conviction violation in Virginia

2015However, Phillips v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 548, 552 , 514 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1999), held: “[T]he statute does not apply to simultaneous prosecutions, because only a prior conviction for the violation of an act will bar a later prosecution for the same act.” All of these prosecutions were simultaneous, not successive.

2015However, Phillips v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 548, 552 , 514 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1999), held: “[T]he statute does not apply to simultaneous prosecutions, because only a prior conviction for the violation of an act will bar a later prosecution for the same act.” All of these prosecutions were simultaneous, not successive.

2009It means to obstruct the officer himself not merely to oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)). “[Obstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult” or “frustrates] [his or her] investigation.” Id. at 429, 431, 505 S.E.2d at 389, 390 .

2009It means to obstruct the officer himself not merely to oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)). “[Obstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult” or “frustrates] [his or her] investigation.” Id. at 429, 431, 505 S.E.2d at 389, 390 .

2009It means to obstruct the officer himself not merely to oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)). “[Obstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult” or “frustrates] [his or her] investigation.” Id. at 429, 431, 505 S.E.2d at 389, 390 .

2009It means to obstruct the officer himself not merely to oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed.” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va.App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)). “[Obstruction of justice does not occur when a person fails to cooperate fully with an officer or when the person’s conduct merely renders the officer’s task more difficult” or “frustrates] [his or her] investigation.” Id. at 429, 431, 505 S.E.2d at 389, 390 .

2004We held that “where an indictment is returned for an alleged violation of Code § 18.2-53.1, the underlying felony must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,” but that “to obtain a conviction for a violation of that section it is not necessary to separately indict and prosecute the underlying felony.” Id. at 31, 353 S.E.2d at 907 .

1988Affirmed. 1 See also Code §§ 19.2-266.1 and 19.2-285, permitting the jury to find the accused guilty of any degree of homicide supported by the evidence and in the event of a new trial, prohibiting the accused from being tried for any higher offense than that of which he was convicted on the last trial. 2 In Davis v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 27, 31 , 353 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1987), we held that while the underlying felony must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, to obtain a conviction for a violation of Code § 18.2-53.1 it is not necessary to separately indict and prosecute the underlying felony.

2020A mere proceeding or prosecution which does not result in a conviction does not bar another prosecution in a state court.” Owens v. Commonwealth, 129 Va. 757, 759 (1921).

1991This Code section was subsequently amended, to its present language, by the substitution of the word “conviction” for the phrase “a prosecution or proceeding.” In Owens v. Commonwealth, 129 Va. 757 , 105 S.E. 531 (1921), the Court held that, as a result of this amendment, a mere prosecution or proceeding involving the same act which does not result in a conviction does not bar another prosecution.

2017Coomer, 67 Va. App. at 551 , 797 S.E.2d at 794 (noting that, despite reversing the conviction for violation of Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1), “[w]e do not in any way condone [the defendant’s] actions in operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and with her child in the car”); see also Shifflett v. Commonwealth, No. 1032-11-2, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 391 , at *15 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2012) (“We in no way condone appellant’s illegal behavior, which certainly constitutes appalling parenting. [Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1)], however, does not punish appalling parenting.”).

2017Coomer, 67 Va. App. at 551 , 797 S.E.2d at 794 (noting that, despite reversing the conviction for violation of Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1), “[w]e do not in any way condone [the defendant’s] actions in operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and with her child in the car”); see also Shifflett v. Commonwealth, No. 1032-11-2, 2012 Va. App. LEXIS 391 , at *15 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2012) (“We in no way condone appellant’s illegal behavior, which certainly constitutes appalling parenting. [Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1)], however, does not punish appalling parenting.”).

2017In reviewing the elements necessary to support a conviction for a violation of Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1), we first note that the statute does not require that a child actually suffer -4- an injury as a result of a parent’s act or omission.1 Commonwealth v. Duncan, 267 Va. 377, 385 , 593 S.E.2d 210, 215 (2004).

2017In reviewing the elements necessary to support a conviction for a violation of Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1), we first note that the statute does not require that a child actually suffer -4- an injury as a result of a parent’s act or omission.1 Commonwealth v. Duncan, 267 Va. 377, 385 , 593 S.E.2d 210, 215 (2004).

2017See, e.g., Kelly v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 347 , 592 S.E.2d 353 (2004) (leaving a child unattended in car for seven hours on a very hot day, combined with evidence establishing that the child would have required food, drink, sleep, and diaper changes over the course of the time left in car and the parent’s known history of leaving children in locked cars, is sufficient to support a conviction for violation of Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1)).

2017See, e.g., Kelly v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 347 , 592 S.E.2d 353 (2004) (leaving a child unattended in car for seven hours on a very hot day, combined with evidence establishing that the child would have required food, drink, sleep, and diaper changes over the course of the time left in car and the parent’s known history of leaving children in locked cars, is sufficient to support a conviction for violation of Code § 18.2-371.1(B)(1)).

2017That function presents a pure question of law which we consider de novo on appeal.” Id. at 453-54, 718 S.E.2d at 454 ; see also Hodges v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 687, 693 , 771 S.E.2d 693, 696 (2015).

2017That function presents a pure question of law which we consider de novo on appeal.” Id. at 453-54, 718 S.E.2d at 454 ; see also Hodges v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 687, 693 , 771 S.E.2d 693, 696 (2015).

2011Code § 19.2-294 provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]f the same act be a violation of two or more statutes, or of two or more ordinances, or of one or more statutes and also one or more ordinances, conviction under one of such statutes or ordinances shall be a bar to a prosecution or proceeding under the other or others.” This section “prevents the Commonwealth from ‘subjecting an accused to the hazards of vexatious, multiple prosecutions.’ By its terms, the statute does not apply to simultaneous prosecutions, because only a prior conviction for the violation of an act will bar a later prosec

2011Code § 19.2-294 provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]f the same act be a violation of two or more statutes, or of two or more ordinances, or of one or more statutes and also one or more ordinances, conviction under one of such statutes or ordinances shall be a bar to a prosecution or proceeding under the other or others.” This section “prevents the Commonwealth from ‘subjecting an accused to the hazards of vexatious, multiple prosecutions.’ By its terms, the statute does not apply to simultaneous prosecutions, because only a prior conviction for the violation of an act will bar a later prosec

1999See id. at 471-72, 424 S.E.2d at 720-21 .

1999In Hill v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. 1 Code § 54.1-3401 excludes from the legal definition of marijuana, among other things, mature stalks and sterilized seeds. - 4 - App. 480, 485, 438 S.E.2d 296, 299 (1993), we reversed a conviction for violation of Code § 18.2-248.1 where the Commonwealth introduced 2.98 ounces marijuana inclusive of mature stalk, seed, and stem.

1999It means to obstruct the officer himself not merely to oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed.’” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)). - 3 - Thus, like the statute considered by the Virginia Supreme Court in Jones, Code § 18.2-460(A) requires “actual hindrance or obstruction of the officer,” “opposition or resistance by direct action.” Polk v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 590, 594 , 358 S.E.2d 770, 772-73 (1987). 2 “[O]bstruction of justice does not occur when a

1999It means to obstruct the officer himself not merely to oppose or impede the process with which the officer is armed.’” Ruckman v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 428, 429 , 505 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 141 Va. 471, 478-79 , 126 S.E. 74, 77 (1925)). - 3 - Thus, like the statute considered by the Virginia Supreme Court in Jones, Code § 18.2-460(A) requires “actual hindrance or obstruction of the officer,” “opposition or resistance by direct action.” Polk v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 590, 594 , 358 S.E.2d 770, 772-73 (1987). 2 “[O]bstruction of justice does not occur when a

1997Although evidence of other crimes generally is inadmissible in the guilt phase of a criminal prosecution, such evidence is "properly received if it is relevant and probative of an issue on trial, such as an element of the offense charged." Pittman v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 33, 35 , 434 S.E.2d 694, 695 (1993).

1997Although evidence of other crimes generally is inadmissible in the guilt phase of a criminal prosecution, such evidence is "properly received if it is relevant and probative of an issue on trial, such as an element of the offense charged." Pittman v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 33, 35 , 434 S.E.2d 694, 695 (1993).

1996If no other circumstances than those of the transaction itself are given in evidence, it would be impossible to ascertain whether it was passed with this guilty knowledge, or not____ Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 266, 270 , 246 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1978).

1996If no other circumstances than those of the transaction itself are given in evidence, it would be impossible to ascertain whether it was passed with this guilty knowledge, or not____ Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 266, 270 , 246 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1978).

1995In Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 196, 197 , 269 S.E.2d 356, 357 (1980) (involving a conviction in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1 for use of a firearm while committing or attempting to commit rape), the Supreme Court rejected Holloman’s contention that a BB gun which propelled a .177 pellet by spring action was not a “firearm” as that term is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary.

1995In Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 196, 197 , 269 S.E.2d 356, 357 (1980) (involving a conviction in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1 for use of a firearm while committing or attempting to commit rape), the Supreme Court rejected Holloman’s contention that a BB gun which propelled a .177 pellet by spring action was not a “firearm” as that term is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary.

1994See Leeth, 223 Va. at 337 , 288 S.E.2d at 476 .

1994See Leeth, 223 Va. at 337 , 288 S.E.2d at 476 .