appeal of Hawaiian Flour Mills, 76 Hawai'i 1, 15 , 868 P.2d 419, 433 (1994) (“Deployed on the front lines of litigation, the trial court ‘is best acquainted with the local bar’s litigation practices and thus best situated to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule ll’s goal of specific and general deterrence.’” (Citation omitted.)). 8 IV. | 2 | 2 |
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.red2 sentences2006Deployed on the front lines of litigation, the [circuit] court “is best acquainted with the local bar’s litigation practices and thus best situated to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule ll’s goal of specific and general deterrence.” Id., 496 U.S. at 404 , 110 S.Ct. at 2460 . 2001See In Re Tax Appeal of Hawaiian Flour Mills, 76 Hawai'i 1, 15 , 868 P.2d 419, 433 (1994) (“Deployed on the front lines of litigation, the trial court ‘is best acquainted with the local bar’s litigation practices and thus best situated to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule ll’s goal of specific and general deterrence.’ ”) (Quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 , 110 S.Ct. 2447 , 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990).). | 1 | 2 |
Saucier v. State Tax Assessorgreen1 sentence2006Absent a local rule to the contrary, a party need not affirmatively oppose a motion for summary judgment that fails to show prima facie (1) that the undisputed facts foreclose “genuine issue[ (s) ] as to any material fact[ (s) ] and [ (2) ] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A non-movant’s failure to oppose the facts averred by the movant may constitute admission of those facts, Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283, 288 (7th Cir.1995); Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 745 A.2d 972, 974 (Me. 2000), but those facts must nonetheless establish that the movant is entitled to | 1 | 1 |
Wesley Flynn v. David G. Sandahlgreen1 sentence2006Absent a local rule to the contrary, a party need not affirmatively oppose a motion for summary judgment that fails to show prima facie (1) that the undisputed facts foreclose “genuine issue[ (s) ] as to any material fact[ (s) ] and [ (2) ] that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A non-movant’s failure to oppose the facts averred by the movant may constitute admission of those facts, Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283, 288 (7th Cir.1995); Saucier v. State Tax Assessor, 745 A.2d 972, 974 (Me. 2000), but those facts must nonetheless establish that the movant is entitled to | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Federation of State Medical Boards of the United Statesgreen1 sentence2001The certification requirement of HRCP Rule 11 establishes a twofold standard, one objective, via the “frivolousness clause” (namely, the imperative that the filed document be supported by existing or dicov-erable evidence and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law), and the other subjective, via the “improper purpose clause.” Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ill.1990) (citing Stotler & Co. v. Able, 870 F.2d 1158, 1166 (7th Cir.1989)); Les Mutuelles du Mans Vie, 128 F.R.D. at 237 (citing Tabr | 1 | 1 |
Stotler and Company, Cross-Appellee v. William J. Able, Cross-Appellantgreen1 sentence2001The certification requirement of HRCP Rule 11 establishes a twofold standard, one objective, via the “frivolousness clause” (namely, the imperative that the filed document be supported by existing or dicov-erable evidence and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law), and the other subjective, via the “improper purpose clause.” Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ill.1990) (citing Stotler & Co. v. Able, 870 F.2d 1158, 1166 (7th Cir.1989)); Les Mutuelles du Mans Vie, 128 F.R.D. at 237 (citing Tabr | 1 | 1 |
Bijan N. Tabrizi and Fahimeh A. Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyngreen1 sentence2001The certification requirement of HRCP Rule 11 establishes a twofold standard, one objective, via the “frivolousness clause” (namely, the imperative that the filed document be supported by existing or dicov-erable evidence and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law), and the other subjective, via the “improper purpose clause.” Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ill.1990) (citing Stotler & Co. v. Able, 870 F.2d 1158, 1166 (7th Cir.1989)); Les Mutuelles du Mans Vie, 128 F.R.D. at 237 (citing Tabr | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.green1 sentence2001The certification requirement of HRCP Rule 11 establishes a twofold standard, one objective, via the “frivolousness clause” (namely, the imperative that the filed document be supported by existing or dicov-erable evidence and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law), and the other subjective, via the “improper purpose clause.” Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ill.1990) (citing Stotler & Co. v. Able, 870 F.2d 1158, 1166 (7th Cir.1989)); Les Mutuelles du Mans Vie, 128 F.R.D. at 237 (citing Tabr | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dawson v. United States
green
2 sentences2002In Dawson v. United States, 68 F.3d 886 (5th Cir.1995), for example, a federal district corat sanctioned two assistant United States attorneys for failing to “make a settlement offer commensurate with the party’s litigation exposure[,]” pursuant to a local rule that provided that “[t]he parties in every civil action must make a good-faith effort to settle[.]” Id. at 888 . 2002In Dawson v. United States, 68 F.3d 886 (5th Cir.1995), for example, a federal district corat sanctioned two assistant United States attorneys for failing to “make a settlement offer commensurate with the party’s litigation exposure[,]” pursuant to a local rule that provided that “[t]he parties in every civil action must make a good-faith effort to settle[.]” Id. at 888 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Les Mutuelles du Mans Vie v. Life Assurance Co.
green
1 sentence2001The certification requirement of HRCP Rule 11 establishes a twofold standard, one objective, via the “frivolousness clause” (namely, the imperative that the filed document be supported by existing or dicov-erable evidence and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law), and the other subjective, via the “improper purpose clause.” Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 184, 186 (N.D.Ill.1990) (citing Stotler & Co. v. Able, 870 F.2d 1158, 1166 (7th Cir.1989)); Les Mutuelles du Mans Vie, 128 F.R.D. at 237 (citing Tabr | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Coll v. McCarthy
green
2 sentences1994Deployed on the front lines of litigation, the trial court "is best acquainted with the local bar's litigation practices and thus best situated to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule 11's goal of specific and general deterrence." Id., 496 U.S. at 404, 110 S.Ct. at 2460. 1994Deployed on the front lines of litigation, the trial court “is best acquainted with the local bar’s litigation practices and thus best situated to determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule ll’s goal of specific and general deterrence.” Id., 496 U.S. at 404, 110 S.Ct. at 2460. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen
red
1 sentence1923Co. v. Jensen (1917), 244 U. S. 205, 216 , does not apply as it “contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an Act of Congress” (exclusive jurisdiction in United States district courts in admiralty) “or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.” If nónmaritime the Workmen’s Compensation Act would apply within the meaning of the case of Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, 476 , for the reason that “under such circumstances | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde
green
1 sentence1923Co. v. Jensen (1917), 244 U. S. 205, 216 , does not apply as it “contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an Act of Congress” (exclusive jurisdiction in United States district courts in admiralty) “or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.” If nónmaritime the Workmen’s Compensation Act would apply within the meaning of the case of Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, 476 , for the reason that “under such circumstances | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.