37 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1928–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ivorygreen2 sentences2007The Ivory court analyzed the prior conviction exception to the Apprendi rule and relied upon language from Apprendi indicating that proof of prior convictions as sentencing enhancements need not be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 273 Kan. at 46 . 2002The prior conviction exception was recognized by our Supreme Court in State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44 , 41 P.3d 781 (2002). *1016 We must determine whether the persistent sex offender statute violates Apprendi and Gould . | 1 | 6 |
State v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2018See State v. Wright , 221 Kan. 132 , 140, 557 P.2d 1267 (1976) (information's language properly taken from correct statute; defendant received adequate notice of charge despite typographical error in citation). 2001We found that Wright’s contention lacked merit, noting that section (2) of K.S.A. 22-3201 (Weeks), provided: “ ‘Error in the citation or its omission shall be not ground for dismissal of the complaint, information or indictment or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not prejudice the defendant.’ ” Wright, 221 Kan. at 140 . *62 The State here observes that the original information had no typographical error and that Hooker was bound over for trial on the original information. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Muhammadgreen2 sentences1996While juvenile proceedings are considered civil in nature and totally separate from any criminal implications, State v. Muhamad *677 237 Kan. 850 , Syl. ¶ 2, 703 P.2d 835 (1985), the similarity in language and purpose of K.S.A. 38-1622 and K.S.A. 22-3201 would indicate such statutes should be considered in pari materia. 1996While juvenile proceedings are considered civil in nature and totally separate from any criminal implications, State v. Muhamad *677 237 Kan. 850 , Syl. ¶ 2, 703 P.2d 835 (1985), the similarity in language and purpose of K.S.A. 38-1622 and K.S.A. 22-3201 would indicate such statutes should be considered in pari materia. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Menardgreen1 sentence2015App. at 480-81 ; see also State v. Moya, 141 N.M. 817, 819-22 , 161 P.3d 862 (2007) (rejecting the argument that prior conviction of Utah misdemeanor could not be treated as a felony conviction; New Mexico law controlled whether conviction was misdemeanor or felony); State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 61 (R.I. 2005) (defendant was properly convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm because his prior Arizona conviction for arson was a “ 'crime of violence’ ” under Rhode Island law); Farnsworth v. Com., 43 Va. App. 490, 496-98 , 599 S.E.2d 482 (2004), aff'd 270 Va. 1 , 613 S.E.2d 459 (2005) (defen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Moyagreen2 sentences2015App. at 480-81 ; see also State v. Moya, 141 N.M. 817, 819-22 , 161 P.3d 862 (2007) (rejecting the argument that prior conviction of Utah misdemeanor could not be treated as a felony conviction; New Mexico law controlled whether conviction was misdemeanor or felony); State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 61 (R.I. 2005) (defendant was properly convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm because his prior Arizona conviction for arson was a “ 'crime of violence’ ” under Rhode Island law); Farnsworth v. Com., 43 Va. App. 490, 496-98 , 599 S.E.2d 482 (2004), aff'd 270 Va. 1 , 613 S.E.2d 459 (2005) (defen 2015App. at 480-81 ; see also State v. Moya, 141 N.M. 817, 819-22 , 161 P.3d 862 (2007) (rejecting the argument that prior conviction of Utah misdemeanor could not be treated as a felony conviction; New Mexico law controlled whether conviction was misdemeanor or felony); State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 61 (R.I. 2005) (defendant was properly convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm because his prior Arizona conviction for arson was a “ 'crime of violence’ ” under Rhode Island law); Farnsworth v. Com., 43 Va. App. 490, 496-98 , 599 S.E.2d 482 (2004), aff'd 270 Va. 1 , 613 S.E.2d 459 (2005) (defen | 1 | 1 |
Alleyne v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2014See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2160 n.1. | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCaslingreen2 sentences2011See State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697 , Syl. ¶ 25, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011); State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 46-48 , 41 P.3d 781 (2002). 2011See State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697 , Syl. ¶ 25, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011); State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 46-48 , 41 P.3d 781 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cartergreen1 sentence2009See State v. Nguyen, 285 Kan. 418, 436-37 , 172 P.3d 1165 (2007) (“the instruction as given is inaccurate and misleading . . . [,nevertheless,] when the instruction accompanies all of the rest of the instructions given before deliberations, there is no error”); Carter, 284 Kan. at 330-31 (no error when PIK Crim. 3d 68.12 provided before deliberations with all jury instructions). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nguyengreen2 sentences2009See State v. Nguyen, 285 Kan. 418, 436-37 , 172 P.3d 1165 (2007) (“the instruction as given is inaccurate and misleading . . . [,nevertheless,] when the instruction accompanies all of the rest of the instructions given before deliberations, there is no error”); Carter, 284 Kan. at 330-31 (no error when PIK Crim. 3d 68.12 provided before deliberations with all jury instructions). 2009See State v. Nguyen, 285 Kan. 418, 436-37 , 172 P.3d 1165 (2007) (“the instruction as given is inaccurate and misleading . . . [,nevertheless,] when the instruction accompanies all of the rest of the instructions given before deliberations, there is no error”); Carter, 284 Kan. at 330-31 (no error when PIK Crim. 3d 68.12 provided before deliberations with all jury instructions). | 1 | 1 |
Kansas v. McElroygreen2 sentences2009See State v. McElroy, 281 Kan. 256, 261 , 130 P.3d 100 (2006). 2009See State v. McElroy, 281 Kan. 256, 261 , 130 P.3d 100 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Trottergreen2 sentences2008See State v. Trotter, 280 Kan. 800, 805 , 127 P.3d 972 (2006); State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 134 , 119 P.3d 1148 (2005). 2008See State v. Trotter, 280 Kan. 800, 805 , 127 P.3d 972 (2006); State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 134 , 119 P.3d 1148 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Lopez v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2005Kan. 2005) (unpublished opinion filed April 7, 2005) (applying Moore in holding Almendarez-Torres remains good law after Booker ); Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 723 (Colo. 2005) ("Although there is some doubt about the continued vitality of the prior conviction exception, we conclude that it remains valid after Blakely. "). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Almendarez-Torres v. United States
red
2 sentences2007Ed. 2d 350 , 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998), the source of the prior conviction exception, had been called into doubt by Apprendi. 2006The prior conviction exception was derived from the holding 2 years earlier in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 140 L. | 9 | 2002–2007 |
State v. Salts
green
2 sentences2011The court also noted, when discussing other portions of PIK Crim.3d 68.12, "our criticisms of other language found in PIK Crim.3d 68.12 have never led to reversal of a conviction when the instruction was given before jury deliberations began." 288 Kan. at 266, 200 P.3d 464 . 2010Salts, 288 Kan. at 266 ; State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 216 , 145 P.3d 1 (2006); State v. Makthepharak, 276 Kan. 563, 569 , 78 P.3d 412 (2003). | 2 | 2010–2011 |
City of Burlington v. Stockwell
neutral
2 sentences1995In City of Burlington v. Stockwell, 1 Kan. 1976In City of Burlington v. Stockwell, 1 Kan. | 2 | 1976–1995 |
State v. Wall
green
2 sentences2021The court noted: "[The statute] contains no express requirement that knowledge on the part of a motor vehicle operator that he has been in a collision is necessary to sustain a conviction for its violation; however, we believe such showing is essential." Wall, 206 Kan. at 764 . 2021Because the statute requires a driver to stop and furnish information to anyone who may have been injured, implicit within the statute "must be the element of recognition or awareness on the part of that driver of the fact of the collision." 206 Kan. at 764 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Hargrove
green
2 sentences2018Gordon Atcheson, writing for the panel, questioned: "Should the [invited-error] doctrine extinguish a criminal defendant's appeal of a conviction when that challenge rests on a constitutional defect arising from actions the defendant's lawyer asked the district court to take?" 48 Kan. 2018App. 2d at 524 , 293 P.3d 787 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Farnsworth v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2015App. at 480-81 ; see also State v. Moya, 141 N.M. 817, 819-22 , 161 P.3d 862 (2007) (rejecting the argument that prior conviction of Utah misdemeanor could not be treated as a felony conviction; New Mexico law controlled whether conviction was misdemeanor or felony); State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 61 (R.I. 2005) (defendant was properly convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm because his prior Arizona conviction for arson was a “ 'crime of violence’ ” under Rhode Island law); Farnsworth v. Com., 43 Va. App. 490, 496-98 , 599 S.E.2d 482 (2004), aff'd 270 Va. 1 , 613 S.E.2d 459 (2005) (defen 2015App. at 480-81 ; see also State v. Moya, 141 N.M. 817, 819-22 , 161 P.3d 862 (2007) (rejecting the argument that prior conviction of Utah misdemeanor could not be treated as a felony conviction; New Mexico law controlled whether conviction was misdemeanor or felony); State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 61 (R.I. 2005) (defendant was properly convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm because his prior Arizona conviction for arson was a “ 'crime of violence’ ” under Rhode Island law); Farnsworth v. Com., 43 Va. App. 490, 496-98 , 599 S.E.2d 482 (2004), aff'd 270 Va. 1 , 613 S.E.2d 459 (2005) (defen | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Brown v. Handgun Permit Review Board
green
1 sentence2015The Maryland court found the denial was proper because such a conviction would bar a person from receiving a gun permit if the crime had occurred in Maryland. 188 Md. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Tapia
green
1 sentence2015State v. Tapia, 42 Kan. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Farnsworth v. Com.
green
2 sentences2015App. at 480-81 ; see also State v. Moya, 141 N.M. 817, 819-22 , 161 P.3d 862 (2007) (rejecting the argument that prior conviction of Utah misdemeanor could not be treated as a felony conviction; New Mexico law controlled whether conviction was misdemeanor or felony); State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 61 (R.I. 2005) (defendant was properly convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm because his prior Arizona conviction for arson was a “ 'crime of violence’ ” under Rhode Island law); Farnsworth v. Com., 43 Va. App. 490, 496-98 , 599 S.E.2d 482 (2004), aff'd 270 Va. 1 , 613 S.E.2d 459 (2005) (defen 2015App. at 480-81 ; see also State v. Moya, 141 N.M. 817, 819-22 , 161 P.3d 862 (2007) (rejecting the argument that prior conviction of Utah misdemeanor could not be treated as a felony conviction; New Mexico law controlled whether conviction was misdemeanor or felony); State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 61 (R.I. 2005) (defendant was properly convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm because his prior Arizona conviction for arson was a “ 'crime of violence’ ” under Rhode Island law); Farnsworth v. Com., 43 Va. App. 490, 496-98 , 599 S.E.2d 482 (2004), aff'd 270 Va. 1 , 613 S.E.2d 459 (2005) (defen | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Mashaney v. Board of Indigents' Defense Services
green
1 sentence2015But this clearly does not establish that the defendant was innocent of the charge.” Mashaney, 49 Kan. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Makthepharak
green
2 sentences2010Salts, 288 Kan. at 266 ; State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 216 , 145 P.3d 1 (2006); State v. Makthepharak, 276 Kan. 563, 569 , 78 P.3d 412 (2003). 2010Salts, 288 Kan. at 266 ; State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 216 , 145 P.3d 1 (2006); State v. Makthepharak, 276 Kan. 563, 569 , 78 P.3d 412 (2003). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Anthony
green
2 sentences2010Salts, 288 Kan. at 266 ; State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 216 , 145 P.3d 1 (2006); State v. Makthepharak, 276 Kan. 563, 569 , 78 P.3d 412 (2003). 2010Salts, 288 Kan. at 266 ; State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 216 , 145 P.3d 1 (2006); State v. Makthepharak, 276 Kan. 563, 569 , 78 P.3d 412 (2003). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Engelhardt
green
2 sentences2008See State v. Trotter, 280 Kan. 800, 805 , 127 P.3d 972 (2006); State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 134 , 119 P.3d 1148 (2005). 2008See State v. Trotter, 280 Kan. 800, 805 , 127 P.3d 972 (2006); State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 134 , 119 P.3d 1148 (2005). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Moore
green
1 sentence2007Thus, this court found that under the prior conviction exception to Apprendi , the doubling of Moore’s sentence was constitutional in that he had been convicted of all of the crimes in question, and tire legislature had statutorily defined each of tírese as a sexually violent crime. 274 Kan. at 653-54 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. Shannon Wayne Tighe
green
1 sentence2002The question becomes whether the absence of the jury trial safeguard in juvenile adjudications is enough to remove it from the narrow exception for prior convictions built into the Apprendi rule. *230 Post-Apprendi Analysis Our search for an answer to the above question leads us to U.S. v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Masterson
green
1 sentence1998In Masterson, 261 Kan. 158 , the defendant was also convicted of driving under the influence in violation of K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 8-1567. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Wisner v. State
green
2 sentences1984State v. Robinson, Lloyd & Clark, 229 Kan. 301, 304-05 , 624 P.2d 964 (1981); State v. Howell & Taylor, 226 Kan. 511, 513-14 , 601 P.2d 1141 (1979); Wisner v. State, 216 Kan. 523, 524 , 532 P.2d 1051 (1975); State v. Minor, 197 Kan. 296, 299 , 416 P.2d 724 (1966). 1984State v. Robinson, Lloyd & Clark, 229 Kan. 301, 304-05 , 624 P.2d 964 (1981); State v. Howell & Taylor, 226 Kan. 511, 513-14 , 601 P.2d 1141 (1979); Wisner v. State, 216 Kan. 523, 524 , 532 P.2d 1051 (1975); State v. Minor, 197 Kan. 296, 299 , 416 P.2d 724 (1966). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Howell & Taylor
green
2 sentences1984State v. Robinson, Lloyd & Clark, 229 Kan. 301, 304-05 , 624 P.2d 964 (1981); State v. Howell & Taylor, 226 Kan. 511, 513-14 , 601 P.2d 1141 (1979); Wisner v. State, 216 Kan. 523, 524 , 532 P.2d 1051 (1975); State v. Minor, 197 Kan. 296, 299 , 416 P.2d 724 (1966). 1984State v. Robinson, Lloyd & Clark, 229 Kan. 301, 304-05 , 624 P.2d 964 (1981); State v. Howell & Taylor, 226 Kan. 511, 513-14 , 601 P.2d 1141 (1979); Wisner v. State, 216 Kan. 523, 524 , 532 P.2d 1051 (1975); State v. Minor, 197 Kan. 296, 299 , 416 P.2d 724 (1966). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| State v. Robinson, Lloyd & Clark green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| State v. Minor green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Jackson v. Virginia red | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Lucas green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Voiles green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Washington green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| City of Overland Park v. Sandy green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Delaware v. Prouse green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| City of Kettering v. Greene neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Chapman v. California red | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| State v. Shiffler neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| State v. Briggs neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.