14 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1963–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sanghi v. Sanghigreen2 sentences2012However, that part of the rule “is not an authorization for the chancellors of a district to bypass the summons requirement by using [a] court administrator’s] notice, even if there were a local rule adopted providing for that.” Id. “[A]n order entered on that day [originally set] may continue the cause to a later date without a new summons being issued.” Sanghi 759 So.2d at 1257 (¶ 82); see also M.R.C.P. 81(d)(5). ¶ 23. 2012However, that part of the rule “is not an authorization for the chancellors of a district to bypass the summons requirement by using [a] court administrator’s] notice, even if there were a local rule adopted providing for that.” Id. “[A]n order entered on that day [originally set] may continue the cause to a later date without a new summons being issued.” Sanghi 759 So.2d at 1257 (¶ 82); see also M.R.C.P. 81(d)(5). ¶ 23. | 2 | 2 |
King v. Murphygreen2 sentences1987Upon the close of voir dire, the trial judge ruled that Dr. Adriani had not demonstrated sufficient knowledge of the local standard of care for doctors then prevailing under King v. Murphy, 424 So.2d 547 (Miss. 1982). 1985See Holmes v. Elliott, 443 So.2d 825, 827-833 (Miss. 1983); King v. Murphy, 424 So.2d 547, 549-550 (Miss. 1982). | 1 | 2 |
Prime Rx, LLC v. McKendree, Inc.green1 sentence2009See also Prime Rx, 917 So. 2d at 795 (quoting DeBlanc, 814 So. 2d at 800 ) (when a matter is “conclusively established” under Rule 36, it may not be “offset by a conflicting answer to interrogatories.”); In re Carney, 258 F.3d at 420 (citing Dukes, 770 F.2d at 548-49 ) (“[s]ince 12 This is true unless the motions were in violation of a local rule or a pretrial order. | 1 | 1 |
Bowie v. Montfort Jones Memorial Hosp.green2 sentences2009We first note that the trial court’s local rules are in derogation of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 83, because they have never been submitted to this Court for approval.7 Furthermore, the local rule at issue in this case potentially conflicts with Mississippi Rule Civil Procedure 12(d), which provides that a motion for improper venue “shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.” 8 The trial court cannot enforce any rule 6 Bowie v. Montfort Jones Mem’l Hosp., 861 So 2009We first note that the trial court’s local rules are in derogation of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 83, because they have never been submitted to this Court for approval.7 Furthermore, the local rule at issue in this case potentially conflicts with Mississippi Rule Civil Procedure 12(d), which provides that a motion for improper venue “shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.” 8 The trial court cannot enforce any rule 6 Bowie v. Montfort Jones Mem’l Hosp., 861 So | 1 | 1 |
DeBlanc v. Stancilgreen1 sentence2009See also Prime Rx, 917 So. 2d at 795 (quoting DeBlanc, 814 So. 2d at 800 ) (when a matter is “conclusively established” under Rule 36, it may not be “offset by a conflicting answer to interrogatories.”); In re Carney, 258 F.3d at 420 (citing Dukes, 770 F.2d at 548-49 ) (“[s]ince 12 This is true unless the motions were in violation of a local rule or a pretrial order. | 1 | 1 |
Palmer v. Shultzgreen1 sentence1996Cir.1989); Hidle v. Geneva County Bd. of Educ., 681 F. Supp. 752, 758 (M.D.Ala. 1988) ("Alabama citizens who believe they are victims of discrimination would face substantial, and often insurmountable, obstacles in finding counsel absent the likelihood of fee enhancement for contingency."); Palmer v. Shultz, 679 F. Supp. 68, 75 (D.D.C. 1988) ("[I]t has become significantly more difficult to locate competent counsel willing to devote the time and resources necessary to conduct Title VII litigation.") We recently ordered a public reprimand and restitution of the fee as a sanction against Alexand | 1 | 1 |
Norwood v. CHARLOTTE MEMORIAL HOSP. & MED. CENTERgreen1 sentence1996The shortage of competent civil rights attorneys has reached crisis proportions, a fact which has been recognized by several state and federal courts.") [1] See also Lattimore v. Oman Constr., 868 F.2d 437, 439 (11th Cir.1989) (noting that the district court "found a `dearth' of attorneys willing to accept employment discrimination cases on a contingency basis in the Northern District of Alabama and noted as well the difficulties experienced both by the local bar association's lawyer referral service and the court itself in finding attorneys willing to accept such appointments"); Fadhl v. City | 1 | 1 |
Nancy FADHL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Defendant-Appellantgreen1 sentence1996The shortage of competent civil rights attorneys has reached crisis proportions, a fact which has been recognized by several state and federal courts.") [1] See also Lattimore v. Oman Constr., 868 F.2d 437, 439 (11th Cir.1989) (noting that the district court "found a `dearth' of attorneys willing to accept employment discrimination cases on a contingency basis in the Northern District of Alabama and noted as well the difficulties experienced both by the local bar association's lawyer referral service and the court itself in finding attorneys willing to accept such appointments"); Fadhl v. City | 1 | 1 |
William LATTIMORE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OMAN CONSTRUCTION, Defendant-Appellant, Bill White, Defendantgreen1 sentence1996The shortage of competent civil rights attorneys has reached crisis proportions, a fact which has been recognized by several state and federal courts.") [1] See also Lattimore v. Oman Constr., 868 F.2d 437, 439 (11th Cir.1989) (noting that the district court "found a `dearth' of attorneys willing to accept employment discrimination cases on a contingency basis in the Northern District of Alabama and noted as well the difficulties experienced both by the local bar association's lawyer referral service and the court itself in finding attorneys willing to accept such appointments"); Fadhl v. City | 1 | 1 |
Alfred U. McKenzie v. Ralph Kennickell, Jr., Public Printergreen1 sentence1996The shortage of competent civil rights attorneys has reached crisis proportions, a fact which has been recognized by several state and federal courts.") [1] See also Lattimore v. Oman Constr., 868 F.2d 437, 439 (11th Cir.1989) (noting that the district court "found a `dearth' of attorneys willing to accept employment discrimination cases on a contingency basis in the Northern District of Alabama and noted as well the difficulties experienced both by the local bar association's lawyer referral service and the court itself in finding attorneys willing to accept such appointments"); Fadhl v. City | 1 | 1 |
McKenzie v. Kennickellgreen1 sentence1996The shortage of competent civil rights attorneys has reached crisis proportions, a fact which has been recognized by several state and federal courts.") [1] See also Lattimore v. Oman Constr., 868 F.2d 437, 439 (11th Cir.1989) (noting that the district court "found a `dearth' of attorneys willing to accept employment discrimination cases on a contingency basis in the Northern District of Alabama and noted as well the difficulties experienced both by the local bar association's lawyer referral service and the court itself in finding attorneys willing to accept such appointments"); Fadhl v. City | 1 | 1 |
Hidle v. Geneva County Board of Educationgreen1 sentence1996Cir.1989); Hidle v. Geneva County Bd. of Educ., 681 F. Supp. 752, 758 (M.D.Ala. 1988) ("Alabama citizens who believe they are victims of discrimination would face substantial, and often insurmountable, obstacles in finding counsel absent the likelihood of fee enhancement for contingency."); Palmer v. Shultz, 679 F. Supp. 68, 75 (D.D.C. 1988) ("[I]t has become significantly more difficult to locate competent counsel willing to devote the time and resources necessary to conduct Title VII litigation.") We recently ordered a public reprimand and restitution of the fee as a sanction against Alexand | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Kennickellgreen1 sentence1996The shortage of competent civil rights attorneys has reached crisis proportions, a fact which has been recognized by several state and federal courts.") [1] See also Lattimore v. Oman Constr., 868 F.2d 437, 439 (11th Cir.1989) (noting that the district court "found a `dearth' of attorneys willing to accept employment discrimination cases on a contingency basis in the Northern District of Alabama and noted as well the difficulties experienced both by the local bar association's lawyer referral service and the court itself in finding attorneys willing to accept such appointments"); Fadhl v. City | 1 | 1 |
Holmes v. Elliottgreen1 sentence1985See Holmes v. Elliott, 443 So.2d 825, 827-833 (Miss. 1983); King v. Murphy, 424 So.2d 547, 549-550 (Miss. 1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fredericks v. Malouf
green
2 sentences2019The Supreme Court concluded that the local rule was “in 1 See http://www.14thchanceryms.com/resources.php (last visited May 8, 2019). 16 derogation of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 83, because [it had] never been submitted to [the Supreme] Court for approval.” Id. at (¶16). 2019Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also “emphasize[d] that the trial court’s rule did not prohibit the [d]efendants from requesting a hearing; there [was] no evidence that the trial court would not [have] consider[ed] such a request; and no order exist[ed] denying such.” Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Koerner v. Crittenden
green
1 sentence2012Koerner, 635 So.2d at 836 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Gary Dukes and Thomas E. Barber, D/B/A D & B Dozer Service v. South Carolina Insurance Company
green
1 sentence2009See also Prime Rx, 917 So. 2d at 795 (quoting DeBlanc, 814 So. 2d at 800 ) (when a matter is “conclusively established” under Rule 36, it may not be “offset by a conflicting answer to interrogatories.”); In re Carney, 258 F.3d at 420 (citing Dukes, 770 F.2d at 548-49 ) (“[s]ince 12 This is true unless the motions were in violation of a local rule or a pretrial order. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Carney v. Internal Revenue Service
green
1 sentence2009See also Prime Rx, 917 So. 2d at 795 (quoting DeBlanc, 814 So. 2d at 800 ) (when a matter is “conclusively established” under Rule 36, it may not be “offset by a conflicting answer to interrogatories.”); In re Carney, 258 F.3d at 420 (citing Dukes, 770 F.2d at 548-49 ) (“[s]ince 12 This is true unless the motions were in violation of a local rule or a pretrial order. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Cucos, Inc. v. McDaniel
green
1 sentence2007I am aware of Cucos, Inc. v. McDaniel, 938 So.2d 238 (Miss.2006), where the Mississippi Supreme Court seems to indicate that notwithstanding the requirements of Rule 41, a trial court has the inherent authority to control its own docket. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Johnson v. WESTON LUMBER & BLDG. SUPPLY
green
1 sentence1994The majority cites Johnson v. Weston Lumber & Building Supply Co., 566 So.2d 466 (Miss.1990), and Waits v. Pennington, 598 So.2d 1308 (Miss.1992), both factually distinguishable and the rationale of which support this dissent. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Watts v. Pennington
green
1 sentence1994The majority cites Johnson v. Weston Lumber & Building Supply Co., 566 So.2d 466 (Miss.1990), and Waits v. Pennington, 598 So.2d 1308 (Miss.1992), both factually distinguishable and the rationale of which support this dissent. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Van Howell v. Joe D. Tanner, Individually and as Commissioner of Department of Natural Resources
green
1 sentence1994In Howell v. Tanner, 650 F.2d 610 (5th Cir.1981), we held that a local rule providing that a respondent to a motion for summary judgment must submit all briefs within ten days and that all motions would be decided without a hearing unless otherwise ordered by the court fully satisfied the notice and hearing requirements of Rule 56. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
United States v. Thomas Charles Griek
green
2 sentences1993Griek challenged the constitutionality of an applicable local rule of the Southern District of Florida, and also Fed.R.Evid. 606(b), which permitted juror polling "after the jury had been discharged, upon application in writing and for good cause shown ... to determine whether the verdict is subject to legal challenge." Id. at 842 . 1993Id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Conway v. Mississippi State Board of Health
green
2 sentences1978The argument of the Mississippi State Medical Association is that the statute was construed in an analogous case to obviate the need for showing irreparable harm, thus overruling the Redmond decision, Conway v. State Board of Health, 252 Miss. 315 , 173 So.2d 412 (1965), and that in the Darby case, supra, we allowed a local bar association to bring suit without requiring a showing of irreparable harm or lack of legal remedy. 1978The argument of the Mississippi State Medical Association is that the statute was construed in an analogous case to obviate the need for showing irreparable harm, thus overruling the Redmond decision, Conway v. State Board of Health, 252 Miss. 315 , 173 So.2d 412 (1965), and that in the Darby case, supra, we allowed a local bar association to bring suit without requiring a showing of irreparable harm or lack of legal remedy. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Agregaard v. Duncan
green
1 sentence1978This argument is not persuasive. *1091 It is true that Conway construed suit under the statute to obviate the need for such a showing stating: "Section 8923-51 [now Mississippi Code Annotated section 73-51-1 (1972)] by implication assumes there was not an adequate remedy at law and that the injury was irreparable, i.e., the legislation was needed or else it would not have been enacted." ( 252 Miss. 324 -25), 173 So.2d 416 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
General Contract Corp. v. Bailey
neutral
2 sentences1963In General Contract Corp. v. Bailey, 218 Miss. 484 , 67 So. 2d 485 , the Court held that the statewide privilege tax required by Code Secs. 9341, et seq., was not in lieu of the tax levied by Code Sec. 9696-135, but in a dictum stated that presumably a taxpayer who paid the statewide finance company tax would be exempt from the local privilege tax levied by Code Sec. 9696-134. 1963In General Contract Corp. v. Bailey, 218 Miss. 484 , 67 So. 2d 485 , the Court held that the statewide privilege tax required by Code Secs. 9341, et seq., was not in lieu of the tax levied by Code Sec. 9696-135, but in a dictum stated that presumably a taxpayer who paid the statewide finance company tax would be exempt from the local privilege tax levied by Code Sec. 9696-134. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.