local standard in Michigan

2017The only other change is the inclusion of a serial comma after the word “mechanically.” 2 Plaintiff cites LeBlanc v Lentini, 82 Mich App 5 ; 266 NW2d 643 (1978), Birmingham, 204 Mich App 418 , Turbin, 214 Mich App 215 , and Collins v Lefkowitz, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 13, 2011 (Docket No. 298801), in support of her characterization of the local standard-of-care rule as antiquated.

2017The only other change is the inclusion of a serial comma after the word “mechanically.” 2 Plaintiff cites LeBlanc v Lentini, 82 Mich App 5 ; 266 NW2d 643 (1978), Birmingham, 204 Mich App 418 , Turbin, 214 Mich App 215 , and Collins v Lefkowitz, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 13, 2011 (Docket No. 298801), in support of her characterization of the local standard-of-care rule as antiquated.

2024As this Court has explained, a “specialist is not measured by a local rule but by a national standard because: ‘The reliance of the public upon the skills of a specialist and the wealth and sources of his knowledge are not limited to the geographic area in which he practices.’ ” Francisco v Parchment Med Clinic, PC, 407 Mich 325, 328 ; 285 NW2d 39 (1979), quoting Naccarato v Grob, 384 Mich 248, 253-254 ; 180 NW2d 788 (1970). 3 person is licensed as a health professional in this state or another state and meets the following criteria: (a) If the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimo

2024As this Court has explained, a “specialist is not measured by a local rule but by a national standard because: ‘The reliance of the public upon the skills of a specialist and the wealth and sources of his knowledge are not limited to the geographic area in which he practices.’ ” Francisco v Parchment Med Clinic, PC, 407 Mich 325, 328 ; 285 NW2d 39 (1979), quoting Naccarato v Grob, 384 Mich 248, 253-254 ; 180 NW2d 788 (1970). 3 person is licensed as a health professional in this state or another state and meets the following criteria: (a) If the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimo

2024As this Court has explained, a “specialist is not measured by a local rule but by a national standard because: ‘The reliance of the public upon the skills of a specialist and the wealth and sources of his knowledge are not limited to the geographic area in which he practices.’ ” Francisco v Parchment Med Clinic, PC, 407 Mich 325, 328 ; 285 NW2d 39 (1979), quoting Naccarato v Grob, 384 Mich 248, 253-254 ; 180 NW2d 788 (1970). 3 person is licensed as a health professional in this state or another state and meets the following criteria: (a) If the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimo

2024As this Court has explained, a “specialist is not measured by a local rule but by a national standard because: ‘The reliance of the public upon the skills of a specialist and the wealth and sources of his knowledge are not limited to the geographic area in which he practices.’ ” Francisco v Parchment Med Clinic, PC, 407 Mich 325, 328 ; 285 NW2d 39 (1979), quoting Naccarato v Grob, 384 Mich 248, 253-254 ; 180 NW2d 788 (1970). 3 person is licensed as a health professional in this state or another state and meets the following criteria: (a) If the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimo

2024However, if the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a specialist who is board certified, the expert witness must be a specialist who is board certified in that specialty. (b) Subject to subdivision (c) [which is inapplicable to these cases], during the year immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for the claim or action, devoted a majority of his or her professional time to either or both of the following: (i) The active clinical practice of the same health profession in which the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is of

2024However, if the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a specialist who is board certified, the expert witness must be a specialist who is board certified in that specialty. (b) Subject to subdivision (c) [which is inapplicable to these cases], during the year immediately preceding the date of the occurrence that is the basis for the claim or action, devoted a majority of his or her professional time to either or both of the following: (i) The active clinical practice of the same health profession in which the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is of

2017The only other change is the inclusion of a serial comma after the word “mechanically.” 2 Plaintiff cites LeBlanc v Lentini, 82 Mich App 5 ; 266 NW2d 643 (1978), Birmingham, 204 Mich App 418 , Turbin, 214 Mich App 215 , and Collins v Lefkowitz, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 13, 2011 (Docket No. 298801), in support of her characterization of the local standard-of-care rule as antiquated.

2017The only other change is the inclusion of a serial comma after the word “mechanically.” 2 Plaintiff cites LeBlanc v Lentini, 82 Mich App 5 ; 266 NW2d 643 (1978), Birmingham, 204 Mich App 418 , Turbin, 214 Mich App 215 , and Collins v Lefkowitz, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued December 13, 2011 (Docket No. 298801), in support of her characterization of the local standard-of-care rule as antiquated.

2000Because the applicable legal duty is an issue of law, Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 436-437 ; 254 NW2d 759 (1977); Papadimas v Mykonos Lounge, 176 Mich App 40, 45 ; 439 NW2d 280 (1989), an evidentiary offer of proof is not appropriate or required.

2000Because the applicable legal duty is an issue of law, Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 436-437 ; 254 NW2d 759 (1977); Papadimas v Mykonos Lounge, 176 Mich App 40, 45 ; 439 NW2d 280 (1989), an evidentiary offer of proof is not appropriate or required.

2023Nonetheless, the trial court ordered the out-of-state lawyer to represent the defendants, “with whatever help the local bar could provide.” Id.

2023Without considering what actually occurred at trial, the Powell Court concluded that “the likelihood that counsel could have performed as an effective adversary was so remote as to have made the trial inherently unfair.” Id. at 660-661 .

2015Id. at 72-73 .

2000Because the applicable legal duty is an issue of law, Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 436-437 ; 254 NW2d 759 (1977); Papadimas v Mykonos Lounge, 176 Mich App 40, 45 ; 439 NW2d 280 (1989), an evidentiary offer of proof is not appropriate or required.

2000Because the applicable legal duty is an issue of law, Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 436-437 ; 254 NW2d 759 (1977); Papadimas v Mykonos Lounge, 176 Mich App 40, 45 ; 439 NW2d 280 (1989), an evidentiary offer of proof is not appropriate or required.

2000See MCL 600.2912a; MSA 27A.2912(1), Bahr v Harper-Grace Hosps, 448 Mich 135 ; 528 NW2d 170 (1995), and Whitney v Day, 100 Mich App 707, 710, 712 ; 300 NW2d 380 (1980) (a nurse anesthetist, possessing greater qualifications than an ordinary nurse, is subject to a local, not national, standard of care).

2000See MCL 600.2912a; MSA 27A.2912(1), Bahr v Harper-Grace Hosps, 448 Mich 135 ; 528 NW2d 170 (1995), and Whitney v Day, 100 Mich App 707, 710, 712 ; 300 NW2d 380 (1980) (a nurse anesthetist, possessing greater qualifications than an ordinary nurse, is subject to a local, not national, standard of care).

1999However, in Haeberle v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019 (C.A.5, 1984), the court rejected a claim that a local rule forbidding attorneys to interview jurors without the court's permission was unconstitutional.

1999The court held that the attorneys, unlike journalists "did not seek juror interviews in order to serve the general public's right to receive information about judicial proceedings" but instead "sought information to satisfy their own curiosity and to improve their techniques of advocacy." Id. at 1021-1022 .

1997The United States Supreme Court held that "such designation of counsel as was attempted was either so indefinite or so close upon the trial as to amount to a denial of effective and substantial aid ...." Id. at 53 , 53 S.Ct. at 58 .

1997The United States Supreme Court held that "such designation of counsel as was attempted was either so indefinite or so close upon the trial as to amount to a denial of effective and substantial aid ...." Id. at 53 , 53 S.Ct. at 58 .

1984Wolodzko, supra, pp 533-534 .

1978That was the province of the jury.” In Siirila v Barrios, 398 Mich 576, 597 ; 248 NW2d 171 (1976), the Court concluded that: "[A] specialist may testify as to the standard of care of a general practitioner as long as the witness is knowledgeable about the general practitioner’s standard of care.” More recently, in Callahan v William Beaumont Hospital, 400 Mich 177, 180 ; 254 NW2d 31 (1977), in discussing the standard for determining the competence of a witness to testify as to the local standard of care, the Court stated: "The question is not whether the proffered expert witness ever practiced

1978That was the province of the jury.” In Siirila v Barrios, 398 Mich 576, 597 ; 248 NW2d 171 (1976), the Court concluded that: "[A] specialist may testify as to the standard of care of a general practitioner as long as the witness is knowledgeable about the general practitioner’s standard of care.” More recently, in Callahan v William Beaumont Hospital, 400 Mich 177, 180 ; 254 NW2d 31 (1977), in discussing the standard for determining the competence of a witness to testify as to the local standard of care, the Court stated: "The question is not whether the proffered expert witness ever practiced

1978That was the province of the jury.” In Siirila v Barrios, 398 Mich 576, 597 ; 248 NW2d 171 (1976), the Court concluded that: "[A] specialist may testify as to the standard of care of a general practitioner as long as the witness is knowledgeable about the general practitioner’s standard of care.” More recently, in Callahan v William Beaumont Hospital, 400 Mich 177, 180 ; 254 NW2d 31 (1977), in discussing the standard for determining the competence of a witness to testify as to the local standard of care, the Court stated: "The question is not whether the proffered expert witness ever practiced

1978That was the province of the jury.” In Siirila v Barrios, 398 Mich 576, 597 ; 248 NW2d 171 (1976), the Court concluded that: "[A] specialist may testify as to the standard of care of a general practitioner as long as the witness is knowledgeable about the general practitioner’s standard of care.” More recently, in Callahan v William Beaumont Hospital, 400 Mich 177, 180 ; 254 NW2d 31 (1977), in discussing the standard for determining the competence of a witness to testify as to the local standard of care, the Court stated: "The question is not whether the proffered expert witness ever practiced

1976We express no judgment concerning these plans, but their existence indicates that techniques are available to provide alternatives if the State elects to prohibit mutual assistance among inmates." Johnson v Avery, supra, pp 489-490 . [21] Johnson v Avery, supra , was extended in Procunier v Martinez, 416 US 396, 420 ; 94 S Ct 1800 ; 40 L Ed 2d 224 (1974), where the Court again held invalid a state requirement barring non-lawyers from providing service where implementation of the restriction would deny access to the courts.

1976We express no judgment concerning these plans, but their existence indicates that techniques are available to provide alternatives if the State elects to prohibit mutual assistance among inmates.” Johnson v Avery, supra, pp 489-490 .

1976We express no judgment concerning these plans, but their existence indicates that techniques are available to provide alternatives if the State elects to prohibit mutual assistance among inmates." Johnson v Avery, supra, pp 489-490 . [21] Johnson v Avery, supra , was extended in Procunier v Martinez, 416 US 396, 420 ; 94 S Ct 1800 ; 40 L Ed 2d 224 (1974), where the Court again held invalid a state requirement barring non-lawyers from providing service where implementation of the restriction would deny access to the courts.

1976We express no judgment concerning these plans, but their existence indicates that techniques are available to provide alternatives if the State elects to prohibit mutual assistance among inmates." Johnson v Avery, supra, pp 489-490 . [21] Johnson v Avery, supra , was extended in Procunier v Martinez, 416 US 396, 420 ; 94 S Ct 1800 ; 40 L Ed 2d 224 (1974), where the Court again held invalid a state requirement barring non-lawyers from providing service where implementation of the restriction would deny access to the courts.

1970The notice given the defendant’s attorney in this ease is probably attributable to an early start-up of the notice-giving machinery shortly before the May 13, 1968 effective date of loeal rule 9. 2 Local rule 7; this rule was subsequently amended and is now rule 9. 3 In this connection see Hartman v. Roberts-Walby Enterprises, Inc. (1968), 380 Mich 105 , which appears to hold that journal entries denying motions to set aside a default and for rehearing do not function as entered orders for purposes of computing the time within which appeal may be taken as of right.

1960Co., supra; Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 145 US 1 ( 12 S Ct 810 , 36 L ed 601); American Manfg.

1960Co., supra; Ficklen v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 145 US 1 ( 12 S Ct 810 , 36 L ed 601); American Manfg.

1928Under such circumstances regulations of the rights, obligations, and consequent liabilities of the parties, as between themselves, by a local rule, would not necessarily work material prejudice to any characteristic feature of the general maritime law, or interfere with the proper harmony or uniformity of that law in its international or interstate relations. * * * “The general do'ctrine that in contract matters admiralty jurisdiction depends upon the nature of the transaction, and in tort matters upon the locality, has been so frequently asserted by this court that it must now be treated as s