local rule in West Virginia

2014Reversing the circuit court, this Court found that the discretion afforded a trial court to accept or reject 25 a plea agreement “should not be discarded for the sake of expediency.” Id. at 705 , 542 S.E.2d at 868 .

2014Reversing the circuit court, this Court found that the discretion afforded a trial court to accept or reject 25 a plea agreement “should not be discarded for the sake of expediency.” Id. at 705 , 542 S.E.2d at 868 .

2011Campagnone, 163 Cal.App.4th at 570 , 77 Cal.Rptr.3d at 553 .

2011Campagnone, 163 Cal.App.4th at 570 , 77 Cal.Rptr.3d at 553 .

2004In doing so, the opinion stated that the “fourth affidavit is admissible, as it satisfies the requirement that an out-of-area expert obtain knowledge of the local standard of care by consulting with a doctor familiar with the local standard of care.” Shane, 75 P.3d at 185 .

2000In United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir.1995), the trial court rejected a last minute plea agreement pursuant to a local rule that required all plea negotiations be presented no later than 10 days prior to trial.

2000In United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423 (10th Cir.1995), the trial court rejected a last minute plea agreement pursuant to a local rule that required all plea negotiations be presented no later than 10 days prior to trial.

2000In Hare v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 540 , 652 P.2d 1387 (1982), the Court reasoned that a trial judge is granted discretion under Arizona's criminal statute relating to plea agreements [7] to accept or reject a plea agreement and that no local rule could properly be created that prohibited the exercise of this discretion.

2000In Hare v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 540 , 652 P.2d 1387 (1982), the Court reasoned that a trial judge is granted discretion under Arizona's criminal statute relating to plea agreements [7] to accept or reject a plea agreement and that no local rule could properly be created that prohibited the exercise of this discretion.

1998We find it ironic that a motion for default judgment is one of the “exclusions” listed in the local rule, when, in this case, the appellant’s action was dismissed, in essence, by default. 5 In addition to citing the local rule governing time for responses, the circuit court, in ruling for all defendants, converted Good Shepherd’s supplemental motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. 6 As we stated in Syllabus Point 1 of Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189 , 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994), we review a circuit court’s entry of summary ju

1998We find it ironic that a motion for default judgment is one of the “exclusions” listed in the local rule, when, in this case, the appellant’s action was dismissed, in essence, by default. 5 In addition to citing the local rule governing time for responses, the circuit court, in ruling for all defendants, converted Good Shepherd’s supplemental motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 56. 6 As we stated in Syllabus Point 1 of Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189 , 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994), we review a circuit court’s entry of summary ju

1981Whether the tax was sustained as a fair means of measuring a local privilege or franchise, (citations omitted) or as a method of arriving at the fair measure of a tax substituted for local property taxes, (citations omitted) it is a practical way of laying upon the commerce its share of the local tax burden without subjecting it to multiple taxation not borne by local commerce and to which it would be subject if gross receipts, unappor-tioned, could be made the measure of a tax laid in every state where the commerce is carried on. 303 U.S. at 254-257 , 58 S.Ct. at 548-549 .

1981Whether the tax was sustained as a fair means of measuring a local privilege or franchise, (citations omitted) or as a method of arriving at the fair measure of a tax substituted for local property taxes, (citations omitted) it is a practical way of laying upon the commerce its share of the local tax burden without subjecting it to multiple taxation not borne by local commerce and to which it would be subject if gross receipts, unappor-tioned, could be made the measure of a tax laid in every state where the commerce is carried on. 303 U.S. at 254-257 , 58 S.Ct. at 548-549 .

1945And in Davis v. O’Hara, 266 U. S. 314 , 45 Sup. Ct. 104, 69 L.

1945And in Davis v. O’Hara, 266 U. S. 314 , 45 Sup. Ct. 104, 69 L.