local rule in Oregon

2026Because “both municipalities and the state legis- lature in many cases have enacted laws in pursuit of sub- stantive objectives, each well within its respective author- ity, that were arguably inconsistent with one another,” we resolve potential conflicts by asking “whether the local rule in truth is incompatible with the [state] legislative policy, either because both cannot operate concurrently or because the legislature meant its law to be exclusive.” Id. at 148; see also Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham, 359 Or 309, 336 , 374 P3d 829 (2016) (quoting La Grande/Astoria, 281 Or at

2022However, when a local enactment is found incompatible with a state law in an area of substantive policy, the state law will dis- place the local rule.” Id. at 148-49 (internal citations omitted).

2020“A state statute will displace the local rule where the text, context, and legislative history of the statute ‘unambiguously expresses an intention to preclude local governments from regulating’ in the same area as that governed by the statute.” Rogue Valley Sewer Services, 357 Or at 450 -51 (quoting Gunderson, LLC v. City of Portland, 352 Or 648, 663 , 290 P3d 803 (2012) (empha- sis in Rogue Valley Sewer Services)).

2020“A state statute will displace the local rule where the text, context, and legislative history of the statute ‘unambiguously expresses an intention to preclude local governments from regulating’ in the same area as that governed by the statute.” Rogue Valley Sewer Services, 357 Or at 450 -51 (quoting Gunderson, LLC v. City of Portland, 352 Or 648, 663 , 290 P3d 803 (2012) (empha- sis in Rogue Valley Sewer Services)).

2004A local ordinance is not incompatible with state law simply because it imposes greater requirements than does the state, see State ex rel Haley v. City of Troutdale, 281 Or 203 , 576 P2d 1238 (1978); Oregon Restaurant Assn. v. City of Corvallis, 166 Or App 506, 509-11 , 999 P2d 518 (2000), nor because the ordinance and the state law deal with different aspects of the same subject, see AT&T Communications v. City of Eugene, 177 Or App 379, 390-91 , 35 P3d 1029 (2001), rev den, 334 Or 491 (2002).

2004A local ordinance is not incompatible with state law simply because it imposes greater requirements than does the state, see State ex rel Haley v. City of Troutdale, 281 Or 203 , 576 P2d 1238 (1978); Oregon Restaurant Assn. v. City of Corvallis, 166 Or App 506, 509-11 , 999 P2d 518 (2000), nor because the ordinance and the state law deal with different aspects of the same subject, see AT&T Communications v. City of Eugene, 177 Or App 379, 390-91 , 35 P3d 1029 (2001), rev den, 334 Or 491 (2002).

2015Gunderson, 352 Or at 663 (emphasis added); see also US West Communications v. City of Eugene, 336 Or 181, 186 , 81 P3d 702 (2003) (applying standard statutory interpretation methodology to a question of home-rule city’s authority to impose fee on telecommunications company).

2015Gunderson, 352 Or at 663 (emphasis added); see also US West Communications v. City of Eugene, 336 Or 181, 186 , 81 P3d 702 (2003) (applying standard statutory interpretation methodology to a question of home-rule city’s authority to impose fee on telecommunications company).

2020Rogue Valley, 357 Or at 450-51 (“A state statute will displace the local rule where the 3 The city and amici have provided extensive legislative history for ORS 91.225.

2020“A state statute will displace the local rule where the text, context, and legislative history of the statute ‘unambiguously expresses an intention to preclude local governments from regulating’ in the same area as that governed by the statute.” Rogue Valley Sewer Services, 357 Or at 450 -51 (quoting Gunderson, LLC v. City of Portland, 352 Or 648, 663 , 290 P3d 803 (2012) (empha- sis in Rogue Valley Sewer Services)).

1994LUBA’s rule, codified at OAR 661-10-010(3), provides: “ ‘Final decision’: A decision becomes final when it is reduced to writing and bears the necessary signatures of the decision maker(s), unless a local rule or ordinance specifies that the decision becomes final at a later time, in which case the decision is considered final as provided in the local rule or ordinance.” See also Columbia River Television v. Multnomah Co., 299 Or 325 , 702 P2d 1065 (1985).

1994LUBA’s rule, codified at OAR 661-10-010(3), provides: “ ‘Final decision’: A decision becomes final when it is reduced to writing and bears the necessary signatures of the decision maker(s), unless a local rule or ordinance specifies that the decision becomes final at a later time, in which case the decision is considered final as provided in the local rule or ordinance.” See also Columbia River Television v. Multnomah Co., 299 Or 325 , 702 P2d 1065 (1985).

2017Addressing the local rule’s requirement that a defendant, in an affidavit attached to his motion, “set forth ‘all facts within his knowledge upon which he intends to rely in support of the motion,’ ” the court explained that, if “a defendant intends to rely solely upon the fact that the search and seizure was made without a warrant, his motion to suppress, supported by an affidavit stating that fact, would be a statement of fact sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the rule, at least for the purpose of imposing upon the state the burden to show the legality of the search.” Miller, 269 Or a

2017Addressing the local rule’s requirement that a defendant, in an affidavit attached to his motion, “set forth all facts within his knowledge upon which he intends to rely in support of the motion,” the court stated that, if “a defendant intends to rely solely upon the fact that the search and seizure was made without a warrant, his motion to suppress, supported by an affidavit stating that fact, would be a statement of fact sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the rule, at least for the purpose of imposing upon the state the burden to show the legality of the search.” Id. at 334-35 (interna

2026Because “both municipalities and the state legis- lature in many cases have enacted laws in pursuit of sub- stantive objectives, each well within its respective author- ity, that were arguably inconsistent with one another,” we resolve potential conflicts by asking “whether the local rule in truth is incompatible with the [state] legislative policy, either because both cannot operate concurrently or because the legislature meant its law to be exclusive.” Id. at 148; see also Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham, 359 Or 309, 336 , 374 P3d 829 (2016) (quoting La Grande/Astoria, 281 Or at

2026Because “both municipalities and the state legis- lature in many cases have enacted laws in pursuit of sub- stantive objectives, each well within its respective author- ity, that were arguably inconsistent with one another,” we resolve potential conflicts by asking “whether the local rule in truth is incompatible with the [state] legislative policy, either because both cannot operate concurrently or because the legislature meant its law to be exclusive.” Id. at 148; see also Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham, 359 Or 309, 336 , 374 P3d 829 (2016) (quoting La Grande/Astoria, 281 Or at

2020As a general matter, with exceptions that are not directly at issue here, state law controls over conflicting local law: “[W]hen a local enactment is found incompatible with a state law in an area of substantive policy, the state law will displace the local rule.” 4 LaGrande/Astoria v. PERB, 281 Or 137, 149 , 576 P2d 1204 , adh’d to on recons, 284 Or 173 , 586 P2d 765 (1978); see also State v. Port of Astoria, 79 Or 1, 19 , 154 P 399 (1916) (“Extramural authority * * * is not available to the legal voters of cities and towns, unless the right to exercise it has first been granted either by a g

2020As a general matter, with exceptions that are not directly at issue here, state law controls over conflicting local law: “[W]hen a local enactment is found incompatible with a state law in an area of substantive policy, the state law will displace the local rule.” 4 LaGrande/Astoria v. PERB, 281 Or 137, 149 , 576 P2d 1204 , adh’d to on recons, 284 Or 173 , 586 P2d 765 (1978); see also State v. Port of Astoria, 79 Or 1, 19 , 154 P 399 (1916) (“Extramural authority * * * is not available to the legal voters of cities and towns, unless the right to exercise it has first been granted either by a g

2017Addressing the local rule’s requirement that a defendant, in an affidavit attached to his motion, “set forth all facts within his knowledge upon which he intends to rely in support of the motion,” the court stated that, if “a defendant intends to rely solely upon the fact that the search and seizure was made without a warrant, his motion to suppress, supported by an affidavit stating that fact, would be a statement of fact sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the rule, at least for the purpose of imposing upon the state the burden to show the legality of the search.” Id. at 334-35 (interna

2017Addressing the local rule’s requirement that a defendant, in an affidavit attached to his motion, “set forth all facts within his knowledge upon which he intends to rely in support of the motion,” the court stated that, if “a defendant intends to rely solely upon the fact that the search and seizure was made without a warrant, his motion to suppress, supported by an affidavit stating that fact, would be a statement of fact sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the rule, at least for the purpose of imposing upon the state the burden to show the legality of the search.” Id. at 334-35 (interna

2016According to defendant, a late filing is not equivalent to default under the FED statutory scheme — something we previously recognized in Hart v. Hill, 230 Or App 612 , 216 P3d 909 (2009); furthermore, defendant argues that the court’s local rule, SLR 18.010, is not “an independent basis upon which the court could treat defendant’s answer as a nullity.” 2 We review the court’s default ruling, which is predicated on an interpretation of statutes and a court rule, for errors of law.

2016According to defendant, a late filing is not equivalent to default under the FED statutory scheme — something we previously recognized in Hart v. Hill, 230 Or App 612 , 216 P3d 909 (2009); furthermore, defendant argues that the court’s local rule, SLR 18.010, is not “an independent basis upon which the court could treat defendant’s answer as a nullity.” 2 We review the court’s default ruling, which is predicated on an interpretation of statutes and a court rule, for errors of law.

1996A “statutory contract” exists when the legislature enacts a statute that “reveal [s] an underlying legislative intent to enact and protect contract rights.” Hughes, 314 Or at 19 (emphasis in original).

1978See, e.g., Winters v. Bisaillon, 152 Or. 578 , 54 P.2d 1169 (1936), holding that the State Motor Vehicle Act displaced local speed limits and overruling a prior holding that city authority is paramount; [19] Southern Pac.

1978See, e.g., Winters v. Bisaillon, 152 Or. 578 , 54 P.2d 1169 (1936), holding that the State Motor Vehicle Act displaced local speed limits and overruling a prior holding that city authority is paramount; [19] Southern Pac.