local rule in Tennessee

2022Due to this inherent power, we have held that a trial court “‘is not restricted in the administration of its rules in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court to the injury of a party,’” and “‘[t]his Court will not reverse a Trial Judge for waiving a local rule absent the clearest showing of an abuse of discretion and that such waiver was the clear cause of a miscarriage of justice.’” Craven v. Dunlap, No. 02A01-9202-CH-00027, 1993 WL 137584 , at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 3, 1993) (quoting Osgood, 141 S.W.2d at 506 ; Killinger v. Perry, 620 S.W.2d 525, 525 (Tenn. Ct. Ap

2007In Killinger v. Perry, 620 S.W.2d 525 (Tenn.Ct.App.1981), the court considered a trial court’s ability to waive or abolish a local rule.

2016Similarly, in Brown v. Daly, 884 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), we held that a local rule regarding a demand for a jury trial conflicted with Tenn. R.

2015Jan. 24, 2014) (no perm. app. filed) (finding a local rule invalid to the extent it conflicted with an applicable statute, in the context of a divorce action); Kenyon v. Handal, 122 S.W.3d 743, 752 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003) (holding a deadline in a local rule unenforceable to the extent it conflicted with a deadline in the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, in the context of a medical malpractice ease); Brown v. Daly, 884 S.W.2d 121, 123-24 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994) (finding a local rule null and void as conflicting with the Rules of Civil Procedure, in a suit for partition of real property).

2011Although he had never practiced medicine in Tennessee, he testified that he had reviewed over twenty medical charts from Tennessee, had testified in three other malpractice cases in middle Tennessee, and “had reviewed statistical information about the medical community in Williamson County, Tennessee, which included information about the medical specialists and resources available at the Williamson County Medical Center.” Id. at 723 (citation omitted).

2004The distinction was made even more clear in the Court’s analysis in Stovall v. Clarke, 113 S.W.3d 715 (Tenn.2003), where the Court found that the proposed expert did not simply rely on a national standard or equate the local standard with a national one.

2014In Hackman v. Harris, 225 Tenn. 645 , 475 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tenn. 1972), our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in its denying the defendants in a civil case a jury trial based on the defendants’ failure -4- to follow the relevant local rule.

2014In Hackman v. Harris, 225 Tenn. 645 , 475 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tenn. 1972), our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in its denying the defendants in a civil case a jury trial based on the defendants’ failure -4- to follow the relevant local rule.

2011But we further stated that “[t]his Court is mindful, however, that in many instances the national standard would indeed be representative of the local standard, especially for board certified specialists” and observed that “an expert’s discussion of the applicability of a national standard does not require exclusion of the testimony.” Id.

2011But we further stated that “[t]his Court is mindful, however, that in many instances the national standard would indeed be representative of the local standard, especially for board certified specialists” and observed that “an expert’s discussion of the applicability of a national standard does not require exclusion of the testimony.” Id.

2020See Pistole v. Hayes, No. M2002-00470- COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1123528 , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2004) (“As we have indicated on prior occasion, T.R.C.P. 26.02(1) allows discovery of the identities of individuals having knowledge about the facts of a case; however, it does not require that a party designate its trial witnesses.”); Pettus v. Hurst, 882 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (“[P]arties are not entitled to discover the identities of the persons their adversary intends to call as witnesses at trial in the absence of a local rule or a court order.”); Reed v. Allen, 522 S.W.2d 339

2020See Pistole v. Hayes, No. M2002-00470- COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1123528 , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2004) (“As we have indicated on prior occasion, T.R.C.P. 26.02(1) allows discovery of the identities of individuals having knowledge about the facts of a case; however, it does not require that a party designate its trial witnesses.”); Pettus v. Hurst, 882 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (“[P]arties are not entitled to discover the identities of the persons their adversary intends to call as witnesses at trial in the absence of a local rule or a court order.”); Reed v. Allen, 522 S.W.2d 339

2020See, e.g., Glisson v. Mohon Int’l, Inc./Campbell Ray, 185 S.W.3d 348 , 354–55 (Tenn. 2006) (holding a local rule invalid because it was contrary to a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure); State v. Thomas, 813 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tenn. 1991) (holding a local rule unenforceable because it contravened Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8).

2015See, e.g., Glisson v. Mohon Int’l, Inc./Campbell Ray, 185 S.W.3d 348, 354-55 (Tenn.2006) (holding a local rule invalid because it was contrary to a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure, in the context of a workers’ compensation suit); State v. Thomas, 813 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tenn.1991) (finding a local rule unenforceable because it contravened a supreme court rule, in the context of a criminal case); Smalling v. Smalling, No. E2013-01393-COA-R10-CV, 2014 WL 285682 , at *3 (Tenn.Ct.App.

2020See, e.g., Glisson v. Mohon Int’l, Inc./Campbell Ray, 185 S.W.3d 348 , 354–55 (Tenn. 2006) (holding a local rule invalid because it was contrary to a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure); State v. Thomas, 813 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tenn. 1991) (holding a local rule unenforceable because it contravened Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8).

2015See, e.g., Glisson v. Mohon Int’l, Inc./Campbell Ray, 185 S.W.3d 348, 354-55 (Tenn.2006) (holding a local rule invalid because it was contrary to a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure, in the context of a workers’ compensation suit); State v. Thomas, 813 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tenn.1991) (finding a local rule unenforceable because it contravened a supreme court rule, in the context of a criminal case); Smalling v. Smalling, No. E2013-01393-COA-R10-CV, 2014 WL 285682 , at *3 (Tenn.Ct.App.

2016Sup.Ct. 18 (“Each judicial district may also adopt other uniform rules not inconsistent with the statutory law, the Rules of the Supreme Court, the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, and the Rules of Evidence.”). “[L]ocal trial courts are empowered to enact and enforce local rules as long as those rules do not conflict with general law.” Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 232 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tenn. 2007); see also World Granite Co. v. Morris Bros., 222 S.W. 527 , 528 (Tenn. 1920) (striking down a local rule, whic

2014Our Supreme Court acknowledged Hackman decades later, observing that “[w]e recognized that local trial courts are empowered to enact and enforce local rules as long as those rules do not conflict with general law.” Tigg v. Pirelli Tire Corp., 232 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tenn. 2007).

2014Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527, 553 (Tenn. 2011).

2012Our analysis is also informed by the discussion in Shipley regarding a national standard of care, “recogniz[ing] that in many instances the national standard is representative of the local standard.” Shipley, 350 S.W.3d at 553 .

2006On the one hand, two reported opinions of the Court of Appeals have linked the legal malpractice standard of care with the medical malpractice standard, which is governed by a statutory locality rule. 2 See Underwood v. Waterslides of Mid-Am., Inc., 823 S.W.2d 171, 183 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991) (finding that a professional’s familiarity with “the local standard of care is the exception rather than the rule,” with the principal exceptions being law and medicine); Cleckner v. Dale, 719 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tenn.Ct.App.1986) (“a lawyer’s standard of care does not differ markedly from that of physicians or o

2005Underwood, 823 S.W.2d at 183 (finding “that the requirement that an expert be familiar with the local standard of care is the exception rather than the rule.

2006See Logan v. W instead, No. 03A01-9902-CV-00057, 1999 W L 538208, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 1999) (crediting a defendant attorney’s service as a district attorney general in the Third Judicial District and as an attorney in the county in which the case was heard as evidence of his awareness of the standard of care in his “jurisdiction”); Davis v. Simpson, No. 1295, 1990 W L 16893, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. -3- S.W.2d 171, 183 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a professional’s familiarity with “the local standard of care is the exception rather than the rule,” with the principal excepti

2006On the one hand, two reported opinions of the Court of Appeals have linked the legal malpractice standard of care with the medical malpractice standard, which is governed by a statutory locality rule. 2 See Underwood v. Waterslides of Mid-Am., Inc., 823 S.W.2d 171, 183 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991) (finding that a professional’s familiarity with “the local standard of care is the exception rather than the rule,” with the principal exceptions being law and medicine); Cleckner v. Dale, 719 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tenn.Ct.App.1986) (“a lawyer’s standard of care does not differ markedly from that of physicians or o

2006On the other hand, one intermediate appellate court panel understood “jurisdiction” to mean “Tennessee.” See Wood v. Parker, 901 S.W.2d 374, 379 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (“[w]e find nothing . . . to show that defendant . . . deviated from the accepted standard of care for attorneys in Tennessee”) (emphasis added).

2006On the other hand, one intermediate appellate court panel understood “jurisdiction” to mean “Tennessee.” See Wood v. Parker, 901 S.W.2d 374, 379 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995) (“[w]e find nothing ... to show that defendant ... deviated from the accepted standard of care for attorneys in Tennessee ”) (emphasis added).

2025But cf. Pettus v. Hurst, 882 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (“Trial courts may, however, adopt local practice rules as long as the rules do not conflict with other applicable statutes or rules promulgated by the Tennessee Supreme Court.”).

2020See Pistole v. Hayes, No. M2002-00470- COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1123528 , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2004) (“As we have indicated on prior occasion, T.R.C.P. 26.02(1) allows discovery of the identities of individuals having knowledge about the facts of a case; however, it does not require that a party designate its trial witnesses.”); Pettus v. Hurst, 882 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) (“[P]arties are not entitled to discover the identities of the persons their adversary intends to call as witnesses at trial in the absence of a local rule or a court order.”); Reed v. Allen, 522 S.W.2d 339

2011In Eckler v. Allen, 231 S.W.3d 379 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006), the Court of Appeals added a novel and significant layer of analysis to the issue of qualification of medical experts under the locality rule.

2011The court reached this conclusion despite its recognition that, as we observed in Robinson, “in many cases and particularly in cases that involve a board-certified specialty, such as the case now before us, the national standard is representative of the local standard.” Eckler, 231 S.W.3d at 387 .

2026P. 41.02; see also, e.g., Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 904-05 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming dismissal of a plaintiff’s case despite a court clerk’s failure to comply with a local rule requiring the court to give the plaintiff notice that his complaint was subject to be dismissed); Morris v. State, 21 S.W.3d 196, 202-03 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim for damages for failure to prosecute despite prior grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiff).

2026P. 41.02; see also, e.g., Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 904-05 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming dismissal of a plaintiff’s case despite a court clerk’s failure to comply with a local rule requiring the court to give the plaintiff notice that his complaint was subject to be dismissed); Morris v. State, 21 S.W.3d 196, 202-03 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming dismissal of a plaintiff’s claim for damages for failure to prosecute despite prior grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiff).

2022Rule 8.05 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure for Shelby County Criminal Court provides that “[w]here space is available and with permission of the Court, the defendant may sit at counsel table with his or her attorney.” In State v. Rice, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to this local rule, which “leaves to the discretion of the trial judge whether the defendant may sit at the table with counsel.” 184 S.W.3d 646, 674 (Tenn. 2006).

2022The Rice court found that “[r]equiring the defendant to sit directly behind his attorneys is not the - 136 - same as making the defendant wear prison attire or shackles in the courtroom, which would suggest to the jury that he is a danger,” nor did it “impair the defendant’s presumption of innocence . . . [or] impact the defendant’s ability to communicate with counsel.” Id. at 675 .

2020Dantzler v. Dantzler, 665 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).

2020See Ferguson v. Brown, 291 S.W.3d 381, 388 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); see also Hopkins v. Hopkins, 572 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tenn. 1978) (“Where the extraordinary relief provided in T.R.C.P. 60.02(1) is sought, the burden is upon movant to set forth in a motion or petition, or in affidavits in support thereof, facts explaining why movant was justified in failing to avoid mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect.”).

2020See Ferguson v. Brown, 291 S.W.3d 381, 388 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); see also Hopkins v. Hopkins, 572 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tenn. 1978) (“Where the extraordinary relief provided in T.R.C.P. 60.02(1) is sought, the burden is upon movant to set forth in a motion or petition, or in affidavits in support thereof, facts explaining why movant was justified in failing to avoid mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect.”).

2016See Memphis Bonding Co., Inc. v. Criminal Court of Tenn. 30th Dist., 490 S.W.3d 458, 463 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015).

2016But cf. Memphis Bonding Co., Inc., 490 S.W.3d at 464 (“[T]he chancery court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action for declaratory or injunctive relief regarding the validity of local rules of the criminal court.”). 3 In addition, in seeking a writ of mandamus, Plaintiffs were required to name the trial court judge upon whom they sought writ to issue.

2015Dec. 1, 2011) (same); Perry v. Aversman, 168 S.W.3d 541, 544 (Mo.Ct. *464 App.2005) (involving a declaratory judgment action to have a local rule governing bail bonds declared invalid). 3 However, we conclude that the chancery court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action for declaratory or injunctive relief regarding the validity of local rules of the criminal court.

2015Dec. 1, 2011) (same); Perry v. Aversman, 168 S.W.3d 541, 544 (Mo.Ct. *464 App.2005) (involving a declaratory judgment action to have a local rule governing bail bonds declared invalid). 3 However, we conclude that the chancery court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an action for declaratory or injunctive relief regarding the validity of local rules of the criminal court.

2015Court for Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 11 (1st Cir.2000) (“the proper method for mounting a facial challenge to the validity of [a local rule] ... is through an action for declaratory and/or injunctive relief filed in the district court”); Maynard v. U.S. Dist.