conviction bar in Nebraska

1995Id. at 549 , 357 N.W.2d at 211 .

1995Id. at 549 , 357 N.W.2d at 211 .

2026(C) Any conviction under a law of another state if, at the time of the conviction under the law of such other state, the offense for which the person was convicted would have been a violation of subdivision (3)(b) or (c) - 22 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. KUOL Cite as 34 Neb.

2026(C) Any conviction under a law of another state if, at the time of the conviction under the law of such other state, the offense for which the person was convicted would have been a violation of subdivision (3)(b) or (c) - 22 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 34 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. KUOL Cite as 34 Neb.

2023See, also, State v. Teppert, 307 Neb. 695 , 950 N.W.2d 594 (2020); Taylor, supra note 4; State v. Macek, 278 Neb. 967 , 774 N.W.2d 749 (2009); State v. Hall, 270 Neb. 669 , 708 N.W.2d 209 (2005). 6 Taylor, supra note 4.

2023See, also, State v. Teppert, 307 Neb. 695 , 950 N.W.2d 594 (2020); Taylor, supra note 4; State v. Macek, 278 Neb. 967 , 774 N.W.2d 749 (2009); State v. Hall, 270 Neb. 669 , 708 N.W.2d 209 (2005). 6 Taylor, supra note 4.

2023See, also, State v. Teppert, 307 Neb. 695 , 950 N.W.2d 594 (2020); Taylor, supra note 4; State v. Macek, 278 Neb. 967 , 774 N.W.2d 749 (2009); State v. Hall, 270 Neb. 669 , 708 N.W.2d 209 (2005). 6 Taylor, supra note 4.

2023See, also, State v. Teppert, 307 Neb. 695 , 950 N.W.2d 594 (2020); Taylor, supra note 4; State v. Macek, 278 Neb. 967 , 774 N.W.2d 749 (2009); State v. Hall, 270 Neb. 669 , 708 N.W.2d 209 (2005). 6 Taylor, supra note 4.

2023It provides that for purposes of sentence enhancement, a “[p]rior conviction” is “a conviction for a violation committed within the fifteen- year period prior to the offense for which the sentence is being imposed.” 9 This includes (1) any conviction for a violation of § 60-6,196—which is what Bixby was convicted of in both of his Nebraska DUI prosecutions—or for another Nebraska DUI statute, 10 (2) any conviction for a violation of a Nebraska DUI ordinance enacted in conformance with a Nebraska DUI statute, 11 and (3) “[a]ny conviction under a law of another 5 See, State v. Hurbenca, 266 Neb.

2023It provides that for purposes of sentence enhancement, a “[p]rior conviction” is “a conviction for a violation committed within the fifteen- year period prior to the offense for which the sentence is being imposed.” 9 This includes (1) any conviction for a violation of § 60-6,196—which is what Bixby was convicted of in both of his Nebraska DUI prosecutions—or for another Nebraska DUI statute, 10 (2) any conviction for a violation of a Nebraska DUI ordinance enacted in conformance with a Nebraska DUI statute, 11 and (3) “[a]ny conviction under a law of another 5 See, State v. Hurbenca, 266 Neb.

2015(Emphasis supplied.) In Hopkins v. Stauffer, 18 Neb.

2014Miranda prohibits officers from simply persisting after a suspect invokes his or her right to remain silent.25 [12] Therefore, the district court’s failure to suppress Susan’s statements from 3:43 to 4 a.m. was a constitutional error.26 But even constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a conviction if that error was a trial error and not a structural defect.27 The admission of an improperly obtained statement is a trial error, and so its erroneous admission is sub- ject to harmless error analysis.28 [13,14] To conduct harmless error review, we look to the entire record a

2014Miranda prohibits officers from simply persisting after a suspect invokes his or her right to remain silent.25 [12] Therefore, the district court’s failure to suppress Susan’s statements from 3:43 to 4 a.m. was a constitutional error.26 But even constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a conviction if that error was a trial error and not a structural defect.27 The admission of an improperly obtained statement is a trial error, and so its erroneous admission is sub- ject to harmless error analysis.28 [13,14] To conduct harmless error review, we look to the entire record a

2014Miranda prohibits officers from simply persisting after a suspect invokes his or her right to remain silent.25 [12] Therefore, the district court’s failure to suppress Susan’s statements from 3:43 to 4 a.m. was a constitutional error.26 But even constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a conviction if that error was a trial error and not a structural defect.27 The admission of an improperly obtained statement is a trial error, and so its erroneous admission is sub- ject to harmless error analysis.28 [13,14] To conduct harmless error review, we look to the entire record a

2014Miranda prohibits officers from simply persisting after a suspect invokes his or her right to remain silent.25 [12] Therefore, the district court’s failure to suppress Susan’s statements from 3:43 to 4 a.m. was a constitutional error.26 But even constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a conviction if that error was a trial error and not a structural defect.27 The admission of an improperly obtained statement is a trial error, and so its erroneous admission is sub- ject to harmless error analysis.28 [13,14] To conduct harmless error review, we look to the entire record a

2014The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that this timeframe was insufficient to allow him to plead a conviction as a bar to a later prosecution and concluded that the information “passed constitutional muster.” Id. at 602 , 550 N.W.2d at 659 .

2014The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument that this timeframe was insufficient to allow him to plead a conviction as a bar to a later prosecution and concluded that the information “passed constitutional muster.” Id. at 602 , 550 N.W.2d at 659 .

1997State v. Christner, 251 Neb. 549 , 557 N.W.2d 707 (1997).

1997State v. Christner, 251 Neb. 549 , 557 N.W.2d 707 (1997).

1990Recently, in State v. LaChapelle, 234 Neb. 458 , 451 N.W.2d 689 (1990), we construed the Right to Bear Arms amendment in *562 relation to a defendant’s conviction for violation of a Nebraska statute which prohibited possession of a statutorily specified type of firearm, i.e., a short or sawed-off shotgun.

1990Recently, in State v. LaChapelle, 234 Neb. 458 , 451 N.W.2d 689 (1990), we construed the Right to Bear Arms amendment in *562 relation to a defendant’s conviction for violation of a Nebraska statute which prohibited possession of a statutorily specified type of firearm, i.e., a short or sawed-off shotgun.

1988Although some conduct of counsel, such as refraining from an objection to inadmissible evidence, may be strategy at trial which binds a defendant in a criminal case, see State v. Archbold, 217 Neb. 345 , 350 N.W.2d 500 (1984), and “Absent exceptional circumstances, [the defendant] is bound by the tactics used by his counsel at trial. . . ,” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 , 103 S. Ct. 3308 , 77 L.

1988Although some conduct of counsel, such as refraining from an objection to inadmissible evidence, may be strategy at trial which binds a defendant in a criminal case, see State v. Archbold, 217 Neb. 345 , 350 N.W.2d 500 (1984), and “Absent exceptional circumstances, [the defendant] is bound by the tactics used by his counsel at trial. . . ,” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 , 103 S. Ct. 3308 , 77 L.

1988Although some conduct of counsel, such as refraining from an objection to inadmissible evidence, may be strategy at trial which binds a defendant in a criminal case, see State v. Archbold, 217 Neb. 345 , 350 N.W.2d 500 (1984), and “Absent exceptional circumstances, [the defendant] is bound by the tactics used by his counsel at trial. . . ,” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 , 103 S. Ct. 3308 , 77 L.

1988Although some conduct of counsel, such as refraining from an objection to inadmissible evidence, may be strategy at trial which binds a defendant in a criminal case, see State v. Archbold, 217 Neb. 345 , 350 N.W.2d 500 (1984), and “Absent exceptional circumstances, [the defendant] is bound by the tactics used by his counsel at trial. . . ,” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 , 103 S. Ct. 3308 , 77 L.

1987Specifically addressing the issue of a lesser-included offense, this court, in State v. Lovelace, 212 Neb. 356, 359 , 322 N.W.2d 673, 675 (1982), recognized a test similar to that enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, supra, namely: “ ‘To be a lesser included offense, the elements of the lesser offense must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater without at the same time having committed the lesser....’ ” Although the question arose in the context of a prior conviction as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same convicted offense, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Brown v. Ohi

1987Specifically addressing the issue of a lesser-included offense, this court, in State v. Lovelace, 212 Neb. 356, 359 , 322 N.W.2d 673, 675 (1982), recognized a test similar to that enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, supra, namely: “ ‘To be a lesser included offense, the elements of the lesser offense must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater without at the same time having committed the lesser....’ ” Although the question arose in the context of a prior conviction as a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same convicted offense, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Brown v. Ohi

1984In Berning v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 561 (Ky. 1977), the defendant was charged with breaking into a store, malicious shooting with intent to kill, and with being a habitual criminal.

1977In Latham v. State, 152 Neb. 113 , 40 N. W. 2d 522 , this court said: “The statute prescribes and limits the scope of any inquiry initiated by the State that may be made on cross-examination of a defendant in a criminal case.

1977In Latham v. State, 152 Neb. 113 , 40 N. W. 2d 522 , this court said: “The statute prescribes and limits the scope of any inquiry initiated by the State that may be made on cross-examination of a defendant in a criminal case.

1960At the hearing, if the court shall find from the evidence submitted that the *165 accused has been convicted two or more times of felonies and sentences imposed therefor by the courts of this or any other state, or by the United States, the court shall sentence such person so convicted as an habitual criminal.” In Poppe v. State, 155 Neb. 527 , 52 N. W. 2d 422 , this court, dealing with a charge that accused was an habitual criminal, held that: “When a proper record of a previous conviction has been produced, it becomes a matter of law for the court to determine whether ■ or not that record es

1960At the hearing, if the court shall find from the evidence submitted that the *165 accused has been convicted two or more times of felonies and sentences imposed therefor by the courts of this or any other state, or by the United States, the court shall sentence such person so convicted as an habitual criminal.” In Poppe v. State, 155 Neb. 527 , 52 N. W. 2d 422 , this court, dealing with a charge that accused was an habitual criminal, held that: “When a proper record of a previous conviction has been produced, it becomes a matter of law for the court to determine whether ■ or not that record es

1940From an examination of these citations, does it not appear that they are in accord with the statement in Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782 , 128 So. 258 , to the effect that the application of the declaratory judgment act is held restricted to suits in equity by those interested under deeds, wills, contracts, or other written instruments ?

1940From an examination of these citations, does it not appear that they are in accord with the statement in Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782 , 128 So. 258 , to the effect that the application of the declaratory judgment act is held restricted to suits in equity by those interested under deeds, wills, contracts, or other written instruments ?