conviction violation in District of Columbia

2011In Comford, 947 A.2d at 1189-90 , we stated: "[This Court] will reverse a conviction for error not complained of below only in an extreme situation in which the defendant’s substantial rights were so clearly prejudiced that the very fairness and integrity of the trial was jeopardized.” Under the established four-part test for plain error, an appellant must demonstrate not merely that there was an error, but also that the error was “clear” or “obvious" — "so egregious and obvious as to make the trial judge and prosecutor derelict in permitting it, despite the defendant’s failure to object.” In

1989The central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the question of guilt or innocence, and appellate reversal of a conviction for an error, real or perceived, which has played no role in bringing about the judgment “encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).

1989The central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the question of guilt or innocence, and appellate reversal of a conviction for an error, real or perceived, which has played no role in bringing about the judgment “encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986).

1989This court will reverse the failure to strike a witness’ testimony only where the violation “was with the connivance or knowledge of the party or his counsel.” Brown, supra, 288 A.2d at 456 (quoting Jett v. Jett, 221 A.2d 925, 927 (D.C.1966)).

1989These objectives may be served by remedies which are less severe than striking a witness’ testimony, (such as commenting to the jury on the witness’ conduct, citing the witness for contempt, and allowing opposing counsel to cross-examine the witness on the nature of the violation), and thus, courts will rarely reverse a conviction for violation of the rule on witnesses/ See Brown, supra, 388 A.2d at 456 (violation must be so egregious as to render testimony incredible as a matter of law); Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91 , 14 S.Ct. 10 , 37 L.Ed. 1010 (1893); United States v. Blasco, 702 F.

1989These objectives may be served by remedies which are less severe than striking a witness’ testimony, (such as commenting to the jury on the witness’ conduct, citing the witness for contempt, and allowing opposing counsel to cross-examine the witness on the nature of the violation), and thus, courts will rarely reverse a conviction for violation of the rule on witnesses/ See Brown, supra, 388 A.2d at 456 (violation must be so egregious as to render testimony incredible as a matter of law); Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91 , 14 S.Ct. 10 , 37 L.Ed. 1010 (1893); United States v. Blasco, 702 F.

1989These objectives may be served by remedies which are less severe than striking a witness’ testimony, (such as commenting to the jury on the witness’ conduct, citing the witness for contempt, and allowing opposing counsel to cross-examine the witness on the nature of the violation), and thus, courts will rarely reverse a conviction for violation of the rule on witnesses/ See Brown, supra, 388 A.2d at 456 (violation must be so egregious as to render testimony incredible as a matter of law); Holder v. United States, 150 U.S. 91 , 14 S.Ct. 10 , 37 L.Ed. 1010 (1893); United States v. Blasco, 702 F.

1986There is no general reason why the jury should not be permitted to render a verdict on each theory, so long as the offenses are not in conflict and no aspect of the case gives reasonable indication that the jury might be confused or led astray. 132 U.S.App.D.C. at 289-90, 407 F.2d at 1224-25 ; accord Garris v. United States, 491 A.2d 511, 514-15 (D.C.1985) (Garris II).

1986There is no general reason why the jury should not be permitted to render a verdict on each theory, so long as the offenses are not in conflict and no aspect of the case gives reasonable indication that the jury might be confused or led astray. 132 U.S.App.D.C. at 289-90, 407 F.2d at 1224-25 ; accord Garris v. United States, 491 A.2d 511, 514-15 (D.C.1985) ( Garris II ).

1982In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), Innis was arrested at an early hour in the morning on the streets of Providence in connection with the shotgun death of a taxicab driver.

1982In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), Innis was arrested at an early hour in the morning on the streets of Providence in connection with the shotgun death of a taxicab driver.

1978Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice. [3] D.C.Code 1973, § 23-323 provides: In every information or indictment for perjury, it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offense charged upon the defendant, and by what court, or before whom the oath was taken (averring such court, or person or persons, to have a competent authority to administer the same) together with the proper averment or averments to falsify th

1978Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice. [3] D.C.Code 1973, § 23-323 provides: In every information or indictment for perjury, it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offense charged upon the defendant, and by what court, or before whom the oath was taken (averring such court, or person or persons, to have a competent authority to administer the same) together with the proper averment or averments to falsify th

1978Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice. [3] D.C.Code 1973, § 23-323 provides: In every information or indictment for perjury, it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offense charged upon the defendant, and by what court, or before whom the oath was taken (averring such court, or person or persons, to have a competent authority to administer the same) together with the proper averment or averments to falsify th

1978Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice. [3] D.C.Code 1973, § 23-323 provides: In every information or indictment for perjury, it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offense charged upon the defendant, and by what court, or before whom the oath was taken (averring such court, or person or persons, to have a competent authority to administer the same) together with the proper averment or averments to falsify th

1978Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice. [3] D.C.Code 1973, § 23-323 provides: In every information or indictment for perjury, it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offense charged upon the defendant, and by what court, or before whom the oath was taken (averring such court, or person or persons, to have a competent authority to administer the same) together with the proper averment or averments to falsify th

1978Error in the citation or its omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the indictment or information or for reversal of a conviction if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice. [3] D.C.Code 1973, § 23-323 provides: In every information or indictment for perjury, it shall be sufficient to set forth the substance of the offense charged upon the defendant, and by what court, or before whom the oath was taken (averring such court, or person or persons, to have a competent authority to administer the same) together with the proper averment or averments to falsify th

1977Cf. Inman v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 150 , 243 F.2d 256 (1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 888 , 79 S.Ct. 132 , 3 L.Ed.2d 116 (1958).

1977Although a conviction for a violation of § 22-2205 must be based on proof that the defendant had both guilty knowledge of the status of the property in question (f. e., *407 that it had been stolen) and fraudulent intent in taking possession of the item, the accused nevertheless may be found guilty despite ignorance of the circumstances of the original conversion and innocence of any participation therein. 1 See Weisberg v. United States, 49 U.S.App.D.C. 28 , 258 F. 284 (1919).

1977Cf. Inman v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 150 , 243 F.2d 256 (1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 888 , 79 S.Ct. 132 , 3 L.Ed.2d 116 (1958).

1977Cf. Inman v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 150 , 243 F.2d 256 (1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 888 , 79 S.Ct. 132 , 3 L.Ed.2d 116 (1958).

1973In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 , 89 S.Ct. 935 , 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969), the Supreme Court was again called upon to consider the constitutionality of a conviction for violation of an ordinance making it an offense “to participate in any ‘parade or procession or other public demonstration’ without first obtaining a permit from the City Commission.” Id. at 148 , 89 S.Ct. at 937 .

1973In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 , 89 S.Ct. 935 , 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969), the Supreme Court was again called upon to consider the constitutionality of a conviction for violation of an ordinance making it an offense “to participate in any ‘parade or procession or other public demonstration’ without first obtaining a permit from the City Commission.” Id. at 148 , 89 S.Ct. at 937 .

1969Mincy v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 218 A.2d 507 (1966).

1960Appellant relies on our decision in Mathis v. United States, supra, where we reversed a conviction for violation of the lottery statute due to the lack of probable cause for arrest.

1960Appellant relies on our decision in Mathis v. United States, supra, where we reversed a conviction for violation of the lottery statute due to the lack of probable cause for arrest.