local rule in Arizona

2019Although Rule 28.1 does not provide for a local rule change by administrative order, we cannot say the supreme court lacked authority to establish new § 12-133 arbitration limits in order to implement the FASTAR pilot program in November 2017, with that new limit later reflected in the new Pima County local rules that became effective July 1, 2018. ¶29 In Ballinger , our supreme court emphasized that its constitutional authority to make procedural rules for any court "may not be supplemented, annulled or superseded by an inferior court." 209 Ariz. 1 , ¶ 6, 97 P.3d 101 (quoting Anderson v. Pick

2019Although Rule 28.1 does not provide for a local rule change by administrative order, we cannot say the supreme court lacked authority to establish new § 12-133 arbitration limits in order to implement the FASTAR pilot program in November 2017, with that new limit later reflected in the new Pima County local rules that became effective July 1, 2018. ¶29 In Ballinger , our supreme court emphasized that its constitutional authority to make procedural rules for any court "may not be supplemented, annulled or superseded by an inferior court." 209 Ariz. 1 , ¶ 6, 97 P.3d 101 (quoting Anderson v. Pick

2012And, in any event, the court acted ahead of the final disclosure deadline set forth in Rule 15.6(c) rather than allowing the state the time provided it by Rule 15.6(e) to move for an extension of time to complete the testing. ¶ 12 Additionally, outside of Rule 15, our research has disclosed a local rule, uncited by any party, that partially codifies the “inherent power” of the court to control its docket discussed in Newell, 221 Ariz. 112, ¶ 12 , 210 P.3d at 1286 , and provides the respondent judge some flexibility in dealing with pretrial conferences.

2012And, in any event, the court acted ahead of the final disclosure deadline set forth in Rule 15.6(c) rather than allowing the state the time provided it by Rule 15.6(e) to move for an extension of time to complete the testing. ¶ 12 Additionally, outside of Rule 15, our research has disclosed a local rule, uncited by any party, that partially codifies the “inherent power” of the court to control its docket discussed in Newell, 221 Ariz. 112, ¶ 12 , 210 P.3d at 1286 , and provides the respondent judge some flexibility in dealing with pretrial conferences.

2008The Sixth Circuit in Kuhn , however, stated that the local rule in question "did not compel [the moving party] to register with the court's [electronic docketing] system." 498 F.3d at 370 . [16] The majority's distinction between the trial court's signing and the court clerk's entry of judgment is of course correct, but it is irrelevant here.

2008The Sixth Circuit in Kuhn, however, stated that the local rule in question “did not compel [the moving party] to register with the court’s [electronic docketing] system.” 498 F.3d at 370 . 16 The majority’s distinction between the trial court’s signing and the court clerk’s entry of judgment is of course correct, but it is irrelevant here.

2019Although Rule 28.1 does not provide for a local rule change by administrative order, we cannot say the supreme court lacked authority to establish new § 12-133 arbitration limits in order to implement the FASTAR pilot program in November 2017, with that new limit later reflected in the new Pima County local rules that became effective July 1, 2018. ¶29 In Ballinger , our supreme court emphasized that its constitutional authority to make procedural rules for any court "may not be supplemented, annulled or superseded by an inferior court." 209 Ariz. 1 , ¶ 6, 97 P.3d 101 (quoting Anderson v. Pick

2019Although Rule 28.1 does not provide for a local rule change by administrative order, we cannot say the supreme court lacked authority to establish new § 12-133 arbitration limits in order to implement the FASTAR pilot program in November 2017, with that new limit later reflected in the new Pima County local rules that became effective July 1, 2018. ¶29 In Ballinger , our supreme court emphasized that its constitutional authority to make procedural rules for any court "may not be supplemented, annulled or superseded by an inferior court." 209 Ariz. 1 , ¶ 6, 97 P.3d 101 (quoting Anderson v. Pick

2003Although the magistrate had not suggested that her order constituted a local rule, the supreme court concluded that "the order was in effect a local rule which was not approved by this court and is of no force and effect." Id. ; see also Hare, 133 Ariz. at 542 , 652 P.2d at 1389 (superior court "policy" of rejecting plea agreements after a certain deadline was equivalent to local rule that must be approved by supreme court); State v. Darelli, 205 Ariz. 458, ¶ 20 , 72 P.3d 1277, ¶ 20 , 404 Ariz. Adv.

2003Although the magistrate had not suggested that her order constituted a local rule, the supreme court concluded that "the order was in effect a local rule which was not approved by this court and is of no force and effect." Id. ; see also Hare, 133 Ariz. at 542 , 652 P.2d at 1389 (superior court "policy" of rejecting plea agreements after a certain deadline was equivalent to local rule that must be approved by supreme court); State v. Darelli, 205 Ariz. 458, ¶ 20 , 72 P.3d 1277, ¶ 20 , 404 Ariz. Adv.

1995Ante, at 150, 894 P.2d at 693 .

1992Finally, nothing in our decision in State v. Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 69 , 673 P.2d 1, 7 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 , 105 S.Ct. 267 , 83 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984), in which we held that the use of dual juries in a criminal trial was unauthorized as a local rule not approved by this court, 26 prevents a trial judge in a civil case from employing the case-management techniques authorized by Rule 16.

1992Finally, nothing in our decision in State v. Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 69 , 673 P.2d 1, 7 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 , 105 S.Ct. 267 , 83 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984), in which we held that the use of dual juries in a criminal trial was unauthorized as a local rule not approved by this court, 26 prevents a trial judge in a civil case from employing the case-management techniques authorized by Rule 16.

1992Finally, nothing in our decision in State v. Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 69 , 673 P.2d 1, 7 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 , 105 S.Ct. 267 , 83 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984), in which we held that the use of dual juries in a criminal trial was unauthorized as a local rule not approved by this court, 26 prevents a trial judge in a civil case from employing the case-management techniques authorized by Rule 16.

1988We held that there had been *232 “substantial compliance” with the local rule, and that “the City has neither been surprised or prejudiced.” Prendergast v. City of Tempe, 143 Ariz. 14 , 691 P.2d 726 (App.1984).

1988We held that there had been *232 “substantial compliance” with the local rule, and that “the City has neither been surprised or prejudiced.” Prendergast v. City of Tempe, 143 Ariz. 14 , 691 P.2d 726 (App.1984).

1966For a discussion as to the uncertainty of the origin of this right to an advisory jury in an equity action, whether constitutional or statutory, we refer the reader to Hammontree v. Kenworthy, 1 Ariz. App. 472, 478-479 , 404 P.2d 816 (1965). [3] In Hordyk, our Supreme Court said: "Respondents contend in this Court for the first time that petitioners' conduct itself, aside from the local rule, constituted a waiver of their rights.

1966For a discussion as to the uncertainty of the origin of this right to an advisory jury in an equity action, whether constitutional or statutory, we refer the reader to Hammontree v. Kenworthy, 1 Ariz. App. 472, 478-479 , 404 P.2d 816 (1965). [3] In Hordyk, our Supreme Court said: "Respondents contend in this Court for the first time that petitioners' conduct itself, aside from the local rule, constituted a waiver of their rights.

1965In this rule concerning the production of exhibits at pre-trial it states “Counsel shall not offer any other exhibits at the trial, except when offered for impeachment purposes * * Defendant cites the federal case of Bogatay v. Montour Railroad Company, 177 F.Supp. 269 (W.D.Pa.1959), which involved a similar interrogatory and' a similar local rule regarding pre-trial.

1965In this rule concerning the production of exhibits at pre-trial it states "Counsel shall not offer any other exhibits at the trial, except when offered for impeachment purposes * * *." Defendant cites the federal case of Bogatay v. Montour Railroad Company, 177 F. Supp. 269 (W.D.Pa. 1959), which involved a similar interrogatory and a similar local rule regarding pre-trial.

1916The decision in Williams v. Little, 11 N. H. 86, is to the same effect, and Chief Judge PARKER sustained the decision with force.” Following the doctrine, the supreme court of Indiana says: “On a subject of such general importance, and concerning which there cannot properly be a local rule, and in which the commercial world has a common interest, uniformity and certainty of decision are greatly to be desired; and since the highest tribunals in this country and in England are ruling in harmony upon the point, a state court can hardly be justified in adopting if, indeed, in adhering, to, a diffe

1914These latter states have adopted the so-called “departmental doctrine.” Labatt, in his exhaustive and learned work, “Master and Servant,” at section 1425, says: “The decisions which actually turn upon it (departmental doctrine) seem to be confined to Georgia, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Louisiana, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Utah, Arizona and such federal courts as have avowedly followed the local rule.” Southern Pacific Co. v. McGill, 5 Ariz. 36 , 44 Pac. 302 , relied upon by defendant as authority sustaining the court in passing upon the question we have here, as a question of law

1914These latter states have adopted the so-called “departmental doctrine.” Labatt, in his exhaustive and learned work, “Master and Servant,” at section 1425, says: “The decisions which actually turn upon it (departmental doctrine) seem to be confined to Georgia, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Louisiana, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Utah, Arizona and such federal courts as have avowedly followed the local rule.” Southern Pacific Co. v. McGill, 5 Ariz. 36 , 44 Pac. 302 , relied upon by defendant as authority sustaining the court in passing upon the question we have here, as a question of law