48 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1926–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Spurgeon v. Stategreen2 sentences2018TWO Battery 784.03 8.3 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Comments See Spurgeon v. State, 114 So.3d 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (holding that a conviction for a violation of § 784.07(2), Florida Statutes, had to be vacated because the statute does not include physicians, employees, agents, or volunteers of facilities that do not satisfy the definition of a hospital under chapter 395). 2018TWO Battery 784.03 8.3 Attempt 777.04(1) 5.1 Comments See Spurgeon v. State, 114 So. 3d 1042 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (holding that a conviction for a violation of § 784.07(2), Florida Statutes, had to be vacated because the statute does not include physicians, employees, agents, or volunteers of facilities that do not satisfy the definition of a hospital under chapter 395). | 2 | 4 |
CEL v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Section 843.02, the resisting without violence statute, provides, in pertinent part, that "[w]hoever shall resist, obstruct, or oppose any officer ... in the lawful execution of any legal duty, without offering or doing violence to the person of the officer, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree...." To support a conviction for violation of section 843.02 for obstruction without violence, the State must prove: "(1) the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty; and (2) the defendant's action, by his words, conduct, or a combination thereof, constituted obstruct 2011Section 843.02, the resisting without violence statute, provides, in pertinent part, that “[w]hoever shall resist, obstruct, or oppose any officer ... in the lawful execution of any legal duty, without offering or doing violence to the person of the officer, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree....” To support a conviction for violation of section 848.02 for obstruction without violence, the State must prove: “(1) the officer was engaged in the lawful execution of a legal duty; and (2) the defendant’s action, by his words, conduct, or a combination thereof, constituted obstruct | 2 | 2 |
Trushin v. Stategreen2 sentences1984Appellant appropriately relies on Trushin v. State, 425 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 1983), as authority for a convicted appellant's constitutional issue being raised and entertained for the first time on appeal as shown in the following excerpt: The district court answered the facial constitutionality of the statute question with the following correct assertion: "Notwithstanding that these issues are acknowledgedly raised for the first time on appeal, we consider their merits because a conviction for the violation of a facially invalid statute would constitute fundamental error." [ Trushin v. State ] 384 1982The district court answered the facial constitutionality of the statute question with the following correct assertion: "Notwithstanding that these issues are acknowledgedly raised for the first time on appeal, we consider their merits because a conviction for the violation of a facially invalid statute would constitute fundamental error." 384 So.2d at 672 (footnotes omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Trushin v. Stategreen2 sentences2023However, since Johnson, the Florida Supreme Court has reiterated that “‘a conviction for the violation of a facially invalid statute would constitute fundamental error.’” Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 105 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 1982)). 2002As this Court explained in Trushin , "a conviction for the violation of a facially invalid statute would constitute fundamental error." 425 So.2d at 1129 . | 1 | 5 |
Sanford v. Rubingreen2 sentences2005We note that although not every constitutional issue amounts to fundamental error, Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So.2d 134, 137 (Fla.1970), a conviction for the violation of a facially invalid statute does qualify as fundamental error. 1980Notwithstanding that these issues are acknowledgedly raised for the first time on appeal, [8] we consider their merits because a conviction for the violation of a facially invalid statute would constitute fundamental error. [9] Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1970); In re Kionka's Estate, 121 So.2d 644, 647 (Fla. 1960) (O'Connell, J., specially concurring); Town of Monticello v. Finlayson, 156 Fla. 568 , 23 So.2d 843 (1945); Silver v. State, 174 So.2d 91 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965), cert. denied, 180 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1965); see Kinner v. State, 382 So.2d 756 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), and cases cited. | 1 | 2 |
Alexander v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Alexander v. State, 450 So.2d 1212, 1215 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (citing to Trushin v. State, 425 So.2d 1126 (Fla.1983)). 1984Alexander v. State, 450 So.2d 1212 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). | 1 | 2 |
Westerheide v. Stategreen1 sentence2023However, since Johnson, the Florida Supreme Court has reiterated that “‘a conviction for the violation of a facially invalid statute would constitute fundamental error.’” Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 105 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Trushin v. State, 425 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 1982)). | 1 | 1 |
Pantoja v. Stategreen1 sentence2021A plurality of the court determined section 90.610 “does not permit an 10 exception to the conviction requirement for prior false accusations” and “[t]he only proper inquiry,” in such circumstances “goes to the witness’s reputation for truth and veracity.” Id. at 1096-97 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen1 sentence2019Such error permits reversal of a conviction if the error was “obvious,” if it “likely affected the outcome of the proceedings,” and if it “seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Smith v. State, 737 S.E.2d 677, 681 (Ga. 2013). | 1 | 1 |
Fierro v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See N.T. v. State, 682 So.2d 688, 690 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Hernandez v. State, 624 So.2d 782, 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (“[Sjuccessive prosecution for indirect criminal contempt in this case vio *935 lates the Double Jeopardy Clause” if based on substantive offense underlying prior conviction); see also Fierro v. State, 653 So.2d 447, 448 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (noting that under Hernandez the Double Jeopardy Clause “prohibits the subsequent prosecution for a substantive offense that underlies a criminal contempt charge for which one has been convicted. | 1 | 1 |
NT v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See N.T. v. State, 682 So.2d 688, 690 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Hernandez v. State, 624 So.2d 782, 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (“[Sjuccessive prosecution for indirect criminal contempt in this case vio *935 lates the Double Jeopardy Clause” if based on substantive offense underlying prior conviction); see also Fierro v. State, 653 So.2d 447, 448 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (noting that under Hernandez the Double Jeopardy Clause “prohibits the subsequent prosecution for a substantive offense that underlies a criminal contempt charge for which one has been convicted. | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See N.T. v. State, 682 So.2d 688, 690 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Hernandez v. State, 624 So.2d 782, 783 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (“[Sjuccessive prosecution for indirect criminal contempt in this case vio *935 lates the Double Jeopardy Clause” if based on substantive offense underlying prior conviction); see also Fierro v. State, 653 So.2d 447, 448 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (noting that under Hernandez the Double Jeopardy Clause “prohibits the subsequent prosecution for a substantive offense that underlies a criminal contempt charge for which one has been convicted. | 1 | 1 |
Ross v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See, e.g., Ross v. State, 45 So.3d 403, 434 (Fla.2010). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Jackson v. State, 983 So.2d 562 (Fla.2008); Griffin v. State, 946 So.2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), quashed in part on other grounds, 980 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 2008). 2009See Jackson v. State, 983 So.2d 562 (Fla.2008); Griffin v. State, 946 So.2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), quashed in part on other grounds, 980 So.2d 1035 (Fla.2008). | 1 | 1 |
Conde v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 949 (Fla.2003) (finding that error in admitting evidence of the defendant's flight at time of arrest was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Moore v. State, 701 So.2d 545, 550 (Fla.1997) ("Error is harmless where `there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed *782 to the conviction.' State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986)."). | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Stategreen1 sentence2008See Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 949 (Fla.2003) (finding that error in admitting evidence of the defendant's flight at time of arrest was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Moore v. State, 701 So.2d 545, 550 (Fla.1997) ("Error is harmless where `there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed *782 to the conviction.' State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986)."). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. DiGuiliogreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Garcia-Rodriguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arthur v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rodriguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Malcolm v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ruddack v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Palmes v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Kionka's Estategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kinner v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| State v. Perezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Standard Jury Instructions-Criminal Cases
green
2 sentences2018This instruction was adopted in 1981 [ 431 So.2d 594 ] and amended in 1992 [ 603 So.2d 1175 ], 1995 [ 657 So.2d 1152 ], 2007 [ 962 So.2d 310 ], 2008 [ 994 So.2d 1038 ], and 2015 [ 157 So.3d 1027 ]. and 2018 . 8.16 BATTERY ON PERSON 65 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER § 784.08(2)(c), Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Battery on a Person 65 Years of Age or Older, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Give 1a and/or 1b depending on the charging document. 1. 2018This instruction was adopted in 1981 [ 431 So. 2d 594 ] and amended in 1992 [ 603 So. 2d 1175 ], 1995 [ 657 So. 2d 1152 ], 2007 [ 962 So. 2d 310 ], 2008 [ 994 So. 2d 1038 ], and 2015 [ 157 So. 3d 1027 ], and 2018. 8.16 BATTERY ON PERSON 65 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER § 784.08(2)(c), Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Battery on a Person 65 Years of Age or Older, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Give 1a and/or 1b depending on the charging document. 1. | 4 | 2015–2018 |
Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (95-1)
green
2 sentences2018This instruction was adopted in 1981 [ 431 So.2d 594 ] and amended in 1992 [ 603 So.2d 1175 ], 1995 [ 657 So.2d 1152 ], 2007 [ 962 So.2d 310 ], 2008 [ 994 So.2d 1038 ], and 2015 [ 157 So.3d 1027 ]. and 2018 . 8.16 BATTERY ON PERSON 65 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER § 784.08(2)(c), Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Battery on a Person 65 Years of Age or Older, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Give 1a and/or 1b depending on the charging document. 1. 2018This instruction was adopted in 1981 [ 431 So. 2d 594 ] and amended in 1992 [ 603 So. 2d 1175 ], 1995 [ 657 So. 2d 1152 ], 2007 [ 962 So. 2d 310 ], 2008 [ 994 So. 2d 1038 ], and 2015 [ 157 So. 3d 1027 ], and 2018. 8.16 BATTERY ON PERSON 65 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER § 784.08(2)(c), Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Battery on a Person 65 Years of Age or Older, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Give 1a and/or 1b depending on the charging document. 1. | 4 | 2015–2018 |
In Re Standard Jury Inst. in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2008-05
green
2 sentences2018This instruction was adopted in 1981 [ 431 So.2d 594 ] and amended in 1992 [ 603 So.2d 1175 ], 1995 [ 657 So.2d 1152 ], 2007 [ 962 So.2d 310 ], 2008 [ 994 So.2d 1038 ], and 2015 [ 157 So.3d 1027 ]. and 2018 . 8.16 BATTERY ON PERSON 65 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER § 784.08(2)(c), Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Battery on a Person 65 Years of Age or Older, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Give 1a and/or 1b depending on the charging document. 1. 2018This instruction was adopted in 1981 [ 431 So. 2d 594 ] and amended in 1992 [ 603 So. 2d 1175 ], 1995 [ 657 So. 2d 1152 ], 2007 [ 962 So. 2d 310 ], 2008 [ 994 So. 2d 1038 ], and 2015 [ 157 So. 3d 1027 ], and 2018. 8.16 BATTERY ON PERSON 65 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER § 784.08(2)(c), Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Battery on a Person 65 Years of Age or Older, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Give 1a and/or 1b depending on the charging document. 1. | 4 | 2015–2018 |
Standard Jury Inst. in Cr. Cases No. 2006-2
green
2 sentences2018This instruction was adopted in 1981 [ 431 So.2d 594 ] and amended in 1992 [ 603 So.2d 1175 ], 1995 [ 657 So.2d 1152 ], 2007 [ 962 So.2d 310 ], 2008 [ 994 So.2d 1038 ], and 2015 [ 157 So.3d 1027 ]. and 2018 . 8.16 BATTERY ON PERSON 65 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER § 784.08(2)(c), Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Battery on a Person 65 Years of Age or Older, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Give 1a and/or 1b depending on the charging document. 1. 2018This instruction was adopted in 1981 [ 431 So. 2d 594 ] and amended in 1992 [ 603 So. 2d 1175 ], 1995 [ 657 So. 2d 1152 ], 2007 [ 962 So. 2d 310 ], 2008 [ 994 So. 2d 1038 ], and 2015 [ 157 So. 3d 1027 ], and 2018. 8.16 BATTERY ON PERSON 65 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER § 784.08(2)(c), Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Battery on a Person 65 Years of Age or Older, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Give 1a and/or 1b depending on the charging document. 1. | 4 | 2015–2018 |
Matter of Use by Tr. Cts. of Stand. Jury Inst.
green
2 sentences2018This instruction was adopted in 1981 [ 431 So.2d 594 ] and amended in 1992 [ 603 So.2d 1175 ], 1995 [ 657 So.2d 1152 ], 2007 [ 962 So.2d 310 ], 2008 [ 994 So.2d 1038 ], and 2015 [ 157 So.3d 1027 ]. and 2018 . 8.16 BATTERY ON PERSON 65 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER § 784.08(2)(c), Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Battery on a Person 65 Years of Age or Older, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Give 1a and/or 1b depending on the charging document. 1. 2018This instruction was adopted in 1981 [ 431 So. 2d 594 ] and amended in 1992 [ 603 So. 2d 1175 ], 1995 [ 657 So. 2d 1152 ], 2007 [ 962 So. 2d 310 ], 2008 [ 994 So. 2d 1038 ], and 2015 [ 157 So. 3d 1027 ], and 2018. 8.16 BATTERY ON PERSON 65 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER § 784.08(2)(c), Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Battery on a Person 65 Years of Age or Older, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Give 1a and/or 1b depending on the charging document. 1. | 3 | 2015–2018 |
In Re STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES—REPORT NO. 2014-05
neutral
2 sentences2018This instruction was adopted in 1981 [ 431 So.2d 594 ] and amended in 1992 [ 603 So.2d 1175 ], 1995 [ 657 So.2d 1152 ], 2007 [ 962 So.2d 310 ], 2008 [ 994 So.2d 1038 ], and 2015 [ 157 So.3d 1027 ]. and 2018 . 8.16 BATTERY ON PERSON 65 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER § 784.08(2)(c), Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Battery on a Person 65 Years of Age or Older, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Give 1a and/or 1b depending on the charging document. 1. 2018This instruction was adopted in 1981 [ 431 So. 2d 594 ] and amended in 1992 [ 603 So. 2d 1175 ], 1995 [ 657 So. 2d 1152 ], 2007 [ 962 So. 2d 310 ], 2008 [ 994 So. 2d 1038 ], and 2015 [ 157 So. 3d 1027 ], and 2018. 8.16 BATTERY ON PERSON 65 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER § 784.08(2)(c), Fla._Stat. To prove the crime of Battery on a Person 65 Years of Age or Older, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: Give 1a and/or 1b depending on the charging document. 1. | 3 | 2016–2018 |
Illinois v. Wardlow
green
2 sentences2009However, relying on Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), 4 the district court concluded, in an en banc opinion, that C.E.L.’s “unprovoked flight” from the officers in a “high-crime area” provided reasonable suspicion and that C.E.L.’s continued flight, in defiance of a lawful police order to stop, constituted sufficient facts upon which to base a conviction for the violation of resisting an officer without violence. 2009However, relying on Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), 4 the district court concluded, in an en banc opinion, that C.E.L.’s “unprovoked flight” from the officers in a “high-crime area” provided reasonable suspicion and that C.E.L.’s continued flight, in defiance of a lawful police order to stop, constituted sufficient facts upon which to base a conviction for the violation of resisting an officer without violence. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
CEL v. State
green
2 sentences2009The Second District explained that it had “previously recognized that flight in knowing defiance of a law enforcement officer’s lawful order to stop constitutes an act of resisting, obstructing, or opposing an officer in the lawful execution of a legal duty.” C.E.L., 995 So.2d at 561 . 2009The Second District explained that it had "previously recognized that flight in knowing defiance of a law enforcement officer's lawful order to stop constitutes an act of resisting, obstructing, or opposing an officer in the lawful execution of a legal duty." C.E.L., 995 So.2d at 561 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Erlinger v. United States
green
2 sentences2026Under the prior conviction exception, the Supreme Court explained, a sentencing judge “may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.” Id. (cleaned up). 2026Id. at 839 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Alan Lynsdale Hamilton v. State of Florida
green
2 sentences2017Id. (emphasis added). 20 The actions supporting the dual charges in Holt were both alleged to have occurred “on or about March 14, 2013.” 173 So.3d at 1081. 2017Id. (emphasis added).20 The actions supporting the dual charges in Holt were both alleged to have occurred “on or about March 14, 2013.” 173 So. 3d at 1081. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 431 , 118 S.Ct. 838 , 139 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring). 2016Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 431 , 118 S.Ct. 838 , 139 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2012-05
green
1 sentence2016This instruction was approved in 1992 [ 603 So.2d 1175 ], and amended in 1995 [ 657 So.2d 1152 ], 2007 [ 962 So.2d 310 ], 2008 [ 994 So.2d 1038 ], 2013 [ 131 So.3d 755 ], and 2015 [ 157 So.3d 1027 ], and 2016. 8.15 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON PERSON 65 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER § 784.08(2)(b), Fla. Stat. To prove the crime of Aggravated Assault on a Person 65 Years of Age or Older, the State must prove the following five elements beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Griffin v. State
green
2 sentences2009See Jackson v. State, 983 So.2d 562 (Fla.2008); Griffin v. State, 946 So.2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), quashed in part on other grounds, 980 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 2008). 2009See Jackson v. State, 983 So.2d 562 (Fla.2008); Griffin v. State, 946 So.2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), quashed in part on other grounds, 980 So.2d 1035 (Fla.2008). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Griffin v. State
green
2 sentences2009See Jackson v. State, 983 So.2d 562 (Fla.2008); Griffin v. State, 946 So.2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), quashed in part on other grounds, 980 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 2008). 2009See Jackson v. State, 983 So.2d 562 (Fla.2008); Griffin v. State, 946 So.2d 610 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007), quashed in part on other grounds, 980 So.2d 1035 (Fla.2008). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| McAdam v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Ryle v. State green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Toson v. State green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Richardson v. State green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Hagood v. State green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Anderson v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Cuda v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Diloreto green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. McKendry green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Dean v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Mosely v. State neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Smelter green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| City of Toledo v. Voyles green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Brown v. United States green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Johnson v. Florida green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Nowlin v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Bova v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Town of Monticello v. Finlayson green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Miami National Bank v. Fink green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Silver v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Wooten v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Roberts v. State green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Upshaw v. Renuart Lumber Yards, Inc. green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Kittleson v. State green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Downing v. Bird green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Williams v. State green | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.